Browsing by Author "Kriegel, Uriah"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    The Intentional Structure of Moods
    (Michigan Publishing, 2019) Kriegel, Uriah
    Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: They represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but also entrains an important change in our understanding of the nature of moods—and indeed of the nature of mind. What emerges is an intentionalist account that emphasizes the role of attitude rather than content in determining the character of moods.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemEmbargo
    The Understanding of Value and the Value of Understanding
    (2024-01-16) Wigglesworth, Logan; Kriegel, Uriah
    Epistemologists have distinguished mere knowledge from understanding. When one understands a proposition, one has a deeper grasp of its truth. This same distinction applies in the moral domain. One can merely know a moral proposition, for instance through testimony, without really having a deep understanding of it. My dissertation defends an affective account of moral understanding. Using phenomenological considerations, I first argue that emotional experiences allow us to grasp, and thus understand, moral propositions about specific acts and individuals. I then argue that emotional dispositions are the essence of understanding general moral principles. This account avoids problems with inferentialist accounts and also explains why certain moral propositions seem to defy human comprehension.