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RICE UNIVERSITY

THE SOCIAL BASES OF AUSTRIAN POLITICS:
THE GERMAN ELECTORAL DISTRICTS OF CISLEITHANIA
1900-1914

by

A. Neal Mangham

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Thesis Director's signature:

R. John Rath

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A. Neal Mangham

Chapter I: The Monarchy in 1900

The adoption of universal and equal manhood suffrage as the basis for parliamentary elections in January, 1907, was viewed by the politicians of the western half of the Habsburg monarchy in several ways. Some considered it to be the death knell of the privileged classes, some regarded it as the solution to the national problems which had plagued the parliament for so long, and some saw it as the first step towards the full socialization of the empire. It was none of those things, but it was a momentous step in the political development of the monarchy. In the years following the First World War, the view that the monarchy was doomed to fall under the weight of its insoluble nationality problems, and that no reform could have saved it became prevalent among many students of the empire's history. This view may or may not be correct; it is enough to say that the clash of nationalities was the single most important feature of the political life of the Habsburg monarchy in its last years. The very best studies of the last years of the monarchy's existence have quite properly focused their main attention on the national groups and the conflicts among them. These studies have discussed the national questions without losing sight of the fact that many other serious questions existed to plague the monarchy, but some other studies are not so careful.¹

1. Among the early studies of the monarchy's last days

The more imitative studies have followed the pattern of concentrating on the national disputes but have viewed them

first position must be given to Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929). Other scholars have tended to follow Jászi even when they have disagreed with many of the conclusions he reached. Two well known examples of treatments of the period from the standpoint of the nationalities are Allan James Percival Taylor's The Habsburg Monarchy 1815-1918 (London: MacMillan and Company, 1942), and Arthur James May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951). Leo Valiani's classic study of the end of empire, La dissoluzione dell'Austria-Ungheria (Milan: Casa Editrice Il Saggiatore, 1966), has recently been translated into English under the title The End of Austria-Hungary (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) and constitutes one of the finest works on the subject. Valiani, concentrating on the problems of the nationalities, was able to indicate some of the other problems facing the monarchy. This ability to demonstrate other facets of the situation in which the monarchy found itself was shared by Robert Kann in his study of The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918 (2 vols., New York: Columbia University Press, 1950) which seems, however, to relate all other problems to the nationalities question either directly or otherwise. One of the best textbook treatments of the empire's history is Victor-Louis Tapié's Monarchie et peuples du Danube (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1969), which is available in English under the title The Rise and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (New York: Praeger, 1971). Most successful of all in showing the multiplicity of problems facing the monarchy, perhaps, have been the Austrians, such as Hugo Hantsch in his Die Geschichte Österreichs (2 vols., Vienna: Verlag Styria, 1953), and the contributors to Heinrich Benedikt (ed.), Geschichte der Republik Österreichs (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1954). The studies mentioned here are among the very best available work on the dual monarchy, and all manage to treat the national problems without losing sight of the fact that other difficulties existed. All of them, however, treat other factors of Austrian life as being of peripheral importance.

with so myopic a gaze that they have obscured the rest of the political landscape. Some such studies leave their readers with the impression that the Habsburg monarchy was simply an arena in which monolithic blocs of nationalities maneuvered against one another. The national groups of the empire are all too often pictured as having been united in bitter opposition to one another at every point. Furthermore, the nationalities are pictured as implacable foes of the very existence of the monarchy. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

There were deep and fundamental divisions within as well as among the national groups, and it is the purpose of this study to delineate some of those differences. Furthermore, this study demonstrates some of the effects such divisions had on the political life of the monarchy in its last years. In order to explain some of those differences, the German population of the monarchy is used as a case study. The Germans were chosen for several reasons. While they were never a majority in the monarchy the Germans did constitute a large enough minority to allow meaningful generalizations. At the time of the census of 1900 they formed 35% of the population of the Austrian half of the monarchy, and were the largest single group in the area.² If the Germans had acted and voted in unison, it would probably have been

2. Statistisches Jahrbuch der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Ländern, 1908 (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1910), p. 10.

easier to forge a coalition to govern effectively in the monarchy. They did not act in unison, however, for the Germans exhibited all the social, economic, and political cleavages which existed in varying degrees among all the national groups of the monarchy. In addition to being a large and well developed population, the Germans were the dominant element in the political life of Austria. For all of these reasons, the Germans of the western half of the monarchy were chosen as the focus of this study. The western half of the monarchy was officially titled the "Kingdoms and Lands represented in Parliament" and was unofficially called either Cisleithania or Austria. These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this work.

I have chosen to deal with Cisleithania because of the political events culminating in the electoral reform of 1907. Although Hungary played a major role in many of the important political events which are mentioned here, the suffrage reform law did not apply to the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. The reform extended the vote to virtually all elements of Austrian society and allowed full expression of the disputes within as well as among the national groups. The general elections to parliament which were held in 1907 and 1911 were the last held in the monarchy, and the only two held under the wide suffrage established by the reform. These two elections demonstrate

clearly the range of factors which were important in the politics of the area, and are the major topic of discussion in this study. The voting behavior of the Germans in the last two elections held in Austria is examined with the intent of showing some of the factors other than nationality which played a role in determining political allegiances among the Germans of Cisleithania.

Analysis of voting behavior has long been a favorite tool of the historian in his attempts to understand the pressures and interests which the members of any population felt in their daily lives. Such analyses have ranged from fairly crude compilations of statistics designed to measure the impact of some single causal factor such as economic interest to far more sophisticated multi-causal studies. In recent years techniques developed by social scientists in other disciplines have been added to the historians' repertoire, and have made even more detailed scrutinies of voting behavior possible. One of the favorite techniques adopted in recent years is the computer aided study, which has been used to good effect by both historians and political scientists. Such studies are frequently based on models of human behavior which may be stated as mathematical formulae and which serve as the test of the validity of the data gathered in the course of the study. They have the great advantage of allowing the comparison of vast quantities of data quickly and accurately.

While such studies are useful and thought-provoking, this

examination of the voting behavior of the Germans of Cisleithania has been carried out along somewhat different lines. This was done deliberately and for several reasons. Without a detailed discussion of the theory and mathematics involved in setting up models for social preference studies, of which voting analysis is one type, several points may be made. Most of the models used in such social preference studies are based on the assumption that a person (in this case a voter) will feel some degree of preference (P_1, P_2, P_3) for each of a set of choices (a, b, c, ...) open to him. Assuming that P_3 is the highest preference felt by the voter, the choice for which he feels that degree of preference is the one he will make. Such a model, however, assumes a one-to-one correlation between preference and choice--a degree of correlation which does not always exist in practice. The voter's preference is affected by what can be called social utility of choice, a phenomenon which can alter behavior. Simply put, social utility of choice operates as follows: the voter feels a strong preference for candidate (a) because of his similarity to the voter in many ways (religion, family background, nationality, etc.) but recognizes that the program espoused by candidate (b) is more likely to be of direct benefit to him. He therefore disregards his preference for (a) and chooses (b). The voter may prefer (a), recognize the benefits to him of the program of (b), and still chose (c) because of pressure

from his family, peers, employer, or some other source. This does not deny the usefulness of social preference studies for some types of human behavior, but does indicate one weakness inherent to them.³ As a British social scientist commented in a discussion of these models, "single peakedness of preference is not generally decideable with voting data."⁴

Certain other techniques were also considered and rejected. A great deal of useful and interesting material has been gathered in recent years using survey methods, for example. This method is not suited to the present study, however, because almost no information exists regarding public opinion before the two elections in question. A similar lack of data prevails regarding the membership of the parties. The Austrian Socialist Party allowed access to their archives which house some very useful information including partial membership lists for the years in question. The Austrian State Archive also contains some of the membership lists which the parties were required to submit to the Minister of the Interior, but these are fragmentary and are generally confined to the major cities of Cisleithania. This information is valuable

3. There are many valuable sources of information on the various techniques which may be used in considering voting behavior. A sampling of these are included in the bibliography of the present work. One of the clearest is Prasanta Patanaik's Voting and Collective Choice. Some Aspects of Collective Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

4. Andrew Keith Sen, "Preference, Votes, and Majority Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Vol XXXI (1964), p. 165.

and could easily form the basis for further study, but is inadequate for this study. Finally, it ought to be noted that the original census takers' notes are no longer available. It is, therefore, impossible to make any comments about individuals unless they were prominent enough to be mentioned at some length in newspapers, police reports, or one of the several biographical sources which were consulted.

Another method has been chosen for this study than the models which are available to the researchers who deal with living subjects, or with complete and recent census material. Essentially this method involves analyzing the structure of the German electoral districts of Austria, describing the voting behavior of the residents of these districts, and then searching for any patterns of similarity which might exist to suggest the relative importance of certain social and economic factors in deciding that behavior. The analysis of the districts includes such considerations as the religion, occupational structure, and the differences which might exist between city and rural districts. The data used in the examination of the electoral districts is drawn primarily from census and other official records and from the studies done by scholars active at the time of the elections in question. This analysis may help in preparing rigorous models of behavior at a later date, but it is still far too early to attempt such a feat at present.

In order to make the analysis of the electoral districts, several steps are necessary. One ought to begin by describing the general structure of the whole German population. Such a description allows a similar description of the districts which were entirely or primarily German in their ethnic makeup. One possible objection to the figures used in this study is that they do not clearly differentiate between Jewish citizens of the monarchy and persons of other religious groups who spoke the same languages. This is true, but does not significantly alter the findings presented here.

The Jewish population of Cisleithania in 1910 consisted of 1.3 million persons of all "nationalities," or about 4.6% of the total population. German Jews included 339,981 persons, or about 25% of the total Jewish population.⁵ In other words, Jews composed roughly 1.15% of the total German speaking population of Austria. Furthermore, this small group seems to have been well satisfied with being considered German, and provided support and leadership for several of the major German parties. Zionism as an organized movement was only a decade old and had made little headway in the dual monarchy. All available evidence suggests that Jews were most often found in the Liberal and Social Democratic ranks.⁶

5. Robert Kann, "German-Speaking Jewry during Austria-Hungary's Constitutional Era," Jewish Social Studies, Vol. X (1948), p. 240 n.

6. Ibid., pp. 240-241; Peter Pulzer, "The Austrian Liberals and the Jewish Question," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XXIII (July, 1963), p. 142.

This study includes an examination of the platforms, programs, and campaign pledges of the parties aiming thier appeals at the German voters. This examination should allow a determination of those items considered most important by the political leaders of the area, and the results of the elections allows a judgement on the accuracy with which the leaders assessed the interests of the electorate. The voting patterns among enfranchised Germans also allows comparison between districts, whereby any patterns of correlation between social, economic, and other factors and choice among the competing parites can be seen.

This analysis of the activities of the Germans in the two elections held under the reform measure cannot be made in a vacuum. In order to provide a comparative basis from which to understand the differences the reform made in political alignments, it is necessary to give a general view of the demographic structure of Cisleithania and to examine briefly the last of the curial parliaments.

The Austrian empire which entered the twentieth century was a sprawling conglomeration of nationalities divided roughly into two halves. That portion ruled directly from Vienna had a population of 26,150,708 in 1900 and consisted of 15 political units sending representatives to a central parliament. The population was not a static one, but had a slightly lower rate of growth than some other European states.

the population had grown from 23,895,413 in 1890, and increased to 28,567,890 in 1910.⁷ Most of the growth was due to natural increase, with live births exceeding deaths by just over 300,000 in 1900.⁸ There was a small but steady trickle of immigration, mainly from the east, of persons attracted by the growing industries of Austria, and perhaps also by the civil liberties statutes which were more fully developed than those of some of the empire's neighbors. The greatest growth was experienced by the political, financial, and industrial centers of Lower Austria, Bohemia, and Silesia, while the agricultural centers of Cisleithania maintained a roughly stable population and in some cases actually lost inhabitants.⁹ Despite this growth in the industrial areas, the monarchy retained a primarily rural and agricultural character, with more than half its people living in towns of fewer than 2000 and engaging in farming or related jobs.¹⁰

7. All census data collected in Austria was published in the official Österreichische Statistik. Another useful source of data is the Statistical Abstract of the Principal and Other Foreign Countries in each Year from 1899 to 1910, published by the Board of Trade of the United Kingdom (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1911), pp. 11-12.

8. Statistical Abstract, 1899-1910, pp. 16-17; Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen vom 1900, Vol. LXIII, Pts. 1-3, Österreichische Statistik (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1902), Pt. 1, p. xxx.

9. Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen vom 1900, Pt. 1, pp. 18-19.

10. Peter Sugar, "The Nature of the non-German Societies under Habsburg Rule," Slavic Review, Vol. XXXI (1963), p. 5 n.

Cisleithania, with an illiteracy rate of 38%, was also a poorly educated country when compared to some other parts of wester Europe.¹¹

These figures for the whole of Cisleithania conceal a considerable variation among the political divisions of the area and among the national groups which populated them. The Germans, the largest of the nationalities represented, had a strength of slightly more than nine million. The other groups varied from the Czechs and Slovaks, with a combined strength of just under six million, down to the approximately two hundred thousand Romanians living mainly in Bukowina. The census of 1900 established the following percentages of the total population for each national group identified in Cisleithania:

TABLE ONE¹²

German	35.73%
Czech and Slovak	23.24
Polish	16.59
Ruthenian	13.21
Slovene	4.65
Serbo-Croatian	2.77
Italian	2.83
Romanian	0.90
Other	0.03

The category "Other" included Magyars and a mixed group of other nationalities including immigrants from outside the monarchy. The variation in the national groups was not in size alone, but in their geographic distribution as well. The Germans, the largest of the groups, were also the most

11. Ibid.

12. The figures are drawn from the Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1908, p. 7.

widely distributed, forming a majority or plurality in seven of the fifteen political units of Austria and following close behind the Czechs in Bohemia. The other national groups were more concentrated. Cisleithania thus formed a patchwork of nationalities unevenly scattered across a wide area; it was also an area of marked variety in economic and social development.

The monarchy entered the twentieth century as a healthy and active partner in the European trading market with a favorable trade balance of more than 300,000 crowns per year. As might be expected, the bulk of Austria's exports were agricultural goods, animals, and raw materials.¹³ The empire maintained its favorable trade balance until 1906 when it began to suffer from the slump which hit Europe in that year. From 1906 until the beginning of World War I the monarchy suffered from an unfavorable trade balance. That, however, did not prevent from maintaining its steady growth in industry and the general economy. The wages of a skilled stonemason rose from seventeen to twenty-two crowns per week between 1896 and 1906.¹⁴ During the same period the prices of beef and potatoes went from 0.6 to 0.7 and 0.11 to 0.09 crowns.¹⁵

13. Statistik des Verkehrs in den im Reichsrath vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911), p. xli.

14. U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin No. 88 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), pp. 834-842.

15. Statistisches Rückblicke aus Österreichische, p. 77

At the same time the legal length of the working day in Austrian industry was shortened to ten hours.¹⁶

The improvement in the lot of the citizens of Cisleithania was not shared equally by all, however. While it is not possible to state with precision the share held by any single group in the economy of Austria, it is possible to make some general observations. One indicator of the relative position of the national groups is the amount of direct taxes paid by each. In 1896 the tax laws of Austria underwent a major reform. After that year there was a progressive income tax on all incomes over 6400 crowns per year, on investment incomes exceeding 6400 crowns, and on all income from rents and interest. In addition, there were direct taxes on land and on inheritances and indirect taxes on such items as sugar, alcoholic drinks, and oil.¹⁷ An examination of the direct taxes paid in 1905 reveals that the Germans paid 22.4 crowns per capita and a total of 63.4% of all direct taxes. The Czechs, who paid the next highest amount, contributed 10.5 crowns each and a total of 19.2% of all direct taxes.¹⁸ It is safe to say that the Germans held a position in the Austrian economy out of proportion to their numbers. Another indicator of

16. U.S. House of Representatives, 54th Congress, Document No. 25, Money and Prices in Foreign Countries (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), p. 99.

17. Josef Ulrich, Das österreichische Staatsrecht. Vol. X of Das öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart (Tübingen: Mohr, 1909), pp. 304-306.

18. Heinrich Rauchberg, "Die Bedeutung der Deutschen in Österreich," Jahrbuch des Gehe-Stiftung, Vol. XIV (1908), p. 168.

of German economic strength may be seen in the number of active savings accounts held in banks and other institutions in 1905. Again the German share, 59.3% of the total, was by far the largest and out of proportion to their numbers.¹⁹ The edge held by the Germans in the finances of the empire reflected the fact that their social and economic structure was more diversified than that of any of the other national groups.²⁰

As was noted previously, most of the inhabitants of Cisleithania lived in communes of fewer than 2,000 persons. There were only a few large urban centers with more than 20,000 people, and those few were scattered across the face of Austria without any apparant pattern. It is another indication of German strength that they formed slightly more than 71% of the population of the 12 largest, even when the city was in an area of non-German population.²¹ Certain exceptions to this rule existed, such as Prague with its large Czech population, but the rule generally prevailed.

19. Statistik der Sparkassen im 1905. Vol. XCI, Pt. 3 of Österreichische Statistik (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911), p. xv.

20. Andrew Whiteside, "The Germans as an Integrative Force in Imperial Austria: The Dilemma of Domiance," Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. III, Pt. 1 (1967), pp. 157-200, gives an interesting discussion of the complexity of the demography and indicates some of the problems caused by treating Germans as a unified bloc.

21. Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen vom 1900, Pt. 1, pp. 48-129.

As might be deduced from the large share which the Germans held in the economy and in the population of the major urban centers, they provided more than their share of the area's tradesmen, professionals, and skilled craftsmen.

The census of 1900 identified slightly more than twelve million persons engaged in trade, commerce, the professions, and the industrial sector of the economy. Of that total the Germans provided approximately 56% of persons identified as self-employed or as skilled workers (as opposed to common labor, most of which was in the form of day labor).²² The Germans were particularly active in such fields as mining, heavy industries, wholesale commerce, and money and credit businesses. They were also found in large numbers in the so-called "free" professions--medicine, education, and the law.²³

Considering the large share which the Germans held in such occupations, as well as in the urban population, it is logical to assume that they were equally well represented in the educational institutions of the monarchy, and this was indeed the case. When the numbers of students in Volksschulen and Bürgerschulen was computed in 1900, it was discovered that approximately 2.7 million of them were monolingual. In this group, just over 1.1 million, or 41% of the total, spoke only German. Among those students speaking more than one

22. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1908, pp. 11-12.

23. Ibid.

language, just over half listed German as their first.²⁴ With this advantage in schooling, the Germans enjoyed an edge over the other national groups in their literacy. While the total literacy rate of Austria was around 60%, the Germans were able to read in much larger numbers. The census of 1900 listed the German population at just over nine million, of whom 75% were literate.²⁵ The urban literacy rates showed an even greater margin in favor of the Germans. In the city of Vienna, for example, the literacy rate among Germans was 97%. The situation varied among other nationalities of Austria, ranging from a literacy rate of 56% among Czechs and Slovaks to a low of 22% among the Ruthenians.²⁶

Taking advantage of this high rate of literacy, the German political groups were able to utilize the periodical press to a greater degree than any other group. There were 3,695 different journals in print in 1908, of which 2,021 were in German. The remainder were distributed unevenly among the other languages of Austria, or were printed in tongues not native to the area (there were, for example, four English

24. Statistik der allgemeinen Volksschulen und Bürgerschulen im 1900. Vol. LXII, Pt. 2 of Österreichische Statistik (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1904), pp. 202-230.

25. Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen vom 1900, Pt. 3, pp. 91-121.

26. Ibid., Pt. 2, pp. lxi-lxv.

and one Esperanto journal in print).²⁷

From these general figures it seems fair to judge that Cisleithania was an area of extreme diversity in its make-up. Of course, such an area produced politicians and political groups of an equal diversity, and those men and groups provide the framework for much of the detailed analysis that follows. This complexity in structure was repeated in the national groups of the area, with the Germans being more fully articulated and divided than any of the other groups. While the Germans were the most fully developed of all the nationalities of Austria, all of them shared the complexity which was so much a part of Austrian life. Broad generalizations which treat Czechs, Germans, Slovenians, or any of the other groups as though it were monolithic are highly questionable. It was this very diversity which gave spirit and life to the politics of the area and which dictated the myriad and shifting alliances among the groups competing for votes in Austria--alliances which sometimes cut across lines of nationality. These alliances, just as the political allegiances of individuals, were based not only on national issues, but on broader social stratifications as well. It is the purpose of this study to describe the factors that made up some of the divisions

27. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1908, p. 112.

in the German population of Austria and to demonstrate their effects on the political life of the area.

The full range of social and other factors became important in Cisleithanian politics only after the reform of 1907. In earlier elections, the franchise was limited and gave more weight to some portions of the population than it did to others. The last parliament elected under the old laws convened in 1900 to deal with issues of fundamental importance to the monarchy. A brief look at the elections for that parliament might reveal the way the old electoral system worked. The parliament was elected under a set of suffrage laws adopted during the 1860's and amended several times in the intervening years. Each amendment had brought more of the population into the political arena. These extensions of the franchise, however, did not fundamentally alter the fact that the suffrage regulations were heavily weighted in favor of certain segments of the population and against others.

Chapter II: Suffrage Laws and the Election of 1900

The constitutional framework in which the government of Cisleithania functioned was the product of an extended period of growth. In the years following the Congress of Vienna the monarchy, under the guidance of Prince Clemens von Metternich, held the line firmly against the kind of written constitutional document for which the liberals of the period struggled. During the period from 1815 to 1848, the period usually called the Vormärz, the monarchy was governed through a blend of customs, local patents, and imperial decrees. The revolutions which swept Europe at the end of that period thrust Austria headlong into a new era, and written constitutions appeared in profusion. These documents ranged from codifications of local rights to the most radical schemes of government. The culmination of this period of ferment came in 1860, when the emperor granted a charter to his subjects.

Following the military defeats in Italy in 1859, the empire experienced a resurgence of unrest and criticism of the government. The emperor and his leading advisor, Count Agenor Goluchowski, responded with a promise to return to constitutional government. In October, 1860, after consulting with the leading statesmen of the empire, Francis Joseph issued the October Diploma, in which he pledged himself to recognize the principle of constitutional government exercised through a legislative assembly and to restore a broad provincial autonomy. Among other things, the

provinces were to be co-equal partners with the central government in all decisions involving financial and judicial matters. This reform was never fully implemented, however, because of Hungarian resistance to its terms. The leaders of Hungary's major political groups demanded a return to the full autonomy they had lost in 1849. The emperor refused to countenance such a demand, and he withdrew even the limited autonomy he had already granted. In order to carry out the promise of constitutional government, the emperor issued a new decree in 1861.

This document, the February Patent, included provisions establishing a bicameral legislative body for the empire (the Reichsrat), with an upper house of mixed hereditary and appointed membership, and a lower house with members selected by the provincial diets.¹ The provincial diets were, in turn, elected on the basis of a suffrage which recognized four classes of voters organized into voting curia. The curias were made up of the non-noble owners of great estates, the citizens of cities and towns, the members of chambers of commerce, and the residents of rural communes. The parliament thus elected could meet either as a full body (including Hungarian deputies) to deliberate on matters of general concern, or as a more limited body to consider matters of interest only in Cisleithania (in which case the Hungarians were excluded).

1. Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich, 1861 (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1861), Law No. 20, pp. 60-74.

the establishment of the imperial parliament limited the powers of the provincial diets granted by the October Diploma, thereby exacerbating the opposition of some of the champions of regionalism. It also presaged the later division of the monarchy by establishing what amounted to a separate parliament for Cisleithania.

The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 was followed by fundamental changes in the nature and structure of the empire. In 1867, the Hungarians achieved the autonomy which they had sought through the famous Ausgleich, or compromise, of that year. The separation of the two halves of the empire was so complete that the Hungarians not only achieved full control over their internal affairs, but citizens of one half of the monarchy had to be naturalized as citizens of the other half if they chose to move. Of course, it was necessary to alter the constitutional framework of the monarchy to reflect the new relationships, and this was accomplished during the last months of 1867.

On December 21, 1867, a new fundamental law was promulgated in the Austrian half of the monarchy.² This law was amended several times in the ensuing fifty years, but it remained the basis of government in Austria

2. Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Österreichs, 1867 (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1867), Law No. 141, pp. 389-394.

until the collapse of the monarchy in 1918. The new constitution retained many of the features of the February Patent, including most of the articles relating to the Reichsrat. The parliament remained a bicameral body consisting of an upper house (the Herrenhaus) with an appointed and hereditary membership and a lower house (the Abgeordnetenhaus) whose members were selected by the provincial diets. In 1867 the lower house included 203 deputies divided among the provinces and selected on a complicated basis which took into account the relative sizes, populations, and tax burdens of each political unit of Austria. While no individual could simultaneously hold seats in both houses of parliament, other public officials could sit in either house and it was not unusual for local officials to be sent to the lower house.

