


THE SARMATIAN REVIEW

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Surviving the Holocaust



Marcus David Leuchter in Houston, Texas, May 2000. Photo by James R. Thompson.

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From the Editor

As Peter Novick pointed out in *The Holocaust in American Life* (1999), in the 1970s and '80s in the United States the Holocaust was shifted from the category of an historical event to the category of ideology. Novick's book may be interpreted as a call for a literature of bare facts rather than generalities about the Holocaust. Marcus Leuchter's story of survival is a collection of such facts. To survive in conditions of Nazi and Soviet occupation was a daunting task for Polish gentiles; to survive in Nazi-occupied Warsaw and Kraków was an incomparably more daunting task for Polish Jews. In conditions of the atomization of society which terror imposes, it took hundreds of people to hide one Jew or Jewess; Marcus Leuchter was fortunate enough to find not one traitor among those hundreds of Polish gentiles who knew about his background. At the same time, in conditions of mortal danger he helped many other human beings, gentiles and Jews alike, and he showed the kind of courage and nobility of spirit that is rare in peacetime, let alone under terror. If anyone deserves recognition for courage and humaneness in situations where hope is all but impossible, it is Dr. Leuchter.

His account also makes clear, one more time, that the planners of the Holocaust displayed the kind of ingenuity that is alien to American thinking. They started with separating Jews from gentiles in a move that was not instantly perceived as totally disastrous by a great many Jews. In the Ghetto, the Jews had their own Jewish police and Jewish administration, a benefit of which they were deprived in pre-war Poland where the civil and police authorities were mostly gentile. Likewise, deportations to the camps were organized in such a way that Jewish clerks and Jewish police (under the supervision of the Nazis of course) were in charge of the process of registering, filling out forms, organizing logistics and marshalling people to railway carriages. Since fellow Jews were in charge of the operation, many Jews trustingly went on and volunteered for "labor" or "resettlement in the East."

The mechanism of the Holocaust should teach humility to us all. How easy it is to participate in a process which ultimately leads to the destruction of other human beings. And how few acts of heroism happen in circumstances when agreeing to be a clerk in the Ghetto meant better food and perhaps survival of one's family, and when agreeing to shelter a Jew—let alone a Jewish family—on the "gentile" side meant death if caught. In his generosity, Dr. Leuchter remarks that his Holocaust experience taught him that there is something good in every man and woman. But the ease with which human beings slip into the survival mode where "everything goes" if it is necessitated by survival—underscores the importance of institutions and rituals that mitigate human ability to surrender to evil.

On the margin of Dr. Leuchter's splendid testimony, it should be noted that speaking of "Jews and Poles" is troubling, since it implies that Jews cannot be Poles. Rather, in the spirit of Polish multiculturalism that goes back to the sixteenth century, one should speak of Jews and gentiles, or Polish Jews and Polish Christians.

Dr. Jazbec's paper reminds us that diplomacy is needed more than ever in the twenty-first century, and that nation states must have their sovereignty trimmed down by international agreements to assure a modicum of security in the postcommunist world. Dr. Jazbec rightly defends the nation state, pointing out that its multiplication in the postcommunist period indicates its usefulness for maintaining peace and decreasing international tensions.

Among reviews, one dealing with Dr. Marc Ben-Joseph's book on Bank Krajowy merits attention. Professor Anna Dadlez' Letter is a testimony to the generation of Polish gentiles who came to the United States after World War II, or approximately at the same time when Dr. Leuchter did. Professor Cienciala's Letter closes our discussion of Professor Gella's book. And who would not be cheered up by Rodi Wout's "Sarmatian" story?

Finally, we thank all those who joined our readership in the last several months. Δ

The *Sarmatian Review* Index

Demography

Size of the Jewish community in Czechoslovakia in 1930: 356,000, or 2.4 percent of the population of 14.7 million.

Size of the Jewish community in Poland in 1931: 3.1 million, or 9.8 percent of the population of 32 million.

Source: Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle, WA: Univ. of Washington Press, 1974).

Size of the Jewish community in Czechoslovakia in 1939: one percent.

Source: Agence France-Presse, 25 January 2000.

The Polish Holocaust

Number of verified Polish victims of Soviet repression in 1939–1945 listed by the Karta Center in Warsaw during the press conference on 17 April 2000: 566,000.

Estimated number of Poles who fell victim to Soviet repression in 1939–45 but whose cases could not be verified for lack of full documentation: 934,000.

Source: Professor Andrzej Paczkowski, as reported by RFE/RL *Poland, Ukraine and Belarus Report*, vol. 2, no. 16 (25 April 2000).

Polish higher education

Number of students in Polish institutions of higher education in 2000: 1.5 million.

Of these, percentage of students who study in private colleges and universities: 33 percent.

Number of private institutions of higher learning in Poland in 2000: 172.

Source: Professor Józef Szablowski, "Private higher education in Poland," a paper read at the Sixth International Conference on Polish and East Central European Affairs, St. Mary's College, Michigan, 19 May 2000.

Percentage of students who are sons and daughters of farmers among the total student population: two percent.

Source: Professor Zbigniew Stachowski, "College of Socio-Economics in Tyczyn," a paper read at the Sixth International Conference on Polish and East Central European Affairs, St. Mary's College, Michigan, 19 May 2000.

Life and death

Number of Iraqi children who died of dysentery in December 1989 (before the economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq) and in December 1999, respectively: 101 and 1,576.

Number of Iraqi children who died of malnutrition in December 1989 and December 1999, respectively: 81 and 3,060.

Source: Iraqi health ministry, as reported by *Catholic World Report*, March 2000.

Frequency of infection with TB and syphilis among salespersons in Moscow in 1999: one in 200 infected with TB, one in 100, with syphilis.

Source: Moscow Medical Board, as reported by *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 11 March 2000.

Number of able-bodied Russian men who die 'under the influence of alcohol': 66 percent.

Number of those who die 'completely drunk': half of the above, or 33 percent of able-bodied Russian men.

A sociological study conducted in Moscow and in the Udmurtian Republic, as reported by *Kommersant*, 19 May 2000.

Suicide rate in Poland in 2000: 14.3 per 100,000 inhabitants (same as the European average).

Suicide rates in other European countries: Lithuania, 45.8 per 100,000; Russia, 41.8; Germany, 15.7; Greece, 3.5; Spain, 7.2 per 100,000.

Source: World Health Organization, as reported by AFP, 21 May 2000.

Economy

Amount of money the international De Beers diamond cartel will write off as unrecoverable investment in Severalmaz, a Russian diamond company: \$30 million.

Percentage of ownership of Almazy Rossii-Sakha previously owned by De Beers and now sold because of inhospitable investment conditions in Russia: 27 percent.

Source: UPI (Moscow), 16 May 2000.

Projected Russian external debt in December 2000: \$158 billion (unchanged since December 1999). In December 1998, the debt stood at \$156.6 billion (\$103.5 billion inherited from the Soviet Union and \$54.5 billion borrowed in the last ten years).

Anticipated amount of money Russia should pay in 2000 to service its external debt: \$10.2 billion (\$5.6 billion on the capital owed and \$4.6 billion in interest).

Source: First Vice Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, as reported by AFP (Moscow), 29 March 2000.

Stock market close in Russia on 14 June 2000: 191.25 (-2.08 percent).

Source: Russia Today <www.russiatoday.com/investorinsight/eyeonmarkets.php3>, 14 June 2000.

Economy cont.

Value of the Russian stock market in March 2000: \$36 billion (up 48 percent since Vladimir Putin became acting president).

Source: David McHugh of Associated Press, 21 March 2000.

Percentage of foreign trade of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland that involves countries of the European Union: 64 percent, 69 percent and 67 percent, respectively.

Percentage of foreign trade of these three countries that involves countries of the former USSR: nine percent, five percent, and nine percent, respectively.

Source: Stratfor.com <<http://www.stratfor.com/cis/commentary/0005250124.htm>>, 10 June 2000.

Foreign investment and purchases in the United States in 1999 and 1998: \$282.9 billion and \$215.3 billion, respectively.

Breakdown concerning nations and continents purchasing American goods: Great Britain (\$110.1 billion, or over half of the \$205.2 billion in purchases that came from companies based in Europe); Asia (\$11.5 billion, with Japan accounting for \$8 billion of that amount).

Source: U.S. Commerce Department on 7 June 2000, as reported by *Houston Chronicle*, 8 June 2000.

Amount of money collected by the American IRS in 1999: \$1.7 trillion.

Source: *Economist*, 15–21 April 2000.

Estimated amount of grain Russia needs each year: 75 million tons.

Russian grain harvests in 1998 and 1999, respectively: 47.8 million and 54.7 million tons, respectively.

Source: AFP (Moscow), 13 June 2000.

Decrease in Polish exports in the first two months of 2000: 13.4 percent compared to a year ago, to \$3.99 billion.

The balance of payments deficit in the first two months of 2000: \$949 million.

Unemployment in Poland in March 2000: 13.9 percent.

Inflation in Poland in February 2000: 10.4 percent at an annualised rate, compared with 8.6 percent in 1998 and 9.8 percent in December 1999.

Source: Pierre-Antoine Donnet, "Poland is in the red, economists say," AFP, 12 April 2000.

Beliefs

Percentage of Americans who believe in miracles: 84 percent.

Percentage of Americans who believe in the reality of miracles in the Bible: 79 percent.

Percentage of Americans who say they have experienced or witnessed a miracle: 48 percent.

Source: *Newsweek* magazine poll, *Newsweek*, 1 May 2000.

Percentage of Poles who go to church at least once a week: 51 percent.

Percentage of Poles who go to church only on special occasions: 22 percent.

Percentage of Poles who go to church at least twice a week: seven percent.

Source: PBS Institute poll published by *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 April 2000.

Lifestyles

Decrease in the consumption of alcohol in Poland in the last ten years: 40 percent.

Decrease in the consumption of vodka (as opposed to other alcoholic beverages): from 75 percent to 55–60 percent.

Estimated percentage of alcoholics among Poles: two percent.

Region of Poland where the consumption of alcohol is the lowest and presumed reasons for it: Małopolska, owing to the strong religiosity of the region.

Region of Poland where the consumption of alcohol is the highest and presumed reasons: territories where former sovkhoses (PGR-y) were located (Ślupsk, Koszalin voivodships); territories bordering on Belarus and Lithuania where unemployment is high.

Source: *Rzeczpospolita*, 6 May 2000.

Percentage of adult Russian men and women who smoke: 65 percent and 30 percent.

Percentage of boys and girls aged 14–15 in Russia's urban areas who smoke: 20 percent and 11 percent.

Source: AFP, 24 May 2000.

Central Europe in NATO

Reduction in the number of top generals in the Polish army undertaken to conform to NATO standards: from 47 to 28.

Corresponding reductions in numbers of colonels: from 329 to 124; lieutenants-colonels: from 333 to 215.

Reduction in the number of departments in the Polish armed forces: from 15 to seven.

Reduction in the number of departments in the defense ministry: from 32 to 26.

Source: Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, as reported by AFP (Warsaw), 11 April 2000.

Reflections on the Holocaust

Marcus David Leuchter

When World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, I was 29 years old and, like the entire population of my country—gentiles and Jews alike—I was totally unprepared for the things to come. My main assets were a high degree of education, a well-developed brain capable of fast thinking, and a deep basic belief that any human being has something good in him or her. If all of us have been created by God, then God's fingerprints are all over us, and no human being is entirely devoid of kindness; and to me, kindness means humanity—a realization that all of us are members of an enormous human family called the human race.

Armed with this and hardly any financial resources to speak of, I survived

the Ghetto in German-occupied Kraków

two years of hiding in German-occupied Warsaw

the ill-fated Polish [gentile] uprising in Warsaw in August 1944

the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen

the slave labor camp near Berlin

Having escaped from the Ghetto, I assumed a Polish gentile identity. While everybody around me knew, or at least suspected, that I was a Jew, *nobody betrayed me*. On February 1, 1945, or two and a half months before the war ended, I was even able to fool the Gestapo [*Geheime Staatspolizei*, Secret State Police famous for atrocities and torture] into releasing me from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and sending me to a survivable slave labor camp. And all the time, I was able to maintain contact with my wife who was incarcerated in the Ravensbrück concentration camp famous for medical experiments on prisoners.

It is impossible to describe all the “happenings” of this horrifying period which ended with my liberation on May 8, 1945, without turning this lecture into an autobiography. I will limit myself to describing only those events which will give the reader the “feel” of the situation and appreciation of the most unexpected outcome.

