R-3 Repository :: Browsing by Author "Grandy, Richard E."

Browsing by Author "Grandy, Richard E."

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A critical exposition of D. M. Armstrong's theory of universals
(1987) Marenchin, Leslie Michael; Grandy, Richard E.
As the title indicates, this thesis is a critical exposition of Armstrong's theory of universals. But at a deeper level it is also an argument against one of the main tenets of traditional realism since Plato: the claim that the nature of physical properties, and objects in general, are ontologically independent of any mind or belief system. Armstrong's attempt to argue for a non-relational immanent realism epitomizes this claim. Armstrong's main argument for his position is an indirect one. He argues for the untenability of all theories opposing his and then attempts to show how his theory does not suffer from the same problems. Against theories opposing his (all forms of nominalism and transcendent Platonic realism) he puts forth four arguments: (1) the relation-regress, (2) the object regress, (3) the thought experiment, and (4) causality. These are all various attempts to show that nothing external to an object is relevant to the nature of the object. Against (1) and (2) I argue that the regresses are not infinite and that even if they were they would not be vicious. Concerning (3) and (4) I argue that Armstrong sets up a straw man and that therefore these two arguments are just irrelevant to his general claim. The conclusion then is that he has not given us any reason not to believe that there is no mind-dependent element in ontology. The site having thus been cleared, I then give positive reasons for believing that there are mind-dependent components in ontology. These reasons come mainly in the form of examples for which Armstrong's theory cannot account. My primary examples are artifacts. There seems to be a certain mind-dependent element in the nature of artifacts even though they are external to us. My argument then basically is a challenge to Armstrong's theory and to any realistic theory that holds the claim in the first paragraph above: give an account of artifacts without invoking mind-dependent elements. My claim is that these elements are universals, so they are abstract and multiply exemplifiable, but they depend upon us and they are neither immutable nor external.
A philosophical semantic intentionality theory of metaphor
(1989) Deibler, Timothy Alan; Grandy, Richard E.
This dissertation investigates some philosophical theories of metaphor, those of Aristotle, Black, Lakoff and Johnson, Kittay, Mac Cormac, Searle, and Davidson, then proposes a theory that incorporates some of their insights while seeking to avoid their weaknesses. Part I constitutes exposition and critique of these theories; Part II presents the outline of a resulting philosophical theory of metaphor, a semantic intentionality theory that mediates primarily between the theories of Searle and Kittay. This semantic intentionality theory of metaphor is grounded in a compositional general semantic account and claims that for metaphor to be present, there must be (1) an appropriate conventional meaning of the linguistic item to be used, (2) a propitious discourse situation (context), and (3) a metaphorically competent speaker/writer who intends to speak/write metaphorically. Metaphor turns out to be a speaker/writer's semantic use of conventional meaning to express a meaning inexpressible in literal language. Most metaphor is therefore entirely novel; conventional metaphors are rare. There is a radical blurring of the traditional semantic and pragmatic categories. Metaphorical meaning is semantic in nature and must be sharply distinguished from metaphorical interpretation. It arises when speakers' metaphorical intentions (possibly not fully conscious) operate to select appropriate conventional meanings whose respective affinity and contrast relations with other items in their semantic fields are transferred to organize and structure a semantic field not previously structured by those specific relations. There is no special kind of metaphorical truth nor does the theory require a specific general theory of truth to the exclusion of others. Metaphor is more cognitively important and widespread in natural language than philosophers used to think. But it is less widespread than some current philosophical theories of metaphor claim: they tend to overlook the vast polysemy in literal language and often (wrongly) assimilate a synchronic account of metaphor to a diachronic account.
Alternative scales for extensive measurement: Combining operations and conventionalism
(1993) Bozin, Dragana; Grandy, Richard E.
