Leeds, Brett Ashley2023-08-092023-052023-04-07May 2023Pugh, Alex. "Designed to Favor: The Effects of Appointing Ad Hoc Judges in International Courts." (2023) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/115114">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/115114</a>.https://hdl.handle.net/1911/115114How does the institutional design of international courts, specifically the allowance of ad hoc judges, impact the outputs of courts? Ad hoc judges are appointed by a state for a case if the state does not have a judge of its nationality on the court and are one institutional solution to address concerns about impartiality. This dissertation is composed of three papers that explore the effects of appointing ad hoc judges on three outputs of international courts: judicial voting, judicial opinions, and the overall legitimacy of the court. In the first two papers, I argue that while nationality may be one important factor driving the apparent partiality of judges, the selection process of international judges influences their behavior. The first paper looks at partiality in voting, and I find evidence that ad hoc judges, both national and non-national, are more likely to be partial in their voting decisions than national member judges. In the second paper, I suggest that, given their appointment by a state in the case, ad hoc judges will use their dissenting opinions to defend the interests of their appointing state. Analysis of the texts suggests national attachments to a state in the case and not the means of judicial selection drive differences in the content of judicial opinions. The third paper evaluates whether allowing ad hoc judges poses a legitimacy trade-off for international courts: their presence may provide legitimacy benefits through representation, but their voting behavior may diminish judicial consensus and, thus the authority of rulings. Using two survey experiments conducted in Guatemala, I find evidence that suggests ad hoc judges do not pose a legitimacy trade-off: There are no significant legitimacy costs to reducing judicial consensus, and only national representation confers any legitimacy benefits. Together, these papers contribute to our understanding of the consequences of judicial selection on the functioning of international courts and comprise policy implications for legal practitioners.application/pdfengCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.International CourtsJudicial BehaviorThesis2023-08-09