Blake, William D.Cozza, Joseph FrancescoArmstrong, David A.Friesen, Amanda2024-07-252024-07-252024Blake, W. D., Cozza, J. F., Ii, D. a. A., & Friesen, A. (2024). Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates. American Political Science Review, 118(2), 1075–1083. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606https://hdl.handle.net/1911/117529Why are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? The literature provides few clear answers, as some scholars focus on institutional factors, whereas others emphasize amendment culture. We bridge this divide with new theoretical and empirical insights. Using data from democratic constitutions worldwide and U.S. state constitutions, we examine how social capital reduces the transaction costs imposed by amendment rules. The results indicate that constitutional rigidity decreases amendment frequency, but group membership, civic activism, and political trust can offset the effect of amendment rules. Our findings have important implications for scholars in public law, constitutional and democratic theory, and social movements.engExcept where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.  Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the terms of the license or beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.Journal articlesocial-capital-institutionalhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606