This thesis concerns alternative concatenating operations in extensive measurements and the degree to which concatenating operations are matter of convention. My arguments are directed against Ellis' claim that what prevents us from choosing alternative ways of combining extensive quantities is only convenience and simplicity and that the choice is not based on empirical reasons. My first argument is that, given certain relational theories of measurement, there can be no more than one concatenating operation per quantity; because combining operations are the only conclusive distinguishing characteristic among distinct extensive measurements and thus the only thing that can serve as an indicator for the identity of a quantity. Rectangular and collinear concatenation, for example, cannot both be used as a way of combining lengths. However, rectangular concatenation could be used to measure some other extensive quantity since it fulfills the necessary conditions for adequate numerical assignment. For those that adopt theories of measurement which can support the claim that dinches measure length, I demonstrate, in the second argument, that rectangular concatenation would be a bad alternative and thus no alternative at all. Implementation of rectangular concatenation requires a new science; a science compatible with dinches violates present invariance principles and a new set must be provided, if possible. It is not clear that there is a set of invariance principles compatible with dinches which also gives basis for a science that explains the phenomena as well as the old one. Moreover, new invariance principles would be unintuitive and would require that certain fundamental concepts change their meaning. For these reasons the choice between them is guided by a number of empirical reasons and is not only a matter of convention.
An inquiry concerning fundamental measurement (Measurement)
(1989) Bozin, Dragana; Grandy, Richard E.
Non-standard scales for fundamental measurements obtained by a change of operation of concatenation satisfy the axioms in the same manner as standard scales. One possible change of operation for length measurement is from linear juxtaposition to rectangular juxtaposition. Some argued that the choice between standard and non-standard scales can be guided by no other reason but simplicity of science and convenience. Non-standard scales for length measurement however, would require either change of laws, or introduction of a universal force or a change of all other scales which would preserve the laws, and a complicated practice which consists of many partial measurements that affect the precision of measurement. The set of permissible scales for length measurement divides naturally into two subsets: symmetric and asymmetric scales. The set of permissible scales can be reduced to the symmetric scales by either adding an axiom or by stating a symmetry requirement as a law dictated by the nature of the magnitude under consideration (length).
Certainty and error in mathematics: Deductivism and the claims of mathematical fallibilism
(2004) Dove, Ian J.; Grandy, Richard E.
This project has two goals: (1) to analyze the claims of mathematical fallibilism in order to show that they are less controversial than their usual statement implies; (2) to resurrect deductivism with modifications from its premature burial. For the purposes of this project fallibilism is the disjunctive claim that mathematical proofs are insufficient either (a) to justify mathematical knowledge where knowledge has a certainty-clause or (b) to establish conclusively any mathematical truths. The first clause contrasts with the traditional view that mathematical knowledge is certain. The second clause reinforces this uncertainty by undermining the demonstrative force of proofs. Five arguments for fallibilism are considered. First, (Chapter 2) the distinction between pure and applied math leads to an uncontroversial form of mathematical fallibilism. Moreover, this distinction is shown to fit well with deductivism. Second, (Chapter 3) mathematics employs non-deductive methods. Non-deductive procedures are also, prima facie, difficult to reconcile with deductivism. The fallibility entailed by non-deductive methods is both limited and uncontroversial. In terms of deductivism, old-style Russellian deductivism is abandoned in favor of a more general notion of deductive proof. Third, (Chapter 4) there is the possibility of an infinite regress for mathematical justification. For Lakatos the regress originates in the various prospects for mathematical foundations. His favored theory, quasi-empiricism, is justified by comparison to foundational approaches. Modified deductivism is shown to halt the infinite regress as well. Fourth, (Chapter 4) the fact that informal arguments---i.e., arguments not valid in terms of their logical form---are nearly ubiquitous in mathematics is prima facie evidence in favor of quasi-empiricism. Deductivism is shown to be consistent with informal arguments. Fifth, (Chapter 5) Quine's naturalism is shown to lead to fallibilism. However, when properly understood this fallibility is shown to be uncontroversial. Moreover, although Quine never officially endorses anything but naturalism, it is shown that naturalism is both consistent with and aided by deductivism. Finally, (Chapter 6) the modifications to deductivism are unified and the claims of fallibilism are restated in their uncontroversial forms.
Clusters' last stand: Toward a theory of the process of meaning-making in science
(1991) Chokr, Nader N.; Grandy, Richard E.