The House of Lords consisted of a varying number of peers who fell into four groups: adult members of the imperial family, archbishops and bishops holding princely sees, hereditary nobles and estate owners whose lands carried noble prerogatives, and a final group of peers appointed for life in recognition of outstanding service to the state or the Church. The House of Lords held the same rights of legislative initiative and interpellation of ministers as the lower house, with the single exception that finance and army recruitment bills had to be first introduced in the lower house. The presiding officers of the upper

house were appointed by the emperor while the lower house elected its own leaders.³

Under the terms of the constitutional law of 1867, the government of Cisleithania was entrusted to nine ministers. These men were appointed by the ruler and did not have to be members of parliament. The ministers were individually responsible to the emperor, and the removal of one of them did not automatically bring down the government. While the houses of parliament could not remove a minister from office, they did have the right to bring charges of misconduct against any minister, which he had to answer. If any minister were accused of wrong doing and found guilty by a special court, he was required to submit his resignation immediately.⁴ The law also made it possible for the emperor to rule without parliament if an emergency existed. This provision, Article 14 of the December Constitution, was intended to ameliorate the expected obstruction of parliament by various groups, and allowed only temporary measures to be enacted. Laws decreed under the provisions of Article 14 had to be sanctioned by the next session of parliament or they became void. Furthermore, these acts could not affect the constitutional law itself.

3. Ibid.

4. The ministry is described in the fundamental law, Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für 1867, and is explained in some detail in Edmund Bernatzik (ed.), Die Österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze (Vienna: Manzschke Verlag, 1911), pp. 371-378; and in Josef Ulrich, Das österreichischen Staatsrecht, p. 141.

The method of choosing the members of the new parliament was clarified in June 1868, by a new electoral law.⁵ Under the provisions of the new code the members of the lower house were chosen by the provincial legislatures. The local diets were still elected on the basis of the suffrage implemented earlier. The new code made it clear that members of the first curia were to be landlords whose holdings yielded 50 florins per year in direct taxes, and that voters in the towns and cities had to pay at least ten florins in direct taxes each year. The law also established or confirmed chambers of commerce in twenty-seven cities and required that their members be owners or directors of companies paying at least one hundred florins in direct taxes each year. Voting requirements in rural districts were the same as in urban ones, and a minimum age of twenty-four was set for voters and thirty for office holders.⁶

During the next few years, the selection of deputies by the provincial diets proved impractical because of the uncooperative attitude of some of them. This was especially true of the Czech dominated legislature of Bohemia which refused to send any representatives to Vienna at all. As a result of this intransigent attitude, the government of Prince Adolf Auersperg felt compelled to push through parliament

5. Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für 1867, Law No. 82, pp. 243-246.

6. Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für 1868, Law No. 85, pp. 249-257.

a law establishing direct election of Reichsrat deputies. This law was passed in 1873 and retained the existing curias, simply by passing the provincial assemblies. The voters of Cisleithania would henceforth exercise their franchise personally in elections of deputies to the central parliament.⁷

In the quarter century following the establishment of direct elections the suffrage requirements were gradually relaxed, bringing more and more people into direct participation in Austria's political life. The first such move came in 1882. The elections of 1879 had cost the Liberals their control of parliament and they went into opposition. The new elections resulted in a majority for a coalition of several groups who were united mainly in their desire to prevent the Liberal Party from regaining power. The Liberals adopted a policy of parliamentary obstruction by using filibuster and demanding roll-call votes which demonstrated the weakness of the government's position. The leaders of the government settled on suffrage reform as a means of further reducing the power of the Liberals and in hopes of strengthening their own position. Advocates of the reform hoped that the new voters would give their votes to the national clubs, clerical parties, and other groups which had backed the reform bill.

7. Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Ländern für 1873, Law No. 40, pp. 161-164.

The new law lowered the taxation requirement for voting in the cities and rural districts from ten to five florins per year.⁸ This requirement remained in effect throughout the decade which followed. The tax reform of the early 1890's had the effect of disenfranchising some of the poorer voters, most of whom supported the parties of the ruling coalition. In an attempt to restore these men's vote, and thereby restoring the base on which the government rested, Minister President Count Edouard Taaffe and Finance Minister Emil Steinbach united to shepherd through the parliament a bill reducing the direct taxation requirement in the cities and countryside from five to four florins.⁹

The combined effect of these two measures was to bring into the political arena the small shopkeepers, merchants, independent farmers, and professional men of the monarchy. While the electorate was thus widened to include more of the population, it still excluded the poorest farmers and the growing urban working class. The suffrage laws favored the wealthiest men of the country by giving them a multiple franchise. A member of a chamber of commerce, for example, might vote both in his role as an industrialist and as a resident of one of the urban districts. Multiple mandates were available to the landed gentry in much the same way.

8. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1882, Law No. 142, pp. 548-553.

9. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1896, Law No. 226, p. 747. This reform is discussed in Richard Charmatz, Österreichs innere Geschichte von 1848 bis 1895 (3 vols., Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1918), Vol. II, pp. 110-111.

These reforms, which pleased the members of the middle levels of Austrian society and recognized their growing importance in the life of the state, failed to appease the demands of either the small farmers or the leaders of the urban working classes. Agitation in favor of electoral reform had begun long before the four florin law was adopted, and had become very intense in the early 1890's. Most of this agitation was led by representatives of groups whose strength was based on the urban worker and was aimed at achieving universal and equal suffrage as the basis for parliamentary elections. These demands prompted the government to act in the so-called Badeni Reform of 1896.

The law of June 14, 1896, introduced a fifth curia into the electoral scheme of Cisleithania. In this fifth curia all male citizens who were at least twenty-four years of age and who were permanent residents of Austria were allowed to vote. The reform increased the size of parliament to 425 in order to include 72 deputies elected by the new curia.¹⁰

This reform was somewhat grudgingly accepted by all sides. The opponents of universal suffrage argued that it set a dangerous precedent, while friends of reform objected to the inequality in a curial system of voting. Despite such

10. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1896, Law No. 168, p. 529; Helga Götz, "Die Entwicklung des parlamentarischen Wahlrechts alten Österreich (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Innsbruck, 1949) p. 132.

misgivings, the successive reforms of the suffrage laws did increase substantially the numbers of people allowed to participate in political affairs in Austria. The reforms could hardly be called a move to democratic government, however. The four florin requirement, to be sure, was low, but it still excluded a significant number of people from participating in elections except in the fifth curia.¹¹ In the elections of 1897, the first held under the new code, 58.9% of those voting in the fifth curia could not meet the requirements to vote in any other curia, while all voters in the original four curias were given an additional mandate in the new one.¹²

The Habsburg monarchy was not alone in having a limited suffrage, of course. Virtually all the countries of Europe approached the notion of enfranchising the lower classes with some hesitation. Under the new laws the suffrage in Austria was based on the theory that men of substance had a greater right to participate in the affairs of state than did men of lesser estate. This, too, was an idea far from being unique to Austria. It was, indeed, one of the cardinal premises of parliamentary governments throughout Europe in the nineteenth century.

11. In 1900 four florins was equal to \$1.22 (U. S.), or approximately \$5.00 in current money. See U. S. House of Representatives, 56th Congress, Doc. No. 731, p. 7. The current value is calculated on the basis of the Bureau of Labor consumer price index as reported in Historical Abstract of the U. S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), and the Statistical Abstract of the U. S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).

12. Heinrich Rauchberg, Die statistischen Unterlagen der österreichischen Wahlreform (Brünn: Friedrich Irrgang, 1907), pp. 13-14.

The first parliament elected under the new suffrage laws faced severe problems almost from the start. Members of several of the national clubs and some of the German parties adopted parliamentary obstruction as their main weapon, and it was extremely difficult to conduct the business at hand. For that reason, the emperor announced the dissolution of parliament late in 1900 and the government scheduled new elections for the end of the year.

The new elections were held under the revised code which gave the vote to most adult male citizens of Austria who were financially independent and who were civilians. The law still excluded a large number of people, including nearly all the women of Austria.¹³ Furthermore all military men on active duty were forbidden to vote, as were persons who fell into one of several exclusionary categories. The groups excluded from the franchise included anyone against whom any legal action was pending, criminals, persons adjudged mentally incompetent, and anyone financially dependent on the state or on another person.¹⁴ The net result of the exclusionary articles was that "universal suffrage" was limited to just over five million people, or about 20% of the population.¹⁵

13. Women who owned great estates were allowed to vote in the first curia. All others were expressly excluded.

14. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1896, Laws 168 and 169, pp. 529-558.

15. Rauchberg, Statistischen Unterlagen der Wahlreform, p. 13.

As had been the case in all succeeding elections, the law gave more weight to the political opinions of some men than to the opinion of others. Roughly sixty percent of the voters who took part in the elections could vote only in the fifth curia, while the remaining forty percent had at least two mandates. The elections did not give any noticeable edge to one part of Austria at the expense of others. The percentages of qualified voters among the total population ranged from a low of 16.3% in Silesia to a high of 22% in Upper Austria.¹⁶

The elections held at the end of 1900 took place in an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty. Many of the national clubs felt that the pledge by certain German politicians to support the continuation of German as the official language of state was an implicit threat of a program of Germanization, and the nationalists used this to arouse fears in the electorates which they hoped would enhance their successes.¹⁷ Many of these same national clubs had been among the proponents of parliamentary obstruction and promised a continuation of such techniques in the new house. This threat aroused bitter antagonisms among the German parties and the rhetoric of the campaigns

16. Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1900. Vol. LIX, Pt. 3 of Österreichische Statistik, p. vii.

17. The Times (London), November 13, 1900, p. 5.

took on a fierce edge. Even in those areas where national tensions were the most severe, however, some scholars have suggested that there were underlying causes of the tensions which had little to do with nationalism. In Bohemia, for example, the industrialization which had taken place during the 1880's and 1890's was accompanied by an internal migration of Czechs into areas which were traditionally German in their make-up. This migration, and the subsequent competition for the available employment, added to the ill feelings between the two groups and it was such areas that the most radical politicians of each side found their strongest support.¹⁸

In the German areas of Austria, the competing parties evidenced little sense of national unity and waged campaigns notable for their passion. The most acid attacks were reserved for the Social Democrats, and the lowest forms of political smears were used against them. The leader of the Social Democratic Party in Silesia, for example, was arrested on a warrant that dated back to 1897. One account of the affair indicates that the charge grew out of a scuffle between the politician and an unnamed heckler at a party rally in 1896. The same account notes the fact that the deputy's parliamentary immunity had been suspended on three occasions in the intervening period but that no arrest was made until the campaigns of 1900 were underway.¹⁹

18. Andrew Whiteside, "The Deutsche Arbeiterpartei: A Contribution to the Origins of Fascism," Austrian History Newsletter, No. 4 (1963), p. 4.

19. The Times (London), October 20, 1900, p. 6.

Another example of the tactics employed by the enemies of the Social Democrats was the Anti-Semitic line taken in much of their campaign material. This was especially true of the Christian Social Party, which was sometimes identified by foreign journalists as the "Anti-Semitic Party," and of the German Radical Party. The most blatant example of such tactics was the connection made between the Social Democrats and a Bohemian Jew named Leo Hilsner. In October, 1900, Hilsner was brought to trial for the ritual murder of two Christian girls. The implication was made that a Social Democratic parliament would legalize such murders.²⁰ The fact was that Hilsner had been tried once before for one of the murders, convicted, and then exonerated by an appellate court. He was brought to trial again when the second murder was discovered, and in this case the chief attorney for the prosecution was the leader of the German Radical Party in Bohemia.²¹

In the course of the campaign there was evidence of some attempts at cooperation among the German parties. The German Radicals, Pan-Germans, and German Progressives agreed to run joint candidates in hotly contested areas where they were threatened by a strong Social Democratic campaign.²² In a

20. Ibid., October 26, 1900, pp. 3-4.

21. Ibid., November 15, 1900, p. 3.

22. Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), December 5, 1900 Morning Edition, pp. 4-5.

similar spirit of cooperation, the Christian Socials and the German Radicals united to run joint campaigns in some areas against Social Democrats, while the Progressive Party, the Liberals, and the Pan-Germans united under the banner of anti-clericalism in other parts of Cisleithania.²³

Despite these appeals to fear and prejudice, the German parties of Austria based the largest part of their campaigns on positive appeals to the interests of the voters. The Social Democrats were still fairly orthodox in their socialism, and had not yet developed the peculiarities which marked the "Austro-Marxism" of later years. As an orthodox western socialist party, the Social Democrats aimed their appeals at the workers of the monarchy without regard to nationality. Those appeals were couched in much the same terms that marked socialist appeals elsewhere in Europe, and retained the revolutionary vigor of their origins. The Christian Socials attempted to take away the votes of the Social Democrats by appealing to the religious loyalty of the workers, while promising many of the same practical reforms of their opponents. Although appealing strongly to urban workers, the Christian Socials based their strength on the

23. Heinrich Schnee, Karl Lueger. Leben und Wirken eines großen Sozial- und Kommunalpolitikers (Berlin: Duncker und Humblodt, 1960), pp. 34-36.

on the lower middle class of urban shopkeepers, professional men, and independent peasant farmers.²⁴ The other German parties shared the middle class orientation of the Christian Socials, and the major disputes among these parties revolved around clerical-anticlerical disputes, the antipathies between countryside and city, and the relations between Austria and the German Empire. There was also a weak Peasant's Party which pledged itself to support the interests of small farmers by maintaining relatively high food prices, and by providing tax relief for the peasants.

The old German Liberal Party had lost its stranglehold on the legislature twenty years before, but remained a potent force. Not only was the Liberal Party still a force to reckon with, but some of its offshoots were coming of age. The strongest of these was the Progressive Party, which sought support mainly among the members of chambers of commerce, but it was far from alone in its growing strength. One offspring of Liberalism which was somewhat weak, but particularly interesting, was the Social-politische Partei which first appeared in 1891. In that year a group of politicians from the left wing of the Liberal Party seceded to form the Vienna Fabian Society under the direction of Michael Hainisch and Engelbert Pernerstorfer.

24. The Times (London), November 14, 1900, p. 5. Reprints of all the major party platforms may be found in Klaus Berchtold (ed.), Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967).

Almost immediately the group split again, with the more radical elements following Pernerstorfer into the Social Democratic Party and the remainder forming the Social Political Party. This group had little strength outside Vienna but was able to elect a few deputies on a platform which concerned itself with such items as hours of work, public health and old age insurance, and tax reform. The major figures of the party in parliament were Ferdinand Kronawetter and Julius Ofner, who almost always sat as members of the Liberal Fraction.²⁵

As the day of the election grew closer, the appeals of the German parties grew increasingly strident. Their nature and content even led some observers to fear for the future of the monarchy. One correspondent freely predicted that, since no party could hope to gain a majority and since the bitterness of the campaigns precluded a lasting coalition, the new parliament would be short-lived whatever its complexion. The same observer went on to state that "all those who wish the [monarchy] well fear for its future."²⁶ While he was wrong about the length of the parliamentary session, the Times reporter placed his finger squarely on one of the major problems confronting parliament--the inability of any group to secure a majority and the seeming inability of the German

25. Klau Fuchs, Geistige Strömungen in Österreich 1867-1918 (Vienna: Globus-Verlag, 1949), pp. 141-142.

26. The Times (London), November 14, 1900, p. 5.

parties to work together successfully. It was, perhaps, fortunate for the monarchy that equally serious divisions plagued the national clubs, and that no coordinated attack on parliamentary operations could be mounted.

When the balloting ended and the new parliament convened early in 1901, it was perhaps predictable that the least change had occurred in the representation of the first curia--the one reserved for the great estate owners. There were thirty-six incumbent deputies returned in German areas of Austria, out of a total of forty, of whom only seven identified themselves as members of one of the political parties.²⁷ Four of the seven were members of the so-called Czech Feudal Party which represented German surnamed estate owners in Bohemia. All the remaining deputies of the first curia identified themselves as being loyal to the existing constitutional arrangement,²⁸ and usurped to themselves the title of "Verfassungstreue" which had been carried by the Liberals at an earlier time.

Political parties claimed the loyalties of most of the deputies of the second curia, which represented the chambers of commerce, but again the majority of deputies were incumbents. In the German part of Cisleithania, the area of concern to us, twenty-one deputies were elected in the second curia districts. Only eight of these men were sent to Vienna for the first

27. Hof- und Staatshandbuch für 1902 contains a list of deputies.

28. Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1900, pp. xxix-xxxi.

time in 1901, and five of those were elected to replace men who had either died or retired.²⁹ In this curia only four deputies were not members of the political parties. As might be expected of a group which represented the wealthy industrialists of Cisleithania, those parties which professed to represent the interests of the middle classes polled best among voters of this curia. The strongest party in the curia was the German People's Party (deutsche Volkspartei), with nine adherents. There was also one member of the closely allied Catholic People's Party. The People's Parties were closely followed by the German Progressive Party, with five members, and the Liberal and Pan-German Parties with one member apiece.³⁰

Representation in the remaining three curias was less uniform. Bitter campaigning and confident predictions notwithstanding, neither the Social Democrats nor the Christian Socials gained a large number of seats; indeed both parties lost seats. The other parties also remained essentially unchanged from the parliament of 1897,³¹ with incumbents winning most of the races they entered.³² Generally, the parties whose support came from the middle

30. Hof- und Staatshandbuch für 1902, pp. 298-306.

31. Oswald Knauer, Das österreichische Parlament (Vienna: Bergland, 1969), pp. 19-20.

32. Hof- und Staatshandbuch für 1902, pp. 298-306.

levels of Austrian society prevailed. The German Liberals and the association of parties calling itself the German National Union prevailed in the towns, the Clerical and Christian Social Parties ran strongest among voters of rural districts, and the Christian Socials and Social Democrats were the strongest parties in the fifth curia. The Christian Social Party was spread through more of the curias than any of the other parties, holding about the same number of seats in each of the three curias in which they ran, while the others tended to be more concentrated. The Social Democrats, for example, won seats only in the fifth curia, the German People's Party only in the second, and the German Clerical Party only in the rural districts.³³

The Parties which have been named associated with one another in several larger groups when they entered the parliament. These were known as Fractions, and were the units of voting in the lower house. In the House of Representatives elected in 1900, there were six such groups of German deputies. Table one shows the relative strength of each:

TABLE ONE ³⁴

Liberals	66
Christian Social	25
Conservative	30
German National	28
German People's Party	41
Social Democrats	10

33. Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1900, pp. xxix-xxxi.

34. Knauer, Das österreichische Parlament, p. 19.

In this brief description of the electoral bases of the parties which represented Germans in the parliament of 1901, no attempt has been made to undertake the detailed analysis of each electoral district that has been made for each of the next two elections. The electoral districts were not as clearly drawn or as uniform in either size or structure as they were under the reform bill of 1907, and the composition of the districts varied widely among the curias making any meaningful comparison difficult. In order to show the way in which various social and economic factors influenced the elections of 1900, four areas have been chosen. These were chosen for several reasons and may offer some insight into the factors which influenced voting behavior in Cisleithania. These districts were fairly typical in size and composition and in each case there was an almost exact correspondence between a district of the second curia (the one for the cities) and a district of the fifth curia. This fact makes it possible to see some of the differences between the limited electorate of the second curia and the broader electorate of the fifth curia. For this brief examination of the voters behavior the factors considered include the ethnic and religious structure of the districts, their occupational structures, and the differences in that occupational structure between

various sectors of the economy.³⁵

The first set of districts to be considered lay in Bohemia and included the towns of Eger, Franzensbad, Asch, Rossbach, and Hoslau. It was an area overwhelmingly German in population (98.7%), and consequently one in which there was little overt activity by representatives of any other national group. It was, however, a district which was surrounded by centers of Czech population, and national disputes were never far from either the minds of the people or the speeches of the politicians. The area was primarily Roman Catholic, but included sizeable numbers of Protestant Christians as well as a small number of Jews. The area was almost evenly divided between persons engaged in agriculture and those who earned their living in industry and commerce (45% and 52% respectively) while the remainder of the population worked in the professions or in public service. The economic structure of the area was fairly well articulated, with 32% of the voters self-employed, 4% salaried, and 64% working for wages. In the elections held in the second curia district covering

35. The statistical information on which this section is based has been drawn from the census of 1900 as reported in Osterreichische Statistik, Vol. LXIII, Pt. 1, pp. 48-128, and Vol. LXVI, Pts 1-3. The political districts, which included several of the judicial districts which were used in reporting census data, were identified in the Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1900, which also gave a breakdown of the results of the balloting. All collection and collation of this data was done by the author of this study.

this area the voters were asked to choose among the German People's Party, the German Radical Party, and the German National Party. The winner was the candidate of the German National Party, Ernst Bareuther. In the fifth curia race a compromise candidate of the Pan-German and Radical Parties, Franz Stein, narrowly defeated a Social Democrat.

The second area to be considered was in Lower Austria and included the cities of Baden, Mödling, Perchtoldsdorf, Gumpoldskirchen, Hainburg, and Schwechat. This district, which lay in the area immediately around Vienna, was almost exclusively German and Roman Catholic, with only a very few Czechs in Schwechat. Its economic structure was not quite as uniform as the Bohemian district with 56.5% of the population employed in industry. The remainder of the population was divided between agriculture (18%), trade and commerce (11.3%), and the professions and public service (13.2%). A substantial portion of the working population worked for wages, with smaller groups of self-employed and salaried persons present. The election of 1900 was won by the Liberal candidate Gustav Marchet in the second curia and by the Social Democrat Engelbert Pernerstorfer in the fifth.

The cities of Linz, Urfahr, Ottensheim, and Gallneukirchen in Upper Austria comprised our third area. This was also an area of Roman Catholic Germans with a well developed economic structure. The population was divided between agricultural workers (28%), industrial workers (35%), tradesmen (15.5%), and professional men (21.5%).

The employed persons of the area were mostly wage earning workers (51%), with smaller percentages self-employed (32.5%) and salaried (7.5%). This was a slightly larger area than the first two and sent two deputies to parliament from the second curia. In 1900 these two men were Joseph Böhme of the German Nationals and Julius Löcker of the German People's Party. The victorious candidate in the fifth curia district was Josef Schlegel of the Catholic People's Party.

The last of the four areas considered here was in Styria and included the suburbs of the city of Graz. The districts in this area were primarily German, but included a significant number of Slovenes--the largest national minority of any of the areas mentioned here. It was also an area which was almost 100% Roman Catholic in religion. The employed persons of the districts were divided as follows: 15% in agriculture, 21 % in trade and commerce, 24% in the professions or in public services, and 40% in industry. There were approximately equal numbers of self-employed persons (41%) and wage earners (45%); the rest were salaried employees and day laborers. The victor in the second curia was Julius Derschatta of the German Nationals, while the fifth curia race went to Otto Wilhelm, a member of the German People's Party.

Clearly these four districts are not adequate for any sweeping generalizations about the elections of 1900. They were, however, carefully chosen for their representative nature and can offer some suggestive information about the

election. The Social Democrats ran candidates in each of the fifth curia districts but were successful in only one. That success came in the district with the largest percentage of urban industrial workers, and in the district which lay close enough to Vienna for the party's leaders and its newspaper, Die Arbeiterzeitung, to play a major role in the campaign. The proximity of this area to Vienna gave similar opportunities to the leaders of the Liberal Party and to their organ, Die Neue Freie Presse, and it was in this area that the Liberals won their only victory. The Bohemian districts were much more exposed to nationalist strife than the others, and it was there that the National Party and the two more radical nationalist parties, the Pan-Germans and the Radicals, were successful.

Further south, in Upper Austria, there were large numbers of self-employed farmers on the voting lists. In this area the German National and German People's Parties carried the seats in the second curia while the Catholic People's Party won the election in the fifth curia on a conservative and clerical platform. In Styria there were once again large numbers of non-Germans and national tensions were relatively high. In this area the German National and German People's Parties were once again the strongest.

An examination of the data available on the other German districts bears out some impressions gained from the four areas described here. Clerical and conservative parties tended to run very well among peasant farmers, while the more nationalistic parties succeeded in areas with significant numbers of non-Catholics and where national strife was present. The German Liberals had a better chance of success in cities with large numbers of industrialists and professional men than they did elsewhere. The Social Democrats and the Christian Socials ran well among industrial laborers, and the Christian Socials were able to extend their base by appealing to small merchants and to many independent farmers.

If one examines the structure of the Austrian suffrage laws it is almost immediately apparant that members of what are usually termed the "middle classes" were all but guaranteed a major share of the seats in parliament. The lower reaches of society were excluded from all but the fifth curia by the taxation requirements, while their impact was lessened even in this curia by the fact that members of all the other groups also voted in the general curia. In the three curias representing the cities, the rural communes, and the chambers of commerce parties which pledged themselves to support the interests of the middle levels of society were, indeed, the most successful. This was one of the major concerns of the leaders of the working

classes and of the small independent farmers. It was this domination of parliament by the more wealthy men of Cisleithania which such men sought to end by agitating for universal suffrage.

As has been observed, however, decisions affecting the franchise in Austria were seldom made for theoretical reasons, but were taken in response to practical and immediate political problems. The taxation requirements for membership in the second and fourth curias had been reduced twice in order to expand these groups. The sponsors of these reforms had hoped to increase their own strength and to reduce the strength of their opponents. The Christian Socials had become vigorous proponents of reform because their major support came from men who were not allowed to vote in parliamentary elections. In order to increase their voice in the affairs of state it was imperative that they increase their parliamentary delegation, and this could only be achieved through electoral reform.³⁶ When the reform bill finally came before the lower house in 1906 its success, like that of its predecessors, depended on practical political considerations rather than on the strength of democratic theory.