Before the Kraków Ghetto was established on March 4, 1941, I decided to visit my parents who were landowners in a small village near Tarnów, some 60 kilometers from Kraków. Thanks to my pre-war connections with an Austrian (now German) factory for which I did legal work before 1939, I was able to get with them a job and a permit to use trains, from which Jews had already been barred.

A Jew picked up on a train without a permit was executed on the spot. The problem was that the German police did not even want to look at the permit. When they picked me up on the train and I tried to produce my permit, the young SS-man [*Schutzstaffel*, Blackshirts] hit my face with his fist and started leading me to the place of execution.

At that moment I got a crazy idea: since any effort to talk would have led to further blows on my head, I started singing a German song which I learned attending a German school in the Sudetenland during World War I: “*Wenn du noch eine Mutter hast / So danke Gott und sei zufrieden*. . .” This startled the SS-man and he asked me, “*Wer bist du?*” This gave me a chance to start talking, and he put his gun away and listened. He even stamped the travel permit that was not valid in his district, and let me go. He had a semblance of a smile on his face when he did that. The [Nazi] Law of the Land mandated him to execute me, but he disobeyed it. I survived because I was able to reach something good in him that changed his mind. I had the feeling that he felt good about the whole incident. For me, it was quite an experience that repeated itself many times later on during the war.

I reached my destination without further trouble. Since the SS-man did not confiscate the package I was carrying, I was able to treat my mother to some good coffee, and the local Catholic priest to a bottle of sacramental wine which was still available in Kraków.

Shortly afterwards, the Germans announced that the number of Jews in Kraków has to be reduced, and urged voluntary evacuation with the right to take along all belongings, up to a certain date, after which mandatory evacuation with only 44 lbs. of personal belongings would be allowed. Since neither my fiancée nor her mother could hope to get a residential permit in Kraków, it was decided that they should move to my parents' village which appeared to be a paradise of peace and tranquility at that time. Since trains were too risky, I had to find alternate means of transportation to that village.

The solution was simple but still risky: in the factory in which I worked, I organized a bicycle club that included two ethnic Germans. Since the Germans had the right to display swastikas on their bikes, the Polish police would not dare stop them, while the German police just waved and smiled. Of course, had they stopped us, I would have been executed on the spot, and my companions would have been sent to Auschwitz. Considering the fact that it took six hours of pedaling to reach the village, I obviously had devoted friends helping me.

On March 1, 1941, a new announcement came: by March 20, every Jew had to move into a Ghetto created on the east side of the River Vistula. A very poor suburb

of Kraków named Podgórze had been inhabited by some 3,000 Poles and had only 320 houses. The Poles were ordered out, and 15,000 Jews (those with permits to stay in Kraków) were ordered in. The houses were mostly in bad condition, some without floors or sanitary facilities. In other words, slum conditions. The Jewish Community Council had a difficult time in allocating living space: at first, it was three persons per window, later, four persons. I found myself living with three other men. But it was unprecedented camaraderie. We discovered that even under these miserable conditions, life can go on. Social life was easy in this small area, and we had some unexpected pleasures listening to some well known popular entertainers, among them poet and singer Mordecai Gebirtig (murdered on "bloody Thursday," June 4, 1942).

I had a permit to work in my Austrian factory. At that time, permits to work outside the Ghetto were relatively easy to obtain, owing to the cooperation of the Director of the Jewish Labor Force in the Ghetto, an Austrian named Szepessy. Because of his help to Jews, Szepessy was later arrested by the SS, sent to a concentration camp, and hanged.

The "thinning out" of the number of Jews continued; we suffered continuing raids by the Jewish police arresting all Jews who had no residence permits. The brutality of the Jewish police force was unexpected; in the number of people they caught, they even exceeded the demands of the Germans. Many times, with the permission of my bosses, I stayed over at my factory sleeping on a desk or on a pile of cardboard, but without fear; I also listened to the radio which the factory was permitted to have as a German-owned enterprise. As a matter of fact, it was my own radio which I brought to the factory for safekeeping, instead of turning it over to the German authorities as ordered.

During one of the bicycle trips to visit my fiancée, I learned that by October 20, 1941, she would have to move to a nearby Ghetto (by then, ghettos had been set up in the countryside as well). It became necessary to move Theresa and her mother back to Kraków and into "my" Ghetto, a formidable task because Jews were not allowed to leave their district under penalty of death, and of course using a train was also punishable by death.

I decided on a flimsy, almost laughable plan: to hire a Polish policeman, a certain Mr. Mazurkiewicz, who would "arrest" us and bring us back to Kraków. While the policeman's authority was limited to the Kraków area only, his uniform was the same as in any other city [under German occupation], and his presence eliminated the danger of being denounced by Polish passengers on the train. But there was absolutely no protection against the Ger-

man police, except that I had a train permit and also a letter showing that Theresa would be permitted to enter the Ghetto as soon as she reached Kraków. If we ran into a German policeman, the presence of a Polish policeman would prevent the German from shooting us on the spot, and we might have an opportunity to talk and persuade him. . . a tremendous gamble not only for us but for the Polish policeman as well.

Theresa's mother left one day before our arrival. Our neighbor, Jan Konarski (the grandfather of Grazyna Wojciechowski who now lives in Houston, Texas), provided for my future mother-in-law a fake Polish ID card, so that she was able to disappear from the village. Mr. Mazurkiewicz decided to take the two o'clock night train, and we went to the train station several kilometers away. I was flanked by my mother and by Theresa, while Mr. Konarski walked with my father who was sobbing all the way. My mother did most of the talking, assuring me that I was getting the most wonderful girl who would never fail me. She was so right. When the train showed up—and we had but one minute to board it—both my parents kissed my hand and my mother said simply, "So I will never see you again." And she never did.

We completed the journey without the slighted difficulty and went straight to the German office where a brand new ID was ready for Theresa with her married name, compliments of the German official, Mr. Grün, who did not even ask for our marriage license which we did not have because we were not married yet. He even handed Theresa a special present secured by my factory: a pass to enter and leave the Ghetto freely. Mr. Mazurkiewicz insisted on getting us into the Ghetto, carrying Theresa's suitcase so that it was protected from being confiscated at the Ghetto gate. When time came to pay him, he refused to accept any money. Thus we received a wedding present from a total stranger whose soul we were able to reach.

I failed to mention earlier that I was able to secure living space for us: one half of a kitchen, with enough space for a single bed, one small table, one chair and a small closet for our belongings. A low wood partition separated us from the ever-burning stove located just a couple of feet away. There was no running water in the kitchen, and the only toilet facility was in the apartment of the Zajdner family, who owned the place. Before World War II, the Zajdners owned a metal ware factory that later became the backbone of the Schindler plant.

Almost all my friends were of the opinion that one must be crazy to get married "in these days of terrible uncertainty," as they put it. But we stuck to our plans and decided on a wedding date: October 21, 1941. The Zajdners and some other friends made all the arrangements: the

Rabbi, dinner, etc. Some humor crept into the preparations when our landlady, Ruhele Zajdner, decided to bake a wedding cake. She diligently gathered all possible recipes and followed them to the letter, except for butter. When the cake arrived at the table, it was literally floating in a sea of butter. Ruhele simply remarked in Yiddish, "Butter cannot hurt." The cake tasted so wonderful that we finished it up in no time, and we licked our plates so clean that they did not have to be washed after the meal.

But we received two reminders of our grim situation. As I was walking home before the wedding, I heard a man's voice calling me by my nickname known only to very few people. I had trouble recognizing the man because of his shabby appearance. He was Izzy Bauminger who worked closely with me when I served as Secretary General of the Students' Union at Jagiellonian University. I invited him to come to the wedding and helped him to wash up for that occasion. My landlord permitted him to sleep on the floor at the entrance of our house, and I gave him one of my two pillows. When leaving next morning, Bauminger left the pillow on the floor, but I would not even touch it: it was crawling with lice.

Then the Rabbi reproached me: "You are all rich people, and I and my students are starving. Please help us." He told us that he was teaching several Talmudic students who came to the Ghetto illegally after their small Jewish communities had been destroyed. Those kids were searching for a place to continue learning, because that was all they knew how to do. Of course we did help for some time, but it did not last long: the Jewish police picked them up on one of their daily raids. Except for our landlord who was really rich, the rest of us led a hand-to-mouth existence. I was able to buy for Theresa only one rose; I could not afford more. But I did buy one because what is a wedding without at least one rose to make HER happy?

The situation in the Ghetto was getting tougher by the day because the Germans were constantly pressing for more deportations to reduce the Ghetto population, and the Jewish police were in charge of finding illegals. Many a time they even tore up residence permits to get their victims, and in some cases they blackmailed legal residents.

On December 1, 1941, the Jewish Post Office was closed. This cut off the flow of food from the Polish [gentile] side [of Kraków], and food prices skyrocketed. On December 27, 1941, Jews had to give up fur coats, allegedly needed to keep the German army from freezing. Fur coats for us were not a luxury but a necessity, but non-compliance was punishable by being shot on the spot.

Early in 1942, the Jewish police were ordered to pre-

pare lists of women aged 14–25. These women were then marched off to the German Health Center for anthropological and gynecological examinations. I was able to get my wife off that list by bribing a policeman.

In March 1942, another resettlement order came, and our police delivered 1,500 persons. But this time, we received a horrifying report from a dental technician—his name was Bachner—that the entire transport had been gassed upon arrival at Belzec. Bachner escaped by hiding at the bottom of a latrine for several days. His main complaint about those days was not the smell but the flies swarming around his head. With the help of a Polish gentile farmer, Bachner returned to Kraków and shared with us the news of our impending doom. The time came to run but we were not quite ready yet. We still had to wait for our "Aryan" papers.

The next deportation period began on May 28, 1942. It turned into the first real pogrom in our Ghetto. On that day, the Ghetto was sealed off by heavily armed German police units, and unprecedented acts of brutality unfolded before our eyes. Everybody had to get a stamp in his ID to be saved from deportation. Receiving a stamp depended entirely on the whim of the SS-man. Logic no longer applied. Suddenly, I saw Mr. Spira, the Chief of the Jewish police, running around like mad and yelling, "I need 5,000 people for resettlement and I only have 2,000. All stamps are now invalid, and you have to get a blue slip permitting you to stay in the Ghetto." Everybody had to go through a building to get the blue slip. Many people entered; only a few came out with the slip. The rest were detained for immediate deportation, and they were brutally pushed to the assembly place.

It was already early afternoon and I was still outside, hesitating as to when to enter. Suddenly, a young woman came out, obviously for a work break. I recognized her immediately. She was Yanka Reinhold, a fellow [Jewish] student from the Law School at Jagiellonian University. The SS recruited her for that day to work as a secretary. Yanka told me that her SS-man was an "angel" who listened to people, and she advised me to come to her desk. It worked: I presented my case properly, she gave him a nod and slowly, very slowly, he reached out for a blue slip. It looked as if he was savoring every movement of this life-giving action. The same procedure followed when I asked for a slip for my wife. He had every right to refuse, but Yanka gave a nod and I got a slip for Theresa who had been waiting outside. When I came out, both of us thought that Heaven had smiled on us.

After this "action," everything calmed down in the Ghetto, and we continued our preparations for the escape. Our Polish ID cards were ready to be picked up on

June 21, 1942, in the City Hall of Kraków. Accompanied by our Polish friends who made all the arrangements, we took the risk of picking them up personally, and Theresa's mother also got her card: she had been living with Polish friends in Kraków waiting for our escape. We gave our new cards for safekeeping to a Polish friend of mine, Mrs. Flora Ostrowska, who lived close to the Ghetto. My new name was Feliks Lednicki. Finally, the moment to run away came. We learned that another "action" [deportation] would take place October 28, 1942. On October 25, we walked out of the Ghetto with a group of workers, and met my mother-in-law at Mrs. Ostrowska's place where we also picked up our papers. Then, we took a night train to Warsaw. When we arrived there in the morning, I was picked up immediately by a Polish [gentile] policeman who blackmailed us, but let us go after he took everything we had including my overcoat.

I knew only one Polish gentile in Warsaw: Wacław Smolec. We went there; he greeted us very cordially, but made it immediately clear that he could not help us because helping a Jew was punishable by death [of the entire family]; and he and his wife had a child. Since I remembered the Polish name of a friend of mine who had escaped from the Ghetto before we did, I sent my mother-in-law to the registration office to find out where he lived. It turned out that he lived nearby. We walked over to his place at curfew time. He greeted us very cordially, but then his Jewish girlfriend showed up; she was a personification of fury, and wanted us to leave immediately. Without her knowledge, the [gentile] landlady allowed us to stay a couple of days, until mother found a room in the apartment of Mrs. Eugenia Sawicki, who had three children aged 12, 16, and 18. Her husband was living in their country home near Warsaw. Since all schools were closed by the Germans, and the children were quite anxious to continue their education, it looked like we found a good teaching position. A miracle: they did not even realize that we were Jews.

