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Facts and Myths about the Polish Economy



A Warsaw shopping center nicknamed Złote Tarasy in winter. Photo by Edwin Dyga.

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Correction

In John M. Grondelski's review of Christine Kinealy's article in the April 2015 issue of *Sarmatian Review*, an error concerning bibliographical information crept in. The proper bibliographical note should have been as follows:

Christine Kinealy, "A Polish Count in County Mayo. Paul de Strzelecki and the Great Famine," pages 415–30 in: *Mayo: History and Society*, edited by Gerard Moran and Nollaig O Muraile. Dublin: Geography Publications, 2014. 944 pages. ISBN 978-0-906602-683. Hardbound.

Worth remembering: donations to Sarmatian Review are tax deductible.

Sarmatian Review Data

Russian opinions about Stalin and the Soviet Union in 2016

Percentage of Russians who think that Stalin played a positive role in the history of Russia: 54 percent.

Percentage of Russians who believe that purges and the Gulag were “a political necessity”: 26 percent.

Percentage of Russians who felt this way in 2007: 9 percent.

Percentage of Russians who would prefer that the Soviet Union did not disintegrate: 66 percent.

Source: Levada poll published 25 March 2016, as reported in *Last News from Russia*,
<<http://en.news-4-u.ru/in-russia-more-like-stalin-the-survey-showed-levada-center.html>>.

Islamic fighters from Russia in Syria and Iraq

Increase in foreign fighters from Russia and Central Asia during the last year: approximately 300 percent increase since June

Top foreign fighter nationalities: Tunisian, Saudi Arabian, Russian.

Approximate number of fighters from Russia that joined the Islamic State in Syria or Iraq between 2014–2015: 2,400, for a total of 4,700 fighters from Russia.

Areas of the Russian Federation from which the Islamic volunteers come: mostly North Caucasus.

Source: *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, The Soufan Group, 2015, <http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf>, accessed 1 April 2016.

Polish-German trade in 2015

Increase in Polish exports to Germany in 2015: 11.2 percent, to 48.5 billion euros and 27.2 percent of total Polish exports, or exactly the same as total Polish exports to the United States and four times more than total Polish exports to Canada.

Increase in Polish imports from Germany in 2015: 7.8 percent, to 40 billion euros.

Poland's position in German economic partnership ranking: #7, after the United States, France, Holland, China, Great Britain, and Italy.

Germany's position in Polish economic partnership ranking: #1.

Items Poland exports to Germany: cars and car parts (13 percent of all exports), food and agricultural products (10.3 percent), kitchen appliances (7.5 percent), machinery, furniture, and metal products.

German investments in Poland as of 2015: 30 billion euros.

Polish investments in Germany: 1.2 billion euros, of which most has been invested by PKN Orlen, followed by Ciech SA, Boryszew SA, OT Logistics and Comarch SA.

Source: Portal <wgospodarce.pl>, <<http://wgospodarce.pl/informacje/24595-handlujemy-z-niemcami-na-potege>>, 11 April 2016, accessed on the same day.

Public debt inherited from the previous government by Law and Justice government in Poland

Foreign ownership of means of production in Poland: 113 percent of Polish GNP.

Percentage of Poland's total debt held by foreign subjects: 60 percent.

Percentage of treasury ministry debt held by foreign subjects: 30 percent.

Percentage of industrial production manufactured in factories owned by foreign companies: 50 percent.

Percentage of Polish exports manufactured in factories owned by foreign subjects: 66 percent.

Amount of money transferred abroad each year as profits of foreign owners: 95 billion zloties, or ca. 28 billion dollars.

Source: IV rozbiór czy rewolucja? Portal <wgospodarce> <<http://wgospodarce.pl/opinie/24761-iv-rozbiór-czy-rewolucja>>, 15 April 2016, accessed on the same day.

Bestsellers in Germany in 2016

Ranking of Adolf Hitler's recently reissued *Mein Kampf* on the weekly bestseller list maintained by German weekly *Der Spiegel*: #1.

Number of copies sold in the first three months of 2016: 50,000.

Source: Portal *Buchreport* <http://www.buchreport.de/nachrichten/bestseller/bestseller_nachricht/datum/2016/04/18/mein-kampf-ausgabe-fuer-historisch-interessierte.htm?no_cache=1>; Portal *Klein Report* <<http://www.kleinreport.ch/news/mein-kampf-nummer-1-auf-der-spiegel-bestsellerliste-83956/>>, both accessed 20 April 2016.

Poland's religious statistics

Data from 2011 population census concerning religiosity and denominations in Poland: 87.58 percent declared themselves Roman Catholic, 0.41 percent Eastern Orthodox, 0.36 percent Jehovah's Witness, 0.18 percent Lutheran, 0.09 Eastern rite Catholic, 0.07 Pentecostal, 0.03 Mariavite, 0.15 percent others, 2.41 percent nondenominational; 7.10 percent refused to answer.

Drop in the percentage of Catholics between 1983 and 2011: 4 percent.

Number of clergy in Poland in 2016: 153 bishops including four cardinals; 31,000 priests (there were 23,099 priests in 1990); 3,571 seminarians.

Age of priests: in 2010: 57.7 percent were under 50 years of age.

Number of monks and nuns in 2013: 12,291 and 19,037 respectively.

Number of dioceses and parishes: in 2011 there were 41 Roman Catholic dioceses plus an extraterritorial diocese for the Polish Army. The number of Catholic parishes in 2011 was 11,019, with 3,162 parishioners per parish on average.

Drop in baptisms between 1990 and 2014: from 569,000 to 370,000, mostly because of a catastrophic drop in the fertility of women.

Mass attendance: between 2008 and 2014: 40 percent of Catholics claimed weekly Mass attendance, with 16 percent receiving Communion during Mass.

Increase in percentage of persons rejecting abortion: from 35.7 percent in 1991 to 64.6 percent in 2012.

Catholic charity institutions in 2014: 835 institutions conducting about 5,000 charity projects (aid for children and the homeless, shelters and soup kitchens for the poor).

Source: "Polska najbardziej religijnym krajem Europy," Portal <wpolityce.pl>, <<http://wpolityce.pl/kosciol/289577-polska-najbardziej-religijnym-krajem-europy-analiza>>, accessed 20 April 2016.

Policies toward the Catholic Church implemented in partitioned Poland and under communist colonialism

Estimated number of students in Polish Catholic schools run by monasteries and convents in the sixteenth century: ca. 15,000.

Percentage of parishes in prepartitioned Poland that had their own schools: 40 percent.

Number of monasteries closed down in the Austrian partition at the end of the eighteenth century: 150.

Number of monasteries allowed to function in the Prussian partition: four.

Number of monasteries closed down in the Russian partition: virtually all were closed down.

Polish response: in the mid-nineteenth century the creation of dozens of new orders that did not wear traditional monastic habits and were therefore unrecognizable by the police of the partitioning powers.

Number of hospitals run by the Catholic charity organization Caritas in 1946: 256.

Year in which communist authorities liquidated Caritas and its hospitals: 1950.

Year in which only eight schools were allowed to be run by nuns: 1978/79.

Source: Data from the Statistical Institute of the Catholic Church, as reported by Portal <wpolityce.pl>, <<http://wpolityce.pl/kosciol/289361-szkoly-szpitala-przytulki-gus-i-iskk-podsumowuja-1050-lat-chrzescijanstwa-w-polsce>>, accessed 21 April 2016.

Statistics of German World War II death camp in Ravensbrück

Location of the death camp for women: near Fürstenburg in Brandenburg.

Date of camp's creation: 1939.

Estimated total number of people imprisoned in the camp: 132,000 women and teenage girls from all over Europe, and 20,000 men.

Estimated number of Polish Catholic women and girls in the camp: between 30,000 and 40,000, of whom 17,000 died.

Estimated total number of deaths in the camp: 92,000 or more than two out of three prisoners.

Date of liberation by the Red Army, who then engaged in rapes: April 1945.

Number of prisoners found upon liberation: 3,000 dying women and several hundred dying men.

How Germans dealt with the remaining prisoners: several days before the Red Army liberated the camp, 20,000 women were forced into a death march in a northeastern direction.

Famous Polish Catholic survivors of the camp: Wanda Półtawska (medical doctor, writer, and friend of John Paul II); actress Mira Zimińska; medical doctor Alicja Gawlikowska.

Source: Portal <wpolityce.pl>, 29 April 2016 <<http://wpolityce.pl/historia/291240-w-holdzie-polkom-ktore-nie-przetraly-piekla-ravensbrueck-wzruszajaca-uroczystosc-przy-symbolicznej-mogile-na-powazkach?strona=1>>, accessed 30 April 2016.

