

**Careful Commitments:
Democratic States and Alliance Design**

Online Appendix

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This document includes: (1) procedures to code democracy; (2) description of the process of the S-Score construction; (3) tables for all robustness checks explained in the main text and footnotes.

1 Democracy Coding

This section describes how we coded democracy for states that formed an alliance. As described in the paper, we use information from the Polity IV project as the major source. Specifically, a country is coded as a democracy if it receives a polity2 score of 6 or higher in the year of alliance formation. However, there are country-years (3.8% of the country-years) in which the polity2 score is missing. For these observations, we refer to other sources.

Table A.1 summarizes our coding rules and coding decisions for the countries for which polity2 score is missing. The table shows the COW country code (first column) and country names (second column), alliance years for which polity2 is missing (third column), and whether we coded these country-years as democracy (Y) or autocracy (N) (fourth column). The fifth column shows the forms of missing in the Polity IV data set. Blank cells mean that the country-years are not included in the Polity IV data set, -88 means that the country-years are coded as “transition periods”¹ and -66 means that the country-years are coded as “foreign interruption periods”. The last column summarizes the sources we consulted in coding democracy for these observations.

¹Values of polity2 for transition periods are usually prorated by interpolation. However, interpolation does not work for countries that ceased to exist following the transition periods. In our sample, East Germany during 1989–1990 is coded as transition period.

Table A.1: Coding for Missing Democracy Scores

COW	Country	Years	Dem?	Polity	Note
53	Barbados	1967–2000	Y		CGV
54	Dominica	1979–2000	Y		CGV
55	Grenada	1981	N		CGV
		1996	Y		CGV
56	St.Lucia	1979–2000	Y		CGV
57	St.Vincent & Grenadines	1981–2000	Y		CGV
58	Antigua & Barbuda	1996	N		CGV
60	St.Kitts & Nevis	1984–2000	Y		CGV
91	Honduras	1907	N		Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
212	Luxembourg	1944–2000	Y		CGV
232	Andorra	1993	Y		CGV
240	Hanover	1816–1867	N		EB
265	East Germany	1989–1990	N	–88	Polity at $t - 1$
267	Baden	1816–1818	N		EB
269	Saxony	1848	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
273	Hesse Electoral	1816–1867	N		EB
275	Hesse Grand Ducal	1816–1867	N		EB
280	Mecklenburg Schwerin	1816–1867	N		EB
310	Hungary	1956	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
316	Czech Republic	1992	Y		Polity at $t + 1$
317	Slovak Republic	1992	Y		Polity at $t + 1$
329	Two Sicilies	1815	N		Polity at $t + 1$
338	Malta	1964–1972	Y		CGV
345	Yugoslavia	1920	N		Polity at $t + 1$
355	Bulgaria	1913	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
360	Romania	1916	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
395	Iceland	1949–2000	Y		CGV
403	Sao Tome & Principe	2000	Y		CGV
500	Uganda	1979	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
591	Seychelles	2003	N		CGV
616	Tunisia	1957–1958	N		CGV
640	Turkey	1921	N	–66	Polity at $t + 1$
652	Syria	1958	Y	–66	Polity at $t - 1$
660	Lebanon	1990–2000	N	–66	CGV
663	Jordan	1945	N		Polity at $t + 1$
690	Kuwait	1961–1962	N		Polity at $t + 1$
		1990	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
710	China	1937–1945	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
740	Japan	1945	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$
780	Sri Lanka	1947	Y		Polity at $t + 1$
800	Thailand	1941	N	–66	Polity at $t - 1$ and $t + 1$
812	Laos	1953	N	–88	Polity at $t + 1$

CGV: Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)

EB: Encyclopedia Britannica

Polity: Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2010)

2 S Score Construction

This section describes how we constructed our measure of interest similarity among alliance members. We measure similarity of interests using Signorino and Ritter's (1999) S-score based on the ATOP alliance data (Leeds et al. 2002). The S-score measures similarity of foreign policy positions between two states in terms of alliance portfolios.² It takes higher values for pairs of states that have similar alliance portfolios.