Unfortunately, this did not last long. Our landlady's nephew, who had been released from a POW camp in Germany, had to pass through Warsaw on his way home, and he decided to stay for a few days at his aunt's place. When he saw us, he immediately realized that there was a chance to make some money. He brought in a gang of blackmailers who robbed us clean and took our Polish ID cards. Now Mrs. Sawicki realized who we were, but she never told us that she knew we were Jewish. Most probably she was influenced by her children, and she informed us that we could stay provided we got back our ID cards. A heartwarming offer but quite meaningless, because we did not know how to go about getting back those IDs.

But something unexpected happened. Two depressing days later, there was a knock at the door, and an unknown woman came in to advise us to move to a different location because the police knew who we were, and we had to move to save our lives. Suddenly Janusz Sawicki, the 16-year-old son of our landlady, grabbed her handbag and found our ID cards right there. I then saw that, again, I reached the soul of a stranger who decided to help me. Further proof came when Mrs. Sawicki, who was getting scared, decided [some time later] to give us a month's notice. Janusz then took a train to see his father who had never met us; before World War II, that Mr. Sawicki was an anti-Semite who used to chase Jews away with dogs. Janusz came back with an order from the father: "They stay." The Sawicki family suffered with us for two years, risking their lives for us without any financial advantages.

On August 1, 1944, the Polish Underground Army started a revolution in an effort to liberate Poland's capital so that the advancing Russians would not get credit for it [and Poland would have a chance to regain independence after World War II]. The revolution failed; the Germans squashed it by burning down every house and evacuating everybody in Warsaw to the town of Pruszków. There, we were all guarded by Latvians and Ukrainians who were part of the German army. All of a sudden, we saw that brutal treatment was not reserved for Jews only. Killings and rape were the order of the day. I saw a frightening scene. A boy and a girl ran up to a wagon loaded with bread for soldiers. Two shots rang out. The boy escaped, but the girl fell to the ground lying still and lifeless. A soldier came by, kicked her with his heavy boot, and shot her in the head. After that, he grabbed her leg and dragged her to a garbage pile.

The Germans announced that we [Poles from Warsaw] would be taken to Germany for work, and that we would be housed temporarily in a concentration camp where we would get food and shelter, and then we would be sent to free labor camps. Women were separated from us. Of course I was scared that someone would denounce me as a Jew. Somehow, probably because everybody had his own troubles, this did not happen.

When I was already in the camp, I started looking around and came across a young man trying to mend his pants. He told me that he had learned to do it when he was a boy scout. Since Jews were not admitted to the boy scout movement, I sensed that he did not like me, and I began to walk away, saying that I hoped that he would have enough thread to fix his pants. Suddenly, he called me back asking, "How big is your hole?" And he sewed my pants too. Somehow I got through to another human being who undoubtedly knew that I was a Jew.

All of us in the camp had one question on our minds: where were our wives? Soon I found out that as a prisoner, I had the right to appear before the camp commander. I took that risk and was startled when he asked me, “*Was wünschen Sie?*” This unexpectedly polite question filled me with hope, and I rattled off our thanks for saving us from the Russians; I ended up asking, “For God’s sake, what did you do with our wives?” This touched him, and against all camp rules and regulations, he gave me the unheard-of permission to write to the women’s camp in Ravensbrück asking about my wife. He provided paper, pen, and postage. I expanded this privilege and squeezed on that piece of paper 200 names of my fellow prisoners.

After two weeks, I received a reply from my wife. It listed the names of wives incarcerated at that camp. I suddenly, I became a Polish hero. One of my fellow prisoners, Mr. Szelązek, who had been a well known publisher in Warsaw, asked me whether I was related to a Professor Lednicki at the University of Warsaw. I said he was my cousin. Mr. Szelązek immediately discovered family resemblance: Professor Lednicki had some oriental ancestry, and his friends called him “Bedouin.”

Other similar things followed. Once I went to the camp hospital to get some help. The hospital was manned by French prisoners. Talking to them, I said that whenever I got sick before the war, I followed certain procedures and was cured by them. When translating the word “cured” into French, I mistakenly said “*J’étais curé.*” Little did I know that this meant, in French, “I was a priest.” I realized this only after the Frenchmen around me bowed their heads. The benefit of this error was great: I was able to get help and also some extra food for some of my sick fellow prisoners.

When a typist was needed in the camp office, I was assigned to this job and worked with a Norwegian. When I learned that the Norwegians did not eat camp food because they were getting Red Cross packages, I got their permission to take their portions of camp food to my Polish block. Again I became a hero, and nobody would even think of denouncing me.

This situation did not last long. When the Russians were already reaching Auschwitz, the Germans evacuated some of the surviving inmates, among them the engravers who printed counterfeit dollars and pounds, and the Gestapo informers. They all came to our camp. One of these informers came to the camp office and yelled out my real [Jewish] name. I was in mortal danger, and so I asked my friends in the office to transfer me back to the [Polish] barracks as a *Schreiber*, so that I would not have to go out to the camp grounds and be seen.

While evacuating us from Warsaw, the Germans prom-

ised to use us for work in a labor camp. One of my fellow prisoners was Herbert Kloehe, a German from East Prussia. He headed a building commando that was constructing a luxury home for the camp commander (with whom he had a very special relationship in spite of the fact that he was a prisoner). Herbert agreed to discuss with the camp commander the following idea: during our evacuation from Warsaw, a promise was made that the stay in the concentration camp would be only temporary, and we would be soon moved to a free labor camp. The Sachsenhausen [concentration] camp was getting crowded: over 70,000 prisoners with only 400 guards, most of them being older men not fit to fight at either the eastern or western fronts. The camp population was getting restless sensing the [approaching] fall of Germany. Why not alleviate the tensions by releasing some prisoners from Warsaw as had been promised? The idea worked, and I was put in charge of preparing a list of workmen in professions like carpentry, masonry, automobile repair, etc. Since I could not find even one butcher—and at least one was needed—I put down my own name in that category; this almost tripped me because the question arose, why a prisoner whose documents showed that he was a lawyer wanted to get out as a butcher. When interrogated about this by the camp Gestapo, I gave them a plausible story: born into a butcher family, I did not want to stay in this “stinking” profession. I was able to fool them and was released from the camp on February 1, 1945—two and a half months before the fall of Germany. I am the only Jew in Houston who succeeded in leaving a concentration camp before the end of the war.

Looking back, I came to the conclusion that there is something good in every human being, and because of that, the mind of a human being can be changed. Above all, I discovered that the human mind has no limits and it can produce unbelievable achievements. Δ

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The Small New States in Europe after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and Their Diplomacies

Milan Jazbec

1. The Changed International Environment

An analysis of the changes taking place in the international community on the European continent after the fall of the Berlin Wall leads us to the conclusion that the form these changes took was the result of the simultaneous effects of powerful processes of integration and disintegration.(1) The end of the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall,(2) can be compared to the Peace of Westphalia and the major turning point it represented. The extent of these changes is confirmed by: the huge territory involved (the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, the European part of the former Soviet Union and Transcaucasia), the large number of people involved, the short duration of time in which the changes took place (approximately three years), the large number of states involved, the exceptional social energy that was released and the massive political shifts that occurred. And even now, a decade later, all the consequences of these events have yet to be recognized, particularly those that relate to European stability.

The culmination of the two processes was noticeable in the first half of the 1990s, when the phase of the appearance and international recognition of the new, predominantly small states ended(3) and the stage of acceptance into the Euro-Atlantic international organizations began. In trying to establish where and when these processes culminated and converged, we need to emphasize that they are not yet complete, although it seems at the moment that their intensity is declining.

2. The Nation State and the Small New States

At the heart of these changes is the nation state. Its traditional role, particularly in the twentieth century, has changed considerably, which is why some theoreticians talk about a reduction of its significance and even about its decline. The traditional attributes of its political activities are being altered and partly reshaped by centers of international integration and by the growing significance of the various forms of regional integration.

For our purposes, three types of European-generated states need to be distinguished: pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. As an institution, the pre-modern state did not have the characteristics of the nation state: its function, in addition to that of force, did not extend beyond the

administrative social frame, and the state as a notion did not yet exist in the consciousness of its population. This type of state dominated in the period leading up to the Peace of Westphalia, when the borders between states were, in some cases, unclear and unstable. The traditional or modern state was based on a well-defined territory, a unified population, and a sovereign and exclusive authority that did not allow any interference in its internal jurisdiction. The nineteenth century, when the basic characteristics and elements of the international community were established, created conditions for the appearance of the post-modern state. Its existence has been recognizable for at least the last decade. In this period, the attributes of the traditional nation state, due to the effects of the international processes of integration and disintegration, began to change. The post-modern state is based on a conspicuous and voluntary cooperation, on strong participation in the integration process, and on an openness of its internal jurisdiction, with an obvious acceptance of commonly-agreed rules of conduct.

In the contemporary international community, the nation state remains a basic and most widespread subject of international law.

The appearance of a large number of new states once more actualized the problems of the nation state(4) and its attributes. Among them, diplomacy stands out: it has the role of projecting externally, i.e., to the elaborate network of the international community, the social complexity of the nation state. Diplomacy's role is also to promote the state's readiness for and intention of cooperating with other subjects of international law. The complexity, universality and interdependence of the contemporary international community provide the basic frame of reference for the effects of changes in the traditional role of the nation state. One also notes a great number of new small states which demand international confirmation of their existence and identity, whilst at the same time expecting to be accepted into the numerous forms of European integration. The setting up of their own diplomatic structures has been one of their urgent tasks.

In the study of the new small states, one encounters the problem of definition. Many approaches have been used by various theoreticians, and diverse research methodologies have been used.(5) My definition is based on size of territory and population (10,000–100,000 sq km and 1.5–15 million inhabitants).(6) A lack of resources, including human resources in such states,(7) influences the setting up of diplomatic structures and their activities. These diplomatic structures make a decisive contribution

to the choice of the security options of the new small states and to their manifold positioning in the international community.

In the twentieth century, small states have appeared in four waves following extensive social changes: after the two world wars, during the process of decolonization, and after the end of the Cold War. In addition to the already-mentioned lack of resources, these states display rhetorical sensitivity and vulnerability, as well as dependence on both the immediate and wider international environment.⁽⁸⁾ They are also greatly adaptable, a characteristic facilitated by a smaller social system and greater transparency (in spite of a noticeable overlapping of social roles filled by the same players). Small states therefore have to start focusing on specializing in narrow areas ('niche strategy'), as well as being open to the international environment (the necessity of wide and manifold contacts, at both official and unofficial level).

3. The Security Question

The small European states that have appeared since the fall of the Berlin Wall are finding a solution to the problem of their security in membership in the Euro-Atlantic security organizations. The European security conditions after the end of the Cold War display many different characteristics. Among them is the fact that there exists a considerable number of international organizations providing security in Europe: the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the WEU and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. For the small European states, participation at different levels in a number of these structures is of great significance. Membership in many such organizations may ensure a greater degree of security. In the European security environment there exist, from the viewpoint of small states, certain negative factors. Among these are threats originating in the internal development of the small states (particularly post-socialist states), local threats, anxiety in some states because of what is regarded as threats to their national sovereignty as a consequence of integration processes, the formation of the competing areas of interest of the superpowers (e.g., South East Europe and the Mediterranean), and modernization and professionalization of the military. For these reasons, in spite of the numerosity of these organizations, the United States remains one of the main guarantors of European security.⁽⁹⁾

The security of small countries is dependent on their inclusion in the activities of various international integration processes. In this environment, small states can participate and act as co-decision makers. Positive effects are even greater and more long-term in the case of

participation in the highest executive bodies of the most important international organizations—e.g., Slovenia's non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council (1998–1999). A small state thus becomes recognizable; it participates and becomes part of the decision-making process, and it can influence bodies that are involved in the preparation of global decisions on world peace and security. The effects on the diplomatic structures of the small countries are also significant, and they can be seen in a higher foreign policy profile, as well as in the increased diplomatic burden these countries have to carry. The international position of the new small states thus becomes more solid and recognized, and they begin to enjoy a greater level of acceptability and security. This further affects their local stability. Owing to their involvement in international processes, these states are probably less likely to become targets of the potential foreign policy ambitions of other states.

The United States remains a major guarantor of European security.... Diplomacy remains a necessary and irreplaceable instrument of the nation state and its politics with regard to the international community.