Interpreting Poland

Krzysztof Brzechczyn

AN OUTLINE OF RECENT EVENTTS

The direction of political changes in Poland has recently been debated in the European Parliament. Here, in a nutshell, is the chronicle of relevant events. In 2015 elections, a previously unknown candidate Andrzej Duda won the presidency while Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) received the plurality of votes. Two new parties, Kukiz-15 and Nowoczesna.pl, gained substantial presence in the parliament. Significantly, after a twenty-five-year presence on the Polish political scene, the SLD (former communist) party did not make it to the parliament, while the PSL (People's Party) barely reached the election threshold. Two small parties, Razem and Korwin, reached the 3 percent election threshold, which made them eligible for budgetary subsidies for parties; however, their role is negligible. These changes can be compared with the 2001 elections when the AWS and UW parties did not even enter the parliament, and the new parties that did were Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Samoobrona (Self-Defense), and Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families). After the 2005 election Prawo i Sprawiedliwość had to enter a coalition with Samoobrona and Liga Polskich Rodzin to form a government. These two small parties are now extinct. In 2007 a new coalition of Platforma Obywatelska and PSL was formed. The coalition ruled for eight years and was defeated in the 2015 election.

The 2015 competition had its dark horse: Paweł Kukiz, who unexpectedly took third place in the first round of the presidential election. The slogan "fighting the system" gained him the votes of people who viewed the coalition government of PO and PSL critically, but were not supportive of PiS. What is perplexing about the phenomenon of Kukiz's success is that his slogan of "fighting the system" enjoyed instant popularity, even though the "system" remained undefined, as did the methods of fighting it. The

fiasco of the referendum on the single-member constituencies, which the Kukiz party advocated supports that view. As we observe the public debate, we conclude that PO seems to be at a loss as to why it lost the election, PiS why it won, and the Kukiz-15 why it made it to parliament to begin with.¹

DEMOCRATIC VERSUS OLIGARCHIC CAPITALISM

In order to explain the turn of events in Poland I focus on the concept of the system **while using the theses and theoretical assumptions of the social theory that can be named non-Marxian historical materialism.**² In light of that theory politics, economy, and culture constitute autonomous but similarly organized realms of public life. In each of them social minorities emerge that maximize their specific interests: power regulation, profit, and spiritual supremacy, respectively. The foundation for the appearance of social classes is material social means. In politics they are *means of coercion*. Depending on the position with respect to those means, two social classes can be distinguished: a class of rulers that decides how to use and distribute them, and a class of citizens that does not have that ability. In the realm of economy people are either owners or direct producers, according to their access to the *means of production*. In culture there are two social classes, defined by their relationship to the *means of persuasion* (television, radio, press, and the Internet): the "priests" who decide which ideas are to be popularized, and the "followers" who do not have that power. These antagonistic pairs of social classes have contradictory interests: the rulers aim at maximizing power regulation, and citizens at maximizing social autonomy; owners tend to maximize profit, employees their own income; "priests" want the greatest possible spiritual domination and "believers" spiritual autonomy.

In terms of the social theory assumed here, democracy can be defined as a class-balanced society in which the classes of rulers, owners, and "priests" have similar influence and are able to realize their social interests without the support of the other dominant social classes.³ Social conflicts between rulers and citizens (in politics), owners and direct producers (in the

economy), and “priests” and “followers” (in culture) are solved by way of compromises and of concessions made by the dominant classes on behalf of the dominated. Moreover, the state of social peace is strengthened by class alliances formed across the power line, whereby a class that is dominant in one realm of life offers support to a class that is dominated in a different domain.

For example, rulers intervene in economic life and support direct producers in their conflict with owners, in this way contributing to social peace in the economy. Owners, on the other hand, counterbalance the rulers’ advantage over citizens by helping the latter class limit the power of the former, bolstering social peace in politics. In turn, social peace in both the political and social realms facilitates social peace between “priests” and “followers.” Peace in that realm is conditional upon the *dispersed* distribution of the means of indoctrination, which ensures world-view and ideological pluralism.

It can be assumed that democratic capitalism is an empirical approximation of a class-balanced society. In that form of government everyone has the right to free elections, the creation of political parties, private property, the creation of labor unions, and the freedom of belief and religion. That fragile social balance can be disturbed by a “horizontal” direction of social alliances formed not by a dominant and a dominated social class, as is the case in a class-balanced society, but between the dominant classes.

For example, owners in economic-political oligarchization reach for political support of their interests. That support can be given in various forms. Rulers can limit the role of labor unions, regulate the relationships between employers and employees, lower the costs of production (tax exemptions), or secure the realization of extraordinary profits (concessions, public procurements). Rulers may use the owners’ material resources to weaken the control exerted over their own class by the civil society. For instance, since the high costs of running a political campaign can only be covered by political parties with sufficient

financial means, new political parties are at a significant disadvantage in their competition with the established ones. That restricts the political market to a limited choice of candidates.

The oligarchization of the political and economic realms also has a negative influence on ideological and worldview pluralism. Rulers set the fees for radio and television broadcast licenses and determine, together with entrepreneurs, where advertisements will be placed. The oligarchization of social life is also manifested in economic scandals, corruption, clientelism, or favoritism, which distort competition in the political, economic, and media markets.

In an oligarchic society the clashing interests of rulers and citizens, owners and direct producers, priests and believers are reconciled by disadvantaging lower classes by limiting their autonomy, income, and intellectual freedom which adds fuel to the social conflict. **Such oligarchization of social life leads to the creation of what was called a “system” in the 2015 election campaign. The beginnings of the system reach as far back as 1989, when Polish capitalism assumed, from its very beginning, the oligarchic form.**⁴ The core of this oligarchization was the process of the “enfranchisement of the *nomenklatura*.” It can be defined as “the exchange of current political privileges, associated with the position of a person in the administrative hierarchy of the political apparatus, for economic capital.”⁵ The main shareholders of *nomenklatura* companies were people from the ruling milieu—the higher officials of the Polish United Workers’ Party and the administrative workers of the state—who became the actual owners of state assets with only a small financial input. **A new company, entering into an agreement with the mother company, took over some of its assets: office space, warehouses, know-how, technological lines. The new *nomenklatura* company specialized in the same branch of production as the mother company and took over some of its orders and clients and, consequently, profits.** These initiatives served the purpose of transferring capital from the state sector to the private one, which would have been impossible

if the people doing so did not have the political influence to ensure the stability and safety of the transfer. As a result of these processes, corrupt privatization and corrupt-clientelist economy took root.⁶

This was facilitated by the shock therapy of economic reforms that have drastically lowered employee income and excluded a significant part of society from participation in the transfer of ownership. For example, in January 1990 industrial production declined by over 30 percent and the national income fell by 11 percent. In the years 1990–1991 the real income from work on individual farms plummeted to 40.3 percent and employee salaries decreased to 65.9 percent.⁷ The liberalization of foreign trade resulted in a flood of cheap foreign products and contributed to the bankruptcy of national producers who were not able to withstand the competition, as well as to unemployment. In the years 1990–1992 the number of unemployed rose to three million people. According to Tadeusz Kowalik, it was “not so much a transformation-related recession, perceived as the inevitable cost of great changes, but a recessive transformation, i.e., a great social change effected by means of a recession as a tool for creating a polarized society.”⁸

The assumed model of privatization favored foreign capital and obstructed the formation of a domestic class of capitalists, other than those related to the state apparatus. According to Kazimierz Poznański’s calculation, state assets were sold for about 9 to 12 percent of their free-market value.⁹ The shortcomings of domestic industry are reflected in the structure of Polish exports, of which the share of the profits from the sale of advanced technologies is presently 7 percent of GDP (in Germany it is 16 percent).¹⁰ Additionally, capitalism without domestic owners is less sensitive to employee pressure or state regulations. The data of the National Labor Inspectorate show that during the first decade of transition two-thirds of the controlled companies did not pay salaries to their employees on time and did not have a union organization.¹¹ Stanisław Gomułka estimates that the productivity of Polish employees is equal to two-thirds of the productivity of employees in Western countries, while Polish salaries only

reach one-fourth of the salaries there.¹² That disparity is also reflected in the percentage of employee salaries in the Polish GDP, 35.6 percent, while in Germany it is 51 percent and in Denmark 59 percent.¹³ The so-called “trash agreements” (*umowy śmieciowe*) that offer no benefits are becoming an increasingly popular form of employment in Poland. Two million Poles have emigrated for economic reasons. The growing income inequality is not balanced by social spending, which is well below the European average and constitutes 18.1 percent of the Polish GDP compared to 29.5 percent in Germany and 34.6 percent in Denmark.¹⁴

IS CAPITAL THE ONLY THING THAT DOES NOT HAVE A MOTHER COUNTRY? ABOUT NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CLASSES

In the last decade in Poland the oligarchization of capitalism has aggravated economic and social divisions and confirmed the peripheral position of the Polish economy in the international system of the division of work. That phenomenon has not been eliminated by the accession of Poland to the European Union. Furthermore, globalization and integration processes have generated a new social phenomenon: the separation of the heretofore uniform national and supranational social classes. Generally speaking, members of a dominant social class (rulers, owners, and “priests”) realize their social interests primarily within their national society that constitutes a natural reference point for them. The scope of the realization of interests of a particular social class is the result of the forces of juxtaposing the social classes operating in a particular realm of national social life: rulers and citizens in politics, owners and direct producers in the economy, “priests” and “followers” in culture.