36. This is not to say that the Christian Socials were altogether opportunistic. There was a good deal of very real concern in their ranks for the plight of the "little man" in Austria. For an intriguing, if somewhat colored, view of the party's early days see the chapter entitled "Socialisme Chrétien" in Count Paul Vasisli's La Société de Vienne (Paris: Nouvelle Revue, 1885).

Chapter III: The Electoral Reform Movement

During the course of the nineteenth century the idea that universal and equal suffrage could form the basis of a system which would somehow right all social wrongs and heal all breaches within a country gained currency among some groups. In the years following the experiments of the French Revolution and in the outburst of enthusiasm following the revolts of the early 1830's, this idea was espoused by reform minded politicians and idealistic students alike. When the great series of revolts broke out in 1848 universal suffrage was one of the by-words of the leaders of the groups which toppled the governments of monarchical Europe. In the streets of Vienna and other cities of the Habsburg monarchy slogans were shouted demanding that the "people" be allowed to control their own destinies through parliaments elected by all the citizens of the empire. As the revolts collapsed under the weight of the advancing imperial armies, and of their own idealism, these demands were shelved. Almost without exception, the governments of Europe returned to decision-making by the few--to governments controlled by elite groups of some kind.

The government of the Habsburg monarchy was no exception to this rule. The failure of the partisans of universal suffrage was complete, but it did not end their commitment to the goal of equality for all in the political life of the

state. Democratic books and pamphlets continued to appear and to hold up universal suffrage as a panacea. With the passage of time new groups appeared and became important in the political life of the monarchy. Some of the new groups bore little resemblance to the liberal idealists of earlier days, but were no less attached to the ideal of universal suffrage. Among the first groups openly to propose the enactment of laws establishing the reform were the parliamentary socialist parties of western Europe whose potential electorate lay among the workers of the industrial cities--a group excluded from the franchise almost everywhere.

The Social Democratic Party of Austria followed this general pattern. Cisleithanian socialists viewed the extension of the suffrage which had taken place between 1873 and 1896 as a series of attempts by the middle classes to exclude the workers from the political process while extending the power of the "bourgeoisie." In article three of the program adopted at Hainfeld in 1889, the Social Democrats pledged themselves to work for the adoption of "universal, direct, and equal suffrage" throughout the empire.¹ The Social Democrats continued to speak hotly and fluently in favor of the reform, but made few practical attempts to achieve their goal. That situation changed, however, when in 1893

1. Verhandlung des Parteitages der Österreichischen Sozialdemokratie am 31 December 1888 und 1 Januar 1889 (Vienna: Arbeiter Verlag, 1889); Berchtold, Österreichischen Parteiprogramme, pp. 138-144.

a committee was formed under the leadership of Viktor Adler to develop a strategy for the party to follow in its fight.

This committee met for several months and finally wrote a recommendation for the party's leaders.² Their proposal was adopted almost verbatim in the Vienna Program of 1901, when the party again pledged itself to strive for universal suffrage and to be satisfied with nothing else.³ The party was particularly insistent on reform after the Badeni Reform of 1896, which the Social Democrats saw as a ruse designed to quiet agitation in favor of universal suffrage without changing the power structure of the state. In the first elections held under the five curia system the Social Democrats met with indifferent success, winning only a very few seats. The party blamed this failure on their own failure to campaign vigorously and on what they considered to be collusion between the regime, the Church, and the leaders of their main opponents, the Christian Socials.⁴

The socialists were not the only proponents of suffrage reform, although the reformers supported universal suffrage for a wide variety of reasons. The Social Democrats, of course, hoped to make the influence of the workers felt, but they mentioned several other concrete benefits which they

2. Julius Braunthal, "Viktor Adler," in Norbert Leser (ed), Werk und Widerhall. Große Gestalten des österreichischen Sozialismus (Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1964), p. 21.

3. Berchtold, Österreichische Parteiprogramme, p. 147.

4. Viktor Adler, "Die Niederlage am 9 März 1897," Arbeiter Zeitung (Vienna), March 10, 1897, pp. 1-2.

believed universal suffrage would confer on the monarchy. Chief among these was the solution of the national problems which plagued the empire, especially after the enactment of the controversial language laws in the last years of Badeni's tenure as chief minister. At the socialist congress in Brünn in 1899 the party clarified its position. The official position was that a parliament consisting of worker deputies would concentrate on social issues and ignore fruitless national embroglios.⁵ This came to be a recurrent theme in socialist literature in the years preceding the reform of 1907, and was perhaps best articulated in the many works written under various pseudonyms by Karl Renner.⁶

As the old century faded into the new, the Social Democrats were joined in their open support for the cause of electoral reform by other groups. The Christian Socials included a resolution favoring the reform in their program adopted at Vienna in 1896.⁷ Like those of the Social Democrats, however, this first statement was unaccompanied by any concrete activity. The initial Christian Social position was largely theoretical and was adopted by the party because of its understanding of the Papal encyclical De Rerum Novarum

5. August-Karl Ruszicka, "Geschichte des Klubs der sozialdemokratische Reichsratsabgeordneter von 1897-1918." (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1953), pp. 79-83.

6. See especially Rudolf Springer (Karl Renner), Kampf der Nationen (Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1902), pp. 225-227.

7. Berchtold, Österreichische Parteiprogramme, p. 171.

of 1891.

The success of the Christian Social candidates in the fifth curia districts during the election of 1897 dramatically demonstrated the potential benefits to the party of electoral reform, and the leaders of the party began to actively support the reform. This support was further strengthened by the rise of Karl Lueger to a preeminent position in party circles. As mayor of Vienna, Lueger had found his strongest support among the small shopkeepers and Catholic industrial workers of the capital city. It was quite natural that he should wish to increase the electoral power of such men at the national level, since he anticipated receiving continued support from their ranks.

Impressed by Christian Social successes, and fearing possible Social Democratic electoral victories, other groups began to join the reform movement. For example, the Progressive Party had bitterly opposed the Badeni Reform because it threatened their position in parliament. With the success of reform agitators among the people, however, the moderate party leaders realized that an obstinate refusal to consider reform could be disastrous. When these moderates gained ascendancy in the party they were able to have the party's parliamentary delegation speak in favor of and vote for the reform bill. Many of the Progressive deputies, however, never gave up hope that they could amend the bill to give them some guarantee that the position of the middle classes

could be protected.⁸

Several of the national parties had either opposed or at least had been indifferent to the reform when it was first proposed, but began to move slowly into the camp of its supporters. In Bohemia, for example, the Social Democrats had monopolized Czech agitation for reform, but after 1900 they were joined by other groups which realized the appeal of the reform to the electorate. By 1905 the Social Democrats were united with the Czech National Socialists and moderate wings of both the Old Czechs and the Young Czechs in their demand for reform.⁹

These groups wanted to reform the electoral system of Cisleithania for both theoretical and practical reasons, but they had little initial success in achieving their goal. Despite all the demonstrations, speeches, pamphlets, dramatic gestures in parliament, Austria clung to the curial system of voting. As was noted in connection with earlier reforms, any change in the franchise was customarily undertaken because of pressing and immediate problems. Taaffe and Badeni had both extended the franchise to new groups of men in order to strengthen the base on which their

8. Diethild Harrington-Müller, Der Fortschrittsklub im Abgeordnetenhaus der österreichischen Reichsrats, 1873-1910. Vol. XI of Studien zur Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie (Vienna: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1972), pp. 135-137.

9. Joseph Bradley, "Czech Nationalism and Socialism in 1905," Slavic Review, Vol. XIX (1960), pp. 74-84.

governments rested. The adoption of universal and equal suffrage was to be accomplished in the same way--in response to specific and practical political problems.

To say this is not to accuse the Habsburg monarchy of an opportunism which set it off from other states of the era. The French had adopted universal suffrage largely due to Louis Napoleon's desire to unite his country and to lend an air of legitimacy to his rule. There was little, if any, deep commitment to liberalism apparent in Napoleon III's actions, including his support for electoral reform. In the same way the German Empire had adopted universal suffrage as the basis for elections to the Reichstag almost at the moment of its creation. This was done under the sponsorship of Prince Otto von Bismarck, the imperial chancellor--a man hardly renowned for liberal sentiments. In fact, Bismarck seems to have pushed for the wide suffrage as a part of his program to win the people away from the Großdeutschland liberals who had used universal suffrage as one of their most effective electoral promises. These two cases provided ample precedent for some of the conservative leaders of Austria when they were faced with the need to solve some very trying political problems.

The timing of the reform seems to have been decided by a set of coincidences--when several problems came to a head about the same time. At least three major difficulties were obvious to almost everyone who cared to look, and they

played a major role in converting the government leaders to the cause of reform.

The first of these was a renewed outburst of the language question. The difficulties reached a peak in the attempt to establish a Slovenian language school in the town of Cilli in the last years of the 19th century. The bills pushed through parliament to resolve this crisis pleased no one and the language question remained a troublesome background to much of the political turmoil of the early twentieth century. In 1903 the dissatisfaction resurfaced when the issue of the language of command and communication in the army was raised. The Hungarians wanted to use Magyar not only in the Honved but also in Hungarian units of the joint imperial army. They were joined in their insistence on multiple languages by some of the other national groups. In attacking the army, however, the Hungarians had located the one institution which the emperor was the least likely to agree to change.

Not only was the army the chief ornament of his reign, and the chief concern of the emperor, but Francis Joseph realized the practical impossibility of operating an army without a uniform language of command. The emperor's resistance to the change was even stronger in a period when unrest in the Balkans made it imperative that the monarchy possess an efficient and integrated fighting force.

The struggle continued unabated between 1903 and 1906, when the Ausgleich came up for renewal. When the Magyar leaders threatened to block the reconfirmation of the compromise, Francis Joseph was forced to act quickly and firmly. His answer was to suggest that he might introduce universal suffrage in Hungary by royal decree. Such a move would have seriously endangered the Magyar supremacy in the Kingdom, and the Hungarian leaders were forced to yield on the compromise. The threatened reform in Hungary had repercussions inside Austria which were of great importance to the reform of the electoral laws. The leaders of the reform movement increased the intensity of their efforts, and they began to use the argument that the emperor could hardly expect them to accept his using as a punishment for the rebellious Magyars a move which loyal and devoted subjects had sought for so long.¹⁰

While the language question was the most widely publicized issue of the day, the nationalities of the empire were far from quiet in other fields. Constant bickering among the various groups, parliamentary obstruction, and the inability of any group to secure a majority

10. This crisis is examined admirably in Gunther Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Army and the Nationality Problem in the Nineteenth Century," Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. III, Pt. 1 (1967), p. 82; and in Rudolf Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Großmacht (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 1932), pp. 238-239.

in parliament made it very difficult for the government to achieve the enactment of any of the measures which it wanted. A leading member of the ministry, Max Vladimer von Benck, and the experienced civil servant Rudolf Sieghart, both believed that the introduction of universal suffrage was necessary to resolve the nationality questions. They argued that the reform would bring into the parliament a greater number of representatives of the lower classes who would be more interested in practical social questions than in nationalistic strife. They also believed that the internationalism of the larger socialist delegation, which they expected, would provide a solid base on which to build a government truly representative of the peoples of the monarchy. Even if that did not happen, it might still be possible for a coalition to be formed between one of the German parties and representatives of the smaller national groups.¹¹ Beck and Sieghart argued that the examples of England and the German Empire demonstrated that a parliament based on a broad suffrage could operate effectively without being taken over by radical groups, and that parliamentary socialists could be useful to the government despite the violence of some of their rhetoric.¹²

11. Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Großmacht, pp. 101-102; Karl Gottfried Hugelmann, Das Nationalitätenrecht nach der Verfassung von 1867. Der Kampf um ihre Geltung, Auslegung, und Fortbildung (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1932), pp. 238-239.

12. Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Großmacht, p. 101.

Francis Joseph listened to the arguments of his two statesmen and began to look more favorably on reform, despite the objections of many nobles and other important men of Austria. The emperor was amn who kept his own counsel for the most part, and it is difficult to know his inner feelings on the question of extending the franchise. Max von Beck, who worked closely with the ruler on the reform measure, was a more honest memoirist than some, and he simply reported that the emperor never expressed an opinion one way or another.¹³ Other men have speculated on the emperor's attitude, arriving at various conclusions. Sieghart believed that the ruler had no interest in placating the Social Democrats, but was converted to the cause of reform because of his concept of duty.¹⁴ Later historians have also speculated on the emperor's opinions. Some of them dwell on practical matters, as does William Alexander Jenks who believes that the change in Francis Joseph's attitude reflected his ability to yield to public pressure at exactly the right moment to maintain his success as a ruler.¹⁵ Hugo Hantsch believes that the emperor had a more complex reason for supporting the

13. Max Vladimer von Beck, "Der Kaiser und die Wahlreform," in Edouard Steinetz, Errinerungen an Franz Josef (2d edition, Vienna: Herold Verlag, 1955), p. 238.

14. Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Großmacht, p. 218.

15. Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907, p. 42 n.

enactment of universal suffrage. He argues that Francis Joseph believed that the weakening of the national strife which would result from the reform would strengthen the international situation of the monarchy.¹⁶ The great Italian student of the monarchy, Leo Valiani, believes that the ruler's support of the reform was based on a desire to undermine the national parties and to resist the growth of socialism. These two aims would be achieved if the clerical and conservative parties would modernize themselves and turn their attention to social matters. The emperor believed that these modernized parties would win the workers away from nationalism at the same time that the Catholicism of the parties provided an "internationalism" which would counter the Social Democrats' hold on so many voters.¹⁷

As the emperor began to look more favorably on the reform and as agitation by various groups increased, another factor appeared on the scene. Indeed, this development exploded in the midst of the statesmen and politicians of Austria with the force of a bombshell.

In 1905, the citizens of the most resolutely absolutist

16. Hantsch, Geschichte Österreichs, Vol. II, pp. 488-489.

17. Valiani, The End of Austria-Hungary, p. 12.

power on the continent, Imperial Russia, rose in a massive revolt and demanded constitutional reform. At the end of October 1905, the news reached Vienna, where it was closely followed. The news of the revolt caused great concern in ruling circles, where there was some fear that the advocates of Reform might emulate the Russian Constitutional Democrats and take to the streets. This fear increased when Wilhelm Ellenbogen, a Social Democrat, rose in parliament and read the Russian October Manifesto. The socialists rose and cheered Ellenbogen's speech by singing a spirited rendition of the Marsaillaise. They were followed by some of the national parties who rose to sing their national songs.¹⁸

This tumult in the parliament was followed by a sharp increase in activity by the reformers, and even the loyalist supporters of the regime were affected. Two Christian Social deputies, Karl Lueger and Ämelian Schöpfer, expressed their party's support for reform in speeches before the lower house of parliament on the 2d and 6th of November. These speeches signaled a disquieting desertion of the regime by two of its loyalest supporters.¹⁹ These demonstrations

18. Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Großmacht, p. 84.

19. Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrates, 17th Session, pp. 31,779-31,780 and 32,382.

were followed by exactly that development which the government had feared the worst: the socialists began to take to the streets.

Despite police prohibitions, a mass demonstration was held in Vienna on November 2, 1905, at which deputations from each of the political subdivisions of Cisleithania were present. The Social Democrats claimed that one-quarter of a million people were in the streets of Vienna. Even if the figure mentioned was exaggerated, there were enough demonstrators to completely block the Ringstrasse for most of the day.²⁰ On the 4th of November a smaller demonstration was held in Prague, and on the night of 5-6 November barricades began to go up in the working class districts of the city.²¹ By the 10th of November the situation had deteriorated to the point where the government's representative in Prague, Count Ernst Korbiner, wrote to the minister of the interior that the demonstrations could be quelled only by military force or by a demonstration that concrete steps were being taken to implement the reform as soon as possible.²²

20. For the official Social Democratic version of the demonstration and a list of delegation leaders, see Der Wahlrechtstag (Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1915).

21. Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Großmacht, p. 84.

22. Count Ernst Korbiner to minister of the interior, Prague, November 10, 1905, Haus, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (hereafter cited as Staatsarchiv), Abteilung LXI (Internationale, 1848-1918), Karton XL, Doc. No. 1025.

The government did not really need the urging from Prague, for on the 3d of November the new minister-president, Baron Paul von Gautsch, met with the emperor and the two agreed to take steps to introduce universal suffrage into Cisleithania as soon as possible. Thus it was a combination of factors which brought the Austrian government to announce, in a statement issued on December 3, 1905, its intention to press for the passage of an act establishing universal, direct, and equal manhood suffrage.

The government's announcement was greeted with joy by the reformers, and both the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials immediately claimed credit for the shift in the government's attitude.²³ The struggle was not ended, however, for there remained many opponents of reform who were determined to resist it as strongly as they could. One of the most vocal opponents of the reform movement was the Pan-German leader Georg von Schoenerer, who believed that such a reform would give the Slavic nationalities of the empire a large majority in the Reichsrat and would mean the end of German rule.²⁴ He was joined in his bitter denunciation of the move by the

23. For an interesting example of the two positions, see Karl Weber, "Die österreichischen Sozialdemokratie und das allgemeine Wahlrecht" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1956, University of Vienna); and Johan Sassmann, "Der Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht und die Christlichsoziale Partei" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1948).

24. Oscar Kabrach, "The Founder of Political Anti-Semitism: Georg von Schoenerer," Jewish Social Studies, Vol. VII (1945) p. 29.

reform by representatives of many other political groups, each with its own reason for opposing the bill, and each holding the line against a move which threatened its position in the parliament.

Among the first moves by the enemies of the reform was the introduction of amendments which would have given a guarantee to the special position enjoyed by men of wealth. The spokesmen for these amendments were mostly nobles, but the reformers believed that their real enemies were not peers at all but members of the Austrian industrialist class. The Social Democrats singled out for special condemnation Ernst von Plenerer, the Liberal leader.²⁵ Some opponents of reform feared that giving political voice to persons with no economic stake in the country was dangerous. They feared that the "masses" would engage in an orgy of foolish legislation which could destroy the monarchy. Perhaps the best statements of this position were made by Count Ottokar Czernin and Otto Steinwender, both of whom predicted that disaster would follow close on the heels of the universal suffrage law.²⁶ Among the nobles of Austria, whose position in the first curia was endangered by the proposed reform, great opposition was also evident.

25. Arbeiter Zeitung, December 15, 1906, p. 1.

26. Count Ottokar Czernin, Österreichs Wahlrecht und Parlament (Vienna: Herold, 1909); Otto Steinwender, Parlaments Dämmerung (Vienna: Verlag der deutschen Vereines, 1900).

A brisk correspondence concerning alternate plans for nlocking the reform began in 1906 and lasted until the passage of the act at the end of the year. As early as December, 1905, one of the leaders of the noble opposition, Count Franz Thun, sought out the emperor to lay before him the objections of the aristocrats. During the course of the interview, Thun told the ruler that the position of the nobles in parliament would be destroyed if the reform were to be enacted, as a consequence of which the emperor would lose his "only real friends in the lower house." Apparently unimpressed by Thun's arguments, Francis Joseph replied that he had great confidence in the ability of his nobles to defend their position at the polls.²⁷

The conservative opponents of reform were disheartened by the emperor's attitude, which was a more realistic one than their own, and began to organize an effort to block passage of the bill. Several of the first curia deputies met at Prague in September, 1906, to map out their strategy for use in the Lower House. They agreed to try and attach a large number of amendments to the bill, any one of which would have protected their position in the house and which together might so alter the character of the bill as to make it impossible to enact. If this tactic were to be

27. Count Franz Thun to Prince Alain Rohan, Sehuschitz, Bohemia, December 13, 1905, in Paul Molisch (ed.), Briefe zur deutschen Politik in Österreich 1848-1918 (Vienna, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1934), pp. 374-375.

unsuccessful, the nobles planned to adopt the obstructionist tactics which had so infuriated them in the past.²⁸

Another group of conservative opponents of the reform measure met in Vienna in the same month to forge a coalition between representatives of the first curia and deputies elected by the chambers of commerce. The parties represented included German Agrarians, Clerical Conservatives, Slovenian Clericals, Pan-Germans, and the more radical Progressives. Agreement in principle was reached to coordinate their efforts, but at least one of the men present feared that the plan might backfire. Opposition might actually increase the resolve of the reformers and gain the bill more support from the emperor and the government, thereby easing the passage of the measure through the lower house.²⁹

By the end of November the opponents of the reform, realizing that they were not going to be able to block its passage, were in the depths of despair.³⁰ From their point of view, the despair was well justified. The bill was carefully shepherded through the parliament, and the bitterest of opponents, such as the Social Democrats and Christian Socials, were able to successfully negotiate their differences.

28. Count Erwein Nostitz-Rieneck to Count Karl Buquoy, Favorite bei Heinrichsgrün, September 10, 1906, *ibid.*, pp. 376-377.

29. Karl von Grabmeyr to Count Karl Buquoy, Vienna, September 28, 1906, *ibid.*, pp. 377-378.

30. Count Franz Thun to Count Karl Buquoy, Tetschen, November 28, 1906, *ibid.*, pp. 378-380.

At the same time that the extra-parliamentary maneuvering of both opponents and backers of the reform was reaching a fever pitch , the government began the delicate process of shepherding the measure through parliament. The first step was taken on October 6, 1905, when five separate proposals were introduced in the lower house. These motions were made by representatives of the Young Czechs, by a combination of Czech and German Social Democrats, by a South Slav coalition, by a group of Czech National Socialists, Polish, Croatian, and Slovenian deputies, and by a combination of Polish Independent Democrats and Polish Democrats. The vote on these five proposals was 155 for and 114 against--a defeat for the bills since it fell short of the two-thirds majority required to alter the constitution.³¹

Throughout October and November the debates continued both inside and outside the parliament, with the reformers holding an increasing number of mass rallies. Karl Lueger

31. Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus, 35th Session, pp. 32,240-32,243. This record of the vote includes a list of the deputies voting for and against each measure during these roll-call votes.

stated the official position of the Christian Social leaders at a meeting in Vienna on the evening of November 27, the same day that a group of Social Democratic railroad workers announced a general strike to demonstrate their support of the reform measure.³² On the following day the minister-president explained the government's plan to the lower house of the Reichsrat. Without offering any details, Gautsch proposed that the curial system of voting be abandoned in favor of one in which there was no consideration of taxes, but he suggested that some kind of guarantees might be given to "interests which have significance for the state."³³ He went on to promise that the government would offer specific measures early in 1906.

The government labored over its reform proposals and laid them before the parliament on February 23, 1906. Gautsch again addressed the lower house and explained that his plan would allow virtually every Austrian male 24 years of age or older to exercise an equal vote. Under the plan the electoral districts were to be very similar in size and as nearly homogeneous in their national make-up as as practical. The districts were to be apportioned on the basis of a very

32. Neue Freie Presse, November 28, 1905, Evening Edition, p. 8.

33. Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus, 35th Session, pp. 32,315-32,323.

complicated scheme which would reflect the total percentage of the country's population residing in each political division and the strength of the various nationalities.³⁴

Gautsch stated that some arrangement would be necessary to safeguard the interests of the Galicians, since the Poles and the Ruthenians lived in districts so mixed in population that it would be impossible to separate them. The proposal was greeted with stunned silence by the representatives of the first curia and by the German Conservatives. The Polish magnates rose as a body to denounce the reform in the most scathing terms for its provisions regarding Galicia.³⁵

The government's plan received its first reading on March 7, 1906, and passed easily. It was supported by the Social Democrats, the Christian Socials, portions of the German Progressive and German People's Parties, and by some of the national clubs. Its opponents were mainly deputies from the first curia, the German Conservatives, many of the clerical parties, and the Polish magnates.³⁶ After its

34. The theoretical basis for allocating mandates was to add a province's percentage of the total population to its percentage of direct taxes and divide by two to get its percentage of seats in the house. In practice there was some variation. See Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform, pp. 143-165.

35. Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus, 38th Session, pp. 34,657-34,661. The bill is discussed in Das Wahlkreis-Einteilung nach der am 23 Februar von der Regierung eingebrachte Wahlreform Vorlage (Vienna: Freytag und Berndt, 1906). This source includes maps of the proposed districts.

36. Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus, 38th Session, pp. 34,825-34829.

initial success, the bill was referred to a special committee consisting of 26 German, 8 Czech, 7 Polish, 4 South Slav, 2 Italian, 1 Romanian, and 1 Ruthenian deputy.³⁷

This committee met through the spring and summer of 1906 and had its first meeting with the new minister-president, Max von Beck, on June 8, 1906. Beck promised his support of the committee and urged it to press on with its work.

In return, Beck received the committee's assurances that the government's bill was receiving full consideration, and that any further proposals would be received with interest.³⁸

It appears that the committee meant what it said, for the bill reappeared in the lower house on November 5, 1906, with the original provisions almost unchanged. The very few modifications gave the Germans a slightly higher share than the original and dealt in more detail with the question of Galicia. In the new bill there were to be 516 districts of approximately the same size and as nationally homogeneous as possible.³⁹ In Galicia there would be 36 districts which sent two deputies apiece to the lower house, one of whom had to represent the minority nationality of the district.