4. The Diplomacies of the New Small States

In establishing their diplomatic structures, the new small states have to contend—as we have already stressed—with both the changing role of the nation state and with the limitations resulting from their own characteristics. However, having in mind the origins and the development of diplomacy⁽¹⁰⁾, we must conclude that diplomacy remains a necessary and irreplaceable instrument of their politics with regard to the international community. The function of initiating and maintaining a dialogue among the subjects of international law is gaining in importance, whilst new forms of diplomacy, new subject matter and methods of activity, are changing diplomacy's traditional nature.

The basic sociological characteristic and limitation of the new small states is the lack of human resources. Because of their late and often sudden attainment of statehood, there is a noticeable pressure for a rapid and urgent establishment of diplomatic services in these states, enforced by their ambitions to be included in the international community. The limited availability of personnel and other resources is detrimental to these ambitions.

The short-term consequences are the following: an influx of unqualified personnel; an influx of politicians of diverse views to the permanent staff in the diplomatic

service; diverse and sometimes unsuitable educational backgrounds of the personnel in the new diplomatic organizations; scarcity of people working in individual organizational units; continuous and intensive fluctuation between the foreign ministry and diplomatic missions, particularly in the initial stage, as a result of the simultaneous setting up of both the foreign ministry and the diplomatic missions network—this often leads to the outflow of the best personnel to the missions. The long-term consequences include the influence of ‘political recruits’ who hinder the setting up of a professional diplomatic organization and interfere in vertical promotion of career diplomats; reduced competitiveness of the new diplomatic structures in comparison with the already established ones; customary acceptance of extensive external recruitment, a practice that permanently lowers the professional level of these diplomatic structures.

No state is strong enough or weak enough to live in splendid isolation.

Slovenia’s experience (and to some extent the experience of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) indicates that the composition and size of the diplomatic structures at their inception are of key importance. I consider ‘the zero hour’ to be the end of the calendar year in which the former multinational state broke up and the new small state emerged. In the case of all the above-mentioned four states, ‘the zero hour’ was December 1991.

At the zero hour, the Slovene diplomatic organization consisted of two homogenous groups: the diplomats who had worked in the former Yugoslav diplomatic service (and who joined Slovenia’s diplomacy or had been accepted into it), and people who had participated in the international activities of the administration of the Republic of Slovenia within the former federal state. These two groups were strongly supplemented by a third one whose significance was growing fast: the heterogeneous population of novices (recruits from politics, economy, universities, etc.). In Slovenia’s case, this last group amounted to nearly 100 people. In contrast, in the three Baltic states the first two groups practically did not exist, so novices of all kinds were of key significance, even though this group was quantitatively very weak. It was supplemented with recruits from the émigré population, particularly from North America, and to a small extent also with a recall of diplomats who had been active in the diplomatic services of the Baltic states during the first period of their statehood between the two World Wars.⁽¹¹⁾ In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania this amounted to 10–20 people in each diplomacy at their beginning.⁽¹²⁾

To summarize, the following five groups have emerged in the new diplomacies: employees of the diplomatic service of the former state divided into the political and clerical subgroups; employees of the former administration who had dealt with international bodies; complete novices in the diplomatic service recruited from political parties, universities, the economy, as well as culture, the media and education; recruits from émigré communities; former diplomats brought in from retirement.

Thus in conditions of a general lack of resources, Slovenia started off with a significantly larger personnel reserve, both in size and in the amount of diplomatic knowledge and experience, than the Baltic states. The reasons were political, cultural, historical and ideological, and the appropriate consequences followed. However, it would be beyond the purposes of this article to explore them in more detail.

In the twentieth century, the role of the nation state has changed considerably. One of the reasons has been the appearance of the post-modern state based on a conspicuous and voluntary cooperation.

Future development and professionalization of the new diplomatic structures will partly depend on how the relations among the diverse groups of recruits develop. The competition between the groups, as well as between individuals in each group, is obvious. We can also observe alliances between individual subgroups, depending on their characteristics, as well as between smaller and narrower circles within groups and subgroups. Perhaps the most promising and important is the subgroup of complete novices (highly educated, with a knowledge of languages, rapidly gaining experience). These individuals often became assistants to the experienced diplomats. The latter constitute the medium-term nucleus of the new diplomacies.

5. The Main Sociological Aspects of the New Diplomacies

Because of the lack of personnel and financial resources, we can observe a lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience in all the compared diplomacies. At the same time, these diplomacies face an increasing number of foreign policy tasks. The need for permanent recruitment of complete novices is therefore obvious even though it temporarily increases the lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience.

At the same time, two other characteristics of the new diplomacies are strengthened by this: youthfulness and feminization. It is estimated that the average age of the four compared diplomacies at the time of their inception was 25–35 years, and that half of the recruits were women.

This trend has continued, especially with regard to feminization. New diplomacies are thus, on the one hand, very young (i.e. young and inexperienced), which is relatively detrimental to their effectiveness.⁽¹³⁾ On the other hand, they are recruited from a wide social spectrum and very noticeably from the female part of the population. This is important as a new phenomenon in the sociological development of diplomatic services that traditionally depended on elitist recruitment from narrow social circles and from the male part of the population.

These two characteristics point to the likelihood of an important social evolution of diplomacy, whilst posing a number of interesting questions. What will be the age structure of the new diplomacies in 20 or more years, and where will the different generations fit in? What influence will the various age groups have? What will be the effects of the already prevalent feminization and what will be the gender distribution in the highest positions? Will the lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience turn into an accumulation of both of these? On the other hand, these characteristics indicate a need for planned recruitment and professional training (not only internal, but also in various international settings) in the new diplomacies.⁽¹⁴⁾

The role of diplomacy is to project to the international community the social complexity of the nation state.

As indicated before, these sociological characteristics of the new diplomatic structures imply limitations as well as advantages. Youthfulness acts as a limitation because of the already mentioned lack of diplomatic knowledge and experience, and as an advantage because of vitality, ambition and solid theoretical knowledge it brings. Feminization acts as an advantage, because it widens the diplomatic reserve of diplomacy and balances its gender representation. It could have a negative effect if becomes so strong that it pushes out and fully replaces the male population. The joint results of these two characteristics will influence effectiveness of diplomatic service. Yet effectiveness can be measured only indirectly and long-term, and this in turn hinders quick and ongoing correction of the situation.

But it is also a fact that these new characteristics account for a greater mobility of diplomatic personnel. It has been possible to advance faster in the new diplomatic structures, at least in the first decade of their existence. This has additional effects on the horizontal and vertical mobility of diplomats, motivating them in their work. They are additionally motivated in their vertical mobility by searching for and forming pacts with influential

individuals and groups outside the new diplomacies. This kind of conduct is rare in the complete novices, and widespread among the political recruits.

From a long-term perspective, professionalization of personnel is of utmost importance. A large proportion of the young recruits act as a foundation for this process. They realize that professionalization is advantageous to them as well. Well-planned recruitment and permanent professional training increase the level of professionalization. At the same time, empirical data indicate that attempts at political recruitment have continued.

6. Conclusions and Dilemmas

In the contemporary change-prone international community, the nation state remains the basic and most widespread subject of international law. Even in the process of its transformation, its attempts to adapt and persist in a central position are clearly observable. However, its position is different from the one it occupied in the seventeenth century when it first appeared. The post-modern state is a flexible, open and dynamic institution. Its contacts with the international community have greatly increased. All this indicates that diplomacy will retain its role as an attribute of such a state. It can even be conjectured that the significance of diplomacy in the modern world is growing, just as its functions are changing. Diplomacy remains an irreplaceable state instrument for the implementation of the foreign policies of the new small states and for their establishment in the international community. For the diplomacies of the new small states, tendencies and characteristics of global society represent a challenge and a point of orientation. The challenge consists of the necessity to adapt to these conditions. On the other hand, it is necessary to face up to the question which even the diplomacies of the well established states have to face: how to embrace and understand the complex situation which has arisen, so that it will be possible to act suitably.

As an answer to the first challenge, diplomatic structures of the new small states are obliged to set up a rational diplomatic-consular network in order to ensure a permanent activity and presence in the international community. As to the second challenge (understanding the complex situation), it has to be tackled in order to make a rational use of the small resources, recruit suitably qualified complete novices and with constant training and carefully planned mobility, achieve a future high degree of professionalism of personnel and working methods; and ensure a high level of technical preparedness. The second challenge also requires active participation in the contemporary currents of integration.

If they are able to meet these challenges, the new small states will be able to function appropriately in the period of an intensive “territorial de-hierarchization,” as well as succeed in working themselves into the networks of international integration. Failing to do so ultimately means separation and isolation, the accompanying vulnerability and reduced security, and a smaller influence in the management of common affairs: “By joining the global community, they [the small states] have, ironically, strengthened their independence. In the process, many small states managed to recover their national identity and dignity, things that could have been seriously threatened had they not joined the United Nations. They have also shown that a small state can exercise sovereignty in a meaningful way within a global framework, and that they contribute to global well-being.”(15) The globalization process is all-encompassing and irreversible, and it is impossible to remain outside its currents, isolated and independent: “No state is strong enough or weak enough to live in splendid isolation.”(16)

The new small states, which have managed in just over a decade to free themselves from the grip of the large, multinational and hegemonic state systems, will thus have to undertake a variety of internal social efforts to accept the inevitable inclusion into global currents. Δ

NOTES

1. In a geopolitical sense, Europe encompasses those states that are geographically only partially or not at all located on the old continent but have an influence on what happens on it. According to Grizold (1998:96), two groups of states belong here: a) Russia, Turkey and the USA. and b) the successor states of the former Soviet Union in the area of Transcaucasia.

2. “The social changes are deep, all-encompassing and ongoing (Dimitrov, Hofkirchner, 1995:76).” “We are witnessing a social transformation which is, in my judgement, historically comparable only with the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age, with the discovery of America in 1492, and with the change of the means of production that came with capitalism (Bütcher, 1995:150).” Cooper (1996:7) states that “1989 marked a break in European history. What happened in 1989 went beyond the events in 1789, 1815 or 1919. These days, like 1989, stand for revolutions, break-up of empires and the re-ordering of spheres of influence. . . . Historically, the right point of comparison is 1648, the end of the Thirty Years’ War when the modern European state system emerged at the Peace of Westphalia.” Feltham (1994:2) evaluates the effect of these changes similarly: “We are living through an avalanche of history, and it is no exaggeration to say that the world is entering a phase of change and uncertainty in its international relations unparalleled in recorded history.”

3. The former Czechoslovakia disintegrated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia; the following states succeeded the Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into the following new states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Macedonia and Slovenia.

4. Also Benko (1997), Grizold (1999), Horsman and Marshall (1994), Kennedy (1993).

5. Amstrup observes that “research on small states in the international system has been hampered by the problem of a definition of its own subject matter, the ‘small state’, and a substantial part of the literature is concerned with this problem. Nevertheless, no satisfactory definition has been presented (1976:165).” Christmas-Möller says that nobody doubts the existence of small states, “but the problem was to identify the phenomenon as a separate category distinct from neighboring categories, because the social world is not organized in distinct groups but on a continuum, with transition from one category to the next (1983:40).” Sieber adds that “the absence of terminological clarity and theoretical coherence [is] also a characteristic of small states studies. In particular, the problem of defining a ‘small state’ has not yet been solved (1983:108).”

6. Vital (1967) uses the criterion of 10–15 million inhabitants for economically developed small states and 20–30 million inhabitants for the undeveloped ones; Barston (1973) suggests 10–15 million; Clarke and Payne (1987), 1 million or less; Bray and Packer (1993), 1.5 million; Senjur (1993) suggests 1–10 million and a territory of 10,000–100,000 square kilometers; Stanic (1990) suggests up to 10 million and up to 100,000 square kilometers; Kindley (1995:143, note 2) up to 16 million; Kramer (1994), 15 million. Checchio and Clarson (1997:5) conclude that in all the literature by authors from the EU, population size is a widely used criterion for the division of the member states into large and small (Nugent, 1994; Sbragia, 1992; Westlake, 1995).

7. Bray and Packer use the term “pool” to indicate small resources [“small states have much more limited pools from which to recruit the personnel that they need.” (1993:234)]. Also Papadakis and Starr [“most small states are characterized by a limited pool of human and material resources” (1987:423)] as well as Streeten [“since it can draw only a smaller pool.” (1993:197)]. Eisenstadt uses the term “reservoir” (*das Reservoir*) and also “resources” (*Ressourcen*) (1977), whilst Geser uses “recruitment field” [*das Rekrutierungsfeld* (1992:632)], as well as “resources” (*Ressourcen*, p. 647); Keber talks about “human potential (1996:136),” and Rupel, about “the problem of insufficient reserves (1994:276)” and about an incomplete personnel structure (p.151).

