Browsing by Author "Eraslan, Hülya"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    An Anatomy of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy under Chapter 13
    (Wiley, 2017) Eraslan, Hülya; Koşar, Gizem; Li, Wenli; Sarte, Pierre-Daniel
    We build a structural model that captures salient features of personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13. We estimate our model using a novel data set that we construct from bankruptcies filed in Delaware between 2001 and 2002. Our estimation results highlight the importance of a debtor's choice of repayment plan length on other Chapter 13 outcomes. We use the estimated model to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the impact of more stringent laws that impose restrictions on the length of repayment plans. We find that these provisions would not materially affect creditor recovery rates and would not necessarily make discharge more likely.
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    Dynamic Agenda Setting
    (American Economic Association, 2017) Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya
    A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues to address--the party's agenda--has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, and preemption with checks and balances depending on how power fluctuates. We also discuss efficiency implications.
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    Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
    (Elsevier, 2017) Eraslan, Hülya; Merlo, Antonio
    It is commonly believed that voting rules that are relatively more inclusive (e.g., unanimity or supermajority), are likely to yield relatively more equitable outcomes than simple-majority rule. We show that this is not necessarily the case in bargaining environments. We study a multilateral bargaining model à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where players are heterogeneous with respect to the potential surplus they bring to the bargaining table. We show that unanimity rule may generate equilibrium outcomes that are more unequal (or less equitable) than under majority rule. In fact, as players become relatively more patient, we show that the more inclusive the voting rule, the less equitable the equilibrium allocations.