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In this issue:

|   |    |   |    |
|---|----|---|----|
| Sally R. Boss, <i>Whither the Ukrainians?</i> .....           | 18 | Letters.....                                | 31 |
| Myron Kuropas, <i>Ukraine's Millennium of Christianity: a</i> |    | PIASA Meeting.....                          | 32 |
| <i>Triumph of Faith</i> .....                                 | 22 | From the Editor.....                        | 18 |
| Adam Hetnal, <i>Women in Ukraine</i> .....                    | 27 | Creative Use of Data Honorable Mention..... | 30 |
| BOOKS.....  | 29 |   |    |

## The Future of Ukraine

### Whither the Ukrainians?



The map of present-day Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

## **From the Editor:**

This issue is devoted to one of Poland's neighbors, Ukraine. Two very different articles are featured: one, by Sally R. Boss, addresses the issue of the future political profile of Ukraine; the other, by Professor Myron Kuropas, presents the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church under the Soviets. Ms. Boss points out that little attention has been paid to the Ukrainian chances of resisting Russification and eventually opting for independence; yet, as Ms. Boss concludes, the fate of the Soviet Union may be decided not in Moscow but in Kiev. If the Ukrainians support the Russians, the Union will survive; if not, a new political configuration is bound to arise west and east of the Ural mountains.

The Kuropas article should make some Poles reassess their ideas about their eastern neighbors. For instance, the Lublin Union of 1569 which is sometimes viewed in Poland as one of the triumphs of Polish diplomacy and the Catholic faith, is viewed in Ukraine as the beginning of 250 years of its partition. While Poles see Piłsudski as a friend of Ukraine, Ukrainians do not, and assess his union with Petlyura as one more attempt by Poles to subjugate Ukraine. The Poles might want to remember Juliusz Mieroszewski's opinion that, "It is only in our own minds that the Jagellonian idea is not related to imperialism. But to the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians it represents the purest form of traditional Polish imperialism."

On the other hand, Ukrainians would do well to pay attention to matters related to the Polish minority in Ukraine of which Sally Boss speaks. The continuing discrimination against Poles in present-day Ukraine is a fact, and unless responsible Ukrainian voices are raised against it here in the United States, a Soviet-style xenophobia might prevail in Ukraine, which would damage the relations with Poland and with other countries.

Adam A. Hetnal writes of one of Ukraine's strengths: its women. It often happens in oppressed communities that women carry major burdens and deserve major credit for keeping the communal spirit alive. Dr. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak's book which Professor Hetnal reviews should be read with interest by other female ethnic scholars interested in strengthening their ethnic communities.

# Whither the Ukrainians?

*Sally R. Boss*

For forty years, American politologists have all but ignored the three states situated between the German speaking countries and the Soviet Union: Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. It took the peaceful revolutions of 1989 to put these states and nations on the map. Since then, the national identities of these three states are no longer questioned.

The same politologists now speak of Russia as beginning at the Soviet-Polish border, thus ignoring another powerful national belt which separates Eastern Europe from Russia: Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Some of these lands, e.g., western Ukraine, fell into the Russian hands after World War II for the first time in history. Others had been conquered by Russia earlier. All of them claim a national identity that is not synonymous with the Russian.

These facts have momentous consequences. Among the centrifugal forces that threaten the unity of the Soviet Union, national separatism is the most powerful. Should Ukrainians achieve tomorrow what the Balts have already achieved, the Soviet Union as

we know it would cease to function. Ukraine is arguably the richest state in the USSR and the second most populous state with 52 million inhabitants.

The present situation spells opportunity and danger for the Ukrainians. Opportunity, because the importance of Ukraine creates a leverage which the Ukrainian leaders can use in bargaining with Moscow. Danger, because they may be cajoled into believing that "going it together" with the Russians is more advantageous for Ukraine than going it alone. This may be so if the Ukrainians are willing to surrender their national identity. The Ukrainian nation already suffers from many defections and is in danger of being absorbed into Russia. As the example of eastern Ukraine has shown, the Ukrainian national identity, however vigorous, finds it difficult to withstand the advantages of Russification. If Ukraine and Russia remain parts of the same state for another generation or so, enough Ukrainians will be Russified to make Ukraine go the Ukraine go the way of the Siberian nationalities, which now are too weak to achieve independence.

In spite of a long history that dates back to the ninth century, Ukraine is a young nation. Ukrainian national consciousness, in the modern sense of the word, made its appearance in the nineteenth century. No, the Khmelnytsky uprising was not *it*. Granted that it indicated the first stirrings of the modern Ukrainian nation, but it was too weak intellectually and too unsuccessful politically to have the makings of a nation. In the seventeenth century, national consciousness was based on tribalism or an awareness of belonging to a single realm and professing the same religion, rather than on civil traditions. Khmelnytsky joined the Muscovite czar because he felt that the religious identity of eastern Ukrainians made them closer to Muscovites than to Poles. It was only in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth century that there appeared a modern concept of nationalism based on civil rather than religious traditions and on a community of language, literature and the arts. Owing to these modern ideas, Ukrainians began to think of themselves as a separate nation.

But another nation, Russia, has also laid claims to the Kievan heritage of Prince Vladimir (Volodymyr) and his successors. What could have been an exclusively Ukrainian literature was taken over by the Russians. In 1667, the transfer to Moscow of the Kievan Academy of Peter Mohyla was symbolic of this takeover which lasted many centuries. The bitter truth is that, yes, others have "robbed" Ukrainians of their art and literature, and sometimes people. And the final irony of the situation is that this takeover, paradoxically, facilitates the Russification of Ukrainians today. After all, the two countries have the same roots, don't they?

Much less successful, and less strenuous, was the effort of the Poles to Polonize the Ukrainians. How did Ukraine become part of Poland? Through dynastic ties. It is seldom remembered today that it was Lithuanians and not Muscovites who freed the Ukrainians from the Mongol domination. In the fourteenth century, they took away from the Mongols Kiev and a large part of the territory of present-day Byelorussia and Ukraine. In 1386, when they joined in a dynastic union with Poland, Ukraine and Byelorussia became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a huge and multi-lingual country which existed for four centuries.

The Polonization of the Ukrainian upper classes stopped abruptly with the final partition of Poland in 1795. Weak and dismembered, Poland and Polish culture ceased to attract the Ukrainian nobles, a fact which many Poles failed to notice (this created ground for future conflict and resulted in a shabby

treatment of Ukrainians under the Second Polish Republic, 1918-1939). At the same time, the attractiveness of Russification also paled, and modern national consciousness took over the imagination of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The momentum created by the nineteenth-century cultural renaissance continues 'til today.

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### **Contrary to the charges of tsars and commissars that it is an agent of western imperialism, Ukrainian Catholicism has proven to be a reservoir of Ukrainian national distinctness.**

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But Ukraine is a young nation, and young nations run the danger of disappearing before they mature. Disappearing by being swallowed up, linguistically, religiously and culturally, by a larger nation. This is so especially because the larger nation has all the military power at its disposal and is not that remote culturally. Poland is not a danger to Ukraine any more; Russia is.