8. Small states are characterized by vulnerability; an international image of ‘no problem’; chronic dependency on the metropolitan economies; permanent status of being spectators with regard to most major world developments; a tendency towards insularity (Julien, 1992:46). Among advantages, Kropivnik and Jelovnik list the following: small countries have greater ability to adapt quickly owing to a relatively simple process of decision-making; they are quicker to develop a niche strategy; they focus primarily on exports;

they can change direction of production more easily; their elementary and secondary education is generally well developed (Kropivnik and Jelovnik, 1995:67–70). Among disadvantages, Kropivnik and Jelovnik list the following: small countries have neither a large territory nor a large market, and therefore their economic structure is less differentiated; the small size of their internal market prevents local companies from achieving real competitiveness; they are excessively dependent on exports; they have difficulties providing guarantees for international loans (which results in limited access to financial markets); their research and development suffers because of inadequate means; the language barrier becomes a disadvantage; they are more prone to natural disasters (67–70). Among economic disadvantages, Briguglio lists the following: small countries have limited natural resources endowments and high import content; they suffer from limitation on import substitution possibilities, from small domestic markets and dependence of export markets; from a limited ability to influence domestic prices and to exploit economies of scale; from limited possibility for domestic competition, marginalization in international trade, high costs of public administration and infrastructural development due to indivisibility of overhead costs (Briguglio, 1995:113).

9. On the basis of membership in Euro-Atlantic security institutions, would it be possible to conclude that more memberships means more influence and more security? What is the motivation of the new (but also the old) small European states as they become members of these security institutions and does the membership in one or two institutions guarantee security but not enough influence? A further important question is whether the USA, as the strongest military force in the world, is still the foundation stone of European security? Is the USA satisfied with this role, are there signs of either a gradual withdrawal or a strengthening of American role on the European continent? What are the relations in the area of security between the various international institutions? Do these institutions follow a precondition that “no organization is able to totally cover all the security and defense needs of the European continent (Grizold, 1999:136),” and if so, are they able to guarantee European security?

10. Additionally, we could also list diplomatic functions and the tasks which the diplomatic service (or diplomats) must perform, usually under instruction from the state. These functions are defined in detail in The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and Feltham (1994:3) summarizes them as follows: representing the sending state and the receiving state; protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; ascertaining, by all lawful means, conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state; promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations. Diplomacy “as a state institution and as a factor in state politics and state interests (Benko, 1997:257–259)” must thus carry out three basic tasks: “representing, negotiating and observing.” In this way, it secures for its government information on the

receiving state, thus facilitating more complete and considered decision-making on concrete policies towards this state. With this information diplomacy advises its government and, as and when the need arises, it also carries out negotiations on certain matters according to its government’s instruction.

11. My own experience and observations; also Jerak and Purkart (1997), and Kosin (1997).

12. How did the other four new states that appeared after the dissolution of Yugoslavia use the diplomatic personnel from the former common diplomacy? Croatia took on a number of individuals from the first group (mainly from the clerical subgroup); in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the extent of the recruitment from the first group depended on the tripartite structure of the state leadership; in Macedonia, most of the diplomats from the first group were included in the new diplomacy; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recruited into its diplomacy those former diplomats who were from Serbia and Montenegro (they constituted a good half of the former diplomacy, whilst Slovenia participated with 3–5 percent, Macedonia, with slightly more, Croatia, with about 33 percent, the rest coming from Bosnia and Hercegovina, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The second group was included in the new diplomacies of all these countries, and the appearance of the third group was also noticeable.

13. These ideas were communicated to me by Andreja Purkart, a young Slovene diplomat currently working at the Slovenian Embassy in Washington. According to her, the lack of personnel in the new diplomacies forces young people, who are devoid of any useful working experience, to take on responsibility for projects which even their older colleagues in established diplomacies do not face daily. This means, they mature very quickly, a process particularly noticeable when they are assigned to a mission abroad. With minimal working experience, they carry out independent and demanding work. The natural allies of these complete novices are the first subgroup of the first group and some individuals from the second subgroup, as well as the political recruits. None of these, in contrast to some of the others, feel threatened by ambitious and hardworking young diplomats.

14. Slovenia established its own Diplomatic Academy in Winter of 1996. A proposal for its formation was written by me in November 1990, while I was still serving in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. The whole text is published in my recent book, *A Slovene in Belgrade, 1987–1991*. A decade later, I am even more convinced of the usefulness of this idea and its later realization, as well as of the fact that the Academy could further fulfill its mission only as an internationalized institution.

15. Briguglio, 1995:110.

16. Steiner, 1982:31.

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The revised text of a paper delivered to Rice University's Central Europe Study Group, February 21, 2000.

BOOKS Books and Periodicals Received

Adversities of Autonomy: Bank Krajowy Królestwa Galicyi i Lodomeryi and the Politics of Credit in Galicia, 1870–1913, by Marc Ben-Joseph. Kraków. Jagiellonian University Press (ul. Grodzka 26, II p., 31–044 Kraków, email: wydaw@if.uj.edu.pl). 1999. 131 pages. Maps, tables, index. Paper.

The book details the genesis and fate of a bank in Kraków founded by the anti-Romantic activists of Polish positivism who, as the author rightly points out, owed more to Herbert Spencer than to Auguste Comte. In nineteenth-century Galicia (which consisted of today's western Ukraine and southern Poland), Poles comprised 40–50 percent of the population, Jews ten percent, and Ruthenians 40–50 percent. The area was largely rural and, by rural standards, overpopulated. The 1773 census indicated that it had 2.3 million inhabitants, whereas in 1836 the population grew to 4.4 million. Galicia's inhabitants produced several times less per head than the remainder of the Austrian empire. Industry consisted of linen, wool,

iron and glass factories. Of the one million farms, 42 percent had less than five acres of land. Only 20 percent were economically viable. Subsistence farming was the rule. Emigration to America was one way out: 67 percent of total emigration from the Austrian Empire came from Galicia. Among the emigrants, 60 percent were Poles, 25 percent Ruthenians, and 15 percent Jews. Later, 25 percent of Galicia's population came to depend on income sent from abroad by relatives who had emigrated.

Before the Charter of Bank Krajowy was confirmed by the Land Parliament in 1882, there had been no public credit system in Galicia. Loans could be obtained from rich landowners, from individual Jews or from the *Kahal*, or administrative organ of the local Jewish community. The interest sometimes amounted to 500 percent per year. As late as the second half of the nineteenth century, interest ranged from 43 percent to 160 percent. The illiterate peasants did not know what they were signing, and often lost all their possessions when taking up a loan meant to fend off starvation until the next harvest. Usury court cases were common: from 1880 to 1889, 506 individuals were convicted of usury in Galicia, among them 75 landowners, with the remainder predominantly Jewish.

The Bank came to existence largely because of the efforts of Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz, the mayor of Kraków. It was initially capitalized by a Land Loan. Its stated goal was to lend to municipalities and villages, rather than to individual farmers who were too impecunious to be able to repay a substantial loan. As time went on, loans to municipalities far surpassed the loans made to rural communities. Interest ranged between five and 12 percent. The staff consisted of 159 employees, not counting janitors and porters. The number of loans grew rapidly, and the Bank began to make a profit. In addition to helping the impecunious and promoting Galicia's economic development, the Bank was instrumental in creating a middle class in Galicia. But try as it might, Bank Krajowy did not solve all the problems. The issue of cheap credit remained largely unsolved, the number of loans made to small farmers was insufficient, and peasant hunger for land was not satisfied.

The book abounds in little revisionist pearls: Maria-Theresa's tears allegedly shed during the partitions of Poland might have had more to do with her apprehension about taking over a poor area of Europe than with sympathy for the Polish cause.

Poles need more such books. While books dealing with ideas and social happenings in Polish lands are relatively plentiful, the figures- and statistics-oriented works about Polish history are rare. Poles know next to nothing about the European banking system in the eighteenth century

and about the financial deals related to the partitions of Poland. Nineteenth-century financial developments are likewise a closed book to persons otherwise literate in Polish affairs. While reading this book—and I am not a specialist in the subject—I noted with melancholy that among hundreds of books on Polish history I have read or perused, none has given me an inkling of the problems which Mr. Marc Ben-Joseph's book addresses. The author deserves much praise for directing Polish eyes into areas where they seldom gaze. (sb)

Dictionary of Literary Biography, vol. 215. Twentieth-Century Eastern European Writers, First Series. Series Editor: Steven Serafin. Detroit. The Gale Group. 1999. 479 pages. Hardcover.

The 215th volume of the *Dictionary* is devoted to twentieth-century Czech, Hungarian (including Transylvanian), Polish and Slovak writers. It is only the fifth volume (out of over two hundred) that deals with the literatures of Slavic and other East and Central European peoples (the other four were devoted to the South Slavic and Russian writers). The Polish section (edited by Bogdan Czaykowski) contains critical and biographical entries on fourteen twentieth-century Polish writers: Jerzy Andrzejewski (written by Stanisław Eile), Waclaw Berent (Joachim Baer), Tadeusz Borowski (John R. Carpenter), Maria Dąbrowska (Bożena Karwowska), Witold Gombrowicz (Stanisław Barańczak) Waclaw Iwaniuk (Elwira M. Grossman), Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (Wladimir Kryszynski), Maria Kuncewicz (Magdalena J. Zaborowska), Bolesław Leśmian (Andrzej Busza and Bogdan Czaykowski), Czesław Miłosz (Bogdan Czaykowski), Zofia Nałkowska (Hanna Kirchner), Teodor Parnicki (Wojciech Skalmowski), Bruno Schulz (Bożena Shallcross), and Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz (Daniel Gerould). Altogether, Polish entries comprise 121 pages. In his general introduction, Steven Serafin describes the literary tradition of Poland as representing “a diversified history of extraordinary importance within Eastern European literature.” In addition to biographical information, critical presentation and synthesis of a given writer's work, each entry contains primary and secondary bibliographies, as well as illustrations.

The least substantial of the other three literatures is the section devoted to Slovak literature, edited by Norma L. Rudinsky and Branislav Hochel. It comprises entries for seven twentieth-century Slovak writers, including Jozef Ciger Hronsky i Laco Novomesky. The Czech section, edited by Jan Čulík, comprises fourteen writers, including entries for Karel Čapek, Jaroslav Hašek, Vladimír Holan and Jaroslav Seifert. The section on Hungarian literature, edited by István Dobos, comprises entries for sixteen

writers, including Endre Ady, Gyula Illyés, Attila József, Geörgy Lukács, and Miklós Radnóti. It is interesting to note that no woman writer is included in the Czech section, and only one woman writer each in the Hungarian and Slovak sections. Another contrast that may be noted is the fact that almost all the entries for Czech, Hungarian and Slovak writers were written by specialists in their respective countries, whereas the authors of thirteen of the fourteen Polish entries hold positions at Western universities.

The volume is highly recommended as an attempt to present the state-of-the-art knowledge of major twentieth-century Central and Eastern European authors to the English-speaking scholarly community and general readership. In preparation are further volumes of the *Dictionary* dealing with Central and Eastern European literatures; for example, as regards Polish literature, volume 217 will comprise entries on several prominent postwar writers, including Barańczak, Czerniawski, Herbert, Konwicki, Mrożek and Szymborska. (Bogdan Czaykowski)

Language of Mules, by John Guzlowski. Charleston, Illinois: DP Press. 1999. 31 pages. Paper.

A book of remarkable poems about experiences of the Polish Displaced Persons in World War II. The author's parents came to America in 1951, having gone through the usual gamut of suffering and assaults on human dignity. The titles of poems conjure up the atmosphere of dispossession: Cattle Train to Magdeburg, A Cross of Polish Wood, Prayers of a Displaced Person, A Good Death, Unmarked Graves, Katyn. The author teaches English at Eastern Illinois University in Charleston, Illinois.

Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy: 1999, edited by Barbara Wizimirska. Warsaw. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (al. Szucha 23, 00-580 Warsaw). 1999. 340 pages. ISSN 1233-9903. Paper.

Although the editorial note says that “the views expressed here are solely those of the authors,” the official Polish horizons are amply represented. Several dozen authors sketch out Poland's relations with her neighbors, multilateral cooperation, NATO, and Polish foreign policy priorities. Predictably, the most interesting sections deal with Germany (by Urszula Pałasz) and Russia (by Artur Michalski). Zdzisław Najder, one of Poland's foremost political analysts, presents Polish options in a separate article.