The creation of the transnational classes changes the mechanism of realization of interests of the particular social classes. This realization is not a vector of the social forces of antagonistic classes within one national society, but a consequence of the global social interest of a transnational class to whose wishes the local social classes have to adapt. In conditions of globalization the movements originating in one nation only have a small chance of succeeding. The pace and scope

of emerging national and transnational classes vary depending on the realm of social life. For example, global corporations invest and move their operations to countries in which the local authorities offer the most attractive conditions such as cheap labor, tax exemption, and desirable regulations of economic activity. These globalization processes have brought about the dominance of foreign capital in the Polish economy. Foreign entities have a 60 percent share in the Polish banking sector, compared to 5 percent in Germany and 10 percent in Denmark.¹⁵ **Over 83 percent of the largest Polish companies are owned by foreign entities.**¹⁶ Bartłomiej Radziejewski estimates that “in the years 2001–2003, six billion zloties were siphoned off from Poland. In the following three years this sum grew to 29 billion zloties, and in the last three years, 56 billion.”¹⁷ In 2013 the economic entities with foreign capital took 82 million zloties out of the Polish economy, which is equivalent to 5 percent of GDP.¹⁸

In the cultural realm there also are national and transnational classes of “priests.” While they make the decisions about which ideas, views, information, and comments are to be popularized, they are not the authors of these ideas or information.¹⁹ They transfer a part of their decision-making power to people who realize the assigned tasks of media production. These people are editors, department managers, and journalists who, by being employed in media belonging to foreign capital, become the local link of the chain of the transnational class of “media priests.”

Let us consider an example pertaining to the press market. In 2014 746 million copies of various press publications were sold in Poland. They were published by nineteen media concerns, of which nine were foreign and ten Polish. Foreign publishers own 138 magazines, with a total circulation of 567 million copies, while Polish publishers own 47 titles with a total circulation of 178 million copies. Thus **76 percent of the Polish press market is controlled by foreign-funded entities**, while domestic entities have only a 24 percent share of the market.²⁰

The Bauer Media concern has a 39 percent share in the Polish press market. It publishes thirty-nine magazines specializing in luxury, advice, youth, computer, and women’s issues. The Swiss and German concern Ringier Axel Springer, with a 16 percent share of the market, publishes sports, information, social and key political periodicals such as *Fakt* and *Newsweek Polska*. The German concern Verlagsgruppe Passau, with a 15 percent share of the Polish market, virtually monopolizes the local press owning twenty out of the twenty-four most popular regional daily newspapers in fifteen voivodeships. These three German publishers control 70 percent of the Polish press market. As regards the Internet, **foreign capital owns the three largest Internet portals.** *Onet.pl* is owned by Ringier Axel Springer; *Wirtualna Polska* by four shareholders: European Media Holding, Orfe S.A., 10xS.A., and Albemuth Inwestycje; while *Interia* belongs to Bauer Media. These three portals are visited by 42 million people each month.

The media influence should not be understood in simplistic terms. A newspaper published by a German concern does not have to automatically represent the German point of view, however it is understood. Before arriving at such conclusions, a comprehensive analysis of the content produced by the foreign-owned media should be made. To my knowledge, this has not yet been undertaken by anyone. But some conclusions can be drawn. For instance, the influence of foreign capital on the Polish media market is reflected in the way the aim of the publishing activity is enforced. The first criterion of the selection of content of a newspaper is its potential profitability. The information most likely to be published is that which is likely to be interesting to a wide audience, not that which is socially valuable but less likely to attract attention. Consequently the foreign-owned media tend to trivialize issues of long-term importance to Poland and highlight inconsequential issues that distract and entertain citizens.

In the political realm, the network of EU institutions is becoming an autonomous environment in which the transnational political class is formed. The administration of the

European Union consumes 6 percent of its annual budget and employs 89,000 people. In 2013 there were 32,000 administrative employees in the Directorates-General of the European Commission, one thousand in the European Parliament, and five thousand in EU agencies. The politicians from various European countries who enter the structures of European bureaucracy become members of the supranational political class. The position and chances for advancement in its hierarchy depend on how efficiently the directives coming from Brussels are realized in these politicians' countries of origin. In contrast, the national fraction of the rulers' class maximizes its influence in its national society. It is in its interest to strengthen and protect the sovereignty of the nation state.

The process of the creation of a supranational rulers' class is still *in statu nascendi* because the creation of a rulers' class presupposes, by definition, possessing the appropriate means of coercion. For the time being, the transnational class does not have such hard means of influence at its disposal. This is why it is in its interest that the new rulers come from the two strongest countries of the European Union: Germany and France, who also have the strongest military. However, these rulers will not abandon the interests of their particular countries. The end result is that they support those aspects of European integration that are profitable for their countries of origin. This is characteristic of Germany in particular. The transnational rulers' class already possesses a strong arsenal of soft coercive means, ranging from public admonitions to threats of sanctions and the withdrawal of financing for economic projects that can be used against recalcitrant national authorities, as has been the case with Hungary.

WHO STANDS TO LOSE AND WHO STANDS TO GAIN FROM THE POWER CHANGES IN POLAND?

The intensity of the political arguments concerning the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland may seem incomprehensible to those who have taken the trouble to study its history and limited importance. Over the last twenty-five years this institution has only had a

corrective function in the legislative work of the Sejm. Briefly said, the issue is power rather than the marginalization of the court.

In order to correctly assess the current political conflict in Poland, it is necessary to take a look at the nature of a political party. **The activity of each political party reflects two types of interests. The first is political in nature:** it is the maximization of power within the party. That interest is realized in the relationships between the particular components of the party's leadership (the leader plus the elite plus the party apparatus) and ordinary party members. Members of the party elite are loyal to the leader in return for expected political profits. When a party is in opposition the reward can be, for instance, being placed in an appropriate position on an electoral list (in the election to the European Parliament, the national parliament, a regional parliament, a city council, or a *gmina* council); or, after a victory in the election, being employed in the office of a parliamentary member. The loyalty of the local party apparatus to the party elite and the loyalty of ordinary party members to the local party apparatus are based on the same principle. However, the lower position in the party hierarchy the smaller the expected political profits and, therefore, the lower the loyalty of party members to their leaders. When a party wins a parliamentary election, it gains access to a new field of power regulation. The elite of the party becomes the elite of the state, which decides who will occupy a certain number of government jobs. This set of positions can always be broadened by creating new institutions or by reforming the old ones.

The second type of interest in a democratic state system is realized in the **relationship between the party and its electorate** because in order to win an election and power and to be able to put selected people in government jobs, the party must mobilize its grassroots members and gain the support of the majority or at least plurality of voters. For that purpose it must construct such a political program containing political, socioeconomic, and socio-ideological components as will mobilize party members and motivate citizens to vote for the party.

The main beneficiaries of political changes are the party elites. Even if political changes improve the functioning of the state, which translates into advantages for citizens, it is the party leadership that will be in charge of implementing the proposed changes. They will become the leaders of the state. The socioeconomic and socioideological parts of political programs are addressed to citizens, with the view of ensuring reelection.

From the point of view of non-Marxian historical materialism we can distinguish three basic varieties of party programs with respect to the economic realm and the same number with respect to the cultural realm. As regards the economy, a leftist socioeconomic program presumes increasing that part of the social income that is used for the benefit of employees, as well as strengthening employee rights in relation to their employers; a rightist program presumes deregulating the economy by lowering taxes, which is beneficial for the owners' class; and a centrist program attempts to reconcile the interests of the two classes. By analogy, from the cultural point of view we can distinguish conservative, liberal, and centrist socio-ideological programs. A conservative program allows the state to support a certain set of social ideas and functional approaches with a view to preserving society as a whole. A liberal program leaves the issue of propagating ideas and attitudes to individual citizens. A centrist one incorporates both tendencies.