Russia has ruled over eastern Ukraine for over three hundred years. Bit by bit, it took away from Poland and Austria the remaining central and western Ukraine. During all these years, Russia has offered the possibility of assimilation and participation in the ruling elite of the Russian empire. The Ukrainian language was tolerated as a local dialect. Orthodoxy in Ukraine fared relatively well. There was only one thing the Russians would not tolerate. That "thing" was Ukrainian Catholicism. Orthodoxy was acceptable: the Russians seemed to know that over a period of generations, Ukrainian Orthodoxy would not protect the identity of a young nation as effectively as would a denomination virtually unique to the Ukrainians: Eastern, or Byzantine, Catholicism. This is why Catherine II, Nicholas I and Stalin fought Ukrainian Catholicism with fire and sword, and finally outlawed it.

The temptation to give up Ukrainian national identity has been strong, and many have fallen for it. Today, even the more ardent Ukrainian nationalists admit that eastern Ukraine is virtually totally Russified. Therefore, a future independent Ukraine would contain huge non-Ukrainian minorities. Russians would make up at least 20% of the population.

In contrast, that part of Ukraine which once was under Poland and Austria and which professed Ukrainian Catholicism remained much less Russified.

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The most effective Ukrainian leaders today hail from western Ukraine.

In addition to Russification, biological devastation also came to Ukraine via Moscow. The Chernobyl disaster made certain parts of Ukraine uninhabitable for millennia, and damaged the health of the future generations of many Ukrainians in ways which are only now beginning to be discussed. Industrial pollution has fouled the land and the rivers. According to a recent Soviet map which charts environmental disruption across the USSR, the Donbass region now falls into the "catastrophic" category from the ecological point of view, whereas some parts of the black belt region are in the "crisis" category owing to overcultivation and chemical contamination of the soil (*Soviet and East European Report*, Vol. VII, No. 18, February 15, 1990).

In this situation, a person of Ukrainian background who becomes a holder of an important office in Russia is likely to become Russified beyond the point of return. If one edits a Russian publication, works with Russian authors and does so in Russia and not in Ukraine, one has already been sucked in by the admittedly attractive (because power is attractive) Russian culture. One becomes a Russian of Ukrainian background. Look at Vitaly Korotich, editor of the Russian illustrated weekly *Ogonyok*, for an illustration of this point.

Yet, in the name of biological rather than cultural survival, there is a tendency among American Ukrainians to disregard such facts and to pretend that Ukrainians are as immune to Russification as Lithuanians or Tajiks. The Ukrainians would do well to consider the Polish experience in this regard. Those Poles who became Russians under the partitions: (e.g., Tadeusz Bułharyn, known as Faddey Bulgarin, editor and author under Nicholas I) were given safe conduct and the wishes of good riddance. There was no illusion that the Bulgarians and the Senkovskys and the Krzhizhanovskys (all Russians who came from Polish families) could be regained for Polish culture. The Poles had the good sense to separate biology from nationality. In the long run, it worked better for the preservation of a cultural identity than the zeal to preserve a nation biologically.

There seems to be a contradiction between the vigorous Ukrainian assertions of national distinctness on the one hand, and on the other, the rejoicing of Ukrainians over the presence of Russians of Ukrainian origin in the Soviet power structure. If Ukrainians want

to be a nation, then priority number one should be the cultivation of those attitudes which make them distinct from the Russians, rather than of those which erase such distinctions.

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### **In the 1989 elections, Solidarity put a Ukrainian on its ticket. Will the Ukrainian Rukh do the same for a Pole in Ukraine?**

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On the other hand, it seems futile to try to re-Ukrainize those who at some point chose to be Russified (or, to a smaller degree, Polonized). Some Ukrainians today hold on to an outmoded view that the Russians and Poles inhabiting Ukraine today are "Ukrainians who speak Russian or Polish," and that one of the tasks at hand is to re-Ukrainize them. Now that is quite different from trying to prevent the Russification or Polonization of Ukrainians. In modern times, nationality has become a matter of choice rather than decree, and the views above described are not conducive to a peaceful coexistence of Ukrainians and their minorities in the future sovereign Ukraine.

This brings us to the question of the treatment of national minorities in present-day Ukraine. In Ukrainian publications, one sometimes finds articles which do not yield an inch and do not admit any legitimate grievances which members of other nations might hold against the Ukrainians. In particular, this is true of minorities such as Poles who do not have a Red Army to defend their rights.

Apart from historical grievances, which should be recorded but which have lost their sting, there is a very real problem of the treatment of the Polish minority in Ukraine today. One observes in Ukrainian publications a virtually total denial of the Polish cultural presence in Ukraine and a refusal of Ukrainians to even recognize the Polish minority as real and as deserving of rights. At the same time, members of the Ukrainian organizations in the United States sometimes write to American congressmen about discrimination against Ukrainians—not in the Soviet Union but in Poland, where only a tiny minority of Ukrainians presently reside.

In a brochure about the nationalities in the USSR, the Ukrainian Institute attached to Harvard University omits Poles. The brochure lists nationalities that are numerically smaller than the Poles—e.g., Estonians. The excuse that the Poles do not have a republic

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is no excuse, for the brochure lists Germans as one of the Soviet minorities. Yet any standard demographic source, e.g., the *Penguin Atlas of World Population History*, will provide different information. Such omissions do not help develop a better understanding between Polish-Americans and Ukrainian-Americans even here in the United States. Yet they are relatively easy to correct. They do not require concessions and do not hurt Ukrainian national interests.

One hopes that both nations have reconciled themselves to having in their midst a certain number of representatives of the other nation; that the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and the Polish minority in Ukraine, be permitted to follow their linguistic, religious and cultural preferences. While the Solidarity government has guaranteed these rights to the Ukrainians in Poland, Poles in Ukraine have not received even nominal assurances from the major Ukrainian groups on the American continent, let alone from the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic. While Solidarity put a Ukrainian, Volodymyr Mokry, on its ticket in the 1989 elections (he won!), one is yet to hear of the Ukrainian Rukh doing the same for a Pole.

In a 1989 interview published in *Studium Papers*, Jerzy Giedroyc said that already in 1945, he assumed that the loss to Poland of western Ukraine and western Byelorussia was final, and that Polish politicians should not waste time demanding these territories back. This opinion prevails among Polish leaders today. They have understood that the belt of nations which separate Poland from Russia should not be controlled either by Poland or by Russia, that it does not want to be controlled by Poland or Russia, and that Piłsudski's dream of "the Confederation of the Borders" belongs to the nineteenth century.

Territorial disputes having lost their edge, there is really nothing, in terms of political interests, that divides Poles and Ukrainians today. Both nations have renounced imperialism--Poles, in Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania; Ukrainians, as a proxy for the Russians in non-Slavic Siberia. Both nations have an interest in dulling the edge of Soviet imperialism. Western Ukrainians and Poles share Catholicism. Perhaps the two nations should emulate the French and the Germans in the way they have shaped their relations after World War II. One would hope that times are auspicious for a similar and permanent development between Poland and Ukraine.

But--the issue of national minorities is only an example of the issues which one misses reading about in the Ukrainian emigre press. If Ukraine is to gain

national sovereignty within the foreseeable future, many problems beg for discussion both in the Ukrainian and American press. Do the majority of Ukrainians really want sovereignty? If so, what kind of sovereignty do they really want? There is no doubt about the Lithuanians, but the Ukrainians are yet to address this matter publicly. Have the Ukrainians reached a consensus in that respect? And if not, what steps are being taken toward a consensus? Will the Ukrainians eventually merge with the Russians a la Korotich? What discussions about these options are being conducted and among whom? Information about such matters would do more for American recognition of Ukrainian national distinctness than hundreds of letters sent to congressmen about some minor issue.