CNN's Cold War Documentary: Issues and Controversy, edited by Arnold Beichman. Foreword by John Raisian. Stanford, CA. Hoover Institution Press (Stanford, CA 94305). 2000. xiv + 173 pages. Paper.

A much-needed corrective to CNN's lengthy documentary on Cold War history. Critics have charged that the series was an attempt to find "equivalencies" on both sides of that war: the Soviets were dishonest, but so were we; they had their spies, but so did we; they suppressed free speech, but so did we (the McCarthy episode). Such equivalencies amount to saying that heaven and hell are similar in that neither of them is democratic. While life in Western democracies was not exactly heaven, life under communism was surely hell, as virtually all but the most privileged inhabitants of the formerly communist countries have testified countless times.

The book contains essays arguing against the CNN series (*Commentary's* Gabriel Schoenfeld wrote a compelling one), and self-defense essays by those who crafted and conducted the series: historian John Lewis Gaddis and Sir Jeremy Isaacs. Arnold Beichman's excellent essay on "Ted's Reds" rightly discredits the much-accepted view that the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 23 August 1939 was signed by the Soviets to gain time to prepare for a war with Germany. Beichman points out that "Stalin did everything he could to strengthen Hitler right up to the very June 1941 day of the Nazi invasion." (p. 101) Richard Pipes's "The Cold War: CNN's Version" points out that the CNN production did not even mention the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1920, and it barely mentioned the Stalin-Hitler Pact of August 1939, attributing it to "Stalin's alleged suspicion of France and Britain" (p. 47).

This reviewer would like to add that in accordance with the anti-Catholicism (and the ensuing anti-Polonism) so often apparent in Ted Turner's enterprises, the series minimized the role of the Polish labor union *Solidarność*. Yet *Solidarność* was the first—and the last—genuine mass movement opposing Soviet totalitarianism. Books such as Lawrence Goodwyn's *Breaking the Barrier* (Oxford, 1991) definitively demonstrated the Polish workers' role in defeating totalitarianism. Goodwyn's book was strangely "forgotten," while the CNN series, as well as the hundreds of books about the fall of communism that have since appeared, "elbow out" *Solidarność* as a crucial factor in the fall of communism.

We welcome Beichman's book as a notable contribution to keeping the record straight.

***Opadanie czasu: modlitwy i przypowieści [the descent of time: prayers and parables]*, by Wiesław Janusz Mikulski.** Ostrołęka, Poland. Ostrołęcki Ośrodek Kultury. 2000. ISBN 83-85867-19-8. 174 pages. Hardcover. In Polish.

Poems by a typically Polish poet of middlebrow horizons.

***Eat Smart in Poland: How to Decipher the Menu, Know the Market Foods and Embark on a Tasting Adventure*, by Joan and David Peterson.** Madison, WI. Gingko Press (P.O. Box 5346, Madison, WI 53705). 2000. Index, bibliography. 142 pages. Paper. \$12.95.

This is neither a travel book nor a cookbook but a clever

combination of general and cooking history in Poland, with names of foods most Poles never heard about. We are taking restaurant food, of course: the book is a useful guide to Polish restaurants. A pleasant and pleasing paperback. Δ

Speaking Volumes about Poles

By Laura Klos Sokol, Warszawa. Wydawnictwo IPS. 1994. 89 pages. Paperback. No price given.

Piotr Wilczek

During my summer holidays in Poland in 1999, after ten months spent in the United States, I visited a new cafeteria in Kraków, a place that desperately attempted to look trendy and funky but gave the impression of snobbism and pretentiousness. The first spooky thing about it was its name: "Naleśniki," the Polish equivalent of "Crepes," but the 'k' in the Polish version was replaced by a foreign 'q'—a letter not used in Polish. Upon entering "Naleśniki," I was immediately asked: "Can I help you?" The question was asked in English. I left immediately, confused and not sure in which language I was supposed to answer. When some time later, already in the United States, I told an American friend about this English question in the center of the ancient Polish capital, he asked with amusement: "Did you have this stupid American smile on your face?" I probably did. And the "Naleśniki" cashier did, too.

Laura Klos Sokol, the author of this book on Polish-American cross-cultural communications, would say that we both followed the American Smile Code. She quotes a Pole who returned to Poland after six years in America: "*There's a lack of smiling here. It's not as spontaneous.*" Another Pole says: "*Americans, in general, smile all the time. Here, people in the streets look worried.*" Of course, American smiles are not completely spontaneous, there exists a Smile Code described by the author. There is "a half or closed-mouth smile in the bank, store or bus" and a "big smile" which is not always desirable in public places: "people might think you were crazy, stupid, or on drugs. Or worse, a politician."

However, I prefer a smile, even restricted by social codes, than a lack of smiling and gloomy faces. When I visit some Polish businesses in Chicago, I find myself in a world where the Smile Code does not exist, the message is "take-me-seriously," and the customer seems to be a nuisance. In such an atmosphere I sometimes forget to use my "stupid American smile." And I do not think it is stupid at all. I observe this "customer-unfriendly" atti-

tude, imported from Poland, with some nostalgia, since in Poland nowadays salespeople do their best to follow the American style of customer service and a big smile is often accompanied by a type of behavior close to aggression—you feel you will not be able to leave the store before buying an expensive pair of Italian shoes or the latest model of a DVD player. This paradox is a result of the current cultural and social changes in Central Europe.

The book I am reviewing was written by an American sociolinguist educated at Georgetown University who has lived in Poland for several years with her Polish husband and who teaches at the Institute of Applied Linguistics at the University of Warsaw. Published in an obscure publishing house and not very well distributed or advertised, this small book consists of short chapters that had previously appeared in *The Warsaw Voice*, an English-language weekly published in Poland. I was not successful in reaching the publisher or *The Warsaw Voice* editor, even via email, and could not learn whether there was a later, possibly enlarged edition of the book. However, even this 1994 edition is still worth discussing, since it includes observations valuable not only for Americans who live in Poland (and who are supposedly its target readers), but also to Poles who live in America, and to Americans who interact with them.

In forty-nine chapters, Ms. Sokol discusses various communication problems. Certain chapters of the book focus on language difficulties of Americans who try to speak Polish in Poland. She provides perceptive comments on the verb *złatwić*. There is even a definition: “During the days of *nie ma* when goods were hard to come by in Poland. . . ‘*złatwić* something’ meant to accomplish or acquire something by pulling strings, using connections, bribes or even personal wit and charm.” Now, the author says, “Poland has moved into its post-*złatwić* period” and she provides a subtle explanation of differences between the Polish *złatwić* and the English *to arrange or take care of*.

Another observation deals with the juxtaposition of the words *friend*, *colleague*, *acquaintance* versus *przyjaciół*, *kolega*, *znajomy*. The author explains why the Polish words are not exact equivalents of the English ones. “With few other choices,” she says, “Americans toss about the word *friend* easily. I think it has to do with the fact that Americans like to be liked and are eager to extend good will. Poles on the other hand, use *przyjaciół* carefully, since they feel that there are only very few true friends in life.”

The notion of friendship itself is different in Poland and in America. According to the author, “some Poles are mystified or disappointed by friendships with Americans.”

She quotes from a book on American cultural patterns: Americans “rarely form deep and lasting friendships in which friends become mutually dependent upon each other.” There is an “American reluctance to become deeply involved with other persons.” The author is right when she explains that this Polish disappointment is not necessarily connected with American inability to form “deep and lasting relationships.” “What might be misleading,” she says, “is that many Americans are perceived as friendly, outgoing and open but this doesn’t mean that they are committed.” This chapter is entitled “Seeking therapeutic friendship” and the title is an allusion to an allegedly Polish understanding of close friendship. The author observes that Polish attitudes might be changing, and she wonders whether “therapists might be hard pressed for business” in Poland nowadays.

Certain chapters of the book deal with individual words (e.g., *friend*), but most of them discuss various communicative situations. A good example is an answer to the question *Co słychać?* (*How are you [doing]?*) “In response to *Co słychać?* Poles expect a meatier exchange to take place and are more likely than Americans to reveal the less glamorous side of life.” Personally, I would add: Poles expect the question to be answered by a longer story of “what has happened to me recently.” For them, the American way of greeting, for example: *How are you — Fine. And you? — Good*, seems to be too conventional. Poles want to have—as they would say—‘real’ or ‘authentic’ contacts, even though such everyday contacts and simple greetings cannot be profound.

Another example is the frequently used expression *we should get together sometime* which is confused by most Poles with a real proposal or an invitation. A few years ago, when I was a research scholar at the University of London, I was a victim of my Polish approach. An American colleague of mine used to say to me quite often: “We should have a glass of beer together sometime.” After several unsuccessful attempts, I nearly forced him to go to have a beer together. He chose a pub closest to the institute in which we worked; we spent there not more than half an hour and probably were both relieved that the social event was over soon. It took me some time to realize that it had never been the intention of my colleague to ‘get together’ after work. It was enough for him to exchange polite greetings in the library, a part of which was, *we should get together sometime*.

When a Pole and an American finally get together, another problem appears. Ms. Sokol says that it had been described “in a handbook written by Poles for Poles going to the States to teach and study: ‘You may be asked very personal question by someone you have just met.’

But don't take offense, the handbook advises, 'No impertinence is intended.'" On the other hand, as Ms. Sokol observes in another chapter, Poles ask questions which may offend Americans: "One day a colleague complimented me on my new coat and in the same breath asked, *Ile zapłaciłaś?* (*How much did you pay?*) That made me a little uncomfortable, since Americans consider money private information . . . Questions about the exact cost of new shoes, pieces of furniture or apartment rents surprise many Americans, but such discussions are not uncommon among Poles."

Another interesting observation discussed in the book is the choice of address term (chapter 15: "*Pan, Pani* or *Hey You*"). When I first arrived in the United States I was surprised how common it was to call people by their first names, both at work and in many public places. And this form of address meant nothing special, just seemed to be practical, although in Poland it has always meant to express close friendship or relationship. I was especially annoyed when after ordering a soup and a sandwich in a bar, a cashier asked for my first name and then announced loudly: "*Piotr* (or: *Peter*) *your lunch is ready.*" The same thing happened when my barber, whom I visited for the first time, was ready to serve me, or a campus advisor called me, also for the first time, to discuss a cultural program for visiting faculty. In such situations I had always a temptation to protest in the British way, *we haven't been introduced*, but I knew that my new American 'friends' would not understand my objections. This is not only a linguistic issue, since among the British who are also native speakers of English, such a way of addressing strangers is still not common. Laura Sokol does not attempt to discuss this problem in more detail, she just explains how forms of address are used in Poland. However, in her description of "a ritual of moving to the first name (*ty*) basis called a *Bruderschaft*," there is a hidden irony, undoubtedly connected with her opinion that Polish society is "hierarchical." On the other hand, in a chapter about "Consuming Chatter," she quotes with some sarcasm her experience in an American restaurant: "It's not unusual to hear a waiter say, 'Hi, I'm Bob, I'll be your waiter tonight.' It would be ridiculous to answer, 'Well, hi there, my name is Laura and, Bob, I'll have the fish please.' Why use first names for a fleeting interaction? Because in the consumer-crazed mind, chatty chummy service equals good. It's probably a blessing that this first name stuff won't work in Polish because of the *Pan/Pani* address system obligatory in interactions with strangers. I think we're safe here."

Some time ago it was interesting for me to observe a good example of a double standard in this matter. An

American colleague of mine (or, should I rather say, friend of mine?), ordered a book in a Polish internet bookstore and received a feedback from them. At the end of the message, some information was included. It was not even addressed to him but to all current and potential customers. This note used the second person singular form *ty*. My friend felt offended and mentioned ironically that they "had not been introduced." The bookstore apparently imitated expressions used by Americans. When my Polish-American students call me in Polish *ty* and at the same time I use *pan, pani* addressing them, or when they sometimes unexpectedly propose, in Polish, *przejdźmy na ty, tak jest łatwiej* (*let's move to ty, it's easier*), I usually do not express disapproval: this is how they do it in America, even in Polish, I console myself.

The author also describes Polish hospitality and observes how different it is at home and in the hotel industry. "For Poles hospitality is something that takes place at home rather than something extended to strangers. In stores and offices, employees may or may not assist you, depending on their mood or your demeanor. But this is changing, albeit slowly." At home, "Polish hospitality elevates the guest to the status of God for an evening. *Gość w dom, Bóg w dom* (*Guest in the home, God in the home*), the saying goes. American hospitality, on the other hand, seems to exist on a continuum from full-service to self-service." In Poland, hospitality goes with codependency, and accepting and returning favors. The author describes how once after an evening with friends she wanted to go home in a taxi and insisted she did not need a ride. "I was apparently coming off as an obnoxiously independent American." At last, she was driven home. "Americans," she says, "often hesitate before asking or accepting favors from other people. . . Poles, on the other hand, will easily ask friends and family for help and depending on others can be an affirmation of friendship." The author wonders whether "the Polish network of favors [will] become less prevalent" as the service industry grows in Poland.

