R-3 Repository :: Browsing by Author "Brody, Baruch"

Browsing by Author "Brody, Baruch"

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A philosophical analysis of filial obligations
(1994) Brakman, Sarah Vaughan; Brody, Baruch
Filial obligations are moral requirements that adult children have for the well-being of their parents. These obligations are non-voluntary special obligations. An examination of selected cultural (classical Greek and imperial Chinese), religious (Judaic, Islamic and Christian) and philosophical (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes and Locke) views concerning filial obligation is provided. Several candidates emerge for the basis of filial obligations. An analysis of the arguments for each of these candidates is provided. Personal identity is rejected as an inadequate basis for filial obligations because it relies on a fallacy. Friendship is rejected because (1) there are morally relevant features of the filial relationship that are not captured by this account and (2) the lack of equality of autonomy and the lack of independence make friendship between children and parents impossible. Reciprocity is rejected when it is shown (1) that the motive of parents for benefiting children is morally irrelevant on a reciprocity account and (2) that the requirement of the repayment of a debts is damaging to the parent-child relationship. Gratitude is supported as the basis of filial obligations because it does not fall prey to the inadequacies listed above. In addition, it addresses all features held to be important to the structure of the parent-child relationship. The argument defended is adult children whose parents have intentionally, voluntarily and benevolently benefitted them for their own sake, have an obligation to cultivate attitudes that are constitutive of the virtue of gratitude. The virtue of gratitude includes the dispositions of appreciation and goodwill. Filial obligations require that one act according to the possession of such attitudes. Application of the gratitude account of filial obligations to cases shows that the specific content of the obligation is context-dependent and cannot be determined across cases. This finding strengthens the argument for gratitude as the basis of filial obligations as it may be applied to our pluralistic society without undermining the values and customs for a particular community.
A theory of willpower
(2002) Tierney, Robert Barkley; Brody, Baruch
This dissertation explores the phenomenology and folk theory of willpower, critically assesses existing scientific theories of willpower that seek to explain the phenomenology and folk theory, and proposes a new scientifically useful theory of willpower. Earlier theories reliant upon such mechanisms or techniques as control of attention, rulemaking and private side bets are shown to be inadequate to explain crucial features of certain behavioral performance deemed to be the exhibition of willpower. This dissertation sets out to a new theory capable of explaining these key features of willpower in terms of a new model of private side bets involving the staking of status ascriptions of strength of will upon the success of the relevant behavioral performances.
Competence to consent
(1989) White, Becky Cox; Brody, Baruch
Informed consent is valid only if the person giving it is competent. Although allegedly informed consents are routinely tendered, there are nonetheless serious problems with the concept of competence as it stands. First, conceptual work upon competence is incomplete: the concept is unanalyzed and no logic of competence has been identified. It is thus virtually impossible to reliably discern who is (not) competent. Traditional work on competence has explicated three dichotomies from which the necessary conditions for the possibility of competence will be identified, viz., that competence (1) is either a global or a specific notion; (2) is present in varying degrees or in virtue of a threshold; (3) and may or not include appeals to consequences. Past efforts have failed to notice a fourth dichotomy: competence as an affective or cognitive notion. Failure to designate the appropriate arms of these dichotomies is responsible for there being, at present, no reliable test for competence. The inadequacies of a highly regarded particular test for competence, the mental status examination, are examined in light of this failure. Competence is located within the rule-governed practice of informed consent. That practice and hence, competence, is justified through a Kantian analysis of respect for persons. This analysis reveals that the logic of competence requires assessment in terms of (1) specific rather than global concerns; (2) degrees of ability rather than a threshold; (3) both cognitive and affective abilities; and (4) no appeal to consequences. Based upon the analyses of consent as an example of decision making within the practice of informed consent and of respect for persons, the capacities which jointly comprise competence are identified. These are the capacities to receive, recognize, and retrieve information; to reason about, relate to oneself, and rank options; to choose among alternatives; and, under certain circumstances, to defend one's choice. Identification of the logic of competence and explication of and justification for the capacities that comprise competence to consent provide a conceptual foundation for the crucial concept of competence that the informed consent process currently lacks. It should facilitate construction of a test for competence.