Let us now consider the relationship between the maximization of political and social interests of various classes comprising the party electorate. Since voter support is necessary to gain power in a democracy, in the long run the maximization of political interest to the exclusion of voters' interest is not in the best interest of a party. If a political party which has taken over the leadership of a state begins to prioritize its influence in the state administration over the realization of the voters' interests, it will lose to the opposing political party in the nearest election. A party with a long-run perspective, including the upcoming elections, will be aware of the fact that the realization of political interests must be mitigated and social interest

must be taken into account if the party is to be successful.

Therefore **the dispute about the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland should be seen as a typical political dispute between the party that has lost the majority in the parliament and the party that has gained it** and, as a result, has the power to fill posts in the state administration. **During the eight years PO was in power, it nominated fourteen out of fifteen judges in the Constitutional Tribunal.** Before the end of the term of office of the old Sejm, on the occasion of the amendment of the Constitutional Tribunal law, an additional five judges were selected whose terms of office were to begin with the term of office of the new Sejm, i.e., in November and December, upon expiration of the term of some of the present judges. In that way, fourteen judges nominated by PO would still be members of the fifteen-person Constitutional Tribunal. The PO obviously intended to use the Constitutional Tribunal to retain political power after the anticipated electoral loss.

An amendment of the law introduced by PiS restricted the number of PO-nominated judges from fourteen to nine. The solutions suggested by PiS on that occasion were not dissimilar from the solutions adopted in other European countries. As regards the entities that nominate the judges in a constitutional tribunal, the term of office of those judges, and their competence, different solutions have been adopted in the constitutions of various European countries that have that institution (some do not). The judges of a constitutional tribunal can be nominated by the president, senate, parliament, or a self-governing council of judges. The idea of moving the Constitutional Tribunal outside of Warsaw, criticized in the mainstream media, was inspired by Germany, where the seat of the Constitutional Tribunal is in Karlsruhe.

Also, a conflict similar to the Polish one regarding the filling of three posts in a Constitutional Tribunal, which lasted about a year and a half, occurred in Italy without attracting attention from any European institution. No member of the Italian Parliament

or the European Commission demanded a debate concerning the condition of democracy in Italy, or a new election, or the monitoring of the situation in that country. Let us also remember that a country such as the United Kingdom does not have a constitution at all, yet no one accuses that monarchy of being undemocratic.

The one-sided **engagement** of foreign and national mainstream media in the dispute surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal is therefore greatly disturbing. The prime ministers of Luxemburg and Austria, president of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, and president of the liberal fraction in the European Parliament Guy Verhofstadt are on record for recommending actions against Poland that cannot be accommodated in the original plan for the European Union. The numerous demonstrations organized in Poland and abroad under the slogan “defense of democracy” and the recurring demand for preterm elections indicate that the issue is something more than an ordinary political conflict between the winning and the losing party about the filling of posts.

My thesis is that the taking over of power by PiS not only limits the scope of the political influence of the previously ruling party—which is a standard outcome of a change of power in democracies—but also threatens the interests of other social classes in Poland and abroad. The political change achieved by the PiS victory is much deeper than commonly assumed. It is not only a matter of power being taken over by a single party for the first time since 1989; this time power went from the fraction of rulers oriented toward the transnational rulers’ class to a nationally-oriented fraction of rulers who promise a significant redistribution of political power, economic profits, and intellectual influence. If we assume that the above interpretation is correct, then the answer to the question of who lost when PiS came to power is as follows.

1. The transnational fraction of the rulers’ class. The taking of power by PiS posits a threat to the scope of the regulations of the supranational rulers’ class because Poland will

not be as willing to realize the recommendations coming from Brussels as it used to be (e.g., the recommendation concerning the acceptance of refugees according to an imposed algorithm). Bearing that in mind, it is no wonder that President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz commented angrily that what has happened in Poland is a kind of a coup d’état. Such remarks are not motivated by his Polonophobia but by his interests: if PiS retains power, Poland may become less dependent on Brussels and follow the example of Hungary. It is symptomatic that the postulate of shortening the term of office of the Polish Sejm surfaced during a demonstration of the recently created “Committee for the Defense of Democracy” (Komitet Obrony Demokracji), and that it took place in the capital of Germany.

2. The transnational fraction of the owners’ class. According to the data quoted above, foreign entities have recently transferred 82 billion zloties out of the Polish economy, which amounts to 5 percent of the Polish GDP. The promised banking and supermarket taxes, as well as a restriction of VAT exemptions, will definitely restrict the profits of the supranational owners’ class.

3. The transnational fraction of the media “priests” class. The announced intention of a “repolonization” of the media and a change in the advertising policies of government institutions and agencies will limit the foreign media companies’ profits from advertising. In the years 2010–2014 the twelve Polish ministers spent about 260 million zloties on advertisements in the press, radio, television, and the Internet—twice as much as all the governments in the years 2006–2010. The following foreign companies are examples of income acquired via Polish government advertising: Axel Springer (3.2 million zloties); Verlagsgruppe Passau (2.6 million zloties); Bauer Media Polska, the owner of the RMF radio (1.9 million zloties); and the French media concern Groupe Lagardere, the owner of Radio Zet, Plus, and Antyradio (5.3 million zloties).²¹ The ministries of the Polish government have placed commercials in foreign television networks as well: in CNN (amounting to 5.6

million zloties), *France* (1.25 million zloties), *Financial Times* (568 thousand zloties), *The Economist* (410 thousand zloties), and *International Herald Tribune* (184 thousand zloties).

4. The national fractions of the classes of rulers, “priests,” and owners. I have already mentioned the political damage to the party that has lost the election. The new rulers have announced a change in the advertising policies in national media. For example, in the years 2010–2014 13.8 million zloties was spent on advertising in TVN and 8.5 million in Polsat (with comparable viewership), while the Agora Company earned 5 million zloties.²² Those amounts may now go to other media, the sympathies of which are more in line with those of the ruling party. The announcement of changes in the tax law and the intention to scrutinize the decisions about VAT exemptions, which have amounted to a budgetary loss of 52 billion zloties, or 3 percent of the GDP,²³ may limit the income of the businessmen associated with the previously ruling party.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN POLAND? AN ATTEMPT AT A PROGNOSIS

We do not know if the coming to power of PiS will change the direction of the redistribution of political power, economic profits, and intellectual influence. There are three possible scenarios that can follow.

1. A pessimistic one. The activity of PiS will be restricted to the realization of the political and socioideological components of its program. The control over government institutions, intensified by competition within the party, will lead to unrestrained replacement of “people from the previous coalition” with “our people” in an increasing number of these institutions. That will reinforce the division into “us” and “them,” leading to growing resentment by members of the losing party, their families, and their friends, which will exacerbate the state of social conflict already fueled by the *hostile* media environment. The conflict could be further aggravated by the realization of a cultural policy consisting in

“wars” on new fronts. Such a policy will result in the division of people into those who realize the flagship projects of the winning party (e.g., the Museum of Polish History or the Museum of the “Cursed Soldiers” in Ostrołęka) and those who will not be able to receive adequate support because they are not associated with the current ruling class.

2. A realistic one. Having established control over some government institutions and agencies, PiS will realize those elements of the socio-economic program that will ensure the support of the key electorate (e.g., the newly passed bill of 500 zloties a month for the second child and further children tax-free). The party will also try to find a *modus vivendi* with regard to some in the leftist-liberal environment, contributing to its neutralization.

3. An optimistic one. Having established control over selected state institutions and agencies, PiS will put into practice the social elements of its socioeconomic program and will introduce changes in the industry to make economic development more dynamic, stimulating the creation of new technologies and workplaces. The restoration of economic independence will require cooperation with academics and gaining the favor, or at least indifference of some leftist-liberal intellectual and artistic circles.

The realization of the first scenario will lead to an electoral failure in the 2019 election. The realization of the second scenario will ensure a majority in the parliament, making it possible to continue governing. The realization of the third scenario will allow the party to gain a majority, which will make it possible to change the constitution.

At present, PiS is at the stage of implementing its political interests and taking control over the state institutions. The mistakes its inexperienced ministers make (e.g., Minister Waszczykowski’s unfortunate phrasing in an interview with a German paper), repeated by the hostile media, unnecessarily antagonize groups of voters. If these are only due to a lack of experience, there is a chance that they will be eliminated.