According to Ms. Sokol, differences also exist in gestures: "Americans relay competence and trust to each other by standing straight with the shoulders back, the chin lifted slightly, a look of brightness in the eyes and a quasi-smile. Hand gestures are used subtly. Americans sit with the torso leaned against the back of the chair and, men especially, extend their legs and drape their arms over chairbacks. . . In a hierarchical society, Poles have a different style; rather than elicit respect, the Polish demeanor conveys it." Poles express deference "with the head slightly lowered, shoulders somewhat rounded and facial expression serious." I think that this analysis of the body

language is too stereotypical to be universally accepted. Some observations in this chapter on “Mammal message” are interesting. However, generalizations about self-confident Americans extending their legs and modest Poles “holding their extremities close to the body,” are not reliable—the lack of systematic testing limits the credibility of these observations. The same is true about many other topics. Real life comments combined with a scientific jargon do not always sound convincing. The observations themselves are nonetheless of value. Although this is a popular book and it often lacks a profound approach, it may be recommended to all Americans and Poles who want to improve mutual understanding. Δ

The author wishes to thank Zbigniew Stryjecki for recommending the book and lending him a copy, otherwise unavailable.

Letters

Poles vs. Polish Americans

I read with interest Dr. John Radzilowski's “Poles, Poland, Polish Americans, Polonia” (SR, XX:1, January 2000). I agree with him that differences between Polish Americans can be traced to the dates of their arrival in the U. S., as different groups came from different social backgrounds. I also agree that there have been three main waves of Polish immigration:

1. The so-called economic immigration (which Radzilowski says occurred at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century) consisted mostly of farmers who naturally were not notable for scholarly achievements. They came from a partitioned country, they did not know English and had no capital; they were in competition with other immigrant groups for low-paying jobs. As the people from Poland, which was a virtual *terra incognita* in the U. S., they encountered little respect. It is worth remembering that when the United States came into being, Poland did not exist on the map of Europe, having been cannibalized by three hostile neighbors. Among American historians, the map of Europe as it existed in the late eighteenth century was often the starting point for research. If academics talked about Poland in the United States, they usually did so from the point of view of the partitioning powers hostile to Poland, i.e., from the point of view of Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

Poles participated in the labor force, and they were generally law-abiding people. They made it economically, but—and here is the crux of the problem—they did not make the headlines.

2. It is this aspect of non-visibility that shocked the

‘middle’ post -World War II immigration to which I belong. We were imbued with memories of heroic war scenes and a belief in the amazing stamina of Poles that was demonstrated during the war. We were painfully aware of the monstrous losses sustained by our fatherland (one of every five Polish citizens dead, 50 percent of the educated classes annihilated) and proud of its war record. Despite its relatively small size, Poland provided the fourth strongest military force in World War II, after the U. S., Britain, and the USSR, but ahead of France and other powers; Poles also distinguished themselves in intelligence, to mention only their acquisition of materials related to the German V-rockets and reconstruction of the Enigma, or the German coding machine. But in the United States, nobody seemed to know or care about such things! And we were still smarting under the Yalta agreements that had placed our devastated country under Soviet rule and effectively eliminated the possibility of our returning to Poland.

Although grateful for being allowed to come to the U.S., the post-war political immigration experienced disappointment when assessing the strength of American Polonia. “Where are the Poles in academia, in opinion-forming research institutes, in the American government?” we asked. “How is it that other ethnic groups managed to obtain an influence which the native-born Americans of Polish background found unobtainable?” Concern for the purity of the Polish language precipitated other complaints. One would not have minded a dialect, but the Polish spoken in the U. S. was crude. “*Jak się masz?*” is not archaic, as Dr. Radzilowski maintains, but a proper term for addressing children and close friends; otherwise it is very rude to use it.

The ‘middle’ immigration was also shocked to find that while in Poland and in other European countries one could be poor and cultured, in the U. S. poverty was often identified with lack of culture, bringing disrespect. Most Polish Americans adhered to the American pattern in this regard, and such attitudes appeared both naive and offensive to the newcomers. In response, Polish Americans felt irritated: “Those people come here penniless, they take our jobs and prosper, but they do not like what we are doing and they criticize everything. Who do they think they are?!”

Yet, despite difficulties, some progress in mutual tolerance and even cooperation has been made due to strenuous efforts on both sides. “Let's reject what divides us and accept what unites us:” Józef Piłsudski's appeal was embraced by both sides. One reason was the need for a common front against discrimination. Another was the belated realization by the post-World War II immigration

that their own group had not managed to raise high the Polish standards either. With the exception of those who became academics, there was no great progress made in the acquisition of important roles in American society, with few Polish Americans in prestigious positions and virtually none in the media. The events that boosted the image of Poles here and in the world did not originate in the United States but outside it. One of them was the election of the Polish Pope; another was the Solidarity movement (which has since become almost invisible, owing to the 'elbowing-out' efforts of the American academia).

3. Then came the 'new immigration' from Poland, before and after the all-important year 1989. As Dr. Radzilowski notes, most of them were welcomed by 'Old Polonia.' We, the post-World War II immigrants, were of course glad to see the countrymen socially close to us and generally well educated. Because of the political system in their country, many of them had chosen 'safe' (i.e., non-political) disciplines such as medicine, technology and science that allowed them to find jobs in this country with relative ease. Unlike many of post-world War II intellectuals, they did not have to begin by scrubbing floors. They also were more self-confident and far more assertive than we had been, although they had lived under communism. That again was not surprising, because there is nothing more detrimental to the feeling of security and self-confidence than a forced transplant from one country to another. While we were ejected from Poland, they left it voluntarily.

What is more, they had also been, at least to a certain degree, beneficiaries of the communist system. Even granting that communism is an awful evil, they were educated for free by the state, and thus reaped the benefits denied to Polish workers and farmers under communism. Those of us who struggled with heavy debts incurred in acquiring an education for ourselves or our children in America looked with wonder at our countrymen who got their education at no cost to their families or themselves.

Some doubts about this group arose due to their sometimes amazingly innocent approach to history (here I rely on my own experiences). They knew of course the main contours of Polish history, but little more. One excuse was their age and the fact that they lived their childhood and early youth in somewhat more 'normal' circumstances than Poles abroad: wars and national tragedies did not radically change their lives as they did ours. They had not been transplanted, at an early age, to a foreign country. Another excuse for their ignorance of history was the school system under communism that effectively suppressed all information relevant and advantageous to the

building of Polish civil solidarity. *But even now, when sources are available, few of those educated in People's Poland display a desire to fill in the gaps in their knowledge of history.* The scandalously inadequate purchases of books and other opinion-making materials distinguish Polish Americans of all generations from those groups that have been successful in American society. In contrast to us, who remember World War II, they do not appear to be aware of the inadequate and often distorted presentation of Polish World War II history in the American media and, even more importantly, at American universities. Yet in no way does the danger of distortion decrease. With the rapid technological advances, an opportunity for manipulation of public opinion is on the rise and what Daniel Shore calls "industry of unreality" expands.

It is this concern for the true image of Polish history and culture that allows the 'old Polonia' (generations born in the U. S.) to unite with the middle group of Polish immigrants, making them see eye to eye in a way often incomprehensible to the 'third wave.' The native Polish Americans understand that our country consists of diverse ethnic and interest groups, each of them struggling for visibility and influence, and that among such lobbies Polonia tends to appear weak and ineffectual, its achievements and struggles basically unappreciated. The Polish Americans born here, and those who have lived here for some decades, also know that there is strength and inspiration in Poland's past, and they cannot fail to see how the past of other ethnic groups has contributed to their image and their influence.

It becomes of primary importance for Polonia to produce history teachers, history writers, history-literate media people. Highly valuable though the medical and technological professionals are, they do not devote their lives to the correction of errors and misconceptions pertaining to Polish history and culture; and these errors have a way of growing and producing offspring in American history textbooks and in the media. One must also remember the larger question of scholarship in this country. Do we want American children, whether of Polish or non-Polish background, to learn untruths and distortions from their textbooks of European history? Should we not, as American citizens, become involved in the issue of general education in our adopted country? But who is there who would choose to take on an often contentious field of study? While Polish historians who arrived here after World War II are now slowly fading away and the newcomers from Poland are inclined to embrace less controversial subjects and professions, it is left to the second, third, fourth, and fifth generations of Polish Americans to pick up humanistic subjects in the name of historical fair-

ness and historical truth. When they do it, they will find fellowship and a ready response from the emerging post-communist class of new historians in Poland.

Anna R. Dadlez, Saginaw Valley State University,
Michigan

Professor Cienciala responds

I regret that Professor Gella finds my review full of “invectives” against him (*SR*, XX:2, April 2000). It was certainly not meant that way. I also regret having to answer his letter because I am sure it will not affect his views, but am doing so for interested *Sarmatian Review* readers.

1. Professor Gella is right that my views and criticisms are almost identical with those of Professor Wandycz, as expressed in *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 129, December 1999, 159–172. We did not consult each other, so all I can say is that I am in very distinguished company. Furthermore, Professor Wandycz’s review is much longer and, if anything, more critical than mine. He calls “absurd” Professor Gella’s “view that if there had been a strong Poland in the 19th century, there would not have been two world wars” (*ZH*, 129, p.161), and says the belief [Gella’s] that the destruction of one generation can determine the future of a nation, “borders on megalomania” (*ibid.*, 169). It is curious that Professor Gella does not accuse Professor Wandycz of using “invectives” in his review. Could it be that for Professor Gella, men are more entitled to forthright criticism of the work of other men than are women?

2. I did not omit Professor Gella’s “central topic, the annihilation of the Second Polish Republic.” I wrote that “the book is useful because it contains many documents that the average interested Polish reader may find hard to find, but this is counterbalanced by the author’s intemperate statements and judgments, and by his misinterpretations of history both within and outside his chosen period” (*SR*, January 2000, p. 683). In my view, it was quite clear that I was concerned not with the central theme of the book, but with some of Professor Gella’s opinions and unhistorical “annexes” (in Polish, *przypudówki*).

3. I must say again that most of Professor Gella’s views on history outside his chosen theme, the destruction of Polish underground leaders in 1945–47, are not shared by professional historians. These views include Poland’s role in World War II (“without the Polish armed effort [in 1939], the fate of Europe would have been total catastrophe;” or that Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck’s was persuaded by the British to accept the British Guarantee of Polish independence in late March 1939—for both these statements, see Gella’s book, p. 17). The first view is unproven, and the second is plain wrong, since both Polish and British documents show that Beck was the first to

propose a secret Polish-British agreement on consultation, which led to the guarantee offer. (See Anna M. Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy in 1939: Determination to Fight or Avoid War?” *Polish Review*, XXXIV:3, 1989, 204–05). The guarantee offer was accepted by Beck without a moment’s hesitation.

4. Professor Gella writes: “Cienciala defends Beck’s policy, which is quite understandable as she edited Beck’s papers over the years 1926–39. Therefore, she cannot see his policy more critically” (*SR*, 718). I suppose this refers to my statement that “Beck cannot be blamed for not securing a [British] guarantee against both German and Soviet aggression” (*SR*, January 2000, 684; Gella’s book, p. 32). As a matter of fact, most Polish historians today agree that no matter what policy Beck would have pursued, he could not have saved Poland from catastrophe, though they are critical of some aspects of his policy. That, too, is my view of Józef Beck, particularly regarding the annexation of Zaolzie from Czechoslovakia in fall 1938, which I believe would best have been settled through negotiations, though an ultimatum was understandable in the circumstances of the time. [See Anna M. Cienciala, *Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 1926–1939* (Paris: Institut Littéraire, 1990), p. 41; and Anna M. Cienciala, “The Munich Crisis of 1938: Plans and Strategy in Warsaw in the Context of the Western Appeasement of Germany,” in Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein, editors, *The Munich Crisis, 1938. Prelude to World War II* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 73].

5. Contrary to Professor Gella’s assumption that I have not read John Earl Haynes’ and Harvey Klehr’s *Venona. Decoding the Soviet Espionage in America* (*SR*, 718), I have read it. It shows there were many more Soviet spies in the U. S. government than previously thought, so Stalin had very good information on its policies. However, the book offers no proof that these people shaped or influenced President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policy on Poland and Eastern Europe. In fact, it is well known that FDR decided to sacrifice Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe to Soviet domination in order to make sure that Stalin would continue the war in Europe until the defeat of Germany, and then help the U. S. defeat Japan. He did not have to be persuaded by Soviet spies to adopt this policy. I cite books on FDR’s foreign policy in note 12 of my review.