Conventional dyad-year S-scores (such as those available in the EUGene software) are based on annual observations of alliance membership data. Such annually-measured S-scores are not suitable for our purposes because these scores do not vary over a given year even when there is a change in alliance portfolios during the year. Since states can form or dissolve alliances at any time during the year, dyad-year S-scores may overstate or understate the similarity of interests for dyads whose alliance portfolios change during the course of the year. For example, suppose we are interested in alliance formation between states A and B at time t in year T . A dyad-year S-score measured at the end of the year T will overstate the similarity of dyad $A - B$ at t if both states A and B form or dissolve an alliance with a common third-party state C at time $t' > t$ in year T . Similarly, it will understate the similarity if only one of the states A and B forms or dissolves an alliance with C at time $t' > t$. On the other hand, a dyad-year S-score measured at the beginning of the year T (or at the end of the year $T - 1$) will understate the similarity of dyad $A - B$ at t if both states A and B form or dissolve an alliance with a common third-party state C at time $t'' < t$ in year T , and it will overstate the similarity if only one of the states A and B forms or dissolves an alliance with C at time $t'' < t$.

To make sure that the score is not biased by the alliances formed or dissolved during the year, we calculate the S-score just one day before alliance formation. Specifically, for each unit of observation (alliance formation) in our main analysis we calculate S-scores that incorporate all the alliances that are in force just a day before the formation of the alliance in question. In other words, our S-score for alliance formation observed at t reflects the alliance portfolios measured at t minus one day.

Following Signorino and Ritter (1999), we distinguish three types of alliance ties between states: dyads that have defense and/or offense alliance treaties are given the value of 2; dyads that have no defense or offense alliance treaty but have neutrality and/or consultation alliance treaties are given the value of 1; dyads that have no alliance treaties are given the value of 0. All the codings are based on the ATOP alliance data. We then compute the S-score for all dyads based on the absolute value distance metric (Signorino and Ritter 1999, 127). For multilateral alliances involving more than two member states, we take a weak link approach and measure foreign policy similarity among alliance members as the minimum S-score of any pair of original alliance members.

²It is possible to compute S-scores based on factors other than alliances, such as trade or UNGA voting. We only use alliances because of the data availability. Data on UNGA voting are only available after 1946 and for UN member states. Data on trade also have a large number of missing values.

The resulting measure of interest similarity can take any values between -1 (very dissimilar) and 1 (very similar). In our sample, the variable ranges between -0.2 and 1 . Figure 1 shows the distribution of this variable.




Figure 1: Observed distribution of interest similarity for all alliance formation observations ($n = 536$).

3 Robustness Checks

Table A.2 reports results using Benson’s (2012) variable for “probabilistic deterrence” alliances as our dependent variable (footnote 2).

Table A.2: Logit Analysis of Probabilistic Deterrence Alliances, 1815 to 2003

	Pr. Def.	Pr. Def.
Proportion of Democracies	1.848*** (0.467)	1.227** (0.545)
Similarity of Interests		-2.814*** (0.774)
Number of Members		0.105** (0.050)
Threat Level		0.104 (1.117)
War Time Alliance		-0.778 (0.538)
Constant	-2.024*** (0.221)	0.016 (0.840)
Observations	260	260

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.3 and A.4 report our results testing our hypotheses using a dummy variable that captures whether any of the alliance members were democratic at the time of alliance formation (footnote 7).

Table A.3: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul
Democracy Dummy	1.307*** (0.199)	1.221*** (0.210)
Similarity of Interests		-1.205** (0.585)
Number of Members		-0.159** (0.069)
Threat Level		-1.487** (0.734)
War Time Alliance		-1.132*** (0.370)
Constant	-1.475*** (0.155)	0.380 (0.638)
Observations	536	536

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.4: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.	Def. Con.
Democracy Dummy	0.476* (0.266)	0.432 (0.331)
Similarity of Interests		-1.312* (0.686)
Number of Members		0.087 (0.054)
Offense Obligation		1.485*** (0.323)
Consultation Obligation		-0.783*** (0.280)
Constant	-0.358** (0.154)	0.465 (0.655)
Observations	260	260

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.5 and A.6 report our results excluding NATO from our sample (footnote 9).

Table A.5: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.823*** (0.256)	1.601*** (0.264)
Similarity of Interests		-1.494*** (0.572)
Number of Members		-0.114 (0.071)
Threat Level		-1.442** (0.735)
War Time Alliance		-1.137*** (0.375)
Constant	-1.409*** (0.140)	0.581 (0.619)
Observations	535	535

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.6: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.	Def. Con.
Proportion of Democracies	0.671* (0.406)	0.979** (0.476)
Similarity of Interests		-1.125* (0.666)
Number of Members		0.101* (0.053)
Offense Obligation		1.532*** (0.326)
Consultation Obligation		-0.852*** (0.285)
Constant	-0.337** (0.147)	0.240 (0.643)
Observations	259	259

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.7 and A.8 report our results excluding alliances formed during the Cold War and including a dummy variable for whether the alliance was formed during the Cold War (footnote 9).