One also misses a discussion about the very serious matter of dividing the national wealth of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians could claim part of the nuclear arsenal. Is there in the United States a technologically competent and articulate group of Ukrainians who have discussed such issues?

Where are the spokesmen for Ukrainian independence on American TV and in the American press? Must all discussion be conducted in the ethnic press? Are the Ukrainians planning for the year 2000, 2010, 2020...?

These are some of the matters that are of concern not only to Ukrainians but also to their neighbors, and to the United States as well. For it may happen that the future of the Soviet Union will be decided not in Moscow but in Kiev.

*Sally R. Boss is our Florida correspondent.*

A young Polish lady, American-educated and computer-literate (she is about to graduate with a Master's degree in Political Science) seeks employment in a company conducting business in Poland. She is flexible and willing to work as a trainee for a reasonable period of time. Relocation to Poland is a possibility. Interested parties should direct inquiries c/o *The Sarmatian Review*, or call Barbara at 409-291-6928.

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# Ukraine's Millennium of Christianity: A Triumph of Faith

*Myron B. Kuropas*

The year 1988 marked the one-thousandth anniversary of Christianity in Ukraine, presently a submerged nation within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For Ukrainians on both sides of the iron curtain, the millennium represents a miracle of faith. Despite centuries of often brutal religious and national persecution, the Ukrainian religio-cultural identity has survived. Today, the Ukrainian church in the USSR is still an "outlaw" church, officially banned by the Kremlin for over forty years. And yet, the church lives, in the "catacombs," clandestine but spiritually resurgent.

Ironically, Moscow, capital of a powerful and still officially atheistic state, also commemorated the millennium of Christianity with observances orchestrated by the KGB-directed Russian Orthodox Church. The Moscow events had two major goals: (1) to demonstrate to the glasnost-enamored democracies of the west that religion is respected in the USSR and that the Soviet people enjoy religious freedom; (2) to convince the world that Ukrainian millennium celebrations are manifestations of a long moribund Ukrainian nationalism that is reactionary, obstructionist and anti-ecumenical.

Since much space has already been devoted by the western press to the Russian perspective, the purpose of this paper is to examine briefly the history of Christianity in Ukraine and Russia and, by so doing, elucidate the Ukrainian perspective. We shall start with some history.

## Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Soviets

Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine established an autonomous state in 1917 and declared their independence from Russia on January 22, 1918. Western Ukraine became an independent republic with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire and formally joined the newly established Ukrainian National Republic on January 22, 1919. For the first time in over 250 years, Ukraine was a united nation.

The collapse of the czarist regime provided new opportunities for Ukrainian reformers. The All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council was organized early in

December 1917. With the conditional approval of Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow, the Council organized the first All-Ukrainian Sobor [Church Council] which convened in Kiev in January 1918. The Sobor, temporarily suspended by the Bolshevik invasion, re-convened in June and, on July 9, adopted the so-called Statute for the Provisional Supreme Administration of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The Statute was presented to Tikhon who accepted it in essence, but added the stipulation that "resolutions of the All-Russian Church Councils as well as decisions and directives of the Holy Patriarch shall have obligatory force upon the entire Ukrainian Church." The Patriarch's addenda was rejected by the Sobor which began to press for autocephalous [independent] status.

**To Cardinal Lubachivsky's call for reconciliation, the Polish clergy responded with similar sentiments. The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate is yet to respond.**

On January 1, 1919, the Ukrainian government approved a law calling for the complete autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. "Henceforth," reads Article 6, "the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, with its Synod and ecclesiastical hierarchy, shall be completely independent from the All-Russian Patriarch." The subsequent Bolshevik offensive, however, once again prevented effective and permanent settlement of the Orthodox question.<sup>1</sup>

Despite growing opposition from the Russian Orthodox clergy and hierarchy, leaders of the autocephalous movement created a second All-Ukrainian Church Council on April 7, 1919. On May 5, 1920, the Council formally announced the independence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, declaring that the Russian Church had "with the help of the civil government, used prohibition, banishments, violence and terror" to destroy not only the former independence of the Ukrainian Church, "but almost everything in it that contained any characteristic of the national creativeness peculiar to the Ukrainian people." Searching in vain for a bishop willing or able to assume the lead-

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ership of the new church body, the Council was forced to call another All-Ukrainian Church *Sobor* and to proceed without episcopal legitimacy.

The first All-Ukrainian Church *Sobor* convened in Kiev on October 14, 1921, with over 400 delegates (including sixty-four priests) in attendance. With no duly consecrated Orthodox bishops present to take part in the elevation of new bishops,<sup>2</sup> the canonical validity of the *Sobor* came up for discussion. Reasoning that apostolic succession and the gift of Grace reside in the whole Church,<sup>3</sup> the delegates elected to resurrect a mode of consecration not practiced in the Christian Church since the second century.<sup>4</sup> On October 23, Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivsky was consecrated Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine in an imposing ceremony patterned after the early practice of the Alexandrine Church. In the words of an eyewitness:

*...the presbyters (over 24 priests) laid their hands on the Holy Gospel, which was placed upon the head of the Metropolitan; ...the deacons laid their hands upon the arms of the presbyters; and believers placed their hands on the deacons' arms.... Thus the whole Church united in embraces of love; through the collective laying on of hands, they symbolized what God did through the Church, conferring love and grace upon him who became bishop, the choice of the entire Church, and for whom the latter prayed in pure and sacred love and faith in Christ....<sup>5</sup>*

Before the *Sobor* ended on October 30, Metropolitan Lypkivsky elevated Archpriest Nestor Sharaivsky to episcopal rank and the two hierarchs consecrated four more priests to serve as diocesan bishops.<sup>6</sup>

The unusual consecration of bishops was not accepted by the rest of the Orthodox world and for a time the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was viewed as "uncanonical." The issue was not resolved until 1942 (western Ukraine was then part of Nazi-occupied Poland) when the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church consecrated Ukrainian Orthodox bishops in the traditional manner.<sup>7</sup>

Ukrainian independence was short-lived. Attacked by the Red Russian army from the east, the White Russian army from the south, and the Polish army from the west, Ukraine finally fell in 1920. Ukraine was subsequently partitioned among Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine), Rumania (northern Bukovina), Poland (Galicia), and the USSR (eastern Ukraine). The largest part of Ukraine remained with the USSR.

During their first years in power, the Soviets

attacked all religious institutions. Beginning with the Soviet Decree of February 5, 1918, all church property was transferred to the state, religious instruction was forbidden, and all theological schools (and eventually all monasteries and convents) were closed.

The regime shifted its tactics in the direction of "sovietization" of individual churches during the early 1920's.<sup>8</sup> The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was allowed to function without much interference until 1922. Despite increasing friction with the Communist regime in Ukraine, the Church prospered. By 1924, it included 30 bishops, approximately 1,500 priests and deacons, some 1,100 parishes, and between three and six million faithful.

In 1922, the Soviets began to undermine the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with intimidation and infiltration aimed at sowing discord within. When these techniques failed, the Soviet secret police arrested Metropolitan Lypkiwsky, replaced him with someone more acceptable, and ordered the dissolution of the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Repression intensified in 1929 when the Church was accused of being a "bourgeois nationalist" institution. In January 1930, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was forced to dissolve itself at an "Extraordinary *Sobor*" orchestrated by the NKVD. Only some 300 parishes were permitted to exist as the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church." Closely monitored by the NKVD, even this remaining vestige of Ukrainian Orthodoxy was slowly eroded until 1936, when the last parish was closed. Two metropolitans, 26 archbishops and bishops, some 1,150 priests and deacons, and approximately 20,000 lay leaders were liquidated in purges which followed. During the 1930s, famous Orthodox structures in Kiev such as the Church of St. Basil, the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas, the Church of Sts. Boris and Hlib, St. Michael's Monastery and many others were destroyed.<sup>9</sup> Some churches became museums of atheism.