Diagnosing exploitation: Justice and human subjects research
(2006) Phillips, Trisha Buchanan; Brody, Baruch
In our effort to protect the human subject of medical research we have failed to ensure that the subject will be treated justly, specifically, we have failed to ensure that the subject will not be exploited. I argue that we fail in this regard because we do not understand the concept of exploitation well enough to identify and address all instances of the problem. This dissertation builds a model of exploitation, complete with a principle of justice in transactions, and applies this model to human subjects research. The model of exploitation shows that A exploits B just in case A gains through his transaction with B, and A's gain is unjust with respect to B. Drawing from both economic theory and social and political philosophy I show that A's gain is unjust with respect to B just in case A's gain is larger than the fair market price and A can make no entitlement claim to the difference. Applying this model to human subjects research shows that whether a subject is exploited depends on a number of variables, including what the subject can offer to the researcher, what the subject seeks to gain through his participation, and the alternative ways in which the subject can pursue his desired goods. Each variable can be instantiated in a number of ways, and various combinations of these instantiations can characterize several different subject populations. For each population we can construct a "fair research protocol" and determine whether a given clinical trial is exploitative to subjects recruited from this population. Using this method I show that at least three current research practices, namely, offering money for participation according to an expense-reimbursement model, recruiting from the clinic, and advertising clinical trials as treatment options, are exploitative to at least some patient populations. I also show that these cases of exploitation, and all other cases of exploitation in human subjects research, can be prevented in three ways: first, by modifying protocols to exclude exploitative elements; second, by changing recruiting methods to exclude subject populations vulnerable to exploitation; and, finally, by prohibiting the research.
Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Quality of Will Approach
(2012-09-05) Robichaud, Philip; Sher, George; Brody, Baruch; Kaplan, Gergory; Sommers, Tamler
My central aim in the dissertation is to defend an account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that distinguishes culpable ignorance from non-culpable ignorance. The view that I defend is that ignorance is culpable just when an agent flouts or ignores moral reasons that underlie her epistemic norms or obligations. This view is a quality-of-will theory of moral responsibility that emphasizes the agent’s reasons-responsiveness. It holds that only relevant epistemic obligations are those that require acts of investigation or reflection. In the dissertation, I examine extant theories of culpable ignorance and suggest that they all fall short in some important respect. Then, I propose and defend an account in which epistemic norms play a leading role. I analyze the nature of epistemic norms and their normativity, and I argue that agents who ignore or flout actional investigative norms and then act on subsequent false beliefs are connected to the wrongness of their action in a way that establishes their blameworthiness. I also argue that epistemic norms that require agents to hold certain beliefs or make certain inferences are not relevant to culpable ignorance. Finally, I explore the implications of my view for certain interesting cases of moral ignorance. I discuss ignorance that results from an agent’s social or historical circumstances, ignorance that stems from pure moral deference, and ignorance that is explained by epistemic difficulty of getting certain moral facts right. There are two striking outcomes of my research. The first is that reflection on the epistemic condition shows that one cannot think deeply about moral responsibility without also engaging issues in epistemology relating to the nature and normativity of belief, and issues in normative ethics relating to what our moral obligations actually are. The second striking outcome is that bringing these rather disparate topics together, as I attempted to do, reveals that much of our ignorance is actually non-culpable, and that many of our beliefs about the blameworthiness of ignorant agents are unwarranted.