Table A.7: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	2.277*** (0.328)	2.151*** (0.339)	1.780*** (0.256)	1.565*** (0.265)
Similarity of Interests		-1.504* (0.896)		-1.641*** (0.578)
Number of Members		-0.104 (0.093)		-0.139* (0.073)
Threat Level		1.464 (1.024)		-0.706 (0.810)
War Time Alliance		-1.585*** (0.466)		-1.223*** (0.377)
Cold War Alliance			-0.327 (0.210)	-0.486* (0.249)
Constant	-1.490*** (0.182)	-0.015 (0.901)	-1.289*** (0.157)	0.769 (0.629)
Observations	346	346	536	536

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.8: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.	Def. Con.	Def. Con.	Def. Con.
Proportion of Democracies	1.272* (0.695)	1.599** (0.719)	0.943** (0.425)	1.076** (0.488)
Similarity of Interests		-0.572 (0.998)		-1.484** (0.710)
Number of Members		-0.029 (0.063)		0.100* (0.054)
Offense Obligation		0.809** (0.401)		1.331*** (0.339)
Consultation Obligation		-0.639* (0.380)		-0.855*** (0.295)
Cold War Alliance			-1.224*** (0.266)	-1.079*** (0.289)
Constant	0.158 (0.204)	0.692 (0.969)	0.205 (0.190)	1.088 (0.708)
Observations	131	131	260	260

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.9 and A.10 report our results excluding alliances formed with the US and including a dummy variable for whether the alliance was formed with the US (footnote 9).

Table A.9: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.932*** (0.262)	1.685*** (0.271)	1.883*** (0.258)	1.647*** (0.266)
Similarity of Interests		-3.211*** (0.733)		-2.734*** (0.693)
Number of Members		-0.170* (0.103)		-0.105 (0.076)
Threat Level		-1.610** (0.774)		-1.825** (0.759)
War Time Alliance		-1.203*** (0.410)		-1.142*** (0.381)
US Alliance			-1.164** (0.521)	-2.110*** (0.650)
Constant	-1.400*** (0.141)	2.169*** (0.762)	-1.382*** (0.139)	1.693** (0.709)
Observations	510	510	536	536

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.10: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.	Def. Con.	Def. Con.	Def. Con.
Proportion of Democracies	0.613 (0.442)	0.874* (0.493)	0.533 (0.426)	0.984** (0.478)
Similarity of Interests		-1.767* (0.916)		-0.998 (0.806)
Number of Members		0.107 (0.076)		0.102* (0.055)
Offense Obligation		1.536*** (0.331)		1.541*** (0.326)
Consultation Obligation		-0.856*** (0.295)		-0.860*** (0.286)
US Alliance			0.682 (0.514)	0.232 (0.689)
Constant	-0.368** (0.149)	0.775 (0.852)	-0.355** (0.148)	0.121 (0.741)
Observations	240	240	260	260

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.11 and A.12 report our results dropping alliances (ATOPIDs 4810 & 4985) that started out as nonaggression pacts but have different obligations in later phases (footnote 10).

Table A.11: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.814*** (0.255)	1.598*** (0.264)
Similarity of Interests		-1.457** (0.575)
Number of Members		-0.147* (0.078)
Threat Level		-1.398* (0.737)
War Time Alliance		-1.113*** (0.375)
Constant	-1.415*** (0.140)	0.606 (0.633)
Observations	534	534

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.12: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.	Def. Con.
Proportion of Democracies	0.707* (0.403)	0.981** (0.475)
Similarity of Interests		-1.194* (0.668)
Number of Members		0.093* (0.054)
Offense Obligation		1.535*** (0.326)
Consultation Obligation		-0.859*** (0.286)
Constant	-0.345** (0.148)	0.317 (0.649)
Observations	259	259

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.13 reports our results testing Hypothesis 1 with a recoded dependent variable that includes consultation pacts that have neutrality obligations (footnote 11).

Table A.13: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	2.290*** (0.265)	2.139*** (0.279)
Similarity of Interests		-0.788 (0.586)
Number of Members		-0.197** (0.080)
Threat Level		-2.295*** (0.719)
War Time Alliance		-1.428*** (0.367)
Constant	-1.148*** (0.131)	0.681 (0.635)
Observations	536	536

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.14 reports our results testing Hypothesis 1 excluding the 44 alliances that only include neutrality obligations (footnote 11).