37. Ibid., 39th Session, p. 35,747.

38. Beilagen, Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus, Vols. XXVII-XXX (1906-1907), pp. 233-234.

39. Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus, 43d Session, p. 39,438.

Another section stipulated the the deputies were to be at least 30 years old and qualified voters. The franchise was extended to all Austrian males at least 24 years old who were permanent residents of Cisleithania and who did not come under the provisions of one of several exclusionary articles, which were almost identical to those of the earlier laws.⁴⁰

Debate on the bill began almost immediately, with the Sozial Democrats and the Christian Socials leading the list of those who spoke in favor of the bill. They were joined by nationalist deputies from the Slavic areas of the empire and by some members of the Progressive and People's Parties. Opposition was centered in the first curia and among the clerical parties and the Pan-Germans. The bill was called to a vote on December 1 and passed by a margin of 194 to 63.⁴¹ The reform then proceeded to the upper house where there was one last effort to kill it.

This effort to defeat the bill in the House of Lords failed because the reform had the full backing of the emperor and the government, who used every means at their disposal to secure its passage. Although the bill was accepted by the

40. Ibid., 44th Session, p. 40,708.

41. Ibid., 45th Session, pp. 41,265-41,267.

upper house, it was amended to include a provision limiting the number of life peers who could sit in the house at any one time. This amendment, the so-called numerus clausus, was resented by a large number of the deputies in the lower house, who considered it an effort by the peers to guarantee themselves a veto on any legislation. Many erstwhile supporters of the bill disliked the amendment so much that they seriously proposed scrapping the entire measure. Beck, however, threw the entire weight of the government behind the bill. He was joined in supporting the measure by the spokesmen of the Social Democratic and Christian Social Parties, who believed that a flawed reform was better than no reform at all. On January 10, 1907, the amended reform act passed the lower house of parliament by a huge majority.⁴² On January 26, 1907, the emperor signed the measure into law, and the Austrian half of the monarchy joined the ranks of countries whose legislatures were elected on a broad suffrage.

It is worth repeating that support for the reform came from a variety of sources. Both the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats, at loggerheads on almost every other

⁴². For the text of the bill as it was finally passed and signed, consult the Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, Laws No. 15-18, pp. 57-112.

issue, voted for the reform bill en masse. The other parties, both German and non-German, split over the proposal. Some opposed it to the last, some became reluctant supporters, and some divided internally over the reform. The failure of the deputies to resort to the kind of nationalistic bombast which had so often marred parliamentary operation in the past must have heartened the government greatly and increased its conviction that the measure had been the proper step for it to take.

As it finally became law, the reform bill was somewhat complicated. The suffrage was extended to all Austrian males who were permanent resident of one of the electoral districts established by the bill and who met certain other qualifications. As had been the case in earlier electoral codes, there were several categories of exceptions to the law. Active duty military personnel, paupers, criminals, and the mentally incompetent were all excluded from the franchise. The districts were intended to be about the same size and to include representatives of only one nationality wherever possible. The districts were divided between urban and rural areas, with as little overlap as possible, and were to return one deputy each, except for the thirty-six Galician districts with double representation. The Germans, who comprised approximately 36% of the total population of Austria were given 233 of the 516 seats (45% , a provision which was accepted somewhat grudgingly by the other national groups,

but considered essential by the government.⁴³ The shape of some of the districts was very peculiar, due to the effort to include members of only one nationality in each, but generally adhered to the law's intent. Ninety-three percent of those persons qualified to vote lived in districts in which their nationality formed a majority or where the rights of the minority were protected by some special arrangement (i. e. the 36 Galician Districts). The 7% of the population living in areas where they were members of a national minority were mainly Carinthian Germans, Silesian Czechs, and Istrian Slovenians.⁴⁴

Very soon after the law was promulgated, parliament was dissolved and new general elections set for May, 1907. These elections were approached with great enthusiasm by some and great dread by others.

43. Heinrich Rauchberg, Die statistischen Unterlagen der österreichischen Wahlreform. pp. 26-27.

44. The Reichspost (Vienna) carried articles on its front pages on April 30 and May 1, 1907, which were intended to explain the new law, and which go beyond that to form a good capsule history of the electoral reform movement. On April 28, 1907, the Neue Freie Presse printed maps of the Viennese districts. A larger scale map, showing the districts throughout Cisleithania, appeared on pp. 4 and 5 of the Arbeiter Zeitung on April 30, 1907.

Chapter IV: The Campaigns of 1907

The reactions that greeted the passage of the reform act of 1907 ranged from enthusiastic optimism to a pessimism that bordered on despair. The attitude of the friends of reform was made clear long before the law passed, and may be seen in two statements made before the passage of the bill in its final form. Karl Lueger, leader of the Christian Socials, told his colleagues in the lower house of parliament that:

If the reform is enacted on the basis of universal equal, direct, and secret suffrage, then, Gentlemen, our Fatherland will once again be a strong empire. Then the nationalities and small states of the Balkans will once again look on Austria with awe, and we will be a mighty people again, a mighty empire, and thereby regain that old position which we have, sadly, lost because of the ineptitude, the weakness, and the lack of foresight of the government which we have¹ seen on all sides. God Grant that it will be so.

Slightly more than a year later, the Arbeiter Zeitung announced the passage of the bill on its first reading:

The great work is finished! The House of Representatives passed the two electoral bills today by an overwhelming margin. In Joy and gratitude we greet the vote that confirmed the founding of a new Austria.²

1. Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus, 17th Session, pp. 31,779-31,780.

2. Arbeiter Zeitung, December 2, 1906, p. 1.

While the parties which claimed responsibility for the reform rejoiced, there was deep despair in other quarters. The representatives of the landed gentry had tried and failed to block the bill, and now they saw their favored position in parliament swept away. It must have seemed to some of them that an entire way of life was being carried away by the floodtide of the lower orders. The defenders of the Liberal position looked with horror on the prospect of a parliament dominated by the delegates of the propertyless masses, while the Pan-Germans grimly awaited the onslaught of the Slavic hordes which they expected to inundate the Reichsrat. The clerical parties of Cisleithania were divided, some of them having joined in supporting the reform and some of them opposing it because they feared its passage would bring into parliament increased numbers of representatives "Godless" socialism.

In this atmosphere of mixed joy and sadness, the political parties of Austria began to prepare for the coming elections. The struggle among them would be decided at the polls in May. The government had scheduled the elections almost at the moment of the dissolution of parliament in January 1907. The date of the elections was believed to be far enough away to allow the campaigns to be completed, but not so distant that the emperor would have to resort to rule through Article 14 in the absence of the legislature.

The elections were to be held in the districts detailed in the new law, and which had been established on a formula in which both population and direct taxes were considered. Theoretically, the new districts were set up on a strict mathematical formula, but in practice there were some deviations. Under a strict application of the formula, the province of Lower Austria would have received 102 seats in the new parliament, but this was felt to be too large a delegation, and the province actually received only 64 seats. The Germans of the empire were assured of controlling 233 seats, which were to be divided between urban and rural districts. These districts were in 12 of the 15 provinces of Cisleithania, ranging from Lower Austria, where all 64 seats were German, to Carniola, where 1 of 12 seats was German. The Germans received just over 45% of the total seats in the house, a higher percentage than could be justified on the basis of population, but considerably less than the German share of the state's direct tax income.

3. Summarische Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen von 1907, p. v. For these purposes, a city was defined as any municipality with a population of 5,000 or more.

the voters of the German districts were the targets of a campaign which began as soon as the date of the new elections was announced. Some 21 parties and political clubs took part in the campaigns in these districts, although only a few had any realistic hope of gaining widespread support. These included the Social Democratic and Christian Social parties, which soon emerged as the leading contenders for German votes. There were other groups which hoped to gain support in a variety of kinds of districts, but most could reasonably look forward to success only in districts of very similar structures. The second category of parties included such groups as the German Agrarians, which ran in rural areas throughout Cisleithania. Other parties campaigned in even more limited areas. These included such groups as the German National Party, the Catholic People's Party, and the so-called "Beamtenpartei." In addition there were the purely local parties as well as those appeals were limited to a small area because of their dependence on the personality of some particular individual. One of these, the Social Political Party, had only one man able to carry an election in 1907. The local parties were the ones which represented regional interests such as the Tyrolean People's Party, the Upper Austrian Peasant's Union, and the German Conservative Peasant's Union of Lower Austria. Some of these parties increased their influence on national affairs by entering into coalitions

with one of the larger parties. The Christian Social Party was especially adept at using this technique, and materially increased its electoral strength by cooperating with locally strong parties in several areas of the country.

Most of the parties were limited in their appeals and aimed their campaigns at only one segment of the populace. Many of them revealed their orientation quite clearly in their names, as did the various peasant groups and the German Worker's Party, for example, while others were by long tradition active among some special group. This was especially true of the Social Democrats and of the heirs of the Liberal Party, which were most active among the workers on the one hand and the owners and managers of Austrian business on the other. There were in fact only two parties which could hope to cut across lines of social station and of interest to build large followings: the German People's Party and the Christian Social Party. The Christian Socials based their hopes on the fact that they were actually a union of several groups under a common name and leadership.

One of the constituent parts of the Christian Social Party (whose official title was "christlichsoziale Reichspartei") was the Christian Social Worker's Party. This wing of the party came into direct conflict with the Social Democratic Party, against which it competed for the loyalty of the Austrian worker. Both groups sponsored associations of workers, with the Christian Socials favoring industrial unions and the Social Democrats leaning towards the craft union. In 1904, the Social Democrats sponsored

4,231 unions, with a combined strength of 732,957 members. The Christian Socials, who entered the field later than their opponents, had 1,165 associations of Catholic workers with a combined strength of 148,698.⁴ The Christian Social Worker's Party functioned as a sub-group of the larger party, but sponsored its own newspaper and for the most part ran its own campaign. It was under-represented on the council of the party in terms of its potential electoral strength, and at least one observer feels that it was used mainly as a showpiece for the workers of the monarchy.⁵ The main body of the party proclaimed itself a party which sought to serve all the Germans of the monarchy rather than merely those of the cities where its strength had been greatest in the past. The party described itself as a truly German party and explained that the "Christian" in its name meant that it sought to serve the interests of all Christian Germans against the threats of Judaism and socialism. The party leaders stressed their intention of uniting Christians of all confessions, and claimed that they were not a clerical party in the sense that the older Christian conservative parties had been.⁶ This orientation placed

4. Reinhold Knoll, Zur Tradition der Christlichsoziale Partei (Vienna: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1973), p. 220.

5. Ibid., pp. 220-221.

6. Wahlmanifest angenommen vom 1. christlichsozialen Reichsparteitag in Wien am 10 März 1907 (Vienna: Verlag Ambrose Opitz, 1907.)

the party in direct conflict with the Social Democrats among the country's workers, with the Catholic Clerical Party in the countryside and the German People's Party and Progressive Party in the cities. It also gave the Christian Social Party the opportunity to become the most truly representative of all the German parties.

The opponents most feared by the Christian Socials were the Social Democrats. Led by men who were not themselves members of the working classes, it was a typical socialist party of the period. The Social Democratic appeals were based on promises to fulfill the immediate needs of the industrial laborers at the same time it prepared for full socialization of the empire. The Social Democrats, who believed they were responsible for the electoral reform, planned to use the increased power of the lower classes to seize control of the government. They intended to pass legislation which would improve the life of the workers and to give the laborers a larger voice in determining their relations with the state and their employers. They were not as radical as their opponents often claimed that they were, or as their own rhetoric sometimes suggested, and, in fact they were committed to the continued existence of the monarchy. The Social Democrats believed that the monarchy offered protection from the German Empire, on the one hand, and the Russian Empire, on the other, while offering them a chance to prove that cooperation among workers of

several nationalities was possible--in short, that Socialist internationalism was no idle dream.

The political parties of Cisleithania were for the most part prepared to begin campaigning immediately. Most of them made only minor changes in programs adopted earlier and presented the same programs to the people in 1907. The German People's Party, for example, had held party meetings in 1897 and 1899, at which they set the tone for the campaigns of 1907. At both meetings the party adopted a stand which pledged that it would work for the maintenance of German as the official language of the state, and the uniting of all Germans against threats from other groups.⁷ The party maintained this stand during the elections of 1907, proclaiming as its chief enemies the "Jewish Liberals" who opposed them in the cities of Bohemia. The Deutsche Volkswehr, a Pan-German paper which supported People's Party candidates in areas where no Pan-German candidate was active, made the party's attitude clear in early March when it proclaimed that the "Liberal Party is today what it has always been: a Jewish Party."⁸

7. Berchtol, Osterreichische Parteiprogramme, p. 206 pp. 210-215.

8. Deutsche Volkswehr (Budweis), March 2, 1907, p. 3.

The Liberals, who had bemoaned the passage of the reform because of its effect on the position of the urban middle class in the parliament, saw their main enemy in the growing Christian Social Party. Correctly estimating the weakness of some other parties, the Progressives believed that the appeal of the Christian Socials to the middle classes of Austria was the single most important threat to their power. Shortly after the campaigns began the Neue Freie Presse noted the adoption of the title "Reichspartei" by the Christian Socials. The paper reported that the title unfortunately was an accurate one and that the Christian Socials were likely to win enough mandates to dominate the German part of the Reichsrat. The Presse went on to state its belief that "the entire monarchy will experience evil days" because the Christian Socials were "the deadly enemies of modern civilization." The article continued by asserting that the only thing which could save the monarchy was the appearance of a man who could inspire the entire German "Volksseele" and unite all Germans under a common banner. Such a man, the paper believed, was absent from the lists of the Liberal candidates, although those candidates were men of courage and foresight. The journal's comment on the elections was that "the Germans of Austria have no luck."⁹

The Liberal journal also addressed itself to the

9. Neue Freie Presse, April 7, 1907, p. 1.

claim of the Social Democrats that the new parliament would be able to resolve the country's nationality questions by uniting men of all nationalities to concentrate on social issues. The attitude of the newspaper was that universal suffrage would not solve the problems between the national groups; nor would it solve the divisions between urban, commercial interests and agricultural ones. All the reform could promise was the exclusion of the German middle class from the halls of parliament and the delivery of the monarchy into the hands of socialist fanatics and clerical demagogues.¹⁰ The leaders of the liberal-style parties, which were collectively referred to as the "freisinnige" parties, and the editors of the Neue Freie Presse apparently believed that their best efforts were having little effect on the electorate, for on the morning of the election (May 14) there was an "address to the 'freisinnige' electorate" which had a desperate note. The essence of the journal's appeal was that the future of the monarchy and the position of the middle classes in it were in peril. The article asserted that a failure to vote would lead to the decline and fall of the empire.¹¹

Among the "clerical demagogues" so roundly condemned

10. Ibid., May 5, 1907, Evening Edition, p. 1..

11. Ibid., May 14, 1907, Morning Edition, p. 1.

by the Presse, many people were also determined to protect an endangered parliamentary position. On April 6 the Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna, Hans Gruscha, published a letter which was read from all the pulpits of his diocese. As it was reprinted in the Neue Freie Presse, the message called on the population of Austria to:

Do your duty! Cast your votes according to your best ability. Elect Catholic men who love their Church, who conduct themselves according to its teachings, and will fulfill their duties as Catholics. Elect men who will render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's. Elect Catholic men! Such men will resolve the penetrating social questions with good counsel and mutual cooperation. They will solve these problems on the basis of Christian morality and love, without which no solutions are possible.¹²

The Cardinal Archbishop meant, of course, that members of the Catholic Clerical Party or one of the various Catholic Conservative groups should be elected. He did not mean Christian Socials, whom he saw as distasteful radicals at best and as dangerous demagogues at worst. Later in the campaign the organ of the Catholic Clerical Party, the Vaterland, described what it believed to be the real danger of the campaign. There was a distressing possibility that the Christian Socials, flying false colors by proclaiming itself a Catholic party, might displace the real defenders

12. Ibid., April 2, 1907, Evening Edition, p. 4.

of the Catholic position in Austria. Some of the upper clergy, however, were not so strongly opposed to the Christian Socials, partly because of that party's strong stand on the position of the Church in the educational establishment. These clerics heartily condemned the "vicious and unwarranted" attacks of the "freisinnige" parties on the Christian Socials, who at least had the advantage that they were Catholics.¹³

The Pan-Germans and the Radicals, the more openly nationalistic of the German parties, cooperated closely in some parts of Austria. These nationalist parties were financed, at least in part, by the funds they received from the Pan-German Union of the German Empire, which had begun to funnel money into Austria as early as 1902. The funds were originally intended to finance journals and pamphlets but were increased after 1906 and earmarked for use in political campaigns. The purpose, of course, was to strengthen the nationalists against the Slavs. In practice, the use of foreign money had an opposite effect from the one intended, and brought unfavorable attention to the parties in the newspapers of the area, not to mention from the ministry of the interior.¹⁴

13. Das Vaterland, May 3, 1907, p. 1.

14. Lothar Werner, Der alldeutsche Verlag 1890-1918 (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Emil Ebering, 1934), pp. 220-224.

The Pan-German Party ran a campaign which was most clearly outlined in the Deutsche Volkswehr's endorsement of the campaign of Wilhelm Pollauf in Bohemia. He promised that the party would support the separation of Austria and Hungary, and that they would seek some special relationship with the German Empire. Pollauf also championed the continued dominance of the German language, continued anti-Semitic activities, tax reform, and the repeal of indirect taxes on foodstuffs. He tried to appeal to as broad an audience as possible by demanding the dissolution of cartels, cheap credit for farmers, and wage legislation in the Austrian industries.¹⁵ These and other proposals of the same sort were thrown together in a grab-bag program designed to offer all things to all men. Since the party championed such a complicated and sometimes self contradictory program, it is hardly surprising that Pollauf was defeated.

The real lines of battle in much of Cisleithania were drawn either between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats, or between the Christian Socials and one of the parties representing the interests of small farmers. The most bitterly fought campaigns were those which pitted Christian Socials against Social Democrats in the industrial cities. As is often the case in such struggles, the two groups were not so very far apart in the promises they made

15. Deutsche Volkswehr (Budweis), March 30, 1907, p. 1.

to the electorate, although they seemed poles apart in the political principles they represented. The Social Democrats based their campaigns on platforms adopted at various party meetings. In the Brünn Program of 1899 the party made its stand on the national strife of the country quite plain.

At the party congress held in Brünn, the party adopted a plank calling for a federal solution to the problems of the empire, with guarantees for the rights of minorities in every part of the empire. They had originally adopted a program favoring autonomous areas for each of the national groups, but dropped this specific recommendation from later statements. A split had developed in the party between those who favored this sort of geographic autonomy and those who preferred a strong central government based on a parliament to which members of each national group sent deputies.¹⁶ When the electoral campaigns began, the Social Democrats paid less attention to such questions of theory and addressed themselves to more concrete issues.

16. George Vaughn Strong, "Nationalism and Socialism: A Study in the Attitudes of the German Austrian Social Democratic Party to the National Question, 1907-1918" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1970), pp. 17-18.

The items of major interest to the Social Democrats may be seen clearly in the pages of the Arbeiter Zeitung and in many of the pamphlets published during the campaigns. One such broadside, addressed to the voters of the 47th district of Lower Austria, supported the candidacy of Leopold Ottinger and explained the party's stand on several issues. The pamphlet, published in an area inhabited mainly by small farmers, had seven major sections, each dealing with a specific question. These questions included such matters as rising taxes, and indirect taxes, which were said to raise the price of food on the worker's table without bringing more income to the farmer. The Social Democrats also saw a need to replace the standing army with a National Guard; a need for free schools financed by the state; a need to lower tariffs on items needed by the common man; and a need to redistribute land in order to make more available for communal grazing and mowing. The pamphlet blamed the problems of the small farmer on the capitalists who owned the great estates and proposed to resolve the land reform problem by making available for common use the land held in hunting reserves by the nobility.. This could be done without resorting to expropriation, and would avoid the problems caused by such a move. The pamphlet went on to deny in heated terms the charges of Zionism leveled at the party by its opponents.¹⁷

17. An der Wählerschaft der 47. Wahlbezirkes (Vienna: privately printed, 1907).

Attacks on the nobility, the estate owners, and the large industrialists, however, were not the sole property of the Social Democrats. Christian Social candidates were also active in this area, and one observer was led to describe the Social Democratic platform as being the same as that of the Christian Socials without the specifically Catholic planks. The same observer went on to remark on the almost complete lack of nationalist rhetoric among Christian Socials, and the even more surprising absence of revolutionary rhetoric among Social Democratic candidates. He also mentioned the repeated claims by Social Democratic speakers that they were responsible for the reform of the electoral code, and claimed that these assertions were bringing many people into the socialist camp.¹⁸

The Christian Socials, a younger party than the Social Democrats, held their first meeting of representatives from all parts of Cisleithania in March, 1907, to map out the party's electoral strategy. The English observer who had seen little difference in Social Democratic and Christian Social campaign pledges characterized the speeches of the latter group as based on fear and hostility directed at the great industrialists of the monarchy. He singled out four items which he said the Christian Socials stressed more than

18. Valerie Hussey Walsh, "Through the Austrian General Elections," The Fortnightly Review, new ser., Vol. LXXXI (1907), p. 981.

any others: the reduction of indirect taxes and introduction of a progressive income tax, the enactment of social legislation patterned on the German system, the adoption of free trade laws, and a greater hand in education for the Church.¹⁹

The party meeting at which the program was adopted was opened by Prince Alois von Liechtenstein, who pledged the party to support social reform and the dynasty and to protect the interests of all Germans without regard to their situation in life. He was interrupted by applause at several points in his speech, and he closed by promising that the party would put "in the place of class hatred and special interests, brotherly and active cooperation" among all Germans, at which point there was a tremendous and sustained outburst of enthusiasm from the assembled delegates.²⁰ Liechtenstein was followed by a series of other speakers including Richard Weiskirchner, who blamed the problems facing Austria on the "Moloch of great Jewish capitalists."²¹ After Weiskirchner came a long line of speakers who introduced the party's platform in small segments. Josef Stöckler pledged that the party meant to reform school laws to allow peasant children more time to learn their trade, and that it would introduce a system of cheap credit, guaranteed

19. Ibid.

20. Wahlmanifest angenommen vom 1. christlichsozialen Reichsparteitag.

21. Ibid.

by the government, to help farmers modernize and improve their holdings. He was followed by Hermann Biellohlwak, Leopold Steiner, and Leopold Kunschalk, who addressed the assembled delegates on specific portions of the party's platform.

As the platform finally emerged from the meeting, it had five main sections. It began with a promise to renew the Ausgleich on terms more favorable to Cisleithania than to Hungary. In more specific terms, the party assured the voters that it would secure social legislation and tax reform bills which would help the workers, the farmers, the widows, and the elderly of Austria. They promised to help small businessmen deal with the unfair practices of corporate giants and to secure cheap credit for peasants who wanted to improve their land. The speeches ended with the party leaders promising to protect the common man from the Jewish capitalists and to make his life more pleasant through the establishment of public parks and cheap entertainment.²²

The mass meeting in Vienna was followed by a series of smaller meetings throughout Cisleithania at which the message was spread. One such meeting was held at Tarrenz, in the Tyrol, where Professor Moritz Mayr explained to an assembly of about 330 people the differences between the Christian Social and other Catholic parties. He stressed the Catholic nature of the party but explained that it also was a patriotic

22. Ibid.

group which sought the best way to serve monarchical, rather than clerical, interests.

Mayr also explained that the party was a German one, which sought to unite all elements of the population against the Social Democrats, who pledged themselves to destroy the monarchy.²³ The various elements within the party stressed the part of the platform designed to appeal to its segment of the electorate. Thus the Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung could promise the workers its support through economic reforms, public insurance, and wage and hour laws on the same day the Reichspost pledged the party to support the interests of the German middle class against all enemies--including, presumably, the workers.²⁴

There was a considerable amount of cooperation between the parties during these campaigns. Most obvious was the mutual support given one another by the various parties of the "freisinnige" group. No party in the accepted sense of the word, this was a loose coalition of several parties, including parts of the Radical Party, the Progressive Party, the Liberal Party, and several other groups such as the "candidates of the central industrialist election committee," which was simply a loose organization of some of the former representatives of the chambers of commerce.

23. Neue Tiroler Stimmen (Innsbruck), April 8, 1907, p. 1.

24. Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung (Vienna), May 11, 1907, p. 1; Die Reichspost (Vienna), May 11, 1907, p. 1.