In Defense of Sufficiency as the Distributive Ideal for Political Power
(2013-09-16) Tune, Dustin; Sher, George; Brody, Baruch; Bradford, Gwen; Davidson, Chandler
Many people think that political equality is obviously a good thing, an ideal toward which any decent political system should strive. Despite this -- or perhaps because of it -- some basic questions about political equality remain unanswered. What is political equality? What is good about it? Could some other ideal(s) take its place? My aim here is to answer each of these questions. In regards to the first question, I argue that political equality obtains when political power is distributed equally. Two people are political equals if, and only if, they have the same amount of political power. By 'political power' I mean (roughly) the ability to get what one wants in the political arena. Conceiving of political equality in this way allows us to accommodate both the moral and amoral dimensions of politics. What is good about political equality, so conceived? Political equality is good insofar as it leads to the equal advancement of everyone's interests. There are several reasons to think that advancing everyone's interests is important. It may be a fundamental requirement of morality, a principle of social justice, or a necessary condition of political legitimacy. Of course, an equal distribution of political power is not unique in its ability to advance people's interests equally. Indeed, I argue that an unequal distribution of power will almost always lead to a moral equal advancement of everyone's interests. This is because different people have different interests, and, depending on the circumstances, different amounts of power may be needed in order to advance different sets of interests to the same degree. Thus, it is a mistake to assume that an equal distribution of power will lead to the equal advancement of everyone's interests. If the equal advancement of interests is our ultimate goal, then political power should be distributed in accordance with a principle of sufficiency, not equality. Everyone should have whatever amount of political power they need in order for their interests to be advanced to the same degree.
Embargo
Living Reflectively: Authenticity and Justifiability
(2019-04-09) Kao, Ya-Yun; Bradford, Gwen; Brody, Baruch
“What makes your life go well for you?” Subjective and objective theories of well-being answer with a certain appeal—the subjective theories pay attention to what you feel about or what you want for your life, whereas the objective theories remind us that there are objective goods we should pursue. However, each has its own drawbacks. Arguably, pleasure is not the only thing that matters in living a good life. Neither is the thing you desire always justifiable. The objective goods might be alienated from your perspective, given that objectivists’ major claim that what makes your life go well is independent of your attitudes. Value fulfillment theories strike the middle path, capturing the best of both sides and avoiding the worse. My account situates itself in this category. In this dissertation, I develop and defend the following novel account of well-being: to live a good life, one must fulfill values and commitments that are authentic and justifiable after critical reflection. Call my account “well-being as authentic and justifiable.” My account avoids objections leveled against the subjective and objective theories of well-being in the following way: The authenticity requirement avoids the alienation problem that objective theories face, whereas the justifiability requirement responds to the underlying problem faced by objectivists and subjectivists alike, that is, why the thing one claims to be good is good. I argue that an agent can satisfy the authenticity requirement by reflecting on values and commitments to ensure that they are consistent, affirmed by the agent, and compatible with the agent’s aspirations. And the agent can satisfy the justifiability requirement by engaging in interpersonal dialogue and ensuring that the agent’s values and commitments are defensible. I also distinguish my account from existing views. Unlike Valerie Tiberius who use virtues to counterbalance reflection, I focus on reflection itself. Unlike Jason Raibley who advocates functioning well as robustly realizing one’s values, I focus on ensuring the quality of values through reflection. I conclude by showing how my account is well-equipped to avoid objections leveled against all value fulfillment theories and thus showing that my account is a promising new account of well-being.
Moral complicity: An expressivist account
(2003) Parker, Joseph Clinton; Brody, Baruch
In this project, I argue that moral complicity is best conceptualized as conduct that expressively aligns one with another agent's wrongdoing. Expressive alignment occurs as a result of one agent expressing a positive desire, attitude, or belief toward another agent's (a primary agent's) wrongdoing. I use William Alston's account of illocutionary acts to elucidate the notion of complicit expression. I go on to argue that causal facilitation can also function as a form of positive expression toward a primary agent's wrongdoing. I then compare and contrast the expressivist account with accounts of complicity put forth by Sanford Kadish, Judith Kissell, and Christopher Kutz. I then argue that the wrongness of complicit conduct stems from the fact that it expresses antipathy and disregard for the moral law. Finally, I use the expressivist account to analyze three different cases of purported complicity: stem cell research, referrals for physician-assisted suicide, and the bombing of Dresden.