Table A.14: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.809*** (0.262)	1.541*** (0.273)
Similarity of Interests		-1.466** (0.585)
Number of Members		-0.157** (0.075)
Threat Level		-2.117*** (0.766)
War Time Alliance		-1.217*** (0.381)
Constant	-1.278*** (0.141)	0.987 (0.649)
Observations	492	492

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.15 and A.16 report our results testing our hypotheses dropping alliance members that are missing Polity2 scores (footnote 12).

Table A.15: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.982*** (0.264)	1.762*** (0.273)
Similarity of Interests		-1.371** (0.574)
Number of Members		-0.115 (0.070)
Threat Level		-1.291* (0.738)
War Time Alliance		-1.114*** (0.374)
Constant	-1.443*** (0.141)	0.411 (0.627)
Observations	533	533

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.16: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.	Def. Con.
Proportion of Democracies	1.270*** (0.457)	1.643*** (0.541)
Similarity of Interests		-0.804 (0.678)
Number of Members		0.120** (0.055)
Offense Obligation		1.546*** (0.328)
Consultation Obligation		-0.863*** (0.289)
Constant	-0.397*** (0.148)	-0.148 (0.660)
Observations	257	257

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.17 and A.18 report our results dropping an alliance (ATOPID 2550) that included occupied member states (footnote 12).

Table A.17: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.801*** (0.255)	1.586*** (0.264)
Similarity of Interests		-1.451** (0.572)
Number of Members		-0.135* (0.073)
Threat Level		-1.405* (0.734)
War Time Alliance		-1.120*** (0.374)
Constant	-1.403*** (0.140)	0.588 (0.626)
Observations	535	535

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.18: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.	Def. Con.
Proportion of Democracies	0.715* (0.402)	0.999** (0.475)
Similarity of Interests		-1.154* (0.667)
Number of Members		0.105* (0.054)
Offense Obligation		1.532*** (0.327)
Consultation Obligation		-0.851*** (0.286)
Constant	-0.347** (0.148)	0.251 (0.646)
Observations	259	259

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Tables A.19 and A.20 report our results testing our hypotheses controlling for similarity of interests using the mean of all the alliance members s-score (page 17).

Table A.19: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.593*** (0.264)
Similarity of Interests	-1.473** (0.616)
Number of Members	-0.090 (0.068)
Threat Level	-1.373* (0.734)
War Time Alliance	-1.108*** (0.374)
Constant	0.509 (0.618)
Observations	536

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.20: Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815 to 2003

	Def. Con.
Proportion of Democracies	0.984** (0.474)
Similarity of Interests	-1.354* (0.737)
Number of Members	0.132** (0.053)
Offense Obligation	1.548*** (0.327)
Consultation Obligation	-0.843*** (0.286)
Constant	0.361 (0.673)
Observations	260

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.21 reports our results testing Hypothesis 1 controlling for the mean level of threat of all the alliance members (page 17).

Table A.21: Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815 to 2003

	Consul
Proportion of Democracies	1.603*** (0.263)
Similarity of Interests	-1.314** (0.552)
Number of Members	-0.140* (0.073)
Threat Level	-1.691** (0.860)
War Time Alliance	-1.120*** (0.371)
Constant	0.480 (0.593)
Observations	536

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.22 reports our results testing Hypothesis 1 with a sample that includes five times more zeros than ones on the dependent variable using a Two-Part model. We also reproduce the results with ten times more zeros shown in Table 1 of the main text for comparison (footnote 16).

Table A.22: Two-Part Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815-2003

	Two-Part Model		Two-Part Model	
	10 times more zeros		5 times more zeros	
	Consul	Alliance	Consul	Alliance
Proportion of Democracies	1.59*** (0.27)	0.10 (0.15)	1.59*** (0.27)	0.12 (0.15)
Similarity of Interests	-1.45** (0.60)	0.28 (0.37)	-1.45** (0.60)	0.17 (0.35)
Number of Members	-0.14** (0.07)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.14** (0.07)	0.04* (0.02)
Threat Level	-1.41** (0.65)	-2.20*** (0.37)	-1.41** (0.65)	-2.32*** (0.36)
War Time	-1.12*** (0.40)	-0.04 (0.14)	-1.12*** (0.35)	-0.02 (0.14)
Constant	0.59 (0.62)	-2.07*** (0.39)	0.59 (0.62)	-1.26*** (0.37)
Observations	536	5896	536	3216

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Table A.23 reports our results testing Hypothesis 2 with a sample that includes five times more zeros than ones on the dependent variable using a Two-Part model. We also reproduce the results with ten times more zeros shown in Table 2 of the main text for comparison (footnote 16).