During the course of the campaigns more formal coalitions began to emerge in several parts of Austria. In some of the German parts of Bohemia, for example, the Pan-Germans, Independent Pan-Germans (splinter group of the older party), and some German Radicals agreed to run common candidates in areas where there was a strong threat from some other group (usually the Social Democrats).²⁵ The Christian Socials also sought coalitions with locally powerful groups throughout Austria. The first effort came in the Tyrol, where the Christian Socials alone were not strong enough to win elections. They sought an alliance with the Catholic Clerical Party, which retained much of its influence with the intensely religious farmers of the area. The initial move in this alliance came at a rally in Innsbruck, held under the auspices of the Conservative Party. Christian Social speakers shared the rostrum and asked for close cooperation between the Catholics of the empire against the "Godless" Social Democrats and against nationalist agitators who threatened the very existence of the monarchy.²⁶ Conservatives and Christian Socials had been at one another's throats for some time, and at first the efforts at cooperation between them were marred by distrust and dislike. Both sides seem to have wanted some

25. Georg von Schöberer und die Entwicklung des Alldeutschtum in der Ostmark (Verlag: Rudolf Dietjens, n. d.), p. 81.

26. Neue Tiroler Stimmen, April 15, 1907, pp. 1-2.

sort of association, but neither could really trust the other. The Catholic Conservatives, whose programs were "built entirely on a Catholic foundation," never entirely trusted the more secular Christian Socials, who, in turn, were suspicious of the ultramontanistism of some of the Catholic Conservatives.²⁷

After extended negotiations, however, the two groups reached an agreement, which was greeted with enthusiasm by the leaders of both groups. The Vaterland, rejoicing over the accord, proclaimed that it was now possible for all Catholics to act in concert to protect the empire from its real foes, the Jewish internationalists of the Social Democratic Party and the leaders of the national clubs.²⁸ The union with the Conservatives would be most helpful in the countryside, and the Christian Socials turned their attention to the cities as soon as possible. In Carinthia and Styria, as well as other parts of Austria, the Social Democrats could look for support from both German and non-German workers. The number of anti-Social Democrat Germans in those areas was not always sufficient to defeat the socialists, and the Christian Socials began trying to build an internationalism of their own.

In the south the Christian Socials found the answer to their difficulty in a union with Catholics of other

27. Ibid., April 18, 1907, p. 3.

28. Das Vaterland, April 26, 1907, p. 1.

nationalities. The Slovenian Clerical Party was influential in much of this area, but were not strong enough to win alone. Since the Slovenian Clericals hated and feared the Social Democrats as much as the Christian Socials, it was logical that the two groups should cooperate. The leaders of the parties entered into lengthy conversations, and in early May an agreement was reached. The Reichspost, defending this agreement, admitted that the Slovenians were not German, but stressed their tradition of loyalty to the empire and their intense Catholicism. Such a union of patriotic Catholics, without regard to nationality, offered the best hope of defeating the "deutschfeindlich" Social Democrats.²⁹

This sort of international cooperation among parties based on their perceptions of mutual enemies must have pleased the emperor and his ministers greatly. It was repeated in other parts of Cisleithania, where Christian Socials united with non-German peasants' and clerical parties to oppose Social Democrats and nationalist parties. These alliances were both tenuous and temporary, perhaps, but they offered at least the possibility of growing into more permanent unions. They consisted for the most part of agreements that the parties would not run candidates against one another, and that they would consult on questions of

29. Die Reichspost, May 3, 1907, pp. 2-3.

mutual interest. The journals of all the major parties of Austria carried lists of their candidates just before the elections, and the Christian Social journals carried lists of compromise candidates and formal endorsements of other parties as well.³⁰

The cooperation between parties representing different national groups was a hopeful sign, but could not conceal the fact that nationalist agitation continued in Cis-leithania. The Vaterland, commenting on the division of Moravia into Czech and German districts, stated that the real danger of such a division was the development of a "domestic warfare" which would threaten the interests of all citizens of the area. This division might have the effect exacerbating the national tensions and obscuring the fact that the real problems of the day were not national, but concerned the "economic and social structure and development of the monarchy."³¹ Whether or not the Reichspost was accurate in its assessment of the situation in Moravia, there was difficulty in some areas.

August Meschede, the Austrian consul in Kiev, for example, reported that Ukrainian student groups at the University of Kiev were collecting funds for political campaigns in Galicia. The governor of Kiev forbade such

30. See the Reichspost, April 21, 1907, pp. 11-12; and May 12, 1907, pp. 17-18.

31. Das Vaterland, May 1, 1907, p. 1.

activity but made little effort to prevent the collection of money.³² The Ruthenians, of course, were not alone in nationalist agitation. Georg Hörmann, Austrian Resident in Ragusa, reported to his superiors that the agitation for an Italian school in that city was actually a subtle form of electoral agitation. The Italian politicians of the area hoped that by making impossible demands of the regime, they could muster support among the voters to defeat the Social Democrats.³³ It was precisely this kind of activity, often funded from outside the monarchy, which prompted coalitions among the German parties and between Germans and non-Germans who shared a common patriotism.

As the campaigns went on, it became obvious to everyone that the Christian Socials and Social Democrats were not very far apart in their programs. Both offered comprehensive programs for social reform and both claimed responsibility for passage of the electoral reform act. It was also apparent to almost everyone that the Christian Socials posed a serious threat to the position of the Progressive Party and its allies in the cities. The "freisinnige" group, with a less coherent program than the Christian Socials had, resorted to the kinds of political rhetoric which seem typical of modern mass politics. At

32. August Meschede to Richard Bienerth, Kiev, March 28, 1907, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Abteilung LXI (Intern 1848-1918), Karton XL, Doc. No. 3575.

33. Georg Hörmann to Richard Bienerth, Ragusa, April 24, 1907, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Abteilung LXI (Intern 1848-1918), Karton XL, Doc. No. 3680.

first, their attacks were made in the form of "news" reports which were presented as fact.

One article in the Neue Freie Presse, for example, reported that a group of municipal officials, all of them members of the "freisinnige" parties, attempted to enter a hall where Christian Social candidates were speaking. The officials were met by a group of Christian Social speakers and "brutally ejected" from the hall--so forcefully, in fact that one of the officials required hospitalization.³⁴ After the first elections the Liberals faced the possibility of political disaster which could be staved off only by victories in the run-offs. They again turned their attention to the Christian Socials, this time using sarcasm as their main weapon. The Presse carried one article lamenting the fact that the great comedian Nestrøp had no worthy successor, for the Christian Social campaigns contained "the raw material for a satirical drama." The article gave special attention to the attacks made by Christian Social speakers on the big banks of Austria which were, according to the article, staffed at the upper levels by Christian Social supporters and which provided most of the money to finance the Christian Social campaign.³⁵

34. Neue Freie Presse, April 27, 1907, p. 1.

35. Ibid., June 1, 1907, p. 1.

The Christian Socials replied to these attacks in the same tone. The contents of an article which appeared in the Reichspost is typical of the Christian Social counter-attacks. Referring, as they did without exception, to the "Jewish Liberals," the paper accused the parties of the "freisinnige" group of using monies extorted from the poor by the big banks and the cartels to purchase the votes they needed to destroy the "real Germans" in the Reichsrat.³⁶

The Liberals were not the only targets of Christian Social wrath. Aiming their anger at the Slavic nationalities of Cisleithania, the party reported an incident which they said was typical of Pan-Slav reactions to Christian Social campaigns. In the village of Deutsch-Altvausz, in Bukovina, the party scheduled a rally to be addressed by the local candidate, Karl Schläger. Just before the rally was to begin the home of one of the party's leaders burst into flames. The fire, which gutted the house, was the work of a "Slavic mob spurred on by Greek Orthodox priests."³⁷

Although the Christian Socials paid a good deal of attention to the Slavic parties and to the liberals, the worst of their venom was reserved for the Social Democrats. With few real differences in their programs, the two parties

36. Die Reichspost, April 30, 1907, p. 9.

37. Das Vaterland, April 13, 1907, p. 2.

resorted to the worst kinds of political smears in their efforts to discredit each other. Throughout the months of April and May the Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung carried a regular column entitled "Social Democratic Electoral Lies" which devoted itself to refuting charges made against the party. In the issue of April 6 the column carried statements from several Christian Social leaders which were designed to show their opposition to military conscription.³⁸ The Social Democrats had earlier claimed that the Christian Socials hoped to make the draft a tool to take votes away from socialist candidates by drafting known party members. It was not enough to simply reply to Social Democratic attacks, of course, and the Christian Socials rose to the occasion. One of their most consistently repeated claims was that the Social Democrats were deliberately attempting to foment divisions and class warfare among the Germans of Austria. The Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung even used political rhymes against their enemies, such as the one entitled "Nieder mit dem roten Freiheitsschändern:"

Wer die Freiheit wirklich liebt,
 Wer ein Feind des Terrorismus ist,
 Wer nicht haben will daß die brutale Gewalt,
 Daß die Faust an sich öffentlichen Leben beherrschen,
 Der wähle die Partei den wirklichen Freiheit,
 der wähle Christlichsoziale! ³⁹

38. Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung, April 6, 1907, p. 3.

39. Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung, April 9, 1907, p. 2.

Bad poetry, perhaps, but effective political propaganda.

The Social Democrats were no less active than their opponents. In addition to the kinds of attacks on Christian Social programs to which the Christian Social journal responded in its regular column, the Social Democrats attacked the nature of the Christian Social Party itself. In a pamphlet issued shortly before the election, the Social Democrats tried to demonstrate that the attempt to satisfy all segments of the population made by the Christian Socials could only hurt the country. The pamphlet claimed that the real intent of the Christian Socials was to conceal an attack on the workers of the monarchy behind a program of ineffective social reforms and to alter the tax structure so that the middle classes paid almost none and the workers paid almost none and the workers paid an ever increasing share.⁴⁰ The Social Democrats also mocked the claims of the Christian Social to be a German party. How, they asked, could a German party justify its close relations with Slavic parties such as the Slovenian Clerical Party? The answer, as the Social Democratic leader Viktor Adler posed it, was that the Christian Socials were no German party at all but simply another manifestation of the old Clerical-Noble-Slavic majority that

40. Hans Winter, Christlichsoziale Wirtschaft (Floridsdorf: privately printed, 1907).

had always dominated the empire.⁴¹

The campaigns of 1907 were conducted on several levels. Each of the German parties stressed as much as possible the positive aspects of their candidates and of the programs they offered. In many instances, however, these programs were either duplicated by other parties or were hopelessly vague. When such duplications and inconsistencies occurred, there was little left to do save to attack each other. The attacks and counterattacks which followed reached a remarkable height of bitterness.

As the campaigns drew to a close, the parties began to try and sum up their programs and to make a final effort to get their own supporters to the polls. The journals of Cisleithania were filled with exhortations and pleas to the voters which reached their emotional peaks just before the elections. In Innsbruck there was a final effort to secure an uneasy cooperation between the Christian Socials and Christian Conservatives. In an article entitled "Catholics, who is taxing you?", the two parties accused both Jews and Protestants of conspiring to reduce their share of the tax burden while raising that of the Catholics and exhorted the Catholics to strike back by voting for Christian Social-Catholic Conservative compromise candidates.⁴²

41. As reported in Die Reichspost, March 5, 1907, pp. 2-3. The acid reaction of the journal to Adler's attempt to speak for the Germans while serving as leader of an internationalist party was predictable.

42. Neue Tiroler Stimmen, May 1, 1907, p. 1.

The front page of the Viennese daily, Die Reichspost, was dominated on May 12 by an article entitled "White or Red?" and a poem, "An Appeal to the People." They both exhorted the Christian Social faithful to flock to the polls in order to stop the Social Democrats from having any successes.⁴³ The Tyrolean campaign reached its peak on the 10th, when the Neue Tiroler Stimmen's lead article was an address to the "Catholic Voters of the Fatherland" urging them to go to the polls and giving them a list of the Christian Social candidates in each of the Tyrolean districts.⁴⁴ On election day the morning journals carried a last appeal to the electorate. Most of them were similar to the one which appeared in Das Vaterland and stressed the duty of the party faithful to support their party's candidates. In this case, of course, the "right" choice was Catholic and Christian Social. The Vaterland, like most other journals, included in this article a list of the polling places in each district which it served.⁴⁵

The campaigns--the first to be held under the new system--are very difficult to characterize. The appeals ranged through the entire spectrum of political possibility--from the most

43. Neue Tiroler Stimmen, May 1, 1907, p. 1.

44. Die Reichspost, May 12, 1907, p. 1.

45. Das Vaterland, May 14, 1907, pp. 2-3.

negative forms of demagoguery and hate-mongering to the most positive, well elaborated plans for legislative activity. No party was innocent of using the lowest forms of political tactics, and no party was spared the lash of its opponents anger. The voters of Cisleithania were subjected to a continuous barrage of pleas, exhortations, and threats. They went to the polls with confident predictions of victory from every party ringing in their ears. There were no proven instances of violence or fraud on election day, and the confusion that sometimes prevailed was no more than should have been expected in the first elections held on such a broad suffrage and in completely new districts. Vienna was described as lying still, with an air of hushed anticipation hanging over it all through the long day. The rest of the country was also quiet, and an air of studied calm lay over Cisleithania as the parties awaited the verdict of the people.

Chapter V: The Election Returns of 1907

The campaigns preceding the first election held under the new Austrian electoral code closed on a disturbing note.. The parties and political clubs had resorted to every strategem which they could devise in their attempts to further their own electoral chances and to reduce those of their opponents. There were instances of reasonable argument, name-calling, and even physical attacks. The authorities were understandably nervous as the day grew near, fearing that violence might erupt or that fraud would be widespread. In this atmosphere, it is to the credit of the voters and the imperial officials charged with overseeing the elections that not a single proven instance of either violence or fraud anywhere in the country. Voting took place in a relatively quiet and orderly fashion, and the results were accepted by all parties with a minimum of complaint. Given the array of choices facing the voters, many of whom had voted only in the fifth curia, if they had voted at all before 1907, it is not surprising that run-off elections were required in 212 of the 516 electoral districts. These run-offs were held on May 24, 1907, ten days after the first round of voting.

A larger percentage of the electorate turned out than ever before. More than four million people voted in 1907

84.4% of the qualified electorate as compared to 71.9% in 1897 and 56.7% in 1901.¹ This figure may be somewhat misleading since six of the provinces of Cisleithania had laws making voting compulsory. In areas where such laws did not prevail, participation ranged between 70.8% and 71.9% of the qualified voters--still a high proportion of those qualified.² The Germans, to whom the reform guaranteed a slightly higher number of parliamentary seats than could be justified solely on the basis of population, cast 1.7 million votes, or 38.38% of the total.³ These votes elected 232, or 44.9%, of the 516 deputies to parliament--a discrepancy explained by the fact that Germans paid the lion's share of direct taxes.⁴

The electoral districts were designed to reflect the history and composition of the monarchy in several ways. They were divided among the various kingdoms and lands of Austria according to a complicated scheme which reflected the relative size and tax burden of each and were apportioned among the national groups in such a way as to ensure that as few voters as possible lived in districts where their nation-

1. Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im Jahre 1907. Vol. LXXXIV, Pt. 2 of Österreichische Statistik (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1907), p. ix.

2. Ibid.

3. Summarische Ergebnisse der Statistik der Reichsratswahlen von 1907 (Brünn: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1907), p. xii.

4. Rauchberg, Der statistischen Unterlagen der österreichischen Wahlreform, p. 168.

alities were in the minority. This led to some oddly shaped districts and to some other peculiarities. In Galicia, as has been noted, there were 36 districts with dual representation-- a fact necessitated by the uneven geographic distribution of Poles and Ruthenians in the area. In Moravia a completely different system was adopted to separate the Germans and Czechs, whose demography was also very complex. Two separate sets of districts were created, one for each of the national groups.⁵

Another feature of the electoral districts was that they were designed to reflect the division between town and country. This bifurcation characterized Austrian life just as did that of other European countries of the time. It has already been noted that the rural population (persons living in communities of fewer than 2,000 persons) exceeded the urban population of the monarchy by approximately seven percent, with the Germans being the most urbanized group.⁶ In fact, the Germans accounted for 60.9% of the urban vote in 1907 and only 29.2% of the rural vote.⁷ The more urban character of the Germans was taken into consideration when districts were drawn, and they were assigned 117 rural and

5. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, Law No. 17, pp. 88-112.

6. See ante, pp.

7. Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1907, p. ix.

115 urban districts--the highest proportion of urban to rural districts assigned to any group.⁸ Since the hope of the men who devised the districts was to keep them as close as possible to the same size and at the same time to avoid mixing city and rural areas, the city districts often included several towns separated by considerable distances. The accompanying map of the Tyrol (figure 1) demonstrates the manner in which this linking of several towns and market centers was accomplished throughout Cisleithania.⁹


In most towns where Germans and other national groups lived separate districts were created for each. This procedure was sometimes impossible, as in the case of Vienna. Although predominantly a German city, the capital was also the home of considerable numbers of non-Germans, including a large group of Czechs. These citizens, however, were not sufficiently concentrated to form a separate electoral district. The apparant discrimination may have been less severe than it seems if one takes into account the fact that areas of heaviest Czech population were areas in which Social Democrats ran very well (figure 2).¹⁰ Czechs who formed minorities in other cities fielded their own candidates, either as a form of protest or in the hope

8. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, Law No. 17, pp. 88-112.

9. These are the districts established in 1907 and listed in ibid., pp. 104-105.


10. The concentrations are those of 1910, and follow Monika Glettler, Die Wiener Tschechen um 1900. Vol. XXVIII of Veröffentlichen des Collegium Carolinum (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1972), p. 55.

TYROL



Figure

CZECHS IN VIENNA, 1910



Administrative Districts

of gaining favors from one of the German parties. This was not done in Vienna--another indication that the Viennese Czechs were not too disturbed over their failure to be assigned a district of their own.

The attempt by the government to recognize demographic facts was not perfect, perhaps, but was undertaken in good faith and drew no major criticism from the parties representing the Germans. The division between countryside and city varied from place to place depending on the social and economic structure of a given district. The German districts of Austria were divided as follows:¹¹

TABLE 2

AREA	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL
Lower Austria	43	21	64
Upper Austria	6	16	22
Salzburg	3	4	7
Styria	11	12	23
Carinthia	1	8	9
Carniola	0	1	1
Tyrol	5	11	16
Vorarlberg	1	3	4
Bohemia	27	28	55
Moravia	10	9	19
Silesia	5	4	9
Bukovina	3	0	3
TOTALS	115	117	232

The electoral districts thus represented the divisions

11. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, Law No. 17, pp. 88-112.

within Cisleithania as closely as possible. This fact probably accounted in part for the very peaceful nature of the elections. The parties campaigned hard, and most of them ended their efforts on an optimistic note, predicting victory for their candidates. The parties which had represented men of wealth and which therefore dominated the curial parliaments were the only groups which feared the new elections. Their fear was well justified, for it was exactly those parties which lost the most in the balloting. The party of the great landlords, the so-called "Verfassungstreue" group, disappeared altogether, while such parties as the Progressives lost ground. The greatest gains were registered by the groups which appealed to the newly enfranchised workers, artisans, and small merchants of the western half of the empire. The most spectacular gain was made by the Social Democratic, which increased its delegation from 10 to 86 (including 50 German deputies). The Christian Socials, archenemies of the Social Democrats, also made large gains in the new parliament, increasing their seats from 25 to 96.

The size of the various parties reflected their ability to convince the electorate of the validity of their programs and their ability to speak to the needs of the voters. This is always true in popular elections, of course, and it is often difficult for the parties to determine the proper path

to follow in their struggle for support. It is equally difficult for the observer to determine after the fact what caused voters to choose as they did. There are many intangible factors involved in electoral decisions, some of them not susceptible to any genuine measure. It is, for example, possible to say that a man like Karl Lueger commanded a personal respect and admiration among the electorate which helped to explain his phenomenal success, but it is not possible to say with any comfortable degree of accuracy how large a part this personal dimension occupied. Therefore this analysis of the elections of 1907 concentrates on some data which is susceptible to analysis, and attempts to assess the importance of those factors in voting behavior among Austrian Germans.

The factors which are examined here are of several kinds. Each district which was apportioned to the Germans was examined to determine its location, the national and religious composition of its population, the employment patterns among its voters, and whether it was an urban or rural district. This data was recorded and the electoral results were compared in order to discern any patterns of similarity which might have existed. The results of that comparison follow, without the detailed and sometimes tedious computations which preceded the actual analysis. Examples of the worksheets on which all data was recorded

are included in Appendix A, and may be consulted there. The information which was included in each of the 232 cases was drawn from a variety of sources, rendering it impractical to cite specific sources for each piece of data. The method of calculation used in arriving at the information are also explained in Appendix A, and require no special expertise. In fact, it was a matter of accumulating the figures from various sources and adding them together.¹² These sources were primarily official records and were supplemented by information compiled by other observers on hand for the voting. One clear pattern which emerges from this data is the distribution of parties among the provinces of Austria.

12. Appendix A demonstrates the methods used to compute this information and gives specific references which are typical of the sources used in each of the 232 districts. The data was drawn from a wide variety of sources, including Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1907; Summarische Ergebnisse der Statistik der Reichsratswahlen im 1907; Berufsstatistik der Wahlberechtigten bei der Reichsratswahlen von 1907. Vol. XCI, Pt. 1 of Österreichische Statistik (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1912); Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen vom 31 December 1900; and Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen von 1900. Vol. LXVI, Pt. 1, Österreichische Statistik (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1904). The biographical data for the deputies has been drawn primarily from Fritz Freund, Das Österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus. Einer biographische statistischen Handbuch 1907-1913 (Vienna: Wiener Verlag, 1907); Oswald Knauer, Das Parlament Österreichs von 1848-1966 (Vienna: Bergland, 1967); and the reports in the newspapers of the period as well as the police reports regarding the political activities of individuals and groups. Those police reports are currently housed in the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna.

These provinces varied widely in their social and economic development, and those variations affected the political life of the area, helping to determine the success of the parties in the elections. The Christian Socials and German People's Parties were the most widely distributed of all the parties, with the Social Democrats also succeeding in most of the provinces. The other parties appealing to German voters tended to be less well distributed, and won elections in fewer of the provinces. The Agrarians, for example, found most of their support in Bohemia and Moravia where the larger farm was the basic unit of agricultural production. One of the Agrarian seats, the one held by Prince Karl Auersperg, reflected not only the nature of agriculture in the Carniolan district, but also the personal popularity which Auersperg had won while serving as the governor of the province.

The more openly nationalistic of the German parties, the Pan-Germans and the Radicals, were also concentrated in a few provinces. Two of the three Pan-German and eleven of the thirteen Radical deputies were elected in Bohemian districts. The remaining support for these groups was centered in Moravia and Silesia. The Pan-German and Agrarians ran a coalition candidate in Styria who managed to win one seat. In other words, both of the nationalistic

parties found most of their support in areas which had an active and sizeable non-German population, or in areas on the periphery of the monarchy. Table 3 shows the distribution of the German parties among the provinces of Cisleithania.¹³ It is plain that the Christian Socials, one of the most widely distributed parties, was also one of the most successful at gaining support from other groups. In the Alpine lands it was the Catholic Conservatives who threw their support to the Christian Socials, while in the Styrian borderlands the party gained the backing of the powerful Slovenian Clerical Party. This may be explained by the avowed Catholicism of the Christian Socials, as well as by the fact that conservative and clerical parties were the groups most fearful of Social Democratic successes. The Christian Socials offered these groups the best chance for maintaining Catholic representation in parliament, as well as for preventing the Social Democrats from gaining too much power.

The German parties were unevenly distributed not only among the provinces but also between the urban and rural districts as well. The Christian Social and the

13. This table is based on a count of the votes in each district. These figures may be found in Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1907; and in Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus 1907-1913.

1907
TABLE 3.

Party Strength by Province

[illegible]

German People's Parties were again the most widely distributed, winning elections in large numbers in both kinds of areas. The other parties showed a tendency to do well in either rural or urban districts, but not in both kinds of districts. The distribution of the German parties among the rural and urban districts was as follows:¹⁴

TABLE 4

PARTY	URBAN	RURAL
Christian Social	27	69
German People's	20	10
Social Democrats	35	15
Radicals	11	2
Pan-Germans	2	1
Agrarians	1	19
Progressives	17	0
Free Socialist	0	1
Social Political	1	0
Zionist	1	0

The pattern of these distributions becomes even clearer when one realizes that the "rural" districts in which Social Democratic candidates were elected were in fact suburbs of industrial towns or were in mining districts. The other significant differences between the parties are not explained by their spread among the provinces or between rural and urban areas. In order to explain the important features of party distribution it is necessary

14. Ibid. Some sources show slightly different strengths because they count parliamentary associations of several parties rather than individual groups as done here.

to characterize the kinds of districts in which each party found the bulk of its support.

The Christian Social Party, the largest and best distributed of the German parties, was also the one which had the broadest electoral base. The party's strength in urban districts was in areas where the majority of the voters ~~were~~ either self-employed in small shops or worked as salaried employees. In two districts Roman Catholic industrial workers were in the majority, and in those districts the Christian Socials defeated a Social Democratic candidate by a narrow margin. In rural districts which elected Christian Social candidates the population was mainly Roman Catholic and German, with a high incidence of sizeable Slovenian voters, and were mainly self-employed as farmers or merchants. The common feature of these districts was their strongly Roman Catholic nature, and the fact that self-employed persons predominated.

The German People's Party, which was also well represented throughout the country, ran best in a different kind of district. The areas which elected deputies from this party were overwhelmingly German in population, but showed a greater religious variety than the Christian Social districts. The population in these districts was mainly self-employed and salaried and tended to work in some part of the industrial sector. There were also large numbers of professional men among these voters. The common feature of the German People's Party electorate was that it was strongly German and

that it was composed of small industrialists and professional people. Industry and the profession also supplied the occupations of most of the voters who supported the Social Democrats.