Objectifying the objective list
(2002) Harrison, Kelly; Brody, Baruch
The aim of the present paper is to clarify the essential features of the objective list and address consequences of this characterization. The objective list theory is frequently criticized for its rigidity and its inability to accommodate the variety within the human population. However, I argue that the list can be far less rigid than it initially appears; opportunities for variety within the list abound. Further, issues such as having a well-rounded life as opposed to a specialized one are weighed. I argue that one may forego some goods to better achieve or acquire others. Finally, I claim that one need not maximize amounts of goods in one's life to live a good life and that 'satisficing' is an inadequate answer to the maximizing requirement.
Pluralistic casuistry, animals, and the environment
(2004) Weir, Jack L.; Brody, Baruch
This thesis analyzes, modifies, and defends Baruch A. Brody's theory of pluralistic casuistry as the best contemporary theory of animal and environmental ethics. In the course of reviewing lots of theories of animal and environmental ethics, two problems emerge: "inclusiveness" and "derivability." Unlike the other theories, pluralistic casuistry resolves the two problems. The argument begins by analyzing several cases that give evidence (intuitive case data) that moral theories should include in appropriate ways nonhuman animals, plants, and inorganic things. Next, important recent theories of three types are critically analyzed: (1) utilitarian theories (John Passmore, Peter Singer, and intrinsic-value utilitarianism); (2) deontological theories (Paul Taylor's theory of respect for life, sentience deontology, Tom Regan's theory of animal rights, and Holmes Rolston's theory of duties based on intrinsic-value), and (3) virtue theories (Stephen R. L. Clark, J. Baird Callicott, and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.). These theories fail in two ways: (a) they include too little or too much, or both (the "inclusiveness" problem); and (b) they fallaciously attempt to derive duties directly from values (the "derivability" problem). When emended as proposed in the thesis, Brody's theory of pluralistic casuistry resolves the inclusiveness and derivability problems. First, inclusiveness of nonhuman animals, plants, and inorganic things is achieved by casuistry's five major moral appeals (consequences, rights, respect, virtues, and justice). As argued by W. D. Ross (1930) and Brody (1979, 1988, 1998), pluralism is necessary because no single principle or monistic standard coherently encompasses all of the legitimate moral cases and principles. Pluralistic casuistry resolves the derivability problem by making explicit the empirical aspects of the case and by invoking one or more of the five major appeals. Ethics begins and ends with a case: the case's moral problem, and the moral decision resolving the problem. When more than one appeal applies, a conflict results. Conflicts are resolved by a holistic moral judgment. In contrast to other theories, pluralistic casuistry explains conflicts and gives detailed guidance for resolving conflicts.
The (un)reliability of eyewitness evidence: A philosophical examination of the conflict between the psychological research and the use of eyewitnesses in the legal system
(2002) Wilks, Nancy Goldberg; Brody, Baruch
According to the psychologists, finders of fact erroneously---though unknowingly---place too much weight on eyewitness testimony. One consequence of this misplaced reliance is the conviction of innocent persons. To remedy this problem with eyewitness testimony, the majority of psychologists advocate the introduction of an expert in eyewitness testimony---ordinarily a research psychologist who is familiar with the factors affecting the reliability of the eyewitness's perceptions and memories---whenever eyewitness evidence is admitted. The psychologists' arguments for admitting eyewitness experts and the courts' explanations for excluding this testimony are fraught with difficulties. However, alternative remedies---those currently existing as well as potential remedies---similarly fail to resolve the problem. This thesis constitutes the first of a two-part work. In the present part, the different positions are assessed. The analysis yields three alternatives: (1) exclude all eyewitness testimony; (2) accept a partial, though far from complete, resolution; or, (3) do nothing. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
