Electricity grids and geopolitics: A game-theoretic analysis of the synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity networks with Continental Europe

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dc.citation.articleNumber114068en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleEnergy Policyen_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber188en_US
dc.contributor.authorFang, Songyingen_US
dc.contributor.authorJaffe, Amy Myersen_US
dc.contributor.authorLoch-Temzelides, Teden_US
dc.contributor.authorLo Prete, Chiaraen_US
dc.contributor.orgBaker Institute for Public Policyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-07T19:14:59Zen_US
dc.date.available2024-08-07T19:14:59Zen_US
dc.date.issued2024en_US
dc.description.abstractCan supply of electricity be used as an energy weapon? This question rises in importance as more countries trade electricity across borders to smooth out grid stability issues and improve cost-efficient dispatching across large geographic areas. In the context of the Baltics’ disentanglement from the BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) electricity grid and synchronization with Europe, we develop a game-theoretic model and examine the strategies of the involved parties in light of the potential for electricity trade to be used as a geopolitical weapon. We conceptualize the process of the synchronization project as a sequential-move game between three actors (Russia, the Baltic states, and the EU-U.S.). Our findings suggest that, in large part due to reputational concerns, Russia is unlikely to cooperate in the synchronization process. Instead, our model predicts that Russia will not wait for the Baltic states to complete their synchronization with the European grid before disconnecting them from the BRELL system. Direct Russian cyberattacks against Baltic grids are not implemented and the Baltics do not have to make concessions, provided that Western allies signal a strong likelihood of deterrent retaliation. We offer policy recommendations for Europe, Russia and the Baltic states.en_US
dc.identifier.citationFang, S., Jaffe, A. M., Loch-Temzelides, T., & Lo Prete, C. (2024). Electricity grids and geopolitics: A game-theoretic analysis of the synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity networks with Continental Europe. Energy Policy, 188, 114068. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114068en_US
dc.identifier.digital1-s2-0-S0301421524000880-mainen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114068en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/117592en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsExcept where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC BY-NC-ND) license.  Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the terms of the license or beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.titleElectricity grids and geopolitics: A game-theoretic analysis of the synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity networks with Continental Europeen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpublisher versionen_US
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