The Social Democrats drew most of their support from wage earners, as befitted a group which was, rhetorically at least, one of the most socialist of all European socialist parties. The Social Democrats succeeded mainly in areas with mixed national and religious populations, but where most people worked in similar jobs. In all but three of the Social Democratic districts, industrial and transportation workers made up the bulk of the voting population. In the three non-working class districts which returned Social Democrats, the majority of the voters were professional men. In one of these districts Karl Renner was the party's candidate, and his personal popularity probably goes far to explain his victory. In the other two districts the German People's Party and the Christian Socials split the non-working class vote and gave the workers a greater weight than they might otherwise have had. The Social Democrats were joined in their success among Cisleithanian workers by the single Free Socialist deputy, who carried a Bohemian district which was solidly German, Roman Catholic, and where iron foundries provided the bulk of the local jobs.

The Progressive Party also found most of its support

in districts of a mixed religious and national character. These were all urban districts and had large Protestant and Jewish minorities in their populace, as well as significant numbers of the non-German peoples of Austria. Even more significant in the party's success, perhaps, was the fact that in all these areas self-employed and salaried professionals were in a majority among the voters. The single Social Political deputy was returned from a Viennese district with a Jewish population of professional men--most of them minor public servants. The Progressive districts were also home to a great many of Austria's wealthier industrialists, especially in Vienna and some of the Bohemian cities.

The remaining parties tended to be more nearly "special interest" type parties than the ones mentioned above. The Agrarians, for example, were elected in areas where the majority of the voting population was composed of large farmers and estate owners--the group which had previously given its allegiance to the "verfassungstreue" group. Religion and nationality played a relatively small part in the success of this party, which drew on the Czech gentry as well as the German. It is interesting to note that there was an apparant difference in political motivation among the grain farmers and stockmen, on the one

hand, and the vintners, on the other. In the areas of Cisleithania where vineyards were important, especially in Upper and Lower Austria, the Christian Socials swept the field among the rural population, while the Agrarians held sway in areas that were the centers of grain and stock production.

The other "special interest" groups were the Pan-Germans, the Radicals, and the Zionist Parties. The Pan-Germans carried three districts, all of them with vocal Slavic national parties. Religion may also have played a role in this party's success, for it tended to amass votes in districts with large Protestant populations and with significant numbers of Old Catholics. The three Pan-German districts exhibited other similarities as well. They were all areas in which small tradesmen formed the majority of the voting population. The Radicals, much less strident in their nationalism than the Pan-Germans, also succeeded in areas Slavic minorities and in areas which lay on the periphery of the monarchy. The single Zionist deputy was elected in a district in the city of Czernowitz which had a large Jewish population of professional men and wealthy tradesmen.

There were, of course, exceptions to the categories described above, as the three non-working class districts

won by Social Democrats show. In most districts which did not match the general patterns, the victorious parties failed to win the first round of balloting and were forced into a run-off. The German People's Party, for example, won in two districts with large working class populations. In both cases the Christian Socials had held a plurality in the initial voting, but lost the run-off when Social Democratic votes went to the German People's Party in the run-off. A similar situation prevailed in three districts where Progressive candidates won run-offs from the Christian Socials by picking up Social Democratic votes in the run-offs. Not to be outdone, the Christian Socials turned on the Social Democrats and threw their votes to an Agrarian candidate in one district, allowing him to win the run-off by a small majority.

This rivalry between Social Democrats and Christian Socials was one of the clearest features of the election. The Social Democrats fielded candidates in 228 contests and the Christian Socials in 222, with only 22 of these races seeing one party present without the other. A further demonstration of the mutual antagonism of the two groups is the fact that Social Democratic votes thrown to other parties cost the Christian Socials 11 run-off elections. The Christian Socials were able to return the favor in 6 run-off races. Quite plainly, then, in 1907 the Christian Socials were not simply the party of small shopkeepers and farmers which they were later described as


being. The Social Democrats and the Christian Socials were in fact competing for the same votes in 1907, with the Christian Socials able to draw on the farmers and tradesmen of the area in addition to industrial workers. The direct rivalry between the two groups becomes quite clear when one examines the first and second place voting in the city of Vienna (see maps on pp. 124 and 125).¹⁵

The results of the elections of 1907 demonstrated that the Christian Socials, the largest party, had the broadest electoral base followed closely by the German People's Party and the Social Democrats. The bulk of the support for Social Democratic candidates came from industrial workers, but the party was also able to win over some of the professional men of the area. They shared this feature of the strength with other European socialists, who also drew part of their following and much of their leadership from among the ranks of doctors and lawyers.

The men elected by Austrian voters to sit in parliament demonstrate the strength of the middle levels of society, and reflect the strongly Roman Catholic nature of the country. The religious affiliations of the deputies also serves to strengthen the impressions of the parties gained by viewing the religious composition of the districts


15. Ibid.


VIENNESE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS WINNING PARTIES, 1907




I	Kaiviertel	XII	Mariahilf I	XXIII	Hietzing
II	Stubenviertel	XIII	Mariahilf II	XXIV	Rudolfsheim
III	Parkviertel	XIV	Neubau I	XXV	Fünfhaus
IV	Rathausviertel	XV	Neubau II	XXVI	Ottokring I
V	Leopoldstadt I	XVI	Josefstadt	XXVII	Ottokring II
VI	Leopoldstadt II	XVII	Alsergrund I	XXVIII	Hernals
VII	Landstrasse I	XVIII	Alsergrund II	XXIX	Währing I
VIII	Landstrasse II	XIX	Favoriten I	XXX	Währing II
IX	Wieden I	XX	Favoriten II	XXXI	Döbling
X	Wieden II	XXI	Simmering	XXXII	Brigittenau
XI	Margareten	XXII	Meidling	XXXIII	Floridsdorf


SOCIAL DEMOCRAT 

PROGRESSIVE 

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL 

SOCIAL POLITICAL 

VIENNESE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS SECOND PLACE PARTIES



I	Kaiviertel	XII	Mariahilf I	XXIII	Hietzing
II	Stubenviertel	XIII	Mariahilf II	XXIV	Rudolfsheim
III	Parkviertel	XIV	Neubau I	XXV	Fünfhaus
IV	Rathausviertel	XV	Neubau II	XXVI	Ottokring I
V	Leopoldstadt I	XVI	Josefstadt	XXVII	Ottokring II
VI	Leopoldstadt II	XVII	Alsergrund I	XXVIII	Hernals
VII	Landstrasse I	XVIII	Alsergrund II	XXIX	Währing I
VIII	Landstrasse II	XIX	Favoriten I	XXX	Währing II
IX	Wieden I	XX	Favoriten II	XXXI	Döbling
X	Wieden II	XXI	Simmering	XXXII	Brigittenau
XI	Margareten	XXII	Meidling	XXXIII	Floridsdorf

SOCIAL DEMOCRAT

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL

PROGRESSIVE

in which they succeeded. The Christian Socials, who ran strongest among Roman Catholics, reflected that fact in their parliamentary delegation. As a glance at Table 5 shows, the other parties seem to have been less sectarian in nature than the Christian Socials.

Table 6 shows the occupational patterns which prevailed among the deputies of the various parties, and demonstrates to some extent the broad nature of the Christian Social Party and the narrower base of some of the others.¹⁶ The prevalence of relatively well paid occupations among the deputies is not surprising, since Austrian parliamentary deputies, like those of most other states at the time, served without pay. It is also worth remembering that delegates to legislatures tend to be leaders in their parties. Leaders are ordinarily men of some education, and men with the leisure time to engage in politics--both of which require more money than was available to the average peasant farmer or industrial worker.

The results of the elections demonstrate that there were several factors influencing the behavior of the voters of the country. These varied in strength, to be sure, and are difficult to measure precisely, but they were clearly present.

16. The biographical data on which these two tables is based has been taken from Freund, Das österreichischen Abgeordnetenhaus; Knauer, Das Parlament Österreichs. The group labeled "private officials" included officers in parties, unions, chambers of commerce, and similar groups.

TABLE 5
RELIGIONS

	Catholic	Jewish	Protestant	Old Catholic	No Religion
Agrarian	20				
Pan-German	1		1	1	
Radical	10		3		
Progressive	12	2	3		
Free Socialist	1				
Social Democratic	33	1	2		14
German People's	29		1	1	
Social Political		1			
Zionist		1			
Christian Social	96				

[illegible]

Social Democrats were most clearly influenced by occupational structures, although even this was mitigated by other factors. The size of the farms and the strength of the old Conservative Party tradition in a given area seems to have been the key to whether the Agrarians or the Christian Socials were most successful. The Christian Socials themselves seem to have depended on religion to a greater extent than the other parties, while the others were more likely to be influenced by the occupations of the residents of a district and the location of that district in a rural or urban setting.

In conclusion, one can point to several features of the Cisleithanian social and economic structure which seem to have played a part in the country's political life. The strength of the religious ties of a group of voters was quite important in their choice among the parties, as was the split between city and countryside. The presence of an intense nationalism among the non-German inhabitants of an area seems to have prompted the Germans to respond in kind, while some non-German groups were induced to cooperate with the German parties because of religious and economic interest held in common.

Nationalism, in the sense in which that word is ordinarily used in connection with the Habsburg monarchy played a relatively small role in these elections. Certainly fact that a voter was German limited the range of options. Limits on behavior imposed by nationality were not

inviolable, and the Germans united with non-Germans in several areas. These lines of cooperation were tenuous and uncertain, but were indications that the framers of the reform had been correct in their assessment of the political situation of Austria.

One observer of the election was led to comment that "national identities was still strong, but a sense of reality has triumphed."¹⁷ Perhaps this view was premature, or overly enthusiastic, but there was some truth in it. An article in Das Vaterland indicates that the possibilities of cooperation between the national groups was recognized as a hopeful sign praised the Catholics of the monarchy for avoiding the trap of nationalism and blocking the socialist drive for power.¹⁸ This Christian internationalism was not seen as a good thing by everyone, of course, and the Neue Freie Presse spoke for many when it lamented the success of the international parties of the "red and the black" in so many parts of the country.¹⁹

The promising internationalism of the elections did not resolve all the difficulties facing the parliament, however. Many of the parties in the new house resorted to obstruction just as they had earlier. By 1909 the situation was desperate and the government attempted to ease the crisis by stream-

17. The Times (London), May 17, 1907, p. 5.

18. Das Vaterland, May 15, 1907, p. 1.

19. Neue Freie Presse, May 15, 1907, Evening Edition, p. 1.

lining the procedure for bringing a bill to a floor vote.²⁰ This measure failed to solve the problem, however, and by 1910 the government had given up trying to find a solution in the parliament. The only way out of the difficulty seemed to be the election of a new house, and the emperor accordingly announced that parliament was dissolved. The new general elections were scheduled for the spring of 1911 and the parties began to gird themselves for a renewed struggle.

20. Stenographische Protokolle, Abgeordnetenhaus,
20th Session, pp. 1,129-1,130.

Chapter VI: The Campaigns of 1911

The parliament elected in 1907 was to have continued in session until the early months of 1913 but met with a number of difficulties which made an early dissolution necessary. These problems were not directly related to the reform in the suffrage laws but were exacerbated by the increase in Social Democratic and nationalist deputies, who used the tactic of parliamentary obstruction to block the passage of any bill they disliked. Among the bills and proposals which were targets of great opposition were questions concerning the nature of the tariff agreements with Hungary, the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the so-called "Moravian Ausgleich." The Social Democrats and many of the nationalist deputies in parliament used filibusters and roll-call votes as well as other means to ensure that none of the government's programs were easily passed. The activities of these deputies were not sufficient to prevent either the occupation of the Balkan province or a recognition by the Austrian government that the common tariff with Hungary was legally two identical tariffs rather than an "imperial" tariff, but the obstructionism did cause many difficulties.

In addition to the obstructionist activities of some members of the parliament the Cisleithanian government was plagued by other problems. There was no single party strong enough to give the government a majority; nor were

there enough like-minded deputies of different parties to allow the kind of coalition that had formed Taafe's "Iron Ring." Further complicating the government's position were accusations against some ministers that they were guilty of corruption. Such accusations prompted public irritation at the ministry, and fueled the fires of opposition in the lower house. These situations blended together, and it soon became apparent that the government was not able to deal with parliament effectively. The only solution seemed to be a new parliament, and the Reichsrat was dissolved early in 1911. The government set the new elections for early summer, the first voting scheduled for Tuesday, June 13, and the run-offs a week later. If it were necessary to hold further ballots, all voting was to be completed by early July.

The parties of Cisleithania wasted little time in opening their campaigns which were in full swing by the end of January. In fact, some of the political groups had never stopped campaigning. This was especially true of the largest party in parliament, the Christian Socials, and of their major opponents, the Social Democrats. Each of these groups desired to consolidate its position and to extend the gains made in 1907. The parties, and the groupings of small parties in electoral coalitions such as the German Democratic Union, already had lists of candidates before the campaigns officially began.¹

1. A complete list of all candidates in the elections can be found in the Neue Freie Presse, June 10, 1911, pp. 4-7

It was apparent from the first that a good deal of the rivalry was going to center on the rising cost of living and on taxes. The cost of living had risen by approximately 20% between 1900 and 1910 while wages in heavy industry and mining rose about 34%.² The apparent improvement masked some serious problems, notably the great variation in wage increases and the problems facing some of the small farmers of Austria, whose products had to compete with cheaper goods from Hungary. Many of the parties, especially those who wanted to take some of the strength away from the big parties, also prepared to exploit the difficulties encountered in operating the parliament smoothly.

The leadership of the "freisinnige" group, for example, announced that the new elections ought to produce a majority for their group since the people of Cisleithania should recognize the nature of the problems facing parliament. Those problems, the parties maintained, arose because a minority of the deputies were attempting to impose their will on the people of Austria and their government. Election of a strong group of "reasonable and practical" men would solve these difficulties by allowing common sense to replace nationalist and class passions as the motive force in the legislature.³

2. Frederick Herz, The Economic Problems of the Danubian States. A Study in Economic Nationalism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1947), pp. 44-45.

3. Die Reichspost, March 31, 1911, carried a report of the organizational meeting of this group on p. 3.

The freisinnige parties, the largest of which was the Progressive Party, were opposed by a coalition calling itself the German National Union. This was composed of the two Pan-German group, the Agrarians, and the German Liberty Party. The parties of the Union were united mainly in their opposition to the Social Democrats, the Christian Socials, and the "Jewish" parties of the freisinnige group. Otherwise, the Union represented virtually every shade of political opinion which existed among the Germans of Cisleithania.⁴

The "freisinnige" group largely ignored the anti-Semitic outbursts of the Union and based their campaigns on an appeal to middle class economic interests. The new parliament would have to deal with questions of taxation, tariff regulation, and industrial regulation, all items vitally concerning the middle classes. The liberal-style parties urged the voters to elect members of their group in order to protect themselves and in order to staff the parliament with a corps of businessmen able to deal with economic questions.⁵

These parties also recognized the growing strength of the Social Democrats and emphasized the danger of such growth in their campaign speeches and literature. They held that the very existence of the monarchy was threatened by the

4. Das Vaterland, April 8, 1911, identified this group and its major components on p. 3.

5. Neue Freie Presse, June 7, 1911, p. 1.

internationalism of the Social Democrats and their propensity to cooperate with the national clubs representing the smaller national groups of Austria.⁶ The real threat to the freisinnige group, however, came from another quarter. The leadership of these parties, however often they assaulted the Social Democrats and the national clubs, realized that their major competition for votes among the urban merchants and professional men came from the Christian Social Party, and they oriented the bulk of their campaign to counter this threat. The journals of the Liberal parties lamented the success of the Christian Socials in 1907 and proclaimed them to be traitors to the middle classes of Austria. The Christian Socials were accused of selling out to the nobility by cooperating too closely with the Catholic Conservatives and of inflaming the passions of the workers of Austria. One of the consistent features of the campaign was a plea to the middle classes to "come to their senses" and reject the Christian Socials.⁷

The German National Union, or at least parts of it, also realized the necessity of addressing itself to the economic and social questions of the day in addition to the national interests of Germans. The Democratic Party adopted a platform calling for social welfare insurance, tax reform, and a reform of the judicial system to protect the rights of poorer defendants.⁸

6. Ibid., June 10, 1911, p. 1.

7. Ibid., June 13, 1911, p. 1.

8. Programm des Deutsch-demokratischen Vereines (Vienna: privately printed, 1911).

This was very similar to parts of the program adopted by the German People's Party early in the campaign.⁹ This group, one of the largest and most widely spread parties in the parliament elected in 1907, was anxious to extend its position in the new legislature. The leaders of the party rejected any formal coalitions but cooperated closely with individual candidates of the German National Union in some parts of Cisleithania. The People's Party was committed to furthering the interests of the small businessmen of Austria and emphasized programs which would benefit that group. As one means of serving this group, the party urged such measures as the establishment of cheap credit for small businesses and a critical review of all tariff arrangements.¹⁰ The people's Party found itself very close to some of the National Union's members on many issues, and just before the elections were held the two groups reached an agreement for the mutual endorsement of each other's candidates in hotly contested districts.¹¹ The intermediary for this arrangement was the Catholic People's Party, which was almost identical to the German People's Party in many ways but which stressed the religious solidarity of its membership. The catholic People's Party had been a member of the National Union from the start, and was able to act as a somewhat tenuous link between the group and the stronger

9. Deutsches Volksblatt (vienna), April 16, 1911, p. 2.

10. Ibid., May 2, 1911, p. 1.

11. Ibid., May 23, 1911, pp. 1-2.

German People's Party.

One of these religious parties was the Catholic Conservative Party, which had not profited as much as it had hoped from the coalition with the Christian Socials in 1907, and which decided to organize its own campaign in the new elections. The efforts of the party were strongest in the provinces and especially among the intensely Catholic peasant farmers of the Alpine region. The first attacks launched by the Conservatives were against the Social Democrats, who were accused of bearing the prime responsibility for the early dissolution of parliament.¹² The Conservatives also expressed grave doubts concerning their erstwhile allies of the Christian Social Party. According to the Conservatives, the Christian Socials were not the modern party they claimed to be in the sense of offering modern solutions to modern problems, but only in the sense that they rejected anything which had been tested over a period of time in favor of poorly conceived schemes of reform. The Christian Socials were accused of artificially introducing divisions in the Tyrol, where none had ever existed, and where there was no basis for division.¹³ The Catholic Conservative Party fielded its own candidates in many of the provinces, and these men were declared to be loyal to the emperor, the Church, and to the freedoms of the loyal subjects of the empire--in sharp

12. Neue Tiroler Stimmen (Innsbruck), April 1, 1911, pp. 2-3.

13. Ibid., April 4 and 5, 1911, pp. 1-2, 1-3.

contrast to the other parties of the day.¹⁴

The provincial campaigns, while they might have offered the best chance of success to the Conservatives, were not the only areas of concern to the party. The leadership of the group issued a statement to the entire population of Cisleithania in which the duty of "true" Catholics was spelled out. Catholics were urged to vote for Conservatives wherever the party was active. If no Conservative candidate was available, the voters were urged to give their support to other Catholic parties, such as the Czech and Slovenian Clerical Parties. The voters were also told that the Christian Socials were at least better than the Social Democrats or the anti-Catholic parties of the Pan-German stripe. In areas where the only available choice lay between the Christian Socials and candidates from the Social Democratic or nationalist camps the voter's duty was to vote Catholic. In areas where none of the approved parties were active loyal Catholics were instructed to turn in a blank ballot as a protest.¹⁵

As the campaign developed the leaders of the Catholic Conservative Party found themselves drawing closer to the Christian Socials than they had intended. They reasoned that, since the Social Democrats seemed to fear a coalition between their opponents, such a coalition was a good idea. The voters were urged to make the Social Democratic accusations of collusion a reality, and the leaders of all non-Social

14. Ibid., April 8, 1911, p. 1. In this case the article referred to Johann Dissertori, Mayor of Kaltern and a candidate for parliament.

15. Das Vaterland, April 9, 1911, pp. 1-2.

Democratic Parties were urged to seek a common ground.¹⁶

The provincial Conservative leaders, however, were much more chary of close associations with the Christian Socials than the party's national spokesmen and continued to field candidates of their own, even against Christian Socials-- a fact which weakened both groups.¹⁷

The activities of the smaller parties had something of a desperate note, since most of them realized they were not competing well against the big parties. The Christian Social Party, which had proved able to win votes among virtually all the groups in German society, hoped to repeat their success in the new elections. They faced bitter attacks from all sides in the campaigns and wasted no time in replying. The German National Union accused the Christian Socials replied by accusing the Nationalists of attempting to divide the German vote by a specious show of interest for the common man. The Christian Socials cited their record in the Landestag of Lower Austria, where they had been the major proponents of efforts to secure cheap credit for small farmers during the crisis of 1909-1910.¹⁸ The Christian Socials also faced another threat in the countryside, this one coming from the Social Democrats, who were trying to extend

16. Ibid., April 13, 1911, p. 1.

17. Neue Tiroler Stimmen, April 13, 1911, pp. 1-2.

18. Reichsratswähler! Leset mich! (Vienna: privately printed, 1911). This pamphlet was one of several distributed in the provinces by Christian Social activists.

their foothold in the rural areas of Austria. The Christian Socials accused their enemies of trying to create an artificial differentiation between peasant farmers (Häuslern) and farmers with slightly larger holdings (Bauern) and to foster class warfare where there wasn't even a class.¹⁹

The Christian Socials found themselves surrounded by enemies: parties representing one of the many segments of Austrian society served by the Christian Socials. One of these groups, the German Liberty Party, was accused by the Christian Socials of attempting to begin an Austrian "Kulturkampf" by repeatedly misusing the adjective "clerical" to describe Christian Social policies. This sort of attack was, according to the Christian Socials, a clever attempt by Jewish Liberals to weaken the representatives of Cisleithania's "real Germans."²⁰ The Christian Socials accused both the Social Democrats and the Progressive Party of attempting to prevent known supporters of the party from registering to vote or falsely challenging their credentials. The party journals ran a series of articles explaining exactly how one went about verifying that he was on the voters' list and how a person could have his name reinstated if it were unjustly removed.²¹ On the day elections were held in

19. Deutsche Zeitung (Budweis), January 21, 1911, pp. 1-2.

20. Ibid., January 28, 1911, p. 1.

21. Ibid., February 4 and 11, 1911, p. 3 in both.

Bohemia to replace a delegate who had died in office the Christian Socials accused the Social Democrats of being the tools of a Zionist conspiracy and appealed to "Property, Religion, and Loyalty to the Fatherland" in an attempt to get the largest number of voters possible to the polls.²²

The plea for Christian unity in the face of a Social Democratic threat was repeated again and again. Not only the Christian Socials but also the National Union accused the Social Democrats of trying to create class hatred where none had ever existed and where none was justified.²³

The Christian Socials, always the main opponents of the socialists, constantly underlined the need for unity among all Germans to counter an internationalist threat. To foster that unity, the Christian Social leadership stressed the nature of the party as a combination of several groups, often in articles written by the heads of the subsidiary organizations.²⁴

Even when some group of individuals sought to make some compromise between socialist theory and German national feelings, they were considered as enemies by the Christian

22. Ibid., March 4, 1911, p. 1.

23. Die Reichspost, April 4, 1911, p. 1.

24. Ibid., April 6, 1911, p. 2. In this case, the article is from the pen of Josef Stöckler, a member of the national leadership of the party and head of the subsidiary Lower Austrian Peasant's Union.

Social leadership. On April 6, 1911, a group of Viennese socialists met to organize the German Socialist Party, claiming that they were prompted to do so by their dislike for the internationalism of the Social Democrats. Although the party was so weak that it could not even field candidates during the election, it was nevertheless the target of Christian Social scorn. The Christian Socials commented that "he who seeks to sit on two chairs often falls through the muddle."²⁵ Unity among all Germans was the rallying cry of the Christian Social candidates throughout Cisleithania, as may be seen in a statement by one of the party's candidates in Bohemia urging the voters to cast their ballots only for those men who could call themselves "Christian, German, and Free."²⁶ The unity so avidly sought by the Christian Socials was threatened, or so it seemed, by a conspiracy to further the interests of "Zionists and Jewish Terrorists" at the expense of loyal Germans of all classes.²⁷

The Christian Social campaign was not simply a series of attempts to discredit the party's enemies, however. The

25. Ibid., April 7, 1911, p. 5.

26. Deutsche Zeitung (Budweis), April 22, 1911, p. 2.

27. Die Reichspost, April 28, 1911, p. 6.

party also made much of its own platform and of the failures by its enemies to achieve anything in practical terms. In the 1907 campaigns, for example, the Social Democrats had promised to lower the price of food. The Christian Socials pointed out, somewhat gleefully, that the price of food had not come down and that Hammerbrod, a bread made in Social Democratic owned bakeries, was neither cheaper nor more nutritious than any other brand.²⁸ The Christian Socials pledged themselves to work for social welfare insurance, for the improvement of public finances, for the reduction of taxes, and for the use of low tariffs to encourage the growth of trade and commerce.

