Browsing by Author "Heinrich, Tobias"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data
    (Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2013) Bapat, Navin A.; Heinrich, Tobias; Kobayashi, Yoshiharu; Morgan, T. Clifton
    In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both threats and imposed sanctions. Second, to lessen model dependency of empirical findings, we employ a methodology that permits us to check systematically the robustness of the empirical results under various model specifications. Using the newly released Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data, our analyses of both threats and imposed sanctions show that two factors—involvement of international institutions and severe costs on target states—are positively and robustly related to sanctions success at every stage in sanctions episodes. Our analyses also identify a number of other variables that are systematically related to sanctions success, but the significance of these relationships depends on the specific model estimated. Finally, our results point to a number of differences at the threat and imposition stages, which suggests specific selection effects that should be explored in future work.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Item
    Strategic Choices in Foreign Aid
    (2013-09-16) Heinrich, Tobias; Morgan, T. Clifton; Stevenson, Randolph T.; Fang, Songying; Vannucci, Marina
    This dissertation addresses three important questions surrounding the politics of foreign aid, namely what leads to its provisions by donor countries, and what are some of its consequences on those receiving it. Using arguments rooted in political economy models and large-N statistics, this dissertation provides three core findings: (i) Foreign aid can be driven by heterogenous motives in the donor country. (ii) This heterogeneity determines whether a donor lives up to the promises over foreign aid that it makes. (iii) Inflows of foreign aid tend to restrain the government’s propensity to engage in killings.