Does cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the lab

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dc.citation.firstpage1092
dc.citation.issueNumber3
dc.citation.journalTitleEconomic Inquiry
dc.citation.lastpage1110
dc.citation.volumeNumber60
dc.contributor.authorBanuri,Sheheryar
dc.contributor.authorEckel, Catherine
dc.contributor.authorWilson, Rick K.
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-08T17:02:34Z
dc.date.available2022-06-08T17:02:34Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractCronyism in firms arises when favoritism toward an ingroup affects personnel decisions. Two main motives underlie cronyism: profit, if an ingroup employee works harder; or altruism, if used to transfer resources. In a lab-experiment trust game with naturally-occurring groups, an employer (proposer) faces an employee (responder) who is or is not an ingroup member. We see that both motives play a role. Cronyism is more likely from employers who are more altruistic to the ingroup in a dictator game; and even low-productivity (by design) ingroup members reciprocate trust generously. Cronyism pays for those who engage in it.
dc.identifier.citationBanuri,Sheheryar, Eckel, Catherine and Wilson, Rick K.. "Does cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the lab." <i>Economic Inquiry,</i> 60, no. 3 (2022) Wiley: 1092-1110. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13080.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13080
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/112459
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley
dc.rightsThis is an author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by Wiley.
dc.titleDoes cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the lab
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.publicationpost-print
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