The party also dedicated itself to seeking peace among all the national groups of the monarchy and to ensuring that the empire was protected from external threats.²⁹ The Christian Socials stressed the danger of allowing a "class egoism of the most fearful and regressive type" to triumph over the common interests of Germans of all Social groups.³⁰ The party welcomed any attempt to unite the Catholics of the monarchy but warned of the danger of inadvertently weakening the German position by creating too many parties, splintering

28. Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung, May 6, 1911, pp. 1-2.

29. Kärntner Tagblatt (Klagenfurt), May 9, 1911, p. 1.

30. Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung, May 13, 1911, pp. 1-2.

the German vote, and consequently strengthening the votes of socialists and nationalists.³¹

The Christian Social campaign began to reach a peak in the last days of the campaign with the stress still on the positive achievements of Christian Social deputies and the danger to the Germans of Austria represented by the Social Democratic campaign. The middle classes of Austria were treated to a list of 38 bills presented to the Reichsrat by Christian Social deputies which had either passed or been blocked by Social Democratic efforts.³² The workers were now the primary targets of the Christian Socials' activity and were told that the Social Democrats bore the major responsibility for increased food prices. The citizens of Vienna, addicted to the many coffee-houses of the capital, were told, for example, that the socialists had attempted to institute high tariffs on Brazilian coffee in order to show their sympathy for striking mill employees in Brazil. Such cases were offered as "proof" that the Social Democrats' internationalism blinded them to local needs and interests. The Social Democrats did not truly represent Austrian workers, the Christian Socials claimed, but merely used them to further the aims of the international Zionist-Social Democratic conspiracy.³³

31. Kärntner Tagblatt (Klagenfurt), May 9, 1911, p. 1.

32. Deutsche Zeitung (Budweis), May 20, 1911, p. 4.

33. Kärntner Tagblatt (Klagenfurt), May 24, 1911, p. 2.

The Christian Social Party, on the other hand, was interested in achieving cooperation among all classes of citizens while safeguarding the position of the Germans in the monarchy, achieving economic and social reform, and promoting a healthy tax policy.³⁴ The theme was unity, always unity. Voters throughout the Austrian half of the monarchy heard the Christian Social Party bind itself to a policy of promoting the unity of all classes of citizens, of promoting the interests of the empire abroad, and of ending the nationalist strife through a policy of sensible compromise based on mutual interest. The voters were told that the future of the empire lay in their hands and that they could end the radicalism, the Kulturkampf, and the incipient class warfare which threatened all citizens of the monarchy by casting their ballots for the Christian Social Party.³⁵ The workers were told that the Social Democrats had blocked effective programs of aid to the ill, the aged, and the poor, and that they were the agents of Jewish capitalists whose real aim was to divide and weaken the empire in order to prepare for a revolution.³⁶

The last days of the campaign saw a final series of attacks on the enemies of the party, which summed up the

34. Ibid., May 28, 1911, p. 1.

35. An article typical of this sort appeared in the Deutsche Zeitung (Budweis), June 3, 1911, p. 3.

36. Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung, June 3, 1911, pp. 1-2.

accusations and promises made by Christian Social candidates throughout the campaign. In Carinthia, for example, successive Sundays saw attacks on "Jewish Liberals," "Los-von-Rom" nationalists, and on the Social Democrats who combined the worst of both groups. On the day preceding the general election, there was a last exhortation to the party faithful to go to the polls and ensure the victory of Christian Social candidates and principles.³⁷

The orientation of the Christian Social campaign made it clear that they considered their worst enemies to be the Social Democrats. This group also began its campaign before the parliament was dissolved and the new elections called. Faced with a split in the party over the question of power of the central parliaments vis-à-vis the legislatures of the national areas, the party attempted to clarify its position on major issues as early as 1909. The party leadership, in a meeting reported in the Neue Freie Presse, insisted that the power of Vienna must remain intact in order to protect the empire as a whole from external threats.³⁸ All sections of the party agreed with this statement in principle, but centralized power raised the specter of German domination in the minds of non-German socialists. The party leaders sought to allay such fears by stressing the need for legislation designed to satisfy the demands of the nationalities in regards to the official language of the monarchy.³⁹ This

37. Kärntner Tagblatt (Klagenfurt), June 9, 1911, p. 1.

38. Neue Freie Presse, October 2, 1909, p. 1.

39. Arbeiter Zeitung, October 13, 1909, p. 3.

was helpful, but it did not solve all the problems facing the party, and some of the national groups began to meet separately. In every case, however, these national groups of socialists recognized the need for continued coordination on major questions, and the party continued to sit as a single group in the parliament.

The German wing of the party met at Vienna in 1909 and adopted a program that was in many ways typical of the programs adopted by all elements of the party. The major provisions of the program were the same as those adopted at Brünn in 1889, with some additions. The party pledged itself to work for the cultural development of all people in the monarchy and the strengthening of a spirit of solidarity among the workers of all nationalities. The party also stressed its desire to replace the crownlands with autonomous national areas, to guarantee minority rights everywhere, and to give the autonomous areas self-government on the basis of universal suffrage.⁴⁰

Using this program as the basis for their campaigns, the party entered the struggle in 1911 prepared to stress their positive programs and to answer any charge that they had failed to work for the interests of the Austrian worker. In response to a charge made by Prince Alois von Liechtenstein,

40. Quoted in Strong, "Nationalism and Socialism," p. 5.

leader of the Christian Social Party since Lueger's death in 1910, the Social Democrats agreed that they had indeed favored the introduction of increased direct taxes as the basis for imperial finances. The reason for this was that indirect taxes fell heaviest on the workers, on those least able to bear the burden. The Social Democrats cited the proposed budget of 1911 in which indirect taxes were slated to produce almost four times as much revenue as direct taxes--a situation intolerable to the workers and dangerous for the state.⁴¹

The Social Democrats feared that they were being maneuvered out of the race by illegal means, they specifically accused the Christian Socials of falsifying the voting lists to exclude workers who were suspected of Social Democratic sympathies. They singled out Rudolf Pawelka of Vienna for special condemnation, claiming that he had been responsible for excluding thousands of workers from the lists.⁴² The Social Democrats contended that such tactics revealed the true nature of the Christian Socials. They were, according to the socialists, tools of the industrialists who

41. Arbeiter Zeitung, April 26, 1911, pp. 1-2.

42. Ibid., May 3, 1911, p. 1.

hoped to maintain their control over the country and deny the people any say in their government.⁴³

In addition to illegal rigging of electoral lists, the Christian Socials were accused of equivocation in their platform. The specific attacks began with an indictment of the Christian Social stand on tax reform. The Christian Socials had pledged themselves in somewhat vague terms to tax reform, the socialists claimed, while actually working to implement crippling indirect taxes.⁴⁴ The Christian Socials were also accused of having blocked money for a low cost housing project in order to free the funds for use in building battleships--a clear indication of the party's basic militarism.⁴⁵

Recognizing that they had little chance of winning elections in areas where there were few workers, the Social Democrats sought alliances with other parties. As was the normal procedure, these were not formal alliances but agreements not to oppose one another and to endorse each others candidates.⁴⁶ Such agreements were reached between the Social Democrats and several of the parties of the "freisinnige" group in order to counter what the

43. Ibid., May 6, 1911, p. 1.

44. Ibid., May 9, 1911, p. 1.

45. Ibid., May 11, 1911, p. 1.

46. Ibid., May 13, 1911, pp. 1-3

Social Democrats believed was collusion between the Christian Socials , the German National Union, and the nobility. This was the same combination, according to socialist theory, that had kept the price of food artificially high. The exploitive nature of all these groups meant that the small farmers would be deprived of a fair return on his goods at the same time that the worker paid more for food with the difference going into the pockets of the capitalists. The result was antagonism between farmer and worker, the further enrichment of the noble-bourgeoisie conspiracy, and the continued rule of the country by the exploiting classes.⁴⁷

The Social Democratic campaign began to draw to a close on June 9, when the leaders of the party published an analysis of the mistakes made by the party in 1907. The complacency which had hurt the party in the earlier election was especially to be avoided. The party faithful were exhorted to go to the poll and block the election of a corrupt Christian Social majority in parliament. The party journals carried lists of the polling places and of the party's candidates, as well as lists of the approved candidates of other parties.⁴⁸ The final call to the party members advised them to arrive at the polls early in order to ensure that their names had not been deleted from the lists,

47. Ibid., May 23, 1911, pp. 1-2.

48. Ibid., June 9, 1911, pp. 4-5.

along with a set of detailed instructions on the steps to be taken if a voter's name had been deleted.⁴⁹ On the day before the election the lists of candidates were reprinted and an offer of free transportation for any voter unable to reach the poll on his own was made.⁵⁰

The first round of voting ended with many races undecided. The voters had split so evenly among the stronger parties that run-offs were necessary in many areas. All the parties involved saw these races as a last opportunity to secure their place in parliament and to spoil their opponent's positions. The Christian Socials had recognized the probability of run-offs long before the elections and stressed the necessity of voting in both elections. They accused the Social Democrats of Zionism once more, and added a charge that the socialists had succeeded in "robotizing" its membership so that they would return en masse for the run-offs and vote out of blind loyalty to the "socialist Zionists."⁵¹ The Carinthian journal of the Christian Socials published a "Last Word" to the voters on the day preceding the run-offs in that province in which the

49. Ibid., June 11, 1911, pp. 4-5.

50. Ibid., June 12, 1911, pp. 1-2.

51. Christlichsoziale Arbeiterzeitung, June 10, 1911, pp. 1-2.

electorate was beseeched to give its votes to the two Christian Social candidates who were involved in run-off elections, and to support the Conservative and National candidates where there was no Christian Social running.⁵²

The Social Democrats were also involved in the run-offs and the party pulled out all the stops in its last burst of effort. A series of articles in the party's Viennese daily attempted to rally support for the party's candidates in a campaign which reached its peak on the day before the voting was to take place. The candidates of the party and the approved members of other parties were once more commended to the electorate.⁵³ The candidates approved by the Social Democratic Party were once more members of the "freisinnige" group, with the exception of Julius Ofner of the Social Political Party.⁵⁴

The campaigns of 1911 were similar to those of 1907 in many respects, particularly in the nature of the attacks which the parties made on each other. The Christian Socials were attacked by more groups than any other party, although the Social Democrats were not far behind them. As had been the case in the earlier election, the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats were never very far apart in their concrete proposals. As a result, they were reduced to the most scurrilous kinds of rhetoric in their attacks on one

52. Kärntner Tagblatt, June 20, 1911, p. 1.

53. Arbeiter Zeitung, June 19, 1911, pp. 1-2.

54. Ibid., June 20, 1911, pp. 1-2.

another. Each accused the other of being the tool of a hidden conspiracy and each believed the other opposed to the principals of democracy.

The voters were bombarded with dire warnings and glowing pictures of the future from all sides. The campaigns maintained a strident and peevish note that would be difficult to match in its bitterness. The wait for the final judgement of the electorate was a long and tiring one, stretching out to July 3 in some districts. When the final tabulation of votes was completed, the strongest parties of the outgoing parliament found that the voters had justified their discomfort. The electorate had not ignored the difficulties which had faced the lower house, and they had demonstrated their opinion of who was at fault with their votes.

Chapter VII: The Electoral Returns of 1911

The political parties of Cisleithania took their programs to the people during the early summer of 1911 hoping to extend their holds on the electorate and on parliamentary seats. The few changes made in the appeals of the parties from those offered in 1907 reflected changes both in parliamentary development and in the parties themselves. The voters were well aware of the difficulties which had plagued the lower house, and each of the parties accused the others of bearing the major responsibility for those problems. There were a number of changes in parliamentary representation which were probably directly attributable to voter dissatisfaction with the performance of the parties, but there were even more changes which must be explained some other way.

The parties had altered their programs in some cases because of their lack of success in the former elections. This was true of the Progressives and of the other parties representing the Liberal point of view, for example. These parties had moderated much of their program and had added planks to their platform designed to attract the support of the workers and farmers of the area. Some of the parties, such as the Social Democrats, had undergone changes in their structure which threatened their position. The Social Democrats, of course, were now in the process of

attempting to heal the breaches in the party which had resulted from the doctrinal split of the preceding few years.¹ The Christian Socials, archenemies of the Social Democrats, also faced some internal divisions. These were caused largely by the death of Lueger whose personal ability and magnetism had provided much of the strength of the party.

As was pointed out earlier, the Christian Social Party was actually a federation of several groups, each representing a different segment of the electorate. There were fundamental differences between these groups, and some of them were highly dissatisfied with the performance of the party in Parliament. This was especially true of the Christian Social Worker's Party led by Leopold Kunschalk. This wing of the party had provided much of the program by means of which the party had sought to appeal to industrial labor. The Party had failed to carry out some of the promises made to the group in 1907, however, and while the leaders of the group remained loyal to the party much of the rank and file membership began to fall away.

The fundamental problem facing the party, though, was the loss of its guiding spirit. Lueger had been replaced at the head of the party by Prince Liechtenstein, the "Red Prince of Vienna." A deeply committed man by all reports, Liechtenstein was never the equal of Lueger at mobilizing the masses through public speeches and rallies, and was

1. Strong, "Nationalism and Socialism" explains this doctrinal split and its consequences at some length

simply not trusted by many of the common people who had followed Lueger eagerly.

The other parties retained the orientations they had adopted in 1907, with only minor alterations. The Agrarian Party had joined the National Union, but otherwise held to exactly the same line it had established earlier. Most of the minor parties remained essentially unchanged from 1907--a predictable stance since most of them were organized around some central figure or idea.

The results of the elections of 1911 were in many ways quite similar to those of 1907. The Christian Socials remained the largest party, followed by the Social Democrats and the German People's Party. Both the Christian Socials and Social Democrats lost considerable numbers of seats, however, while several other parties gained and some new groups appeared in the lower house for the first time. Most of the gains were small, the German People's Party gaining two seats and the Pan-German's one, for example. The moderate parties of the center increased their strength most noticeably, followed closely by the Radicals who had moderated their appeal to German nationalism. Table 7 shows the relative strengths of the parties in the parliament as well as in the provinces.² A comparison of these figures

2. The table is developed from figures reported in Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1911, pp. vii-ix; and Freund, Das Österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus 1911-1917, pp. 18-19. The Ergebnisse did not differentiate between the "freisinnige" parties as does Freund.

1911
TABLE 7Party
Strength
by
Province

Lower Aus.	Upper Aus.	Salzburg	Styria	Carinthia	Carniola	Tyrol	Vorarl.	Bohemia	Moravia	Silesia	Bukovina	TOTAL	
25	18	4	12			12	3	1			1		Christian Social
			1		1			15	5	2	1		Agrarian
			1					3					Pan-German
								16	4	1			Radical
6								4	6	2			Progress.
1													German Democrat
2													German Liberty
2								1					German National
1													German Social
1													Social Political
	3	3	5	8	3		1	3	4	2			German People's
26	1		4	1	1			9		1			Social Democrat
								2		1			German Worker's
								1					Free Socialist
											1		Zionist

with the corresponding figures for the elections of 1907 will show clearly the changes in parliamentary representation.

As had been the case in 1907, the Christian Social, German People's, and Social Democratic Parties were the most widely distributed parties. Lower Austrian provided the base for the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats, as it had in 1907, while the German People's Party had a somewhat more even distribution among the provinces of Cisleithania. The other parties represented in the lower house of parliament were less well distributed, tending to find support in certain limited areas.

The districts from which the German deputies were returned to parliament were essentially the same as they had been in 1907. The only modifications which had taken place were minor boundary changes required to reflect demographic changes. These districts still reflected the national groups of the area accurately, with well over 95% of the populace living in districts where their nationality was in the majority or where provision had been made for minority representation. The districts were also representative of the urban-rural split in the population as had been the intent of the men who had drawn up the districts. The 232 districts from which German deputies

were returned were divided between rural and urban areas of the provinces as follows:³

TABLE 8

PROVINCE	URBAN	RURAL
Lower Austria	43	21
Upper Austria	6	16
Salzburg	3	4
Styria	11	12
Carinthia	1	9
Carniola	0	1
Tyrol	5	11
Vorarlberg	1	3
Bohemia	27	28
Moravia	10	9
Silesia	5	4
Bukovina	3	0
TOTALS	115	117

A glance at this list of districts as compared to the table of relative strengths of the parties reveals that the Social Democrats ran best in provinces with a relatively large number of urban districts. This trend is clearly revealed, along with several others, when one examines the results of the elections in terms of the kinds of districts dominated by each party (Table 9).

The most striking change on this list as compared to the same figures for the election of 1907 is in the representation of the Christian Social Party. The electoral base of the party had apparently narrowed somewhat between the two elections, with the party becoming more and more

3. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, Law No. 17, pp. 88-112. Confirmation that these districts had not changed was gained by an examination of Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus and Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1911, which included a map of the districts.

TABLE 9

Party Strength, 1911: Rural-Urban Split ⁴

PARTY	URBAN	RURAL
Christian Social	10	66
Agrarian	1	24
Pan-German	2	2
Radical	14	7
Progressive	18	0
German Liberty	2	2
German Democrat	1	0
German Social	1	0
German National	3	0
Social Political	1	0
German People's	24	8
Social Democrat	36	7
German Worker's	1	2
Free Socialist	0	1
Zionist	1	0
TOTALS	115	117

4. Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1911; and Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus 1911-1917 both

give the results in each district, all of which are designated as either rural or urban.

a rural party representing the interests of the small farmers of Cisleithania. This shrinking of the party's electoral base may be explained in several ways. In the first place, the party was identified with many of the difficulties of the parliament of 1907 and with many of the bills aimed at serving the interests of the farmers.. The party had tried to counter this factor by publicizing a list of the bills sponsored by its parliamentary delegation which were intended to help the small merchant and shopkeeper.⁵ This may have had some success, but was bound to be counter-productive among the urban workers. The Social Democrats seized upon the weakened condition of the Christian Socials in their own intensified efforts and won some of the Catholic workers away from the Christian Socials. This helped to alleviate some of the weakness which the Social Democrats experienced because of the schisms in the party. Probably the major factor in the Christian Social deterioration in the cities was the death of Lueger. No matter how sincere he was, Liechtenstein, as a member of one of the powerful noble families of the empire, could not match the hold on the common man which had been one of the key factors in the success of the former mayor of Vienna.

5. Deutsche Zeitung (Budweis), May 20, 1911, p. 4.

The end result of these changes in the situation of the Christian Social Party was a marked decline in its support in the cities, especially in Vienna. The capital city had been a Christian Social stronghold in 1907, when they had managed to win a fair number of the outer belt of districts, most of which were inhabited by workers. Figure 5 shows the results of the elections of 1911 in Vienna and demonstrates the loss of that outer belt of districts to the Social Democrats.⁶ The party managed to retain its control over only four Viennese districts, most of them in the central part of the city which was the home of the prosperous merchants and professional men of the capital. The other parties, for the most part, had less trouble retaining their power bases than did the Christian Socials.

The Social Democrats were always urban based and they continued to be centered in the cities in 1911. The German People's Party also retained its essentially urban base but also extended its foothold in the countryside. The other parties maintained the same basic orientation they had established in 1907. The Agrarians were still a rural party, although they maintained control of the single urban district which they had won in 1907, a seat which

6. The map is taken from the results of the election as reported in Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1911, and Freund, Das Österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus 1911-1917.

represented a district in Czernowitz that was inhabited by industrialists, estate owners, and other magnates.

The parties of the "freisinnige" group, led by the German Progressive Party, were solidly urban as they had been in 1907. Their growth came mainly in Vienna and at the expense of the Christian Social Party.

The geographic distribution of the parties suggests a development which can be tested by other criteria. The political system of Austria seems to have been developing into a relatively stable multi-party system in which there were several operative cleavages. One of these, clearly, was the urban-rural split. The smaller parties were usually representative of groups within one of those setting but not in both. Some groups were developing as modern mass parties and reflected the city-countryside division less clearly. The Christian Socials had most of their strength in the countryside, but was still able to win some seats in the cities of Cisleithania. The Social Democrats were an urban party which was able to gain some support in rural areas with populations including large numbers of laborers in mines and in other enterprises. The German People's Party, less easily characterized than the other two major parties, seems to have been developing as a middle choice between the other two. Essentially urban, the German People's Party was able to gain some

headway in rural areas, and even managed to increase its influence in the countryside slightly between 1907 and 1911.⁷ The problem facing the observer of these elections, then, is isolate and identify the other factors in Austrian life which had some influence on a voter's choice among the competing political groups. These factors should allow some general comments about the operative social cleavages in Cisleithanian society. The first such division to be considered is religion.

The religious feelings of an individual can affect his behavior in an enormous variety of ways. In order to determine the relative strength of religion as a factor in these elections, each district has been examined for the religious composition of its population. The districts were then grouped according to religious composition and examined for any patterns which might have existed in the success of various parties among different kinds of voters.⁸ As a result of that examination it can be seen that religion did indeed play a role in the elections, although its influence varies from place to place.

7. The ordinarily reliable Freund indicates that the rural district won by Otto Steinwender was Agrarian. Steinwender was, of course, one of the founders and prime figures in the German People's Party.

8. The religious composition was determined by reference to the census of 1910. See Österreichische Statistik, Vol. I, Pts. 2-3, New Ser. (Vienna: K. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1912).. See Appendix A for the full data on the districts.

The most obvious example of a religious influence on the choice of the voters was in the case of the Zionist victory in Czernowitz. An area with a large and wealthy Jewish population, this was also an area where a sense of Jewish self identity had taken root early. That sense of unity was not present among most of the rest of the Jewish population of Cisleithania, and the Jewish Nationalist Party could make no real headway outside its Bukovinan stronghold. If the presence of a sense of religious unity was the key to the Zionist success, they were not alone in depending on that factor.

The Christian Socials won 10 urban and 66 rural races and were the largest of the German parties. These districts were scattered across a wide area and were inhabited by a wide variety of people. The single striking similarity which united all of the Christian Social districts was their strongly Roman Catholic religious structure. The entire monarchy was Roman Catholic, of course, but it was an area with several religious minorities. Moreover, these minorities were protected by law, and more importantly, accepted by the people. A very small variance in religious composition by the standards of other countries of the time seems to have been sufficient to alter the impact of

religion on the voters. In all of the Christian Social districts there was no variation. The districts were Roman Catholic to a man, with religious minorities so small that, if they existed at all, they failed to register in the imperial census.

The religious influence on the other parties is somewhat less clear, with one or two minor exceptions. The Social Democrats ran well in districts of almost every available religious mix. These varied from districts which were almost 100% Roman Catholic to districts which had religious minorities that were very large, at least by Austrian standards. The same thing was true of German People's Party districts. As a rule Christians outnumbered Jews by very large numbers in the People's Party districts, as they did in Pan-German and Radical districts. The presence of Protestants and Old Catholics seems to have been important to the latter two groups, who used the remnants of the old "Los-von-Rom" sentiment in their campaigns.

Religious variety seems to have been important to the parties of the "freisinnige" group, all of which ran well in areas with mixed populations. In no case did one of these parties secure a parliamentary seat from a district which was entirely Roman Catholic in nature. Furthermore, large Jewish communities were quite common to these districts, especially in areas where the Progressives and the Social

Political Party ran well.

The Agrarians may have been the only sizeable party in which religion played no role at all. All of the others seem to have been affected at least minimally by religious strength among the voters. This includes the Social Democrats who lost several working class districts with strong Roman Catholic populations to such parties as the German Worker's Party and the Free Socialists, as well as their traditional enemies the Christian Socials. The Agrarians, on the other hand, won seats in districts of every imaginable religious mix, and made absolutely no mention of religion in their campaigns. This fact leads one to a consideration of some of the other factors in addition to religion which may have played a part in the elections.

The simple fact of a districts location in one or another of the provinces may well have had some effect. As was noted in the election of 1907, the farmers of the area split their loyalty between the Agrarians and the Christian Socials, with some visible geographic patterns prevailing. The Christian Socials did very well in Alpine Austria while the Agrarians ran strongest in Bohemia and Moravia. This may be due in part to the nature of agricultural in the regions, but also quite likely reflected the different historical

development of the areas. Geography also apparantly played a role in the success of the Pan-German and Radical Parties. Both of these parties tended to do much better on the edges of the monarchy than in the center. It is difficult to account for this particular distribution, except to note that on the northern and western edges of the monarchy, German influence was more easily manifested than in the interior. The geographic distribution of the other parties seems to have been quite closely related to the economic structure of the area.

Virtually the same procedures for analyzing the economic structure of Austria have been used in connection with these elections as was used in dealing with the election of 1907. The categories established for the purpose of this pattern constitute a row-column chart which may be seen in Appendix A, and allow some cross analysis between the various sectors of the economy and the occupational patterns prevailing among them. When such comparisons are made, striking similarities among the districts electing representatives of the same party are visible.

The Christian Social Party was still one of the most broadly based of the parties. Although its strength among urban workers had slipped, the party was still able to gain considerable support among that group. These workers tended to be employed in small industrial establishments and in shops of various kinds. These workers were joined in

supporting the Christian Socials by many of the owners of the shops and small industries in which they worked. The tradesmen and professional men of many of the rural communes also supported the Christian Social Party, but the backbone of Christian Social support was to be found among the small independent farmers and vintners of Austria.