The nature of the process of meaning-making in science has been one of the central problems in the philosophy of science of the 20th century. Yet, in spite of strenuous efforts by many able philosophers and historians of science over the past three decades or so, our understanding of this process continues to be unsatisfactory and fragmented at best. The need for an adequate account has been particularly exacerbated by the "infamous" and often misinterpreted problem of incommensurability (of meaning), and its alleged consequence, the incomparability of scientific theories--which presumably threatens the rationality, objectivity, and progress of science. In this project, I argue that a new and revised cluster theory can be articulated, which meets the objections typically raised against (i) traditional (contextual or cluster) theories of meaning (Carnap, Kuhn, Gasking, Putnam, Achinstein) and (ii) theories of reference (Scheffler, Putnam, Kitcher). Such a theory is not only based on more plausible assumptions and principles, but, in addition, it satisfies the main adequacy requirements formulated by proponents of a "cognitive-historical approach" (Shapere, Nersessian, Kuhn). I am thus concerned not just with refuting "the entering wedge" of the argument against a defense of cluster theory, but with offering a relatively developed theory, sufficiently fleshed out to permit appreciation of its distinctiveness and evaluation of its merits. I argue that the new cluster theory provides not only an adequate account of the process of meaning-making in science, but also a nuanced and context-sensitive one, which exhibits the fine-structure of the history of science. It is thus capable of accounting for the different kinds and degrees of meaning and reference changes in science. Furthermore, when applied in a case-study of the "chemical revolution," it accounts for that which has escaped change without discontinuity, or even, as result of (and simply within) a broader framework of continuous conceptual change. The new cluster theory constitutes a proposal showing how the comparability of scientific theories is possible, how we have in fact been comparing them all along, despite "local incommensurabilities" of various kinds and degrees. Such a theory offers new insights into the developments of the chemical revolution in particular, but also into the structure and process of scientific revolutions in general. In short, it gives us a new framework for understanding the rationality, objectivity, and progress of science.
Leibniz on Modality
(2014-04-17) Mills, Jacob Shaw; Kulstad, Mark A.; Grandy, Richard E.; Zammito, John; Brown, Gregory
This dissertation is a systematic account of the concept of modality in Leibniz’s thought. In chapter 1 I will give a detailed account of the metaphysics of Leibnizian possible worlds and show how to link them up with the notion of a possible world as it functions in contemporary possible worlds semantics. I then conclude with some observations on what it means to have a possible worlds semantics and give my solution to a standard problem with Leibniz’s infinite analysis approach to modality. In chapter 2 I show the development of and eventual deep connection in Leibniz thought between the infinite analysis and possible worlds accounts. Possible worlds supply the reason for the infinity of the analysis involved in contingent predicates. Chapter 3 begins with a summary of attempts in the literature to avoid the scope of Leibniz’s essentialism. I then argue that Leibniz employed an intensional theory of reference and provide a model for it. I conclude with an account of Leibniz’s treatment of counterfactuals. Lastly, in chapter 4 I give a treatment of Leibniz’s per se and moral modality. I conclude by showing in what sense Leibniz thought all of an individual’s properties are intrinsic and in what sense he didn’t think all of an individual’s properties were essential.
Models for morality: Temporal semantics for deontic logic
(1985) Hess, Stephen Andrew; Grandy, Richard E.; Brody, Baruch A.; Sistare, Christine
This work addresses several topics in the semantics of deontic logic. In Chapter One I introduce a standard branching temporal model to serve as the basis for deontic logics and I define three tense operators. I argue that none of the three corresponds to a popular view of the 'will* operator, that the 'will' operator cannot be defined on the model provided, and finally, that the truth conditions for will are exactly those of must.1 In Chapter Two I introduce the monadic and dyadic operators ’O' and ’(-/-)' and review arguments for taking the dyadic as primitive. I show that those arguments do not prove that a dyadic operator is necessary, and that the considerations which led to its introduction are better served by defining conditional obligations with a tense operator 'will always' and the standard truth-functional connectives. I also argue that the 'set of morally acceptable worlds' which deontic semantics use should be construed as a set in which some particular agent fulfills all her obligations. In the third chapter I demonstrate how temporal semantics enable deontic logicians to choose among several formulations of the principles that what is necessary is obligatory and that what is obligatory is possible. I review arguments for rejecting the former as a principle of logic and note a problem which arises when it is rejected. In Chapter Four I demonstrate that an attempt by Richmond Thomason to relate 'dutiful' choices to morally perfect worlds on the temporal model cannot succeed. Finally, I conclude the thesis by investigating the broader implications of the results from the first four chapters.