However, the situation will be worse if they are manifestations of a competition for political influence and posts in which PiS politicians play up to the expectations of their electorates without regard for the party's reputation and for Poland's interests.

We can be sure of one thing. The reconstruction of the Polish political scene is a symptom of the diminishing development potential of the transformation that has taken place since 1989. The welfare state that has been maintained functioned only for the ruling classes. As regards the masses, the state only performed the function of a guard protecting the privileges of the oligarchy. The masses now demand change. The parties and intellectual circles that will correctly diagnose Poland's economic, political, and cultural problems and propose viable solutions stand to gain in the Polish political scene. Δ

NOTES

¹ One proof of that is what Witold Waszczykowski, the foreign minister of the new government, has said: "It is our only wish to cure our country of a few diseases so that it can recover. The previous government engaged [the media] in the realization of a specific concept of leftist politics, as if the world had to move according to the Marxist pattern, in one direction only: that of a new mixture of cultures and races, a world consisting of cyclists and vegetarians who only use renewable energy sources and who oppose any expression of religion. That has nothing to do with the traditional Polish values." Ł. Warzecha, "Waszczykowski trafia w dziesiątkę czyli o weganach i rowerzystach," in: wpolityce.pl <<http://wPolityce.pl/polityka/277078-waszczykowski-trafia-w-dziesiatke-czyli-o-weganach-i-rowerzystach>>, accessed 5 January 2016. However, both that statement and the supportive journalist's comment tell us nothing about the economic reasons for voting for PiS, which were highlighted in the political program of the party and presented during the election campaign. As a follower of the campaign, I do not recall any promises made by the party to challenge Polish culinary traditions or to destroy bicycle paths.

² L. Nowak, *U podstaw teorii socjalizmu*, vol. 1: *Własność i władza*. Poznań: Nakom, 1991, pp. 167–182.

³ This topic has been elaborated on in K. Brzechczyn, "Upadek realnego socjalizmu w Europie Wschodniej a załamanie się hiszpańskiego imperium kolonialnego w Ameryce Łacińskiej. Próba analizy porównawczej," in: K. Brzechczyn, editor, *Ścieżki transformacji. Ujęcia teoretyczne i opisy empiryczne*. Poznań: Zysk i Ska, 2003; and "Dziedzictwo Solidarności a przebieg transformacji ustrojowej w Polsce," in: J. R. Sielezin, M. Golińczak, editors, *Solidarność i opozycja polityczna w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 80. XX wieku*. Wrocław: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2012, pp. 217–240.

⁴ K. Brzechczyn, "O ewolucji społeczeństw socjalistycznych. Próba wstępnej konceptualizacji," in: T. Grabińska, M. Zabierowski, editors, *Analizy metodologiczne w nauce*. Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 1997, pp. 105–121; K. Brzechczyn, *Kłopoty z Polską. Wybór publicystyki politycznej*. Poznań: WiS, 1998; K. Brzechczyn, "Kompromis przy Okrągłym Stole. Próba modelu," in: K. Brzechczyn, editor, *Interpretacje upadku komunizmu w Polsce i w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej*. Poznań: IPN, 2011, pp. 87–107.

⁵ P. Strzałkowski, "Polityczne i społeczne uwarunkowania przedsiębiorczości ekonomicznej," in: W. W. Morawski, editor, *Zmierzch socjalizmu państwowego*. Warsaw: PWN, 1994, p. 349.

⁶ T. Kowalik, "Polska transformacja," <www.polskatransformacja.pl>, Warsaw: Muza, 2009, p. 152.

⁷ Ibid., p. 168.

⁸ Ibid., p. 104.

⁹ K. Poznański, *Wielki przekręt. Klęska polskich reform*. Warsaw: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze i Literackie, 2000, pp. 40–41.

¹⁰ M. Malinowski, "Odzyskać państwo," *Nowy Obywatel. Pismo na Rzecz Sprawiedliwości Społecznej*, no. 17 (68), 2005, p. 17.

¹¹ T. Kowalik, op. cit., p. 153.

¹² I quote the data from A. Szahaj's work, *Inny kapitalizm jest możliwy*. Warsaw: Książka i Prasa, 2015, pp. 67, 127–133.

¹³ M. Malinowski, *Odzyskać państwo*, p. 17.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ M. Malinowski, *Odzyskać państwo*, p. 17.

¹⁶ B. Radziejowski, "Renta neokolonialna, czyli ile jeszcze Polak zapłaci," *Nowa Konfederacja. Internetowy Miesięcznik Idei*, no. 2 (53), 2014, p. 3.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 4; also "Koszmary rachunek za bezmyślną prywatyzację. Z prof. Jerzym Żyżyńskim rozmawia Aleksandra Rybińska," *Nowa Konfederacja*, no. 2 (53), 2014, p. 3.

¹⁸ B. Radziejowski, "Renta neokolonialna," p. 3.

¹⁹ I rely on K. Niedźwiadek's "Struktura i rozwój momentu produkcji duchowej," in: P. Buczkowski and A. Klawiter, editors, *Klasy – światopogląd – idealizacja*, Poznań: PWN, 1985, pp. 17–46.

²⁰ P. Grzegorzczak, *Czy musimy repolonizować media? Analiza zagranicznego kapitału w mediach*, in: Jagielloński24.pl
<<http://Jagielloński24.pl/2015/09/14/czy-musimy-repolonizowac-media-analiza-zagranicznego-kapitalu-w-polsce>>, accessed 5 January 2015.

²¹ P. Grzegorzczak, *Media na państwowym garnuszku. Analiza wydatków instytucji publicznych na reklamy*, in: jagielloński24.pl
<<http://Jagielloński24.pl/2015/12/01/media-na-panstwowym-garnuszku-analiza-wydatkow-instytucji-publicznych-na-reklamy>>, accessed 5 January 2016.

²² P. Grzegorzczak, *Media na państwowym garnuszku*.

²³ Z. Kuźmiuk, "Sejmowa komisja śledcza w sprawie wyludzeń VAT?" In: wpolityce.pl
<http://wpolityce.pl/gospodarka/276932-sejmowa-komisja-sledcza-w-sprawie-wyludzen-vat-ustalilaby-w-jaki-sposob-i-za-czym-przyzwoleniem-dochodzilo-do-rozszczelnienia-przepisow-dotyczacych-podatku-vat-i-kto-na-tych-rozwiazaniach-zyskiwal>, accessed 5 January 2016. According to the Global Financial Integrity report, "foreign companies illegally siphon about 90 billion zloties a year out of Poland, i.e. 5 percent of our GDP, mainly by way of frauds concerning VAT, CIT, and customs." Quoted from Z. Kuźmiuk, "Polska wśród 20 najbardziej 'okradanych' państw świata," in: wpolityce.pl
<http://wpolityce.pl/gospodarka/276449-polska-wsrod-20-najbardziej-okradanych-panstw-swiate>, accessed 5 January 2016.

The First World War Writer as Dictator in Zakopane

Rafał Malczewski

Translated by Adrian Lukas Smith

At the end of October 1918, after four years of war, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy collapsed. The army from the front changed into a horde of displaced persons wanting to return home as quickly as possible. The legal authorities perished into ash, blasted away by a hurricane of

enjoyment and rebellion blowing through the constituent countries of the Austro-Hungarian empire and nations of the dying Holy Roman Empire. It acted from Trieste to Suczawa, from Bregenz to Dolna Watra. Galicia and Lodomeria and the principalities of Oświęcim, Zator, and Kraków resisted being taken over. The coup occurred quickly and almost without pain. Authority was grasped by people who were more clever and more experienced in underground work. Secret organizations appeared. There were new faces and new heroes, as well as demonstrations, oaths, rallies, outbursts of patriotism, garrulousness, and improvisation. New homelands were born, former officers of the monarchy stepped down quietly and silently; they were disheartened because of the coup's lack of order, the unjust contempt for bureaucracy. Amateurs grasped governance. Young people persuaded the army to give up their weapons because the army was tired and had been waiting for this for a long time. Hearts rose. New countries began on their journey to the unknown in this intoxicated, anarchic world.