The active contrast between virtue and obligation (Aristotle, Immanuel Kant)
(1988) Melim, Laura Ann; Brody, Baruch
This study aims to restore to virtue, as manifest in action, a central place in ethical theory, by securing for virtuous action conceptual and evaluative independence from virtuous agency, on the one hand, and morally obligatory action, on the other. An Aristotelian, rather than a Kantian or consequentialist, perspective emerges as the perspective proper to a study of virtuous action. However, in its emphasis upon actions, rather than upon the qualities of agents, this study differs from Aristotle's ethics, as well as from most contemporary writings on virtue ethics. To establish the conceptual autonomy of virtuous action, relative to virtuous agency, I posit the primacy of virtue itself and identify virtuous action as secondary to, and informed by, virtue. An action is informed by virtue just in case it is good and fitting. A good action is one whose aim is good, where the aim of an action is neither the intention of the agent nor the actual or probable consequence of the action, but the consequence which a reasonable person would have grounds for inferring is the intended consequence of the action. Virtuous action, so defined, has value and is not merely the expression of the agent's virtue or good motives. Hence, the value of virtuous action does not derive from the agent's virtue or the value of his motives. I distinguish virtuous action from morally obligatory action in three ways: (1) by showing that some obligatory actions lack fittingness, which is a necessary condition for virtuous action; (2) by showing that my definition of virtuous action distinguishes the concept of virtuous action from the deontic concepts of special obligation, supererogation and imperfect duty; (3) by arguing that the ethical perspective proper to an analysis of the nature of virtuous action is genuinely distinct from the ethical perspective which informs modern theories of obligation. Examining the question of the limits of obligation, I argue that there are actions which are morally good and non-obligatory, by proposing criteria of non-obligatoriness in actions and by presenting four examples of actions which, given these criteria, are non-obligatory, yet are virtuous and moral.
The Concept of Human Dignity in Bioethics
(2015-08-26) Eddleman, Lisa McDonald; Brody, Baruch; Sher, George; Zammito, John H.
The concept of human dignity has gained a great deal of traction in European bioethics, yet there remains in American bioethics a deep skepticism regarding the utility of the notion. I contend that the appeal to human dignity is not reducible to the traditional bioethical appeals of beneficence, autonomy or justice that comprise the predominant American approach to bioethics. Nevertheless, current accounts of human dignity in bioethics lack substance, and too often presume shared convictions grounded in either religious beliefs or some kind secular humanism; consequently, such versions of human dignity fail to do the philosophical work necessary to sustain either normative claims or bioethical policy grounded in the appeal. A philosophically satisfactory theory of human dignity must deliver both sufficiently universal justification and richness of content. To that end, I elaborate an original version of human dignity that balances the seemingly incompatible requirements of universality and content in a surprising way: by developing a richer notion of the Kantian rational valuer. I argue that, properly understood, the rational valuer is both normative and foundational: certain capacities and conditions are necessary to function as a rational valuer, and these can be defended as valuable to every human being. To respect human dignity, then, is to protect and promote these capacities and conditions. Utilizing this conception of human dignity, I revisit the list of European bioethical constraints that motivated my work to begin with. I conclude that, while my account of human dignity sustains few of the prohibitions, it enriches bioethical discourse by reconnecting bioethics to the deeper question of human flourishing. An important consequence of this is that my version of human dignity moves bioethics beyond constraints to entail substantial positive duties that have typically been overlooked in the field. Human dignity has previously been largely set to the side in American bioethics. It is time to bring it to the forefront.
