Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game

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dc.citation.articleNumbere0157840
dc.citation.issueNumber8en_US
dc.citation.journalTitlePLoS ONEen_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber11en_US
dc.contributor.authorEckel, Catherine C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFatas, Enriqueen_US
dc.contributor.authorGodoy, Saraen_US
dc.contributor.authorWilson, Rick K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-03T17:59:26Z
dc.date.available2017-01-03T17:59:26Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.description.abstractWhen groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.en_US
dc.identifier.citationEckel, Catherine C., Fatas, Enrique, Godoy, Sara, et al.. "Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game." <i>PLoS ONE,</i> 11, no. 8 (2016) Public Library of Science: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0157840.
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0157840en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/93733
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherPublic Library of Science
dc.rightsThis is an open access article distributed under the terms of theﾠCreative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.titleGroup-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Gameen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpublisher versionen_US
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