Zakopane entered this new epoch beautifully. The people proclaimed: we no longer have an Austrian monarchy! The power of governance was deposited in the hands of a writer. It was not offered to Piłsudski's Legion or to professional Sokół patriots, or to a lawyer or doctor, but to the writer Stefan Żeromski. I am not sure whether this action came from the ghosts of the dying epoch or whether it initiated new times. We know how writers gradually lose their importance. At that time, despite its beautiful blushes, Europe fell ill. Power was lost and law and freedom were scorned, people became delusionary and began to believe in superstitions and gods, dark and bloodthirsty. As usual, Zakopane survived unscathed from the Great War to the time of the cable car to Kasprowy. At the beginning of 1915, Russian patrols came to the foot of the Gorce hills. The *Russkies* lasted on this line until May 1915 when the German offensive pushed them hundreds of kilometers to the east.

Out of spite for Zakopane, the First World War broke out in the summer season. It was a blow to

the town's pocket. Many Poles, as well as Russian citizens, were astonished by the war's activities that cut them off from Warsaw, Łódź, Młociny, and Piotrków. The richer and more courageous individuals faithfully lasted to the end of the summer on Krupówki and in the Tatras. In the autumn, the inhabitants of Congress Kingdom Poland had to return home via Romania. The young people who were stuck under Giewont headed at the proper time to the monarchy's higher schools to complete their studies. Galician universities were not mentioned, Lwów was in Russian hands, Kraków prepared itself for a siege. Kraków allegedly was a "professional defensive stronghold," and it was only then that its inhabitants realized what that meant. An inhabitant was allowed to return to his or her abode if he had proof that he possessed a few sacks of flour and grain, peas, sugar, a barrel of sour cabbage and a large cut of pork fat. During the so-called siege of Kraków in the winter of 1914 to spring of 1915 many Russian officers appeared at the Słowacki Theatre in Kraków. The front was garrisoned loosely; no one was attacked. They had known that theater well before the war; they admired Solski in *Judas* and *Warszawianka*. Obviously they came in civilian clothing and pretended to smile naïvely. Ushers knew them from before the war. They smiled discreetly to the regulars. The theater building did not stay empty—private boxes were full and even Russian officers paid tips.

Something happened in Podhale at that time that changed the world. In the argument between the poet Jan Kasprowicz and the county judge, the second was right; or so we think today. However, from the perspective of 1914 the county judge did something really foolish, or he made a big mistake. He was a local pedant who arrested the Poronin holidaymaker Vladimir Ulyanov (aka Lenin) at the outbreak of war and sent him to prison. Kasprowicz, who befriended Mr. L., approached the authorities and showed the senselessness of the judge's action. They had to let Lenin go, apologized to him and sent him out to the world to carry out his work that blew up the tsarist system. The Austrian monarchy obeyed the Polish poet: Lenin went to

Switzerland while the judge looked like a fool. He was a man from before the First World War, an old-fashioned chap who did not realize how easily one could liquidate people even when all laws were ostensibly observed, if the time was right, and there was tacit approval from above, just because the season for nihilists was open. Perhaps he saved us from an exploding bomb that would make Hiroshima and Bikini look like mere fireflies. Lenin moved on to Switzerland, and the rest is history. At that time Zakopane had other troubles; who needed to worry about a nobody like Lenin?

With his herd of cadets Zaruski left for Piłsudski's Legion. Orkan from Niedźwiedź wanted to do something, so he trudged to Nowy Targ via the summit of Turbacz, leading a cow on a rope. He sold the cow at the market but was attracted to heavy liquor, so all the money for equipment was drunk away. Only when Lgocki, the district head from Łopuszna, helped him, did Orkan finally reach Oleandry.

In the first phase of the war Zakopane froze with fear. A dark future hovered over this so-called Summer Capital of Poland. It was just as well, then, that the people from the Congress Kingdom were trapped while those from eastern Galicia were blown over, especially large landowners. Some could be trusted to pay up and dig money out of their pockets because if they weren't able to pay we knew where we could get the property they owned from behind the army cordon. As time passed, Zakopane recovered from its fear. The fronts moved deep to the east, the governor returned to Lwów, there were no fewer people ill with tuberculosis, this and that person tired of war settled with their whole family in Zakopane. As we know, the mountains are special; they are safe, healthy, and nobody cares about the rules. Even winters began to be nice.

At that time in Zakopane there was a private school owned by Xavery Praus. He later became the Minister of Religion and Public Enlightenment in Moraczewski's cabinet in free Poland. The school was well run by clever people who were amiable to youngsters. This establishment was located in a villa called

Wołodziejówka. We don't know exactly what seeds of knowledge were dispersed in the adolescent heads; the memories of former pupils of this school testify to how different this school was from the school style of the Habsburg Empire. Did it create human beings ready to know how to live in this real life, not as described in literature? We are obliged to answer! This school didn't do what its leader wanted, and so hundreds of dreamers died not only from tuberculosis but also from the inability to adapt to existence in the world of crude Bolshevism.

In guesthouses they enjoyed themselves in modest ways, as was appropriate during "those struggles." There were dances in amateur theaters and, of course, *Damy i huzary* organized by *Dom Pod Jedłami*, or the Pawlikowski family. The Pronaszko brothers produced Wyspiański's *Legion*, featuring their own stage design) on the stage at *Morskie Oko*, every now and again the actor Czarnocki from Lwów produced some new play at this same venue without success. He later founded a school of elocution that many people aged from fourteen to sixty attended. This business did not make any money either. Fortunately Lwów was liberated so they could hurry to larger theater stages.

Jan Gwalbert Pawlikowski, together with the daily newspaper *Słowo Polskie*, his son Michał, and the Russians, withdrew to Kiev. The Austrian government had not confiscated the Pawlikowskis' property in Medyka, and Jan Gwalbert Pawlikowski Jr. was released from the Austrian army so that he could maintain the country estate. Besides the great library and the collection of Chodowiecki's etchings in Medyka there was, among other things, rich soil waiting to be sowed. Junior did not like that kind of work and sat under Giewont, writing *Bajda o Niemrawcu* (The Legend of a Clumsy Person). None of us was astonished at that. No one talked about collective responsibility and the confiscation of the property of enemy citizens. Perhaps they made the distinction that a Pole is not an Austrian and he wants to have his own country, or perhaps this only concerned rich and influential people.

Séances took place at *Krywań*, the Zaruski family's modest guesthouse. I don't know whether this was at the end of the war or a short time after Poland's independence that a street-lamp on a rotten wooden pole fell into the middle of a darkened salon among many famous people, with Władysław Reymont at their head. No one knew where this lamppost had come from. The author of *Chłopi*, who was very excited about the vibrating tables, was flabbergasted. We need to remember that the lamp was an object filled with paraffin, torn from somewhere in Zakopane's streets. No one was able to determine where this lamp was originally located. Regiec, the mayor, who shortly afterwards was accused of being a spook working for the Austrian Internal Security ministry, hardly had the time to monitor municipal streetlamps. The unlucky man did not know that going through the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the Defense Ministry would soon be considered like taking part in the Samosierra charge, or receiving the Order of the Garter, or drinking with the politician Wieniawa.

Egon Petri arrived in Zakopane for the first time. He was a great young pianist, a hungry Dutchman living in Berlin; he appeared with his wife, Mrs. Mita. Who could have supposed then that he would permanently attach himself to Zakopane and the Tatras? He was not a Pole, but would become a Zakopane citizen to the core. Today he lives in California. He was introduced to Zakopane's society; he liked to be a regular socialite and to play. He would settle at the piano after supper and only stop long past midnight.

Many artists and politicians hung out in cheap restaurants: Sroński, Kasprowicz, Żeromski; later Tetmajer, Sichulski, Solski, Kossak, Axentowicz, Augustynowicz, the Pronaszko brothers, Tymon Niesiołowski and so on. Alcohol, no stranger to the Polish nation in good times and bad, served them faithfully. At that time vodka wasn't drunk neat in Galicia and Zakopane. Vodka had to be with taste. What was neat was Aqua Ultra, homemade with smelly dregs, suitable for simple folk. Rowan tree liquor and herbal vodkas were consumed, and of

course many types of liquor including the mysterious *rosolis*.

The Women's League founded a teahouse in which legionnaires gathered, supposedly sipping tea. These unknown faces became well known and decorated the front pages of the capital's daily newspapers, and thus the photos became ever more prominent. Wincenty Witos's supporters and the poor gathered there; anyone who had cash went to Karpowicz's, to the restaurant by the stream. Karpowicz appreciated artists; he didn't poison them with vodka and his cellar wasn't bad. Sichulski produced a series of satirical caricatures there under the influence of alcohol, war, and a plump host.