#### Ukrainian Catholic Church under the Soviets

Hitler's and Stalin's partition of Poland in 1939 provided the Soviets with yet another opportunity to destroy Ukraine's religio-cultural institutions. Soon after "liberating" Galicia from Poland, the Soviet press began its attack on the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The *Kiev Kommunist* wrote:

*During the entire history of the Uniate [Ukrainian Catholic] Church right to our times, the Uniate clergy performed the role of faithful servant of bourgeois Poland in Western Ukraine. They assisted her in the realization of a policy of inhuman national*

*oppression of the people of Western Ukraine. The Uniate metropolitan, the bishop, the priest [and] the monk were faithful servants of the counter-revolution, traitors to the interests of the people, its enemies....*<sup>10</sup>

Within months Ukrainian Catholic schools, monasteries, seminaries and lay organizations were either expropriated or abolished. A program was initiated to sow fear and dissension within Catholic ranks with planted informers and provocateurs, discriminatory taxation, and the arrest of leading lay leaders and priests.<sup>11</sup>

Hitler's surprisingly successful invasion of the USSR prompted Stalin to temper his attacks on religious communities. Hoping to mobilize the national patriotism of the Russian people against the Nazis, Stalin moved to co-opt the Russian Orthodox Church into service for the regime. Anti-religious propaganda was reduced and concessions to the Russian Orthodox Church were made to insure loyalty to the war effort.<sup>12</sup>

#### Ukrainian Churches after World War II

When the war ended, all provinces of Ukraine: Carpatho-Ukraine, northern Bukovina, western Ukraine, and eastern Ukraine were united under the aegis of Moscow. All suffered the same fate.

The newly constituted Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in western Ukraine was simply incorporated into the Patriarchal Russian Orthodox Church.<sup>13</sup>

A similar fate befell the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In the winter of 1944-45, the NKVD organized a "re-education" program for the clergy. On April 5, 1945, an anti-Catholic campaign was inaugurated by the Soviet media, and six days later the NKVD began arresting the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy, including the secular and monastic clergy. Of nine bishops and archbishops, only Metropolitan (later Cardinal) Josef Slipyj, freed by Nikita Khrushchev in 1963, survived the labor camps.

As the mass arrests continued, Soviet authorities sponsored the so-called "Initiating Committee for the Reunification of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church." Working with the NKVD, the Committee sponsored a "Sobor" on March 8-10, 1946, during which the 1596 Union with Rome was declared null and void and the Ukrainian Catholic Church was proclaimed in "reunion" with the Russian Orthodox Church. Knowledge of the "Sobor" had been withheld from the public, there was no election of delegates, and only 216 clerics and 19 laymen were in attendance.

The Vatican and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the free world declared the "Sobor" uncan-

onical and illegal but the protests meant nothing to the Soviets who continued to dismantle the Church. According to the U.S. State Department Sources, by 1950, the four Ukrainian Catholic dioceses had been eliminated; 2,772 parishes had been liquidated or absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church; 4,110 churches and chapels were either closed or absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church; 142 monasteries and convents were expropriated or closed. Of the 2,638 secular priests, fewer than half were forced into Russian Orthodox churches; others were either imprisoned or went into hiding; 129 brothers, 229 seminaries, and 580 nuns were either dispersed or imprisoned. Of the 4,048,515 faithful, many were imprisoned while the majority resisted passively.<sup>14</sup> The Catholic Church in Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) "reunited" with the Russian Orthodox Church in 1949 while the Greek Catholic eparchy of Priashiv in Czechoslovakia followed suit in 1950. Thus ended 350 years of formal communion between the eastern Catholic church of Ukraine and the western Catholic church of Rome.<sup>15</sup>

#### The Church in the Catacombs

Forty years after Moscow's formal dissolution of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic churches, both institutions are alive and well and gaining clandestine members in the "catacombs."

In 1977, Fr. Vasyl Romaniuk, a Ukrainian Orthodox prisoner serving time in the Gulag for his religious beliefs, addressed a letter to Metropolitan Mystyslav, leader of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the free world:

*Your Grace! First of all, I assure you of my devotion and humility. I declare that I consider and have always considered myself a member of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in spite of the fact that I formally belonged to a different hierarchy, for it is well known that the Ukrainian Church, Orthodox as well as Catholic, is outlawed in Ukraine. Such are the barbaric ethics of the Bolsheviks.*<sup>16</sup>

Fr. Romaniuk's affirmation was testimony that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine remains alive among believers and that there is a new ecumenical understanding between Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholics. There is evidence that church attendance in Soviet Ukraine has been increasing steadily. It is estimated that more than fifty percent of the functioning Russian Orthodox churches in the USSR are in Ukraine.<sup>17</sup>

More is known about the catacomb Catholic church in Ukraine. Priests who refused to join the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946 left the formal priesthood but continued to serve the faithful clandestinely



while engaged in other occupations. They were later joined by other, "recalcitrant" priests released during post-Stalinist amnesty periods. By the late 1950s, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was experiencing a revival as more and more former Catholics repudiated Orthodoxy. Alarmed, Soviet authorities unleashed a new wave of anti-Catholic media agitation. Priests were harassed and arrested during the 1960s as the campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian Catholic Church continued. It was during this period that secret seminaries were discovered in Ternopil and Kolomyia and disbanded.

The election of a Slavic pope seemed to inspire Ukrainian Catholics to even greater efforts on behalf of their faith. Responding to the Catholic resurgence in the 1980s, one Communist party official wrote:

*The growing efforts of the Vatican and clerical-nationalistic centers abroad to influence the population of the Ukrainian SSR and negative tendencies in the actions of the Catholic clergy and remnants of Uniatism has called for an expansion of aggressive counter-propaganda activity from Party committees, Soviet organs, and ideological institutions.*<sup>18</sup>

On September 9, 1982, the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church was founded by Ukrainian Catholics. Headed by Josef Terelya, a well-known Catholic lay dissident who had spent time in Soviet psychiatric clinics for his outspoken religious beliefs, the Group (also known as the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics) announced that its primary aim was to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Terelya wrote:

*Despite the declarations and prognoses of some party members, we are living, growing and triumphing. The trials and persecutions suffered by Catholics in Ukraine have strengthened us even more in the faith, and have given us the opportunity to sound the depths of God's providence. I can state without exaggeration that there is nothing greater than to die, a Catholic, in a communist prison. He who loses fear, gains truth and hope. That is why we believe that the Kingdom of God is coming and shall have no end.*<sup>19</sup>

Forced out of his job, Terelya was arrested for "parasitism" on December 24, 1982. Other members of his committee were subsequently attacked and beaten by KGB thugs.<sup>20</sup> Released, Terelya returned to work on behalf of the Church. Arrested again in 1985, he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and five years internal exile.<sup>21</sup>

Despite repeated Kremlin attempts to stem the tide, Catholicism appears to be thriving in Ukraine. Today, the catacomb church reportedly includes hun-

dreds of Catholic priests headed by at least two bishops working under the authority of their primate in Rome, and over 1,000 secret nuns.<sup>22</sup> The faithful appear to be a new breed as confirmed by a Communist researcher who recently wrote:

