Bradford, Gwen2019-05-172020-05-012019-052019-04-09May 2019Kao, Ya-Yun. "Living Reflectively: Authenticity and Justifiability." (2019) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105969">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105969</a>.https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105969EMBARGO NOTE: This item is embargoed until 2027-01-03“What makes your life go well for you?” Subjective and objective theories of well-being answer with a certain appeal—the subjective theories pay attention to what you feel about or what you want for your life, whereas the objective theories remind us that there are objective goods we should pursue. However, each has its own drawbacks. Arguably, pleasure is not the only thing that matters in living a good life. Neither is the thing you desire always justifiable. The objective goods might be alienated from your perspective, given that objectivists’ major claim that what makes your life go well is independent of your attitudes. Value fulfillment theories strike the middle path, capturing the best of both sides and avoiding the worse. My account situates itself in this category. In this dissertation, I develop and defend the following novel account of well-being: to live a good life, one must fulfill values and commitments that are authentic and justifiable after critical reflection. Call my account “well-being as authentic and justifiable.” My account avoids objections leveled against the subjective and objective theories of well-being in the following way: The authenticity requirement avoids the alienation problem that objective theories face, whereas the justifiability requirement responds to the underlying problem faced by objectivists and subjectivists alike, that is, why the thing one claims to be good is good. I argue that an agent can satisfy the authenticity requirement by reflecting on values and commitments to ensure that they are consistent, affirmed by the agent, and compatible with the agent’s aspirations. And the agent can satisfy the justifiability requirement by engaging in interpersonal dialogue and ensuring that the agent’s values and commitments are defensible. I also distinguish my account from existing views. Unlike Valerie Tiberius who use virtues to counterbalance reflection, I focus on reflection itself. Unlike Jason Raibley who advocates functioning well as robustly realizing one’s values, I focus on ensuring the quality of values through reflection. I conclude by showing how my account is well-equipped to avoid objections leveled against all value fulfillment theories and thus showing that my account is a promising new account of well-being.application/pdfengCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.Well-beingAuthenticityJustifiabilityCritical ReflectionValue Fulfillment TheoryThesis2019-05-17