Huge, dark slabs of meat began to appear more and more often on the tables of guesthouses and restaurants. This indicated that Podhale's poachers were venturing abroad, hunting on Duke Hohenlohe's land in Jaworzyna Valley. Guards were stationed at the front, but no one guarded the wild game. Young men armed with rifles went to Świstowa and Czeska in Żabie Stawy in Białczańska Valley and killed deer, fantastic cross-breeds of the Carpathian deer and Canadian Wapiti deer. As time passed, highlander poachers broke down four-meter-high fences on Hohenlohe's land. This meant that large and small animals crossed the border not only of his land but also the country, and entered the Valley of the Five Lakes, Morskie Oko, and Roztoka Valley. Not for long, however, because the poachers' fury steadily rose, especially when extreme hunger hit the Great Powers. There was no way to starve the whole of Galicia; the Austrian civil servants, who were often Polish by birth and conviction, could not achieve this.

In vain they sent commissioners from Vienna to confirm that pastries, paté, roasted meat, white bread and butter—all of which were forbidden fruit—were being served in Zakopane's restaurants. The ministry officials ate legal dinners on beautifully laid tables. Dinner consisted of scraps of meat and dark, tasteless bread and finished with barley coffee. At the same time, the restaurant host called out the names of our people one after the other—the

county judge from Nowy Targ, the commissar of the health resort, and smaller fry too—to lead them to a cleverly camouflaged small room. Here there were glasses full of liquor, plates of sandwiches and meat pastries because it was late autumn, followed by fieldfare in broth, large goose thighs, small drumsticks in breadcrumbs, warm loins with red beetroots and Brussels sprouts. The Commission returned to the capital reporting that they were fiercely hungry in Podhale, especially in Zakopane.

We should add that, as usual, the poor went hungry. The rich society that had settled for a while at the foot of Giewont had connections; they knew shop owners and were never short of sugar, white flour, tea, and coffee. The common folk suffered from deprivation, not as bad as in Vienna or Berlin, but enough to antagonize them against the get-rich-quick merchants.

Meanwhile, Zakopane received Legionnaires as guests, who appeared during the holidays. There also appeared soldiers from the regular Austrian army and summer holidaymakers from Galicia and parts of recently liberated Congress Kingdom Poland. In winter there were ski courses for members of the army.

As we know, Zakopane possessed, and will always possess, people who have no income or job. They don't steal but live in a special way; only they know how. For them, especially the younger ones, ski courses held for soldiers were a kind of salvation. The army didn't care who served as the instructor or to which country or race he belonged; they only wanted their skiing and speaking skills. Since the instructors were paid quite well and were awarded the rank of lieutenant for the duration of the course, these ne'er-do-wells seized this new opportunity to get money from the "enemy country." Not every instructor employed by the Austrian army belonged to this type, but Zakopane's true locals showed great skills, technique, and heart in teaching newcomers how to ski.

I do not remember how often the Austrian soldiers were rotated; I heard every two months. For soldiers pulled from the front or from time in hospital it was a great windfall and a period of rest, as long as they didn't work too hard on

those damn skis. “Our boys” understood this straight away. The course took place every day in a nearby valley under the leadership of an instructor. They built a fire and prepared food they had brought with them. When there was some sun they stripped down to their underpants and sunbathed. If the instructor was musical he organized a choir that sang Polish, Ukrainian, Czech and German national songs. If he was musical the instructor conducted; often he passed the baton on to a soldier and dozed off. About 4 p.m., after a few exercises, the group made their way down to Skoczyska barracks.

Commandants, who were usually middle-ranked officers, were skilled at being lazy. They were heavy drinkers and good mates. Every evening teachers met in any old cheap restaurant and drank themselves blind. Before returning to the front they drank and skied recklessly at breakneck speed. If only they twisted or broke bones, damaged a valuable organ, contracted pneumonia, or suffered from contorted intestines they could go to a hospital and wouldn't have to go back to the front lines. Zakopane's instructors helped as best they could, recklessly leading their squad on tourist trails and very steep slopes, skiing downhill to Jaworzynka or Mechy. Not everyone had good luck; sometimes they had too much. When one individual fell and another person skied over him the skies pierced him like an arrow and he died on the spot.

Global changes shook five continents. War, a terrible war of exhaustion, began to run its course. In the small Zakopane backyard we had a gale of revolution besides the *halny* windstorm. Highlanders had escaped to the mountains and hadn't returned from their vacation for almost a whole year. Autumn came, and the folk prepared themselves for winter. Highlander women delivered salt, flour, guns, and bullets. For the highlanders, wild game was enough: chamois, red deer, roe deer. It continued like this until one day we learned that the Habsburg monarchy was no more, unwittingly slaughtered by its stepsons and their great allies. Who could have foreseen that this signaled the death of an ordered world, and that we were marching toward great changes and crimes.

As we mentioned, a great writer took power in Zakopane. It was on his hand that army officers swore their oath to be faithful to the Republic. Żeromski set up a council and wanted to be a fair ruler. Deserters returned from the mountains; Zakopane was filled with long-forgotten faces. The poor and people without connections rebelled; they wanted to punish shop owners who had traded on the black market during the war and rob the well-supplied cellars of these illegal speculators.

The author-to-be of *Przedwiośnie* feared such mob rule. Hearing such threats, which were circulating widely, he created a citizen's guard to protect the goods of war-profiteering citizens. Lowlanders and law-abiding highlanders walked to Krupówki at night and stood guard holding sawed-off shotguns and scaring the few and far-between passersby. The author of this book belongs to a younger generation; he would never dream of spending a cold night guarding the sleep of someone who had profited from the black market. There were more such people – the whole of Kasprusie district where Żeromski dwelled didn't want anyone to disturb the peace and wanted to get away from “being dictated to” by the citizens' guards. The author of *Popioły* was angry with the rebels; he didn't speak and looked away from them with his heavy black eyes. However, the writer's power did not last long. Soon enough, those men who felt entitled appeared and young guards of the bureaucracy began to sprout on Zakopane's common soil.

With hindsight and the prospect of a Third World War, the short-lasting *caudillo* and leader of Zakopane achieved more than the Italian writer d'Annunzio who conquered Trieste. He did not harm anyone, and being a writer crazy about Polishness and at the same time a gentryman with socialist beliefs, he was neither a Fascist nor a thug.

Without great introduction, when we think about Zakopane, it is evident that we leapt into freedom. However, what resulted belongs to another chapter. Δ

NOTE

This is the first English translation of chapter 10 of Rafał Malczewski's memoir *Pepek świata*.

Wspomnienia z Zakopanego (The Navel of the World: A Memoir of Zakopane). Łomianki: Wydawnictwo LTW (www.ltw.com.pl), 2010. Rafał Malczewski (1892–1965) was the son of Jacek Malczewski, a noted Polish painter. Enamoured of the village of Zakopane in the Polish Tatras, he became an intellectual guide to this unique place and to the influential group of writers, philosophers, and artists who resided there. The remarkable thing about his memoir is its detachment from ideology: this is a diary of a private person who sees things that professional politicians and historians do not see. This truly is a report of what life was like at that time and at that place. The end of the war meant more than just the cessation of hostilities: a new world was ushered in, but some of Zakopane's inhabitants remained blind to these changes well into the 1920s.

Translated by permission.

Coming of Age under Martial Law The Initiation Novels of Poland's Last Communist Generation

By **Svetlana Vassileva-Karagyzova**. Rochester: Univ. of Rochester Press and Boydell and Brewer Ltd, 2015. viii + 224 pages. Index. ISBN 13: 978-1-58046-528-1. Hardcover.

Jacek Koronacki

The author, who is Associate Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Kansas, argues convincingly that the cohort of Poles born roughly between 1960 and 1975—the '89ers, for short—forms a generational community clearly marked by the experience of the cataclysmic fall of communism in 1989 and conscious of a shared experience of social turbulence. This is so despite important differences between those born in the early 1960s and those born in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Indeed, it made a tremendous difference to live under communism and then see the leap to democracy (of sorts) when one was a teenager or in one's twenties. It must have made those beginning their adult life under a competitive

economy, all other things being equal, develop a different attitude toward work and life than of those who entered adult life in the last years of communist rule in Poland. Yet, to quote Vassileva-Karagyzova, "the Polish '89ers seem to be on two completely different agendas only at first glance. In fact, they are closely intertwined and function symbiotically" (17).

A multitude of scholarly works on Polish literature from 1989 until today has been published. Vassileva-Karagyzova is well aware of this fact and wisely relies on much of this work. She is thus equally well aware that hers should not be just another minor addition to this legion. Her aim is much more ambitious, and well described by Irena Grudzińska Gross on the book's cover: "The author places the 'developmental novels' she discussed within their literary, cultural, anthropological, and sociological contexts, thus moving her analysis out of the realm of area studies and into the common language of scholars working on all kinds of literatures and cultural phenomena."