*Of late, a new type of believer has been emerging and becoming more and more noticeable who, compared with the old traditionalist believer, has a higher level of intellectual development, a marked tendency towards rationalistic justification of his faith, and an interest in the philosophical and ethical aspects of dogma, and in the history of religion.*<sup>23</sup>

After spending a total of 24 years in a variety of prisons, labor camps, and psychiatric hospitals, Josef Terelya was allowed to emigrate to Canada in 1987. On October 22, 1987, he testified before the U.S. Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe. "Glasnost," Terelya stated, is a camouflage from the West. Today it is essential for the Soviet Union to present an angelic face to the West." The reality, however, is quite different in Ukraine, the Catholic leader maintained. Repression of non-Russian believers has increased. Some 150 churches were "either burned or destroyed by bulldozers" between December 1986 and June 1987, reported Terelya.<sup>24</sup>

Speaking to the Heritage Foundation on the eve of his summit meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan declared: "Few moves on the part of the Soviet government could do more to convince the world of its sincerity for reform than the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church."<sup>25</sup> Prospects for such an act were assessed by Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, who spoke to Soviet officials about the matter numerous times. "For the issue posed by the Ukrainian Catholic Church to the Soviet is less a religious issue, than it is an issue of national identification," stated Schifter recently. "The concern about the Ukrainian Catholic Church is not so much that it is Catholic, but that it is Ukrainian... the nationalities issue is one that worries the Soviets a great deal...and the Ukrainian nationality issue is one that troubles them very seriously."<sup>26</sup> Any kind of Ukrainian religious institution, Catholic or Orthodox, will continue to be a threat to the Soviets because of the national ramifications such institutions represent.

(Continued on Page 26)

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### Conclusion

Given the divergent religious history of Ukraine and Russia during the past one thousand years, Ukrainians argue that the Russian Orthodox Church had neither the historical nor the canonical nor the moral right to commemorate the millennium of a faith which that Church had consistently attempted to dilute or destroy. The Russian Orthodox Church today remains what it has always been, an instrument of Russian messianic imperialism.

Russia's rulers never achieved the Third Rome. But they did achieve the Third International. Moscow's position today is rooted in an updated version of nineteenth-century policy directives: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and [Russian] Nationalism.<sup>27</sup> It is for this reason that the major Russian millennium celebrations took place in Moscow and not in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, and the site of the baptism of Rus in 988.

As outlined by Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Byelorussia during a press conference in July 1987, the millennium celebration was highlighted by a "solemn ceremony" in Moscow and its "participants were the representatives of religious organizations and social circles with which the Russian Orthodox Church has been cooperating for many years, and striving for peace and the preservation of the sacred gift of life on earth." According to one western source:

*What the Metropolitan did not discuss is also important. A major target of Moscow's campaign is Ukrainian nationalism both at home and abroad. On the domestic front, this means ignoring or denying the Ukrainian aspects of the anniversary. Organizing the celebration under the exclusive aegis of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch is intended to demonstrate the unity of all Soviet Slavic peoples who share the traditions of Orthodox Christianity. Abroad, Moscow will try to discredit and sow conflict among Ukrainian and other emigre communities opposed to Soviet power.*

As with all religious observances in the USSR, the millennium was monitored by the KGB. There were denunciations of the arms race and calls for peace from among the invited guests. To prevent embarrassing incidents, religious dissidents were arrested and the Ukrainian Church terrorized into silence.<sup>28</sup> For the Soviets, it was another disinformation triumph.

Misgivings about Soviet Russian motives have not prevented the Ukrainian Church leaders from attempting a reconciliation, however. In a speech delivered on November 6, 1987, Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky, primate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, now residing in Rome, declared:

*In keeping with Christ's spirit, we extend our*

*hand of forgiveness, reconciliation and love to the Russian nation and the Russian Patriarchate. We repeat, as we said in our reconciliation with the Polish nation, the words of Christ: "forgive us, as we forgive you."*<sup>29</sup>

The Polish hierarchy responded with similar sentiments and an invitation to Cardinal Lubachivsky to visit Poland during the millennium for a joint divine liturgy of commemoration. The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate has yet to respond.

### Notes

1. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Church Policy in the Ukraine, 1919-1939" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1961), pp. 61-106.

2. To assure apostolic succession, Orthodox canon law provides that at least two bishops officiate at the consecration of a new bishop.

3. In a paper presented at the Sobor, Archpriest Lypkivsky argued that its convocation was canonically valid since its members, representing the whole of the Ukrainian Church, were meeting in Christ's name with faith in Jesus and the Holy Spirit among them.

4. In another paper presented at the Sobor by V. Chekhivsky, the thesis was advanced that since bishops in Apostolic times were consecrated by presbyters, the exclusive assumption of this right by bishops was a violation of ancient Christian practice. Since the Grace of the Holy Spirit resides in the whole Church, it has the right to ordain its bishops. The Sobor accepted this argument but ruled that all future members of the Ukrainian episcopacy be consecrated according to Orthodox canon law.

5. Cited in Bociurkiw, p. 207.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-208.

7. The Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church was created in 1924 by the Patriarch of Constantinople who justified his jurisdiction over former Russian Orthodox territories by arguing, among other things, that his was the ecumenical patriarchate and that in 1686 the Metropolitan See of Kiev had been transferred from the jurisdiction of Constantinople to that of Moscow "by uncanonical means."

8. "Soviet Repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Special Report No. 159* (January 1987), p. 1.

9. *Ibid.*; Bociurkiw, "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1920-1930: A Study of Religious Modernization," *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union*, Dennis J. Dunn, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 310-317. Frank E. Sysyn, *The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1987), p. 18. Also, see *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, 2: 170-171.

10. Cited in Bociurkiw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, VII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 93-94.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-95.
12. "Soviet Repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," p. 2. Vasyl Markus, "Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics*, Pedro Ramet, ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Policy Studies, 1984), pp. 63-64.
13. Sysyn, p. 13.
14. "Soviet Repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," pp. 1-2.
15. Markus, "Religion and Nationality: The Unites of the Ukraine," *Religion and Atheism in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe*, Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong, eds. (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1975), p. 106.
16. Cited in Sysyn, p. 9.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-13.
18. Cited in Ivan Hvat, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union During the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II," *The Catacomb Ukrainian Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II* (Cambridge: Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1984), p. 273.
19. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 290.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-294.
21. "Soviet Repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," p. 4.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
23. Cited in Hvat, p. 277.
24. *Ukrainian Weekly* (November 1, 1987).
25. *Ukrainian Weekly* (December 6, 1987).
26. *Ukrainian Weekly* (December 20, 1987).
27. "The fact that the Third International is not international but a Russian national idea is very poorly understood in the West," writes Nicholas Berdyaev. "Here we have the transformation of Russian messianism. Western communists, when they join the Third International, play a humiliating part; they do not understand that in joining the Third International they are joining the Russian people and realizing its messianic vocation." Nicholas Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 144.
28. See "1988: Moscow Marks Religious Anniversary," *Disinformation* (Fall 1986), pp. 1-9.
29. *Ukrainian Weekly* (November 15, 1987).

*Dr. Kuropas is an adjunct professor of education at Northern Illinois State University and a noted Ukrainian writer and educator.*

## Women in Ukraine

*Adam A. Hetnal*

*Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian community life, 1884-1939*, by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak. Edmonton, Canada. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta. 1988. xxv+460 pages. Hardcover. Illustrations.