Nagel's theory of the subjective and objective : implications for rationality in ethics
(1985) Goodin, Susanna Lee; Kulstad, Mark A.; Brody, Baruch A.; Grandy, Richard E.
In this thesis, I consider the consequences of applying Thomas Nagel's theory of the subjective and objective to rational decision-making in ethics. In chapter one, I am concerned with the notion of rationality. I discuss a common assumption man has about rationality and analyze the four necessary conditions for rationality. In chapter two, I present Nagel's theory. I draw out implications which are important in connection with rationality. In chapter three, I examine the implications of Nagel's theory for the notion of rationality. I focus on two problem cases which are designed to highlight a conflict between Nagel's theory and rationality. I use an analogy to Derek Parfit's work on prisoner's dilemmas to support my claim that the acceptance of Nagel's theory rules out the possibility of performing actions based on rational decisions. Finally, I argue that the type of rationality which is possible under Nagel's theory is deprived of any action-guiding force.
Embargo
Semantic Change: What, How, and So What
(2022-02-04) Ng, Wai San; Grandy, Richard E.
Most philosophical works on natural language semantics are done under the idealization that there exist shared stable linguistic conventions, and the mapping from sentences to propositions is common between all members of a community. While this idealization is fruitful for analyzing logical truth and logical consequence, it is not designed for the context of complex questions about natural language meanings. Whenever there is a debate about “What is X”, this idealization mandates that there is an absolutely correct answer, and at least one party must be wrong. But this idealization is, after all, an idealization. If we are willing to re-construe the question of “What is X” as “Has the meaning of ‘X’ changed if we apply it in such-and-such way in so-and-so situation?”, we will discover that speakers have different understandings of “X”. In the long run, it is plausible that the answer to “What is X” is a game-theoretical result of the interactions between different speaker’s Humpty Dumpty style understanding of the symbol “X”. Such an evolutionary understanding of semantics, if true, would have significant ontological implications. This big and exciting picture, however, requires many small and technical explications. Unfortunately, theoretical apparatuses for discussing semantic change are extremely impoverished and underdeveloped. In this dissertation I will strengthen the theoretical set-up for the type-token distinction, truth-condition theory of meaning, causal theory of reference, and 2-dimensional modal semantics, so that we have better tools to properly talk about semantic change. I apply these tools to argue for a more nuanced understanding of semantic change, verbal dispute, and analyticity (which are all fundamentally one and the same topic).
The controversy between Russell and Bradley concerning the doctrine of internal relations
(1988) Eichhoefer, Gerald Werner; Grandy, Richard E.
More than any other philosopher Bertrand Russell is thought to have refuted the Absolute Idealism of Francis Herbert Bradley. He is supposed to have done this by showing that Bradley's doctrine of internal relations is contradictory and inadequate. In this thesis I reexamine the controversy between Russell and Bradley concerning the doctrine of internal relations in an attempt to determine whether Russell did, in fact, refute Bradley. In the first chapter I show how Bradley's internal relations reside on the level of understanding which is between the level of feeling and the level of the Absolute. In the second chapter I show how Bradley himself rejects the whole level of understanding including both internal and external relations as mere appearance. He does this primarily by showing that relations have what I call a "dual nature" which means that they must be but cannot be both unifiers and constituents of complexes. In the third chapter I show how Russell's understanding of relations emerged from his belief that the structure of language parallels the structure of extra-linguistic reality and that Russell also discovers the dual nature problem. In the fourth chapter I examine Russell's powerful arguments against internal relations and conclude that they are effective. Russell's and Bradley's arguments, however, show that external relations, which are necessary for Russell's own pluralism, are also impossible due to the dual nature problem. It seems that Russell rather than Bradley is refuted. In the fifth chapter I consider whether any contemporary writers have identified and solved the dual nature problem. Both Alvin Nelson and Timothy Sprigge have distinguished between what they call the "holistic" and other interpretations of internal relations. I show that neither Nelson nor Sprigge captures Bradley's meaning and that the problem remains unsolved. In the last chapter I present the outlines of a solution which is suggested by the dual nature problem itself. In this solution properties are unifiers and relations are "diversifiers" and a theory of levels or types is required. In the end it is not clear that even this solution solves the dual nature problem.
