He, YinghuaMiralles, AntonioPycia, MarekYan, Jianye2018-11-192018-11-192018He, Yinghua, Miralles, Antonio, Pycia, Marek, et al.. "A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities." <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,</i> 10, no. 3 (2018) American Economic Association: 272-314. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150259.https://hdl.handle.net/1911/103354We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser (1979)'s position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.engArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.Journal articlehttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150259