Table A.23: Two-Part Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815-2003

	Two-Part Model		Two-Part Model	
	10 times more zeros		5 times more zeros	
	Def. Con.	Defense	Def. Con.	Defense
Proportion of Democracies	1.00** (0.47)	-1.22*** (0.25)	1.00** (0.47)	-1.19*** (0.25)
Similarity of Interests	-1.15 (0.73)	1.54*** (0.50)	-1.15 (0.73)	1.28*** (0.48)
Number of Members	0.11* (0.06)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11* (0.06)	0.10*** (0.03)
Offense Obligation	1.54*** (0.31)		1.54*** (0.31)	
Consultation Obligation	-0.85*** (0.28)		-0.85*** (0.28)	
Constant	0.24 (0.68)	-4.28*** (0.46)	0.24 (0.68)	-3.42*** (0.44)
Observations	260	5896	260	3216

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Table A.24 reports our results testing Hypothesis 1 with a multinomial logit model. The dependent variable for the multinomial logit model is an unordered three category dependent variable. This variable adds the outcome of forming no alliance. We estimate the model with a sample that includes five times more zeros than ones on the dependent variable and with a sample that includes ten times more zeros than ones on the dependent variable (footnotes 15 and 16, pages 19-21).

Table A.24: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Alliance Consultation, 1815-2003

	Multinomial Logit 10 times more zeros			Multinomial Logit 5 times more zeros		
	Consul vs Other	Consul vs None	Other vs None	Consul vs Other	Consul vs None	Other vs None
	Proportion of Democracies	1.96*** (0.28)	1.33*** (0.22)	-0.62*** (0.18)	1.88*** (0.27)	1.31*** (0.22)
Similarity of Interests	-2.40*** (0.61)	-1.37*** (0.49)	1.02*** (0.38)	-2.18*** (0.60)	-1.34*** (0.49)	0.83** (0.37)
Number of Members	-0.14** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.07)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.07** (0.02)
Threat Level	-2.40*** (0.72)	-3.96*** (0.63)	-1.56*** (0.37)	-2.23*** (0.72)	-3.97*** (0.64)	-1.73*** (0.38)
War Time Alliance	-0.72** (0.35)	-0.60* (0.32)	0.12 (0.15)	-0.79** (0.35)	-0.64** (0.32)	0.15 (0.16)
Constant	1.40** (0.67)	-1.73*** (0.55)	-3.13 (0.40)	1.22* (0.65)	-1.01* (0.55)	-2.24*** (0.40)
Observations	5896			3216		

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Hausman test for IIA: $p = 0.07$, do not reject IIA.

Table A.25 reports our results testing Hypothesis 2 with a multinomial logit model. The dependent variable for the multinomial logit model is an unordered four category dependent variable – defensive alliance with conditionality, defensive alliance without conditionality, other alliances, and no alliance. Defensive alliance without conditionality is used as the baseline category. We estimate the model with a sample that includes five times more zeros than ones on the dependent variable and with a sample that includes ten times more zeros than ones on the dependent variable (footnotes 15 and 16, pages 19, 20, and 24).

Table A.25: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Defense Alliance Conditionality, 1815-2003

	Multinomial Logit 10 times more zeros			Multinomial Logit 5 times more zeros		
	Def.Con. vs Def.	None vs Def.	Other vs Def.	Def.Con. vs Def.	None vs Def.	Other vs Def.
Proportion of Democracies	0.78* (0.45)	1.56*** (0.33)	2.51*** (0.38)	0.74* (0.45)	1.48*** (0.33)	2.41*** (0.38)
Similarity of Interests	-1.72** (0.75)	-2.46*** (0.57)	-1.34* (0.70)	-1.63** (0.73)	-2.18*** (0.56)	-1.17** (0.69)
Number of Members	0.003 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.21** (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.09*** (0.04)	-0.21** (0.08)
Constant	1.03 (0.70)	5.53*** (0.53)	1.18* (0.68)	0.94* (0.68)	4.62*** (0.53)	1.06*** (0.68)
Observations	5896			3216		

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Hausman test for IIA: $p = 0.08$, do not reject IIA.

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