The input objection: Bane of coherence theory
(1990) Cleveland, Wesley M.; Grandy, Richard E.
A pure coherence theory of empirical justification claims that the justification of empirical beliefs is based solely on internal relations. This claim gives rise to the input objection, which states that pure coherentism allows empirical justification to be cut off from the world. Laurence BonJour and Michael Williams attempt to rebut the input objection. BonJour does so by means of cognitively spontaneous beliefs. The arguments for these beliefs are, however, fraught with too many difficulties for the notion of cognitively spontaneous beliefs to be tenable. Williams challenges the input objection by means of a dilemma, claiming that either the input objection is unintelligible, or epistemic beliefs provide the pure coherentist with a ready answer to the objection. The dilemma is unsuccessful since it fails to take into account all of the plausible conceptions of the world that are available. The input objection therefore remains a problem with which these coherentists must wrestle.
THE NEUROLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF METAMEMORY MONITORING: JOL ACCURACY IN YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS
(2012-09-05) Haber, Sara; Logan, Jessica M.; Beier, Margaret E.; Dannemiller, James L.; Grandy, Richard E.; Beauchamp, Michael S.
Because maximizing the learning of new material is a relevant concern for most individuals, understanding the specific processes involved could be beneficial for people of all ages. Both encoding and monitoring occur during the learning acquisition phase, yet monitoring accuracy and subsequent neural activation have been relatively ignored in the literature. The current research adapts a common metacognitive paradigm using Judgments of Learning (JOLs) to explore the neural differences in monitoring between younger (18-25) and older (65+) adults. Participants were asked to remember natural scenes and predict encoding success by providing a JOL response for each item. Participants were told to respond “will remember” if they believed they would remember that item on a later recognition memory test or “will forget” if they thought they would forget that item on a later recognition memory test. Actual memory performance was compared to predicted memory performance to provide a measure of monitoring accuracy. Individuals reported a JOL response for 150 intact (Easy) and 150 scrambled (Difficult) scenes while in a 3.0T fMRI scanner. Despite minimal differences in behavioral performance, there were several age-related neuroimaging findings of note. When compared to younger adults, older adults had decreases in medial temporal lobe (MTL) activation, as well as contralateral recruitment of the anterior cingulate. Most importantly, the present study also disambiguated structures related to encoding success (the right parahippocampus) and monitoring accuracy (the anterior cingulate). A novel account of neural structures that mediate monitoring is provided both across items varying in difficulty (Easy and Difficult) and across different age groups (Young and Old). Encoding and monitoring are important for learning acquisition and the present research provides the first account that successfully disambiguates the two processes. Results are discussed in reference to their educational implications on resource allocation during the learning of new material.
The Semantics of Indicative Mood Modal Constructions
(2011) Barkasi, Michael Thomas John; Grandy, Richard E.
John MacFarlane and Andy Egan have recently argued that a number of examples, "thirdparty assessments," show that the contextualist view on "epistemic modals" held by Hacking, Teller and DeRose is incorrect. They argue that the examples support a relativistic semantics for epistemic modality. I argue that not every utterance of a modal sentence involving 'may' or 'possible that' expresses the epistemic reading, that the problematic examples are cases where the utterance is ambiguous between epistemic and circumstantial readings, and that it is the circumstantial reading which drives the problematic third-party assessments. The treatment presented here is similar to that of John Hawthorne and von Fintel and Gillies. A major component of the thesis is a careful study of the way in which contextual factors affect both the "flavor" of possibility expressed by an utterance and the ability of a speaker to defend their modal claim against problematic third-party assessments.
The web of reality: Mechanisms of complexity & the metaphysics of levels
(2008) O'Neal, John Alexander; Grandy, Richard E.
This dissertation examines the potential relations between the objects and processes different sciences study. It examines the history, motivations, and analytical consequences of the thesis that individual sciences (such as physics, biology, and psychology) essentially pick out and describe different 'levels' of reality. It argues against the notion that there are different levels of reality that divide empirical domains of enquiry from one another. It proposes an alternate, more fluid, conception of scientific boundaries based upon patterns of causation and spatio-temporal contexts.

Browsing by Author "Grandy, Richard E."

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