This book was inspired by feminism, but it deals with women who were anything but feminists. Full liberation of women in the western world only became a reality in the wake of World War II. As to the rest of the planet, its population has different challenges and priorities. Daily bread and political sovereignty still take precedence over the liberation of women in a vast majority of countries in today's world.

This also applies to the situation in Ukraine before World War II. At that time, Ukrainian men and women sought education, economic improvement, and national emancipation. The contribution of Ukrainian women to this struggle has failed to receive adequate attention. Dr. Bohachevsky-Chomiak has sought to correct that injustice by examining Ukrainian women between 1884-1939. Her task was almost Herculean, since prior to 1945, Ukrainian lands were, respectively, under Polish, Russian, Austrian, Romanian and Czechoslovak rule. Due to these multiple partitions, Ukrainian lands were unevenly developed from the economic point of view, and divided along religious and political lines. The articulate and patriotic Ukrainians had to adjust their activities to the existing political, social, economic and religious realities. Some governments treated the Ukrainians fairly well and allowed the development of Ukrainian national aspirations; others were hostile to them, and still others strangled Ukrainian national consciousness altogether.

Nationalism is often blind. While fighting for their own rights, some people are unable to see the legitimate aspirations of others. Just as the British oppressed the Irish, and the Germans and Russians, the Poles, both Poles and Russians were unable to understand that Ukrainians were a distinct nation. The author deals with these matters as well. She points out that early attempts to create an independent Ukrainian state took place in the seventeenth century. Later, the strongly divided Ukrainians missed their great historical chance during the Russian revolution and civil war of 1917-1920. The present restructuring of the USSR may give the Ukrainians a chance to try again.

**We would like to thank the following persons for their generous donations to *The Sarmatian Review* in January-April 1990:**

**Ms. Marla K. Burns, Dr. & Mrs. Ira N. & Anna Doneson, Mr. Stefan J. Ginilewicz, D. and Mrs. Boguslaw & Maria Godlewski, Dr. and Mrs. Witold J. Lukaszewski, Drs. Bogdan and Stella Nowicki.**

The author of *Feminists Despite Themselves* obviously combines scholarly interests with an active involvement in women's issues. In addition to her job at the National Endowment for the Humanities, she is Vice-President of the National Council for Women in the United States. Among her other publications are *The Spring of a Nation: Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848* [1967] and *S.N.Trubetskoi: an intellectual among the intelligentsia in pre-revolutionary Russia* [1976]. She spent some ten years researching for the work under review. The book is based on archival research conducted in various countries, personal interviews and printed primary and secondary sources. The author has largely excluded from her investigation non-Ukrainian women who lived in the lands of historical Ukraine. Also, her focus is the Ukrainian women of western Ukraine (Galicia), although she devotes some attention to Ukrainian women in other parts of Ukraine.

Bohachevsky-Chomiak describes the general conditions of each Ukrainian land between 1884-1939, focusing thereafter on the general and specific issues that affected Ukrainians. She covers Ukrainian lands within the Russian and Austrian Empires, the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939), Czechoslovakia, Romania and the USSR. She describes the birth and development of women's organizations, their immediate and local aims, and far-reaching Pan-Ukrainian goals. She compares the status of women in the various parts of Ukraine, and deals with inter-ethnic conflicts between the Russians, Ukrainians and Poles in the lands that belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to the partitions of it in 1772, 1793 and 1795. She also examines the attitude of both Ukrainian and other men toward women.

The author explains how conservative, liberal and revolutionary Russians approached both the women's and Ukrainian questions. She deals with the relationship between Ukrainian women's organizations and the feminist movement elsewhere, focusing on those who were articulate and educated: Natalia Kobrynska, Olha Kobylanska, Olena Pchilka, Nadiia Surovtseva, Hanna Chykalenko Keller, Maria Dontsova, and others.

Then the author examines the numerous parties and governments that ruled over the Ukrainian lands between 1884 and 1939. She shows that within the USSR, equality of women was not achieved. Both men and women suffered from economic deprivations and political terror in the 1930s and at other times. Bohachevsky-Chomiak asserts that Ukrainians were subjected to a deliberate genocide under the Soviet regime.

Bohachevsky-Chomiak explains that between 1884 and 1939, Ukraine was largely in the pre-industrial age, and therefore the concerns of Ukrainian women were then similar to those of women of the developing countries today. She argues that in most cases, Ukrainian women adopted a gradualist and pragmatic approach in their struggle for emancipation. National aspirations, community and family concerns prevailed over those of the individual. The fact that a large part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was recruited from the ranks of the Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic clergy probably influenced a certain timidity among women as they dealt with such taboo matters as sex. When a community fights for both economic and national survival, solidarity prevails over other matters, contends the author.

In her view, philanthropy played only a small role among the Ukrainian women. They approached the existing problems such as underdevelopment, unemployment, and political oppression, with realism and pragmatism. The Ukrainian women's organizations and individual feminists stressed the need for education for both sexes, self-help and self-reliance as the best possible way to use the existing resources. Since Ukrainian women considered male drunkenness a major problem, they emphasized bringing sobriety to families. As Bohachevsky-Chomiak stresses over and over again, the chief aim of the Ukrainian women's organizations was to bring people of all social stations and political beliefs closer together, and to avoid as much as possible issues that would shock the community. In this respect, much was achieved by Ukrainian women in the years under review. The author argues that progress took place in all Ukrainian lands except for the Soviet zone in the 1930s where between four and seven million Ukrainians perished as a result of a deliberate government policy.

Any pioneering work has strong and weak points. In this case, the author promises much more than she delivers. For all practical purposes, she has studied only Ukrainian women under Austrian and Polish rule; yet she has failed to explore the archival sources of Vienna. With regard to other parts of Ukraine, her work is largely based on printed primary and secondary sources. She generalizes before fully having studied the conditions in all parts of Ukraine.

Furthermore, one can hardly agree with the author's assertion that the Austrian government favored Poles over Ukrainians between 1772 and 1918. Had she examined the late Jan Kozik's *The Ukrainian*

(Continued on Page 30)

# BOOKS BOOKS AND PERIODICALS RECEIVED

***Between East and West: Writings from Kultura.*** Edited by Robert Kostrzewa. New York. Hill and Wang (A Division of Farrar Straus and Giroux). 1990. xiv + 273 pages. \$30.00 (hardcover).

An event. A voice in the wilderness. An attempt to preface the self-definition of Eastern Europeans which will hopefully emerge out of the confusion following the period of communist destruction and brainwashing. It contains fifteen essays by *Kultura's* most popular authors grouped in three categories: Where We Live; What We Think; What We Write.

***Gazeta International.*** Nos. 1-3. Editor: Jane Dobija. PL 01-023 Warszawa, ul. Dzielna 11A/21. Tel. (011-4822) 38 33 44. Fax: (0-22) 41 69 20. Subscription \$45.00 per year. Checks should be made out to *Gazeta* and mailed to *Gazeta*, P.O. Box 348, New York, N.Y. 10040.

The accompanying letter says that this is the first independent international newspaper published in the Eastern bloc. The first issue argues for the wisdom of allowing the Soviets to remain in Poland until the German-Polish border question is settled. The third issue welcomes Lithuanian independence.

