Does cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the lab

dc.citation.firstpage1092en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleEconomic Inquiryen_US
dc.citation.lastpage1110en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber60en_US
dc.contributor.authorBanuri,Sheheryaren_US
dc.contributor.authorEckel, Catherineen_US
dc.contributor.authorWilson, Rick K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-08T17:02:34Zen_US
dc.date.available2022-06-08T17:02:34Zen_US
dc.date.issued2022en_US
dc.description.abstractCronyism in firms arises when favoritism toward an ingroup affects personnel decisions. Two main motives underlie cronyism: profit, if an ingroup employee works harder; or altruism, if used to transfer resources. In a lab-experiment trust game with naturally-occurring groups, an employer (proposer) faces an employee (responder) who is or is not an ingroup member. We see that both motives play a role. Cronyism is more likely from employers who are more altruistic to the ingroup in a dictator game; and even low-productivity (by design) ingroup members reciprocate trust generously. Cronyism pays for those who engage in it.en_US
dc.identifier.citationBanuri,Sheheryar, Eckel, Catherine and Wilson, Rick K.. "Does cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the lab." <i>Economic Inquiry,</i> 60, no. 3 (2022) Wiley: 1092-1110. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13080.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13080en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/112459en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.rightsThis is an author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by Wiley.en_US
dc.titleDoes cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the laben_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpost-printen_US
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