Fox, Jeremy2022-09-262023-05-012022-052022-04-22May 2022Pirozhenko, Yakym. "Essays on Pseudomarkets." (2022) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/113353">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/113353</a>.https://hdl.handle.net/1911/113353This dissertation studies the problem of assigning indivisible items to agents without monetary transfers. Pseudomarket mechanisms are proposed for both static and dynamic assignment problems. In a static setting, a new algorithm for computing pseudomarket equilibria is described. Using data from the school choice program in Seattle, the pseudomarket mechanism is compared to the Probabilistic Serial mechanism. In a dynamic setting, the pseudomarket model is extended to incorporate a continuum of agents and stochastic individual states. Conditions for equilibrium efficiency are established.application/pdfengCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.Mechanism designpseudomarketschool choiceThesis2022-09-26