The ethics of conception and the concept of harm: A defense of a child-centered ethical appeal
(2004) Malek, Janet Irene; Brody, Baruch
Ethicists have discussed many different aspects of the difficult decisions parents face concerning when and how to conceive children. However, the perspective of those who will be most dramatically affected by conception decisions, namely, the children who will be brought into existence because of those decisions, has been underrepresented in the ethical dialogue. The scarcity of scholarship that takes the possible child's perspective into account is largely due to the work of philosopher Derek Parfit. Parfit has argued that it is impossible for a child to be negatively affected by the decision to conceive her as long as her life is worth living because if a different conception decision had been made, the child never would have existed at all. This unintuitive conclusion has deterred many philosophers from exploring the implications of conception decisions for possible children in any significant way. However, in my dissertation I show that Parfit's conclusions can be avoided and the effect of conception decisions on a possible child's well-being can and should be taken into account. My purpose was to define and defend a child-centered ethical appeal to be taken into account in the consideration of conception decisions. The dissertation has three specific objectives: (1) To develop a view of what parents owe their children from a moral standpoint. I propose accounts of the interests of children and of the obligations of parents; (2) To demonstrate that this account of parental obligations applies to the decision to conceive a child in spite of Derek Parfit's objections. I show where Parfit's arguments are problematic and demonstrate that his conclusions are therefore unwarranted. I suggest that a slightly modified understanding of the concept of harm can make the idea of conception as a harm philosophically coherent; and (3) To demonstrate how the inclusion of a child-centered appeal yields more satisfactory ethical analyses for cases involving the decision to conceive. In essence, the arguments laid out in this dissertation open conceptual space for the inclusion of a child-affecting perspective in ethical analyses of conception decisions. The appeal I propose is a step toward filling this new space.
The Nature and Ethical Significance of Manipulation
(2013-06-11) Gorin, Moti; Brody, Baruch; Sher, George; Wilson, Rick K.
What distinguishes manipulative interpersonal influence from non-manipulative influence? When is it wrong to manipulate a person and what makes it wrong? I articulate a novel account according to which interpersonal manipulation is a process of influence that deliberately fails to track reasons. To manipulate a reasons-responsive person is to render her detached from an important aspect of reality, namely, her reasons or the considerations that ought to govern her behavior. This is what makes manipulation pro tanto morally impermissible (when it is). My account of manipulation provides a helpful framework for thinking through some of the philosophically neglected ethical issues arising out the application of social scientific research on human decision making in the domains of health care and public policy.
The nature and limits of moral compromise
(2001) Kelley, Maureen Catherine; Brody, Baruch
To date, the most developed models of compromise in situations of value conflict come out of the bargaining theory or rational choice theory literature. While useful in compromises over more straightforward preferences and interests, these models are shown to be seriously limited when applied to decisions involving moral commitments and moral compromise, especially among firm moral believers. A series of arguments is offered to motivate compromise over moral commitments, and these arguments attempt to take seriously the experience of the firm believer who is not moved by the straightforward maximizing arguments offered by bargaining theory. Two types of compromise are defended: separation compromises and direct compromises. The first defends indirect forms of compromise or assent to compromise where the damage done to firm moral beliefs is minimized through varying degrees of psychological distancing. Separation compromises include the use of arbiters, reliance on procedural solutions to conflict, separation between private and public or professional roles, withholding of intent, and symbolic gestures of protest or dissent. These indirect compromises, while often the only way of protecting firm beliefs and avoiding protracted conflict by assenting to compromise, come at a sometimes tragic price; at the very least the agent will still be complicit in the compromise, and responsible for immoral compromises. A second, more positive account of compromise is then defended. Three arguments are offered to motivate direct compromise, even among firm believers, in situations where there is some willingness among all parties concerned to at least enter into debate. The first is an appeal to the often self-defeating implications of protracted conflict and "walking away". The second argument appeals to moral fallibility. The third argument demonstrates the important relationship between our underdetermined moral principles and certain forms of conceptual compromise; compromise on this third account can be an important way of filling out our underdetermined regions of moral belief and principle. In closing, the normative limits on moral compromise are considered, as generated by appeals to fairness, moral complicity, and moral integrity.