The relatively broad base of the Christian Socials was a feature shared to some extent by the German People's Party. This group was representative of at least two groups, one much more strongly present than the other. The small industrialists of the empire were the mainstay of this party, which was centered in the smaller towns of Cisleithania where such manufacturing shops were centered. The party depended on these men for the bulk of their support, and received it because these industrialists were no less conscious of their group interests than their richer partners in Austrian industry. The German People's Party was also successful among another group, however. The party was an outgrowth of the left wing of the Liberal Party, and added some planks to its platforms which were quite progressive by the standards of the day. These included provisions for tax reform and for easing the

credit availability in the countryside. This attracted to the party's standard some of the salaried employes in the small shops of the area, as well as some of the more prosperous farmers of Carinthia and other parts of Cisleithania.. The German People's Party was, in fact, the real representative of lower reaches of the middle range of Austrian society--far more so than the Christian Social Party which was becoming ever more clearly a rural party based among poor farmers and small shopkeepers.

The owners of the larger industrial establishments of Cisleithania rejected the German People's Party in favor of a group more responsive to their particular needs. They found such a group in the parties of the "freisinnige" group, and especially in the German Progressive Party. This party had originated among the representatives of the industrial chambers in the old curial parliament, and continued to command the loyalty of such men under the new arrangements. The more prosperous wholesale merchants of Austria also tended to look with favor on this group. The Progressives drew their share of support from this group, which also provided the mainstay for the German Democratic, German Social, and German Liberty parties. Professional men, and especially public servants, also

found a home in this group, and provided the bulk of the support for such groups as the Social Political Party and the Social and Economic Party.

Farther down on the scale of occupations lay the support for the three "socialist" groups. The largest, and by far the most socialist, of these was the Social Democratic Party. This was a fairly typical parliamentary socialist party, and drew its support almost exclusively from among industrial workers. These men were, for the most part, employees in the larger industries, in transportation, and in mining enterprises.

The other two parties which styled themselves socialist were much smaller than the Social Democrats. The German Worker's Party held three seats in Bohemia and Silesia, while the Free Socialists commanded one Bohemian mandate. Both of the parties represented workers in small industrial shops. The real difference between them and the Social Democrats lay in the question of their "socialism." Both groups represented districts which were solidly German in character, and both stressed the dangers to German workers in cooperating with Slavic groups which competed with them for jobs. They were, in this insistence on national unity, similar to the Czech National

Socialists, who emphasized the competition between workers of different nationalities rather than cooperation among national groups.

Several of the parties which were primarily German in outlook depended on non-German votes for at least a part of their success. The Social Democrats, of course, made internationalism based on economic interest one of their most basic tenets, but were not the only group to seek such cooperation. The Christian Socials sought a unity among Christians of all national groups, and among the farmers, merchants, and tradesmen of several national groups. It was earlier that they enjoyed at least some success among non-German clerical parties in 1907, and they leaned on these same groups in 1911. The Christian Socials also won elections in some districts where the clerical parties were not active, but where there were large numbers of non-German farmers. The Agrarians also appealed to non-Germans, stressing the unity in outlook of members of what is often called the landed gentry. These were men with a long tradition of dynastic loyalty, and of a sense of identity with other members of the same economic and social group as themselves without regard to nationality. They had provided a good many of the loyal bureaucrats of the monarchy, and continued to do so while giving the Agrarian

Party its electoral base.

The impressions of the parties gained by examining the religious, economic, and occupational make up of the districts in which they succeeded may be strengthened by a brief examination of the deputies returned by the parties. Tables 10 and 11 show the religious and economic structure of the delegations of the various parties to the Reichsrat after the election of 1911.

It can be seen from these tables that the Christian Socials and the German People's Parties had the greatest diversity in their deputations, just as they had among their electorates. The religious composition of the delegations reveals that the Christian Social Party was increasingly a sectarian party, while the others were less so. The middle class occupations of the deputies were common to all parliaments of the period and may be explained in part by the fact that these men served in the parliament without pay. There is also the fact that only men of some wealth have the education and leisure time necessary to indulge in politics when no reimbursement is legally available.

This analysis has revealed that the Germans were divided along several lines of cleavage, some of which cut across others and some of which were mutually reinforcing.

TABLE 8
RELIGIONS

	Catholic	Jew	Protestant	Old Catholic	No Religion
Agrarian	26				
Pan-German			3	1	
Radical	14		6	1	
Progressive	8	1	8	1	
Democrat	1				
National	2			1	
Social- Economic			1		
Free Socialist	1				
German Worker's	2		1		
Christian Social	76				
German People's	26		6		
Social Democrat	24		4		15
Social Political		1			
Zionist		1			

1911
TABLE 9

Occupation of Deputies	Christian Social	Agrarian	Pan-German	Radical	Progress.	Democrat	Liberty	Social Political	Social Democrat	Free Socialist	German Worker's	German People's	Zionist
Large Farmer	8	20		1								1	
Small Farmer	10			3									
Industry	1	2		2	3							1	
Large Commerce	6				3							3	
Small Commerce	18			2					1			2	
Journalist	2		1	2	1				16		1	5	
Law	4			2	3		1	1	1	1		4	1
Medicine	2		1	3					3			1	
State Official	2	1		1	1	1					1	2	
Province Official					1							2	
City Official	2				1						1	1	
Private Official	2				1				19			2	
University	2	1		1	3				1			3	
Middle School	1			1			1						
Lower School	1			2					1				
Clerics	10												
Engineer Architect				1								1	
Worker									1			1	
Rentier	4			1								2	
Private Means	1			1	1								

These cleavages were the result of the historical and economic development of the country and formed the basis of political allegiances among the population. In order to explain the political life of the monarchy, it is necessary to address these cleavages and their operation directly.

Chapter VIII: Conclusions

The major thrust of this paper has been to demonstrate the existence of several of the major divisions that influenced the political life of the Habsburg monarchy in its last years. The basic divisions which seem to have played the most important roles are religious loyalty, the split between the cities and the countryside, and the occupational cleavages within the economic structure of the society. Within the final division there were several subdivisions, but there seems to have been one basic split which was more important than the others; the one between men who were either self-employed or who worked for salaries and those who who worked for a wage depedent upon hours, amount of work, or some other system.

These splits, which played a large role in the political life of Cisleithania, are all examples of the phenomena known as social cleavages. Quite simply, a social cleavage is a division within a society which separates some members of the group from others. These differences may be simply descriptive of certain conditions which exist and are beyond the control of the individual (such as the question of "race"), or they be related to some aspect of the individuals functional life. It is common when discussing these phenomena to draw a distinction between

what are known as "vertical" cleavages and "horizontal" ones. Vertical cleavages are those which separate parts of a population, and include in each of the groups thus created sub-sets of people who are remarkably different from one another. In fact, the only thing in common among the group is frequently the single uniting element which constitutes the cleavage. Perhaps the easiest vertical cleavage to perceive is religion. Within each confession there will be a great variety of people, some of them having nothing in common except the commonly felt religious bond. Across the gulf of confessions, on the other hand, there will be other people who are similar in every respect except for religion.

Horizontal cleavages are slightly different in nature. They also unite a group of people on the basis of some common feature and set them off from other people with whom they do not share that feature of their life. Within the groups thus created, however, there will tend to be less variety than in the groups created by religious cleavages. The classic example of a horizontal cleavage is economic in origin. The economic division may be drawn at several points in a society, of course, and creates a slightly different effect at each point. A clear hypothetical example, which

happens to coincide fairly closely with the actual experience of the Cisleithanian Germans, would be a cleavage between self-employed persons and wage earners. Again there would be a variety in the stations in life enjoyed by the members of the groups thus formed, but in terms of the sense of identity of such groups there is in fact considerably less variety than is found in groups created by vertical cleavages such as religion.


The explanation offered thus far is, to be sure, a very simple one. Any description of a group based on simple lines is bound to be inadequate in some ways. It cannot, for example, take into account the differences that exist between the owner of a plant employing 1,000 people and the proprietor of a shop with only one employee. Yet both owners are self-employed and therefore fit into the same category. The essential point is that such divisions do affect the lives of the groups which they separate. There does, in fact, seem to be more similarity between the activities of the two owners than between the activities of either of them and any of the men they employ.

All of this is something of an over simplification, of course. In order to understand the way in which such factors can affect the lives of members of a society, it must be remembered that in no sophisticated society is there only one line of cleavage. There are usually a great many lines representing factors separating some of the group from others. In practice these lines of cleavage cut across one another at several points and reinforce one another at other points.

The simplest kind of system for a society is one prevailing in an area with a fairly homogeneous populace. In political terms, such a society is likely to have two major political groups, and the members of each will be separated by a single line of division. If there are weaker lines of cleavage cutting across the major one, they are likely to separate levels within the two major parties (leaders and rank and file, say). Weaker lines of cleavage reinforcing the major division are likely to produce "wings" of the two major political groups. One example of a group formed by such a cleavage would be the classic Liberal Party of nineteenth century Europe. Consisting of men among whom there are considerable variations, but a fundamental similarity of outlook, the Liberal Parties were quite likely to have "left", "center", and "right" wings. At some point in the development of the society in


which the party developed, these wings would be likely to separate from the parent body and form new political groups. The situation of a homogeneous society with a single major cleavage and several weaker ones can be presented graphically, and might aid in understanding the manner in which such divisions function. In the figure below, line A represents the major societal division, and lines B and C the minor ones. In this hypothetical example two political parties are formed on either side of the major disjunction, and sections of each at the minor divisions.

Figure A




Aslightly more complicated situation would exist in a society with a different type of cleavage. This type of social grouping is often called "sectional", and can be represented in several ways. In the first type, shown in the figure below, there is still only one major division along with several minor ones. The political system created in such a case would be a potentially unstable one, with several wings of each party and the liklihood of splinter groups appearing. All of these parties and splinter groups would represent only a very small part of the society as a whole. Such a system might be presented as below, with line A representing the major division, and lines B, C, and D the minor ones.

Figure B



Another variety of sectional society would exist in a case where there were two major cleavages which cut across one another. Such division might be economic and a rural-urban split and might be represented by the figure below. The political system of such a society would be likely to be a multi-party one with a good deal of cooperation between parties across the lines of division. In this example, parties 1, 2, and 3 exist in the quadrants indicated and are able to unite people and cooperate with one another across lines of cleavage as indicated by the broken lines.

Figure C



These are all hypothetical examples, of course, and probably do not correspond to the actual situation in any society. As a rule, the lines of division within a real society are much more complicated than any shown, and the parties cut across them in much more complicated ways than are shown here. The case of the Germans of Cisleithania was a very real one, and thus far more complex than any of the examples shown thus far.

The results of this examination of political choice among the Germans of Austria shows that there were several identifiable lines of social cleavage at work, and that the strength of these divisions varied. There was considerable movement across the lines of cleavage, and the parties were all able to unite voters and reach agreements with other parties across at least one of them. Three major lines of social division can be clearly seen, the first of which was religion.

It has been shown that religion was a factor in the success of all the parties in one way or another, and that some of them leaned on it very heavily indeed. The parties which did not depend on religious loyalty as one of their major selling points were also affected by it, but were usually able to cross this particular societal division to attract voters of various confessions. The second important split identified in the course of this

study is the rural-urban split which affected Cisleithanian life just as it did that of other countries.

The division between countryside and city played a major role in the success of several of the parties and a lesser role in that of other groups. The Agrarians and the various parties of the "freisinnige" group were probably the most strongly affected of all the groups. There were also several parties which were able to unite voters across this division.

The final division in Cisleithanian society with which we have dealt here was economic. The occupations of the voter seems to have played a major role in his choice among the available candidates, although there were again several which were able to bridge the gap. The Christian Socials and, to a lesser extent, the German People's Party were the most likely to be able to disregard this split among the German voters.


In an attempt to facilitate understanding of the relationships between these cleavages and political choice making of the German voters of Austria, it is useful to attempt a graphic presentation of them (figure 5). As in the hypothetical examples shown in the other diagrams, this one is somewhat simplified. There were almost surely other social cleavages in existence to modify the behavior of the voters, although the data is at present insufficient

to identify them clearly. There were also considerable differences among the members of the groups created by these lines of social division. It will, for example, be noted that the Progressive Party and the German People's Party were both based on the same side of the occupational split and the city-countryside division, although it was pointed out that the Progressives tended to attract the more affluent industrialists, while the smaller owners of industrial establishments were attracted to the German People's Party.

In this schematic rendering of the German population of Cisleithania and of their political associations the three major divisions are represented by the solid lines. Line A represents the religious division between Roman Catholics and non-Catholics. This cleavage cuts across the other two, as shown in the diagram. Line B represents rural-urban split which also cut across the other two. The third major line of cleavage, which was occupational, is represented by line C.

The political parties of Cisleithania, represented here by arabic numbers, tended to find their major support among some special group, indicated by the position of the number. They were usually able to appeal to at least one other group of voters, and that appeal is represented here by the arrows.

FIGURE 5




PARTIES

- 1. Christian Social
- 2. German People's
- 3. Agrarians
- 4. Progressive

- 5. Pan-German
- 6. Radical
- 7. Social Democrats
- 8. Free Socialists and German Worker's

This schematic pattern of political relationships to the major social cleavages among the Germans of Cis-leithania may not be entirely satisfactory. It does, however, reveal one essential fact about their political life. That life was highly involved, and there was a good deal of variety and movement in this group, just as there is in most social groups. The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate the influence of some of these factors on the political life of the area. These are all schisms which might be seen in all the national groups of the monarchy, and an examination of the political allegiances among those other groups might well be instructive. None of this has been intended to deny that national identity was an important factor. Indeed nationality functioned as one of the many social cleavages which affected Austrian political allegiances. If one were to attempt a diagram of such lines of cleavage including nationality, it might appear as the one below, with lines D and E representing the limits of German population.

Figure D



The problem with some studies of the Habsburg monarchy is not that they deal with nationalism. The tensions among the national groups of the monarchy were the most important factors in the politics of the empire, and there are many very important questions still to be asked about the relationships among the nationalities. There are, and will continue to be, many useful and provocative studies of the monarchy which concentrate on these questions. It ought to be obvious, however, that some such studies have been badly flawed.

There has been a great deal said about the problems which existed between Czechs and Germans, between Poles and Ruthenians, and between almost any of the other national groups of the monarchy. The difficulty here is that there was no clear unity of purpose among the members of any one of these groups. No one man or group of men spoke for the Germans. Any study which hopes to plumb the depths of the complex life of the monarchy and the nature of the relations between any of the national groups is going to have to take that fact into account.

APPENDIX A

The electoral districts of Cisleithania were established by the electoral reform act of 1907, and are listed in some detail in that law. They are included in the provisions of the bill as printed in the Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, and are shown by province and by whether they were rural or urban districts. The imperial Statistisches Zentralkommission published detailed reports of the elections of both 1907 and 1911 as parts of a regular serial publication, Österreichische Statistik, and a special Summarische Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen. The detailed reports published in both cases included maps of the districts which have been used to verify the boundaries of rural districts and the specific cities which were united in the urban districts.

The data on the occupations of the voters in each election was drawn from a variety of sources. The major source of that data was another issue of the Österreichische Statistik published subsequent to each of the elections. These documents were supplemented by reference to the census figures collected in 1900 and 1910 and published as part of the official report of the census. The reports entitled Berufsstatistik der Wahlberechtigten bei der Reichsratswahlen gave figures listing the total number of voters in each district, the numbers of valid and invalid votes cast, and the national

composition of each district. The nationality figures were checked against the census figures dealing with native languages. The religious composition and the total population of each district was checked in the same census reports.

The electoral results in each district were reported in the two official documents mentioned, and the summary reports published very soon after the elections. They were also printed in the two handbooks prepared by Fritz Freund at the behest of the government published under the title Das österreichischen Abgeordnetenhaus, and in several of the major daily newspapers of the monarchy. These were also the major source of biographical data on the deputies, for which purposes the works by Freund are particularly useful. Freund included details such as the religion, education, family background, occupation, record of public service, and in some cases the jail records of the deputies. There was also a photograph of each representative, and a breakdown of the religious and national composition of the lower house. Two newer works also were used to clear up minor points of detail not covered in Freund. Oswald Knauer's Das österreichische Parlament 1848-1966 was less comprehensive than the Freund volumes, but very useful.

Reinhold Knoll's Zur Tradition der christlichsozialen Partei is not only an admirable study of the early development of the party, but contains an appendix giving some useful data on the economic background of the party's deputies. There were also several biographical dictionaries which proved useful, some accounts in newspapers, reports by special police operatives of the ministry of the interior, and a number of biographies of leading figures. The socialists of this period are treated in the Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier international: L'Autriche, part of a projected series which proposes to give thumbnail sketches of socialist leaders throughout Europe.

The data included on the worksheets for each of the 232 districts, which is the same as on the four examples included here, was gathered in a relatively simple manner. Each of the electoral districts included villages and communes from several judicial districts. Census data was reported by judicial district and further broken down to show the parts of these districts. The procedure followed here was to identify all parts of each electoral district by checking the law and gathering the necessary data from appropriate census records, or the other reports mentioned here. These figures were then added together to obtain the total figures in each of the categories established for the study.

Any special features were marginally noted. When too few representatives of a religious or national group were present to register as one-half of one percent, they were listed as being present in "trace" amounts.

Some decisions are necessary to sort out duplications and other confusing information in any study, of course, and this one is no exception. For example, a deputy might be listed as a doctor of medicine and a journalist. In such cases, the occupation by which he earned his living was the one listed on the data sheet and reported in the body of the study. In one of the examples included here the deputy was an M. D. who served as Public Health Officer in the city of Urfahr, Upper Austria. Because he had not practiced medicine for some time, he was listed on the data sheet as a municipal official.

In order to demonstrate the manner in which the data was recorded for analysis, four examples of the worksheets are included herein, with citations showing the source of each piece of data. The same procedures and similar sources of data were used for each of the other 228 German districts as for these four.

Salzburg: 7	Gastein-Zell a. See-Taxenbach	Rural ¹
Population: ²	1900: 31,500	1910: 31,389
Nationalities: ³	Germans: 100%	Germans: 100%
	Traces Italian in Gastein	
Religion: ⁴	Catholic: 100%	Catholic: 100%

Occupations: ⁵	Self-employed		Salaried		Waged	
Agriculture	2494	(2486)	8	(5)	1783	(1765)
Lg. Industry	2	(2)	7	(7)	146	(167)
Sm. Industry	617	(598)	0	(0)	316	(239)
Commerce	105	(86)	19	(16)	374	(362)
Professions	50	(39)	135	(97)	65	(43)

Qualified Voters: ⁶	1907: 7161	1911: 7282
Valid Ballots	6674	6434
Invalid	39	41
Blank	52	117

Results:	Ldg Pty	2d	Others
1907: ⁷	1. Conservative	IndComs	Soc. Demo.
1911: ⁸	1. Christ. Soc.	IndConservative	Soc. Demo.

Representative:

1907:⁹ Viktor von Fuchs Christian Social (coalition) Lawyer
1911:¹⁰ Same

1. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, p. 94.
2. Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen, 1907, p. I.12; and Ibid., 1911, p. I.21.
3. Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen, 1900, Pt. 1, pp. 56, 58; and ibid., 1910, Pt. 3, pp. 105, 109.
4. Ibid.
5. Berufsstatistik der Wahlberechtigten, 1907, pp. 14-15; and ibid., 1911, pp. 21-22.
6. Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen, 1907, p. I.12; and ibid., 1911, p. I.21.
7. Ergebnisse, 1907, p. I.12.
8. Ibid., 1911, p. I.21.
9. Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus, 1907, p. 202.
10. Ibid., 1911, p. 129.

Bohemia: 128	Braunau-Wekelsdorf-Roknitz			Rural ¹	
Population: ²	1900: 56,700		1910: 55,509		
Nationalities: ³	German: 55,800		German: 54,760		
	Czech: 700		Czech: 839		
Religions: ⁴	Catholic: 95%		Catholic: 94%		
	Lutheran: 2.3		Lutheran: 2.5		
	Jewish: 2.7		Jewish: 3.0		
Occupations: ⁵	Self-employed		Salaried		Waged
Agriculture	2,838 (2,795)		29 (17)		874 (762)
Lg. Industry	25 (23)		31 (27)		3063 (3154)
Sm. Industry	1,508 (1,528)		1 (0)		936 (841)
Commerce	272 (238)		70 (64)		379 (356)
Professions	20 (14)		224 (203)		140 (94)
Qualified Voters: ⁶	1907: 12,764		1911: 12,688		
Valid Ballots	8,700		8,492		
Invalid	72		140		
Blank	74		21		
Results:	Ldg Pty		2d		Others
1907: ⁷	1. Agrarian		Soc. Demo.		Christ. Soc.
	2. Agrarian		Soc. Demo.		
1911: ⁸	1. Agrarian		Soc. Demo.		Christ. Soc.
	2. Agrarian		Soc. Demo.		
Representative:					
1907: ⁹	August Ansorge		Agrarian		Large Farm Owner
1911: ¹⁰	Same				

1. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, p. 82.

2. Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1907, p. I.64-I.65; and Ibid., pp. I.76-I.78.

3. Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen, 1900, Pt. 1, pp. 38-39; and ibid., 1910, Pt. 3, pp. 192-196.

4. Ibid.

5. Berufsstatistik der Wahlberechtigten, 1907, pp. 36-39; and ibid., 1911, pp. 76-77.

6. Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen, 1907, pp. I.64-I.65; and ibid., 1911, pp. I.76-I.77.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus, 1907, p. 437.

10. Ibid., 1911, p. 365.

Lower Austria: 6 Urfahr-Rohrbach-Mauerkirchen Urban¹

Population:² 1900: 36,500 1910: 31,389

Religion:³ Roman Catholic: 100% Roman Cath.: 100%
Traces Lutheran in Rohrbach

Occupations: ⁴	Self-employed	Salaried	Waged
Agriculture	138 (94)	12 (8)	186 (169)
Lg. Industry	32 (14)	67 (43)	573 (450)
Sm. Industry	1607 (1439)	6 (0)	1084 (993)
Commerce	568 (433)	319 (207)	1658 (1489)
Professions	611 (613)	554 (439)	241 (113)

Qualified Voters:⁵ 1907: 7,884 1911: 8,352

Valid Ballots	6,758	7,246
Invalid	59	35
Blank	255	283

Results:	Ldg. Pty.	2d	Others
1907: ⁶	1. Ger. People's	Upper Aus. Peasant	Soc. Demo.
	2. "	"	
1911: ⁷	1. Christ. Soc.	Ger. People's	Soc. Demo.
	2. "	"	

Representative:

1907: ⁸	Hans Winter	German People's Party	City Health Off.
1911: ⁹	Alois Brandl	Christian Social	Master Baker

1. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, p. 93.
2. Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen von 1900, pp. 53-55; and ibid., 1910, pp. 74-75.
3. Ibid.
4. Berufsstatistik der Wahlberechtigten 1907, pp. 12-13; and ibid., 1911, pp. 14-15.
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6. Ergebnisse, 1907, p. I.9.
7. Ergebnisse, 1911, p. I.11.
8. Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus, 1907, p. 178.
9. Ibid., 1911, p. 106.

Lower Austria: 1	Vienna, Kaiviertel	Urban ¹	
Population: ²	1900: 12,000	1910: 11,000	
Nationalities: ³	Germans: 96.7% Czechs: 2.0%	Germans: 97.3% Czechs: 1.4%	
Religions: ⁴	Roman Catholic: 91% Lutheran: 5 Jewish: 2	Roman Catholic: 91% Lutheran: 5 Jewish: 2	
Occupations ⁵	Self-employed	salaried	waged
Agriculture	4 (3)	0 (0)	2 (0)
Lg. Industry	28 (32)	8 (5)	29 (13)
Sm. Industry	269 (254)	3 (3)	112 (103)
Commerce	710 (687)	259 (243)	155 (140)
Professions	327 (310)	346 (328)	354 (309)
Qualified Voters: ⁶	1907	1911	
Valid Ballots	2,246	1,910	
Invalid	6	2	
Empty	45	51	
Total	2,297	1,963	
Results:	Ldg. Pty.	2d	Others
1907: ⁷	Progressive	Christ.Soc.	Social Demo.
1911: ⁸	1.Liberty	Christ.Soc.	Social Demo.
	2.Liberty	Christ.Soc.	
Representative:			
1907: ⁹	Camill Kuranda	Progressive Pty	Gov't Minister
1911: ¹⁰	Same		

1. Reichsgesetzblatt für 1907, p. 88.
2. Ergebnisse der Volkszählungen vom 1900, Pt. 2, p. 43; and ibid., 1910, Pt. 1, p. 27.
3. Ibid., 1900, Pt. 1, p. 51; and 1910, Pt. 2, p. 67.
4. Ibid.
5. Berufsstatistik der Wahlberechtigten bei der Reichsratswahlen, 1907, pp. 3 and 7; and 1911, pp. 4 and 9.
6. Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen im 1907, p. I.3; and ibid., 1911, p. I.7.
7. Ergebnisse, 1907, p. I.3.
8. Ibid., 1911, p. I.7.
9. Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus, 1907, p. 110.
10. Ibid., 1911, p. 38.

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