This Polish version of the *International Herald-Tribune* reads like a paper edited by the just-fired *NYT* journalists. And no wonder: its editor, Jane Dobija, worked for National Public Radio. *GI's* parent is *Gazeta Wyborcza*, and its flavor is decidedly social democratic, with the dream of socialism only inches away. But as the Polish proverb says, when there is no fish, even a crab is a fish. Thus: welcome, huray, *Gazeta*, but *caveat* reader.

***United States--East European Relations in the 1990s.*** Edited by Richard F. Staar. Crane Russak (Taylor & Francis Group). 1989. 332 pages. \$27.00 (paper).

The book focuses on political, economic and military matters. A scholarly work for serious students of Eastern Europe.

***Konrad Wallenrod and Grażyna,*** by Adam Mickiewicz. Translated by Irene Suboczewski. Lanham-New York. The University Press of America. 1990. \$19.95 (hardcover). Distributed by the Polish American Arts Association, c/o Mr. Ludwik Zeranski, Treasurer, 6219 Kellogg Drive, McLean, VA 22101.

A poetic translation of two of Mickiewicz's best known poems. *Konrad Wallenrod* deals with the legendary Master of the Teutonic Knights who purposely led the Knights into a defeat to avenge the wrongs done to his country by the Teutonic Order. *Grażyna* is a brave Lithuanian warrior.

***Tak i nie: A Polish bimonthly in South Africa.*** In Polish. 20 pages. Editor: Krzysztof Marski. P.O. Box 391 069, Bramley 2018, South Africa. Fax 011-887-7776. Subscription R.25.00 per year.

Definitely not an academic publication; editing and proofreading leave much to be desired. Yet, it is more than a run-of-the-mill newsletter of a local Polish club. The issue features the first installment of an account of life in Africa between 1947-1989, written *from the standpoint of Polish political interests* (to be continued). There is a list of members of the current Council of Ministers in Poland. The funnies page has a delightful Horoscope.

***Business Opportunities in Eastern Europe.*** A biweekly newsletter on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Published by the Atlantic Information Services, Inc. (AIS) in conjunction with Georgetown University. 1050 17th Street NW, Suite 480, Washington, D.C. 20036. Toll-free number for subscription is 1-800-521-4323.

This newsletter promises to give you access to a network of willing business partners in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary etc. Krzysztof Szwarz of the Export Development Bank and Hubert Janiszewski of the Foreign Investment Agency represent Poland on the Editorial Board. Among the sample opportunities listed, there is a Polish chemical and pharmaceutical plant seeking joint venture for co-production and modernization of facility, and the city of Gdańsk seeking investors to build a seaside hotel and resort for an increasing number of western tourists.

***Bloc: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Business Journal.*** Vol. II, No. 1. February-March 1990. Published by Eastern Information Resources, Inc., 350 Broadway, Suite 1205, New York, N.Y. 10013. Fax: 212-996-0898. Editor: Stuart Anderson. Subscription price: \$89 per year in the U.S.

If this journal made a serious effort to find partners in Eastern Europe, we have missed it. It appears to be a PR job for soliciting investment mainly in the Russian areas of the Soviet Union. It does however list phones and business contacts in U.S. embassies in Eastern Europe, as well as providing some information about investment. From it we have learned that Daihatsu Motor, a Japanese vehicle manufacturer, will set up a car assembly plant in Żerań, Poland, and the Worldcom Group, an international public relations firm, has opened an office in Warsaw.

***Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research.*** Vol. III, No. 1. Spring 1990. Editor: H.B. Paksoy. Box 1011, Rocky Hill, CT 06067. Subscription \$25.00 per year (includes membership in the AACAR).

A late arrival. Also, a rare periodical publication on the region and the people who have not had a voice in the United States. It contains articles and book reviews on the Soviet Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan and other Turkic areas of the world.



## SARMATIAN REVIEW HONORABLE MENTION FOR CREATIVE USE OF DATA

Our Creative Data Honorable Mention goes to those who showed organizational ability in ways that benefitted either Poland or the United States or both.

This month's Mention goes to Dr. Danuta Z. Hutchins of Buena Vista College in Storm Lake, Iowa. Dr. Hutchins is a published scholar specializing in twentieth-century Polish and Russian literature and in the philosophy of language.

Last year, a list of Polish orphanages run by the Catholic Sisters fell into Dr. Hutchins' hands (such lists are available for the asking from the Polish American Congress). She visited one orphanage and, impressed by the serenity with which its inhabitants accepted grinding poverty, promised to help. She sent money and parcels, and, while giving a history lecture at the Storm Lake High School, inspired her listeners to do likewise. In December 1989, she presided over the action of packing and mailing Christmas gifts to the less fortunate children from those more fortunate. On December 9, 1989, *The Des Moines Register*, *The Sioux City Journal* and *Storm Lake Pilot Tribune* gave ample coverage to Dr. Hutchins' initiative.

Having heard that some schools in her neighborhood were dumping old English textbooks, Dr. Hutchins made sure that these textbooks were not destroyed but sent to high schools in Warsaw for the students of English. Thus the Polish children may be using the good old McGuffey readers rejected by some American schools, whereas American children... but that is another story. Perhaps Dr. Hutchins' efforts will mobilize others not only to send Christmas parcels to Polish kids but also to take a look at the American kids' textbooks.

Hats off to Dr. Hutchins.

(Continued from Page 28)

### Ukrainian Women

*national movement in Galicia, 1815-1849*, she would have been able better to evaluate Vienna's policy. The author forgets that the Austrian government added prestige to the Uniate Church by renaming it the Greek Catholic Church and by treating it well. Of course, Vienna did not want to antagonize Poles either, and it feared Russophile tendencies among some Ukrainians in Galicia. Also, the famine of the 1930s in Ukraine was not due to the Ukrainian peasants' resistance to collectivization but to a deliberate Soviet policy of "weakening" the Ukrainians as a group.

To sum up, the Bohachevsky-Chomiak study

THE DES MOINES REGISTER

SATURDAY, Dec. 9, 1989



Storm Lake students  
play Santa in Poland

page A3

## Storm Lake kids send 'gift' to Poland

By WALT SHOTWELL

Register Staff Writer

Forty students at Storm Lake High School are miffed that Uncle Sam hasn't moved faster with aid to Poland as that nation tries to shed its Communist shackles, so they sent a CARE package to Poland this week.

"We realize the package may not touch many people," said Lara Murray, 18, a senior who is credited with the idea. "The main reason for sending it is to show our government we are disappointed. If our government isn't going to do anything, we will. It's a political statement."

The student action was inspired several days ago when Danuta Hutchins spoke to Tom Langenfeld's American History class. Hutchins came to the United States from Poland 27 years ago and has been a professor of Slavic languages and literature at nearby Buena Vista College since 1979.

Among other things, Hutchins said, "I told them there are great shortages of almost everything in Poland, especially things young children need."

She said class members, led by Murray, raised several questions, including, "Why are we letting them suffer

## Storm Lake gift to Poland

POLAND

Continued from Page 17

shortages when they are trying to get out of the Communist regime?"

"They asked what they could do right now," Hutchins said, "and Lara suggested the CARE package. I thought it was a splendid idea."

Besides prompting the CARE package, Hutchins gave the students important lesson about Communism, Langenfeld said.

"They asked her why Communism failed in Poland," Langenfeld said. "She explained how central planning mismanaged the economy, and how people lost the work ethic, how they lost incentive."