The view from somewhere: Moral judgment in bioethics
(1993) Wildes, Kevin William; Brody, Baruch
Secular bioethics has been involved in the resolution of moral controversies both in the clinic and in the discussion of public policy and there are three models used to justify moral judgments in bioethics. The first is the foundational model which seeks to build a theoretical account of the moral life. The foundational project must confront two difficulties. First, it must come to terms with the dilemma that there is no universal account of the nature of moral reason. Second, each foundational account requires some ranking of moral values if it is to make content-full judgments. Absent a universal moral narrative there is no canonical ranking of values. Two attempts to circumvent these foundational dilemmas have been prominent in bioethics. The first is the middle level principle approach. This model appeals to a set of principles to justify moral judgments. The model assumes that these principles are shared and that they can resolve moral dilemmas without requiring the resolution of the foundational questions. The model faces three difficulties. First there is no conclusive argument as to why this list of principles should be canonical. Second, it is not clear how the principles are related to one another. Third, the principles, without foundations, are ambiguous in their meaning. Another attempt to avoid foundational dilemmas is the hope of Jonsen and Toulmin to revive some model of casuistry. Jonsen and Toulmin select the model of Roman Catholic casuistry in the High Middle Ages. Yet they fail to take full account of the moral values and moral authority which governed this practice of casuistry. Both casuistry and principlism argue that we can reach agreement on moral controversies without appeal to foundations. In carefully examining what is agreed to one comes to see that the assertion of agreement is a sham. It becomes clear that secular discourse in bioethics must rely on a procedural morality which is empty of content. Content-full moral judgments can only be understood and accepted within particular moral communities.
Towards a New Theory of Exploitation
(2014-11-11) Gray, Derrick F; Brody, Baruch; Sher, George; Henze, Matthias
This work examines exploitation as a moral wrong, with the specific goal of explaining how one party might wrong another in an interaction that is to the benefit of both and fully consensual. This form of exploitation is interesting in that it involves neither harm nor certain procedural defects, such as coercion or deceit. I propose that exploitation – at least in some contexts (especially employment) and with few exceptions – occurs when one party (A) uses another (B) to attain what is needed to live a decent life while B is not given such an amount. A’s use of B in this way is a significant failure of respect, meaning A wrongs B despite the fact that their interaction improves B’s overall condition. I examine several contemporary theories of exploitation, finding none of them completely satisfying. I argue that some accounts fail to track the right kinds of considerations (including, in some situations, need). Other accounts fail to explain how the alleged exploiter could be obligated to interact on specific, non-exploitative terms with the allegedly exploited. Moreover, all these accounts share an approach to exploitation that can exonerate potential exploiters for the wrong reasons. After proposing some basic desiderata for a good theory, I offer my own account of exploitation and defend it from important potential objections, including the claim that it is overly restrictive because it will prevent interactions which would otherwise be of significant benefit to individuals in need. I conclude by discussing some connections between exploitation and structural injustice.
Virtue ethics and the moral significance of animals
(2008) Merriam, Garret; Brody, Baruch
What does our treatment of animals say about our moral character? To ask this question is to think about the issue of animal ethics in terms of virtue and vice. It appears that no one writing on either animal ethics or on virtue theory has tried to address this question at length. The aim of this dissertation is to rectify this shortcoming and in so doing, develop a robust theory of the moral significance of animals from the perspective of virtue ethics. Before we can ask any questions about the moral significance of animals, however, or even about virtue itself, we first have to answer some questions about the foundations of the ethical framework to which we will be appealing. Hence, I begin by laying the groundwork, both metaethical and psychological, for virtue ethics as we will employ it in the subsequent chapters. The primary tool used to lay this groundwork is the moral significance of the emotions and their connection to rationality. I explore the emotions as they have been traditional construed in philosophy, and in ethics in particular, and argue that this traditional view is inadequate due to several considerations. Accordingly, I attempt to sketch a superior alterative view that accommodates these considerations. In the second chapter, I argue that our new understanding of the emotions fats naturally with several of the major themes of virtue ethics, including the moral significance of motives, moral education and the importance of the emotions themselves. In these first two chapters our strategy will not be so much to argue for virtue ethics as it is to outline the general framework in which I will be considering virtue ethics for the duration. Chapters 3 and 4 will expand on the details of virtue ethics as I understand it, and argue that a proper understanding of virtue entails considerable regard for the well-being of non-human animals. Chapter 5 and Appendix B will contrast the theory I develop in the prior chapters with the dominant views of animal ethics, namely utilitarianism and rights theory. Chapters 6 and 7 will apply the account I have developed to the practical moral issues of animal experimentation and eating meat.

Browsing by Author "Brody, Baruch"

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