6. Professor Gella faults me for citing a textbook on the relatively small numbers of Poles imprisoned by the Polish Security Police in 1948, 1950 and 1952, as compared with the larger numbers cited by him (*SR*, 718). I quoted these figures from Andrzej Paczkowski’s excellent textbook, *Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939–1989* (War-

saw: PWN, 1995, p. 259), with a note that he was one of the first to read the police files. I referred to this book because it should be easier to find than the more specialized publications. However, if anyone wishes to have the archival file numbers for these figures, he/she can read Paczkowski's book: *Od sfalszowanego zwycięstwa do prawdziwej klęski. Szkice do portretu PRL* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999, pp. 47, 53).

7. Professor Gella charges me with claiming that his contentions regarding British policy and the dissolution of the Polish Armed Forces are not based on evidence, whereas he based them on British documents he discovered in the Public Record Office in London (SR, 718). What I do say is that his "speculations" on British policy are unfounded (SR, 685). I referred to his view that if the Polish generals had kept the Polish army together and ordered them to mutiny, the British government would have been forced to intern them and this in turn would have been a means for Polish emigré pressure on the policies of the allies in 1945–47 (SR, 685). The British might have interned the mutineers, but that is not the point. The whole idea of a mutiny by the Polish Armed Forces after the war's end is unrealistic, and the view that this would have affected British policy on the Polish question—e.g. forcing free elections in Poland—is even more so. Professor Gella's chapter on this episode was, indeed, published in 1988, but this does not absolve him from reading and referring to later publications on the subject.

8. As far as documentation is concerned, we still await Professor Gella's answer to the question put by both Professor Wandycz (ZH, no. 129, p. 171) and myself (SR, 684) on the memorandum on "German Hegemony in Europe," which demanded the return of former German territories from Poland to Germany and was allegedly submitted to the U. S. government in November 1990 by a mysterious body called "The Council of Free Germany" (Gella's book, p. 214). Who were the 87 German Americans who made up this Council? Whoever they might have been, it is clear that if they had any chance at all of influencing American policy—which is doubtful—they were much too late because "The third 'ministerial' meeting of the Two Plus Four [US, USSR, Germany, France, Britain and Poland, A.C.] was held in Paris on July 17, where agreement was reached on the Polish-German border as well as the outline of a final settlement" (George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 1998, p. 198).

9. Professor Gella protests against Professor Wandycz and myself treating as part of the book his account of a disappointing visit to Poland in 1992, and his very negative analysis of the situation there. He says that this part

was added later (SR, 718). Well, it is a part of the book and thus subject to critical evaluation.

In conclusion, I have always believed that the writing of history is best left to professional historians. If others wish to write it they are welcome, but they would be well advised to read relevant studies or consult the appropriate historians on areas outside their expertise—instead of repeating worn-out stereotypes or indulging in national mythology.

Anna M. Cienciala, University of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas

Polish intellectuals and a story

Your remarks about Polish intellectuals and their attitude to foreign or Polonia sponsors outside Poland (SR, XX:1, January 2000) caused a wry smile here. We see the same here. But, in their defense, the damage to "attitude" done in the last three decades to these people will take a long time to go away.

As to monuments, there is no monument in the United Kingdom to the Polish Air Force, Army, and Navy which, for a short period, really did save the British skin in 1940 and therefore every other European skin in the long run. These people get barely a mention. I am not Polish but it makes me fume. If ever a monument were needed, it is here.

Now, a little story for "sarmacki" types to make you smile; it appeals to that sense of irony which is more developed in the Pole than in any other race, I think.

Following the defeats of the Polish army in 1940, many Polish airmen and soldiers escaped to UK via a great variety of exotic and dangerous routes. The Brits, who were in chaos themselves, did not really know where to put them but ended up sending very many thousands of Poles to Lancashire in the northwest of England, to Fleetwood in particular. Of all parts of Britain, then and now, this has to be the gloomiest, wettest, greyest and most xenophobic part where the people, even now, maintain minimal contact with foreigners whom they still regard with suspicion.

There the Poles waited until they could be trained and re-equipped. Of course, they were glad to be safe after all the retreats and murder, and even more glad to get re-trained. People were nice to them and vice versa. Many marriages resulted from this.

But... Oh... The culture difference... the horrible British weather! The *strasznie* English food! That chilly English *sang froid* and pedantic attitude. As for the Polish jokes on this score, it would be unkind to repeat them.

And the English? They looked on appalled at the dandified, fashion-conscious and hand-kissing Polish officers, their crazy incomprehensible language and strange ways.

Despite all that, they all got on well enough. But, in truth and secretly, both parties did regard each other as a complete bunch of “wogs.”

And there is the irony. Because at the turn of the first millennium, the Roman Emperor Hadrian was at war with the very Sarmatians from whom the Polish officers in Fleetwood all too often claimed descent. And when Hadrian severely defeated the Sarmatians, he did not kill or enslave them, he forced them to serve in the Roman army. They were good soldiers then, just as they were later, in World War II.

So, where did Hadrian send the Sarmatian divisions (about 5,500 men plus support blacksmiths, etc.)? He sent them to Lancashire where they patrolled the Roman border for over two hundred years and which place they never left. . . for the veterans stayed on and took Roman nationality. The descendants of the Sarmatian *cataphractii* were, in 1940, serving weak tea and chips to their own co-descendants.

Now that is a Polish story isn't it?

Rodi Wout, Dowally, Perthshire, Scotland

Reviewer was incorrect

With regard to your review of Chicago Polish Theater's performance of *Pan Tadeusz* in Houston (SR, XX:2, April 2000), I wish to state that your reviewer made a mistake in attributing to Ryszard Krzyżanowski an incorrect rendering of a section of *Pan Tadeusz*. *Kraj lat dziecińczych* appears first, in the Invocation; but later, the expression *kraje dzieciństwa* was used by Mickiewicz, and that is what our speaker said.

Barbara Denys, Chicago's Polish Theater,
Chicago, Illinois

Compliments department

Enclosed is a check for our subscription. My father and I enjoy reading your publication immensely, and also the ease of looking it up on the Internet.

Maryann Wojciechowski and Marian Wojciechowski,
Las Vegas, Nevada

Announcements & Notes

Expiring subscriptions

For a year now, we have been streamlining our subscription service. Bills and reminders are no longer enclosed with consecutive issues. They are being mailed separately. As stated in the January 2000 issue, we can afford only ONE notice about expiring subscriptions. If you receive a subscription notice *after* receiving the current issue of the *Sarmatian Review*, it means that your subscription expired with the current issue or earlier. No

further notices will be sent, and no further issues of *The Sarmatian Review* will be dispatched. Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated. We also GREATLY appreciate those subscribers who send in their subscriptions without being reminded to do so.

Polish enrollments at UIC reach 461

Total Polish enrollments at the University of Illinois-Chicago in 1999–2000 reached 461 (251 in the Fall and 210 in the Spring). Colleagues who complain about difficulties in recruiting students for Polish and other non-Russian Slavic languages and literatures should perhaps query Professor Alex Kurczaba, the chief architect of these high enrollments, on how he manages to achieve his results. Other universities in the Chicago area do not even come close to these figures. And what about giving Professor Kurczaba a prize for his ability to attract students? With so many Polish organizations active in the Chicago area, surely someone could devise a proper token of appreciation for his work.

At the same time, it cannot be expected that such high enrollments will be maintained indefinitely without support from Polish organizations and the Polish community. Sitting on one's hands and taking Professor Kurczaba's achievement for granted is a sure way to help Polish Studies at UIC fail. Letters of appreciation sent to the Department of Slavic and Baltic Languages and Literatures, with a cc to the Dean, would be a token of support; consult UIC catalog for names and addresses.

Polish Literature Online

The University of Gdańsk offers a nice selection online of works of Polish literature featuring over a hundred titles, at the following address:

<http://monika.univ.gda.pl/~literat/autors.htm>

A Festival of Polish Arts and Culture in Arkansas? But of course!

Arcansas Catholic (29 April 2000) carried an ad about a Festival which took place in Little Rock, 5–14 May, 2000. The Festival included a lecture on “Arkansas' Polish Catholic Heritage” by James Wood, Ph.D., a piano recital, and a screening of several of Andrzej Wajda's movies. And you thought there were few Catholics in Arkansas, let alone Polish Catholics.

Polish American Historical Association Membership Drive

Once more, we would like to remind you that PAHA seeks new members. To keep the Polish American discourse going, associations like PAHA are essential. To join, send your check and address to

PAHA, St. Mary's College
3535 Indian Trail
Orchard Lake, MI 48324

Or contact Dr. Karen Majewski at PAHASTM@aol.com. Membership fees are as follows: students and senior citizens, \$12/yr; regular, \$20/yr; institutional or family, \$35/yr; patron, \$100; lifetime member (individuals only), \$500. PAHA's history goes back to 1942. The organization publishes a Newsletter and a bi-annual periodical, *Polish American Studies*.

Polish Diaspora in Turkmenistan

A Colonial Narrative

Walenty Tyszkiewicz

(continued from the previous issue)

A new wave of Polish deportations to Turkmenistan came in 1920 from partitioned Ukraine and partitioned Belarus. After the Treaty of Riga in 1921, those Poles who found themselves on the Soviet side of Ukraine and Belarus were deported by the order of Moscow authorities. This group constitutes one of the least known waves of Moscow-engineered deportations and persecutions of "politically incorrect" nations.

The next wave came in 1935, when persecution of Poles in the Soviet Union intensified. And a real big wave came after the Soviet Union occupied western Ukraine and western Belarus, as well as eastern Poland, in 1939. During World War II, Turkmenistan became a way-station for the "Polish war children." These were the children of families deported to Siberia after the Soviet attack on Poland on 17 September 1939. Most of them were orphans by the time they arrived in Turkmenistan. Eventually, many of them were shipped to North Africa, New Zealand, Republic of South Africa, Canada and Australia. Some of these children of war eventually established contact with us: Mr. Tadeusz Dorostański from Australia, Mr. Franciszek Gercog from the United States, and Mr. Bronisław Kowalewski from Bielsko-Biała in Poland.

On its way to Africa, Gen. Władysław Anders' army passed through Turkmenistan, setting up Polish military hospitals in Ashkhabad and Krasnovodsk. Gen. Anders' army consisted of Polish prisoners of the Gulag whom Stalin allowed to enlist as volunteers in the Polish army fighting the Nazis. These new soldiers were in terrible physical shape. In Ashkhabad, 59 of them died after a short stay in the hospital, in Krasnovodsk, 81. We do not know where their graves are because the archives dealing with that period are not available to us.

After 1945, Poles continued to come. These were the victims of arrests in Poland during the Soviet-engineered wave of arrests of members of the Home Army and their families. It is estimated that in 1948, there were 25,000

Poles and persons of Polish background in Turkmenistan. The number has since decreased owing to high mortality and assimilation into the Russian nationality.

After the October Revolution, the Soviets established in Ashkhabad a "Narkomat for Polish Affairs" which established contacts with Polish authorities in Poland. Eventually, this Narkomat became a Polish diplomatic outpost. This group succeeded in sending to Poland two trainloads of Poles who wanted to return to Poland. This happened before 1925. After that date, the repatriations ceased. The Soviet authorities were not interested in diminishing the number of Europeans in Ashkhabad, knowing full well that whatever their background, they would soon be Russified and thus add numbers to the imperial nation. Indeed, it took heroic efforts to maintain a Polish identity in conditions of Russian-speaking totalitarianism, especially that many natives of the region were unable to make a distinction between the Russian-speaking oppressors and other whites who happened to be co-victims.

In 1956, a repatriation commission was set up again, but its work was limited to the city of Ashkhabad. Huge distances, a lack of transportation and of a free flow of information (one could be arrested for passing on information that did not appear in official newspapers) prevented those Poles who lived in other regions of Turkmenistan from knowing about that commission, let alone availing themselves of its activities.

(To be continued in the next issue)

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Lecture

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Harold B. Segel

**Professor Emeritus, Columbia University
 Adjunct Professor, University of Arizona**

Images of the Jew in Polish and Russian Literatures

Professor Segel's numerous books include
*Stranger in Our Midst: Images of the Jew in
 Polish Literature* (Cornell University Press,
 1996)

**October 5, 2000 (Thursday)
 7:30 PM**

Sewall Hall 309

(Sewall Hall is located next to Rayzor Hall)

Wine-and-cheese part to follow the lecture.

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