He said Murray spoke with Hutchins after class, and the CARE package idea was born. Class members contributed a variety of gifts, including non-perishable foods, everything wrapped for Christmas.

Langenfeld said 68 items were mailed in a package measuring two feet by two feet by three feet and weighing 26 pounds.

Postage amounted to \$89.11, he said with the students contributing all but \$10, which he paid.



Danuta Z. Hutchins.

is welcome, but it has certain weak points. Much more work will have to be done to bring about a fair evaluation of the situation of Ukrainian women between 1884 and 1939. Although of Ukrainian descent, Bohachevsky-Chomiak seems at times too distant to understand a society whose main concern was both economic and national survival, rather than feminism. Taking into consideration the conditions in which most Ukrainian women lived, one can only admire the roles they played in their communities.

Adam A. Hetnal is Professor of History at New Mexico State University. He has published widely in American, British, Ukrainian and Polish scholarly journals.



## Letters to the Editor:

### Third Order Dominicans in Moscow

In regard to the "Memoir: From the History of the Moscow Chapter of the Sisters of St. Dominic, 1921-1932" by Anatolia Nowicka [*The Sarmatian Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3]: I vaguely recall a friend in Belgium (possibly in 1979 or so) mentioning that she had received a letter from Sister Nowicka. The friend, Miss Irene Posnoff, is Director of the Foyer Orientale Chrétien (Eastern Rite Catholic Russian Center and Publishing House) in Brussels.

According to an acquaintance in Novosibirsk from whom I heard a week ago, the Catholic church in Tomsk, built in 1833 and confiscated by the Soviets in 1937, will be returned to the Catholic community this Spring. The Polish church in Irkutsk, which in 1970 or 1973 was being turned into a museum, has not yet been returned. The writer of the letter from Novosibirsk also enclosed a photo of a "Polish church" in Novosibirsk (formerly Novonikolaevsk) which the Catholics are trying to have returned also.

The writer mentioned that there is one Catholic priest in Novosibirsk (judging by the name, a Lithuanian) who also goes to Tomsk for three or four days each month to celebrate Mass in Tomsk. According to the writer of the letter, "There is only one Catholic priest in Siberia and the Far East of the Soviet Union."

Donald P. Banas (Fairbanks, Alaska)

Mr. Banas' letter is dated March 6, 1990. Ed.

### Polish economy

In the last issue dealing with economic transformations in Eastern Europe [*The Sarmatian Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1], you failed to address the most pressing questions: how to erect a free economic system on the ruins of socialist economies, and how to open up opportunities for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. Also, two important examples of a positive economic development have not been mentioned: Ludwig Erhard's "economic miracle" in West Germany achieved by means of a sudden and total decontrolling of prices in 1948, and economic reform introduced by Charles de Gaulle in 1958 when he became President of France. Much can be learned from studying these two examples of economic success.

Stanley M. Garstka, M.D. (Riverside, California)

### Polish and German politics

I am writing to register my support for inclusion of Poland in the talks on German unification.

Poland is most directly interested in security and stability of her border with Germany. No other country suffered so much from German aggression as Poland did. Naturally, Poles are most sensitive to the terms of settlement of World War II. They are the most likely country to suffer the consequences of any loopholes, such as German commitment to change their borders "by peaceful means." The

Soviets may well let some loopholes remain in order to play them up later.

We are still witnessing the unwillingness of German politicians to recognize the permanency of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland. They seem to fear that they would lose the German electorate by making a positive commitment to European peace. What this means is that a large part of the German public is again suffering from their national megalomania and feels that they can dispose of the 40 million Poles at will. The West Germans have been taught in schools and by mass media that half of Poland is under temporary status, or "for the time being under Polish administration." The fact that Germans killed 20% of Poland's population and that more Polish soldiers fought on the fronts of collapsing Germany in 1945 than any other nationality besides Americans and Russians, is practically never mentioned.

Poland, an ally of Britain and France, suffered German assault that detonated World War II. In the entire period between the two world wars, German politicians saw the destruction of Poland as their main goal. They believed that "Prussia can be either German or Polish but cannot be both." For the same reason, Chancellor Bismarck advocated extermination of the Polish people. He was following the traditional policies of the Berlin government which initiated the crime of partitions of Poland.

Chancellor Otto Bismarck said: "Hit the Poles till they despair of their very lives...if we are to survive, our only course is to exterminate them (as quoted by Werner Richter in *Bismarck*, N.Y.: Putnam, 1964, p. 101)."

In contrast, George Clemenceau said: "Let us recall the partitions of Poland, the greatest crime in history, which leaves an everlasting stigma...No outrage had ever less excuse, no violence perpetrated against humanity ever cried louder for a redress that had been indefinitely postponed."

For the sake of peace and stability in Europe, the voice of Poland on the German settlement should be heard during the negotiations.

Ivo Cyprian Pogonowski (Blacksburg, Virginia)

The writer is author of *Poland: A Historical Atlas* and of other works.

### Polish at Rice University

**First Year Polish (Plsh 101a)** will again be offered in Fall 1990 by the Department of German and Slavic Studies at Rice University. Rice students can take this course for credit. Others are urged to consider auditing it. The fee for auditing is \$50.00 per semester. Permission of instructor is required. Textbooks are available at the Campus Store. For more information about First Year Polish, call the Department of German and Slavic Studies, 527-4868.

## PIASA MEETING

**Time:** May 5, 1990 (Saturday), 7:30 PM

**Place:** Residence of Drs. Waldemar & Teresa Priebe, 4239 Emory Ave (West University Place), Houston 77005

Take Wesleyan exit off Hwy 59. Go south toward Bissonnet. Turn west on Bissonnet; the first street on the right is Emory, and on the left is Academy.

**Topic:** Polish municipal and county elections in May 1990: analysis and prognosis

**Speaker:** Dr. Witold Lukaszewski  
Sam Houston State University

In May 1990, the first (in 50 years) free elections to the municipal and county offices will be held in Poland. Professor Lukaszewski will provide instant an analysis based partly on the first Polish e-mail newspaper *DONOSY (SCOOP)*.

All Members and Friends are invited.

## Polish Genealogical Society of Texas-- Schedule of Meetings and Sponsored Events in 1990

1. May 19, 10 AM, Collier Library, 6200 Pinemont. Discussion of genealogical research resources featuring poster-size maps of various regions of Poland.
2. July, Slavic Festival at the Knights of Columbus, 607 East Whitney Drive. Exact date to be announced later. PGST will host a booth and have research aids and Polish items for sale.
3. September 22, PGST meeting, arrangements pending, details to be announced at a future date.
4. October, Polish Exhibit at the Collier Library, 6200 Pinemont.
5. November 18, 2 AM, Polish Home, 103 Cooper. Annual Social: covered dish, music and festivities.


## AWARD!

This special Award is offered to politicians and media personalities who have displayed gratuitous hostility to the Eastern Europeans. This time, the Dead Carp Award goes to columnist Max Lerner for his nationally syndicated column published on March 5, 1990, in *Houston Chronicle*, in which Mr. Lerner thus editorializes about the Eastern Europeans: "Except for Europe's philosopher king, Vaclav Havel, whose power thirst is minimal, there is no emerging leader [in Eastern Europe] who wouldn't want to claim more power than he now possesses."

So what happened to Lech Wałęsa, Mr. Lerner?

## AWARD!

# Dead Carp Award



For Conspicuous Diservice  
To Western Civilization  
Max Lerner Is Given  
The Dead Carp Award

April 1, 1990



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