In the first chapter Vassileva-Karagyzova examines the political manifestations of the intergenerational conflict as depicted in the self-thematization narratives of the '89ers in the Polish press between 2002 and 2014. She notes and provides her own explanation for a kind of a leitmotif found in these narratives: "self-blame for the inability of the group to organize itself as a community with a unified and distinct voice and considerable social influence" (12).

Vassileva-Karagyzova begins the second chapter with a brief overview of the developments of the genre of the Bildungsroman since late eighteenth-century Germany to the present time to focus on the post-1989 Polish initiation novels. She elaborates on what she summarizes thus: "Instead of experiencing healthy maturation and smooth integration into an affirmative society, the young protagonists in Polish works adopt a wide range of escapist strategies to resist societal pressures urging compliance with normative values and behaviors and also as a means of psychological survival (self-arrest in an infantile stage of development

to avoid engagement with an intolerable reality)” (12).

The analysis in the third chapter, titled “Emasculated Men, Absent Fathers,” “focuses on the father-child dyad and illuminates the detrimental effects of the physical and emotional unavailability of the '89ers' fathers (having been robbed of their manhood under communism) on the emerging subjectivity of their offspring” (13). Vassileva-Karagyzova distinguishes between three partly overlapping groups of paternal images in the initiation novels: fathers who are physically absent due to death, divorce, emigration, or involvement in the Solidarity movement; fathers, who are intimately involved with the Communist Party and have successful professional careers; and by far the largest group of fathers, who have failed to successfully position themselves in the professional sphere and have found themselves at the margins of both public and family life. She aptly and movingly describes testimonies of inadequate fathering during late communism, which abound in the Polish initiation novels. The testimonies pertain to groups of fathers whose masculinity is either elusive due to their absence or only “officially” sanctioned (as with the party functionaries); or has been defeated (in the third group of fathers) leading to alcohol abuse, promiscuity, and physical violence. Vassileva-Karagyzova also describes psychological consequences of inadequate fathering and hence deviant mother-child relations with father withdrawn and mother overburdened.

In chapter 4, titled “Exorcising Mother-Demons: The Myth of the Polish Mother Revisited,” the author turns to the presentation of Polish mothers in the initiation novels. She begins with her account of the nationalistic myth of the Polish Mother to conclude that her analysis of fictional portrayals of socialist motherhood shows that the '89ers' mothers unconsciously became collaborators in the political and social oppression of the younger generation and, ultimately, became their own children's victimizers. It should be emphasized that Vassileva-Karagyzova does not refer back to any feminist clichés but relies on the rather sincere testimonies of lived childhood

experiences found in the initiation literature, which give ample evidence of too much deficient and obstructive mothering in late-communist Poland. Again, such testimonies are described both aptly and movingly.

In the last chapter Vassileva-Karagyzova argues that “the post-1989 Polish initiation novels reflect the Polish youth's departure from institutional Catholicism (which had become too conservative and inflexible) and their aspirations toward a more inclusive spirituality. . . . On a deeper level, these childhood narratives link the decline of organized religion with the disintegration of the traditional family and, ultimately, with the demise of patriarchy” (13).

Dr. Vassileva-Karagyzova deserves much praise for this book, which is the fruit of much outstanding scholarly work. That readers may on rare occasions get confused as to what is the author's own stand on a given issue is inessential, since it is hidden behind too many quotations from other researchers. She is at her best in accounts of important and dramatic situations found in the initiation novels of the Polish '89ers. She should be applauded for not falling too easily into the traps of oversimplification and militancy set by feminists and postmodern ideologues. As a shrewd scholar, she not only notes that “female patriarchy dependence is now replaced with complete detachment from any roles that might potentially threaten women's independence” (129), but also realizes that nothing good can follow from such detachment.

Yet when it comes to her general conclusions, one cannot help but feel much disappointment. There is no doubt that women's family problems should be addressed with understanding and compassion, but should we start addressing them from a nonmilitant feminist viewpoint, as Dr. Vassileva-Karagyzova does, where everything that pertains to gender is expressed in feminist stereotypes and gender differences are in fact negated, and where multigenerational extended families, perhaps modestly and wisely patriarchal, are fairy tales of sorts for senile elders? I hardly dare mention here Christianity is the only civilization so far to give a firm

foundation to women's rights in particular and human rights in general, and which—at least in principle—has made the lives of men and women in the West worth living.

More generally, except for references to literary critique (Vassileva-Karagyzova refers to a host of distinguished experts), her background on social and political issues seems too one-sided. Given that the author's aim was more ambitious than merely providing a new account of the initiation literature, some omissions concerning post-1989 literature produced by the '89ers are also surprising. Let me confine myself to two examples, Rafał Ziemkiewicz's (b. 1964) *Pieprzony los kataryniarza* and Jacek Dukaj's (b. 1974) *Xavras Wyżryn i inne fikcje narodowe*. While neither qualifies as a bildungsroman, both—one within science fiction and the other within the genre of fantasy—are good illustrations of how the two genres mentioned have entered the field of serious reflection on nationhood, Poland, Polish patriotism, and so on. If one writes about the process of Bildung among Polish '89ers, one cannot skip the work of those who were happy enough to avoid the sad path to unrooted adulthood. Let me give one more example of the Bildung among the '89ers, this time referring to a seventy-six-page-long essay "Rosja i rewolucja—Zygmunt Krasiński" by Andrzej Nowak (b. 1960), now a distinguished historian but a twenty-two-year-old student at the time of the writing. Interestingly, the essay was first presented at a seminar held by Professor Maria Janion.

The aforementioned examples bring me to my main objection: Vassileva-Karagyzova's one-sidedness in her analysis of both the social context within which the Polish '89ers were coming of age, and the intellectual landscape they formed in the 1990s and later. As has already been emphasized, her study does justice to the hardships that many adolescent '89ers endured, but the overall picture and explanations she offers do not tell the whole story, as these three examples already suggest. With her hostility toward the Catholic Church, borrowed from or shared with liberal/postmodern/feminist scholars and commentators, she equates

Catholicism with clericalism, and staying with tradition and cultural identity with aggressiveness and politicization. She goes so far as to claim that the ultimate aim of the Church in the early 1990s was to establish a confessional state. Uncritically, she repeats postcommunist propaganda of that period, claiming that the Church hierarchy ignored public criticism (what specifically, she does not say), thereby weakening its moral authority. Apparently Dr. Vassileva-Karagyzova does not know that this was the time when the Church was under permanent attack by the influential *Gazeta Wyborcza*, and that remembering the past was unwelcome, to say the least, within the circles educated by the *Gazeta*, while the word "patriotism" (understood as "chauvinism" by postcommunists) was deleted from the vocabulary. Admittedly, since the advocates of such views virtually monopolized the media and the university, many people lost their sense of direction and an ability to distinguish between true and false or even right and wrong.

However, many of the '89ers neither fell victim to this kind of confusion nor allowed themselves to become uprooted. To the contrary, writers, philosophers, and publicists of the 1989 generation associated with such journals or think tanks as *Arka* (later *Arcana*), *Frona*, *Teologia Polityczna* and *Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej* have been consistently shaping Polish culture and political and social thought with valuable contributions. Unfortunately, except for one opinion by Marek A. Cichocki cited by Dr. Vassileva-Karagyzova in a footnote (in which he mentions, among others, Paweł Lisicki, Piotr Semka, Piotr Zaremba, Rafał Ziemkiewicz, and Igor Janke), and a few references to Dariusz Gawin, no other insights of an intellectual from the circles mentioned are included in the book reviewed.

Overwhelmed by what she imbibed from authors of the majority of initiation novels and the postmodern/postsecular publicists whose failed social conditioning and fragmented self-identities she takes for the whole picture, Dr. Vassileva-Karagyzova can neither provide a full picture of the Polish 1989 generation nor explain in depth its attachment to or rejection of

Polish Catholicism and the Polish way of being, the latter seen by her as a set of Polish stereotypes. However, this does not deny the importance and accuracy of many insights that can be found in her book. Δ

Selected Drama And Verse by Franciszka Urszula Radziwiłłowa

Edited by Patrick John Corness and Barbara Judkowiak. Translated by Patrick John Corness. Introduction by Barbara Judkowiak. The Toronto Series 37 (The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe). Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, vol. 478. Toronto, Ontario and Tempe, Arizona: Iter Academic Press (Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies), 2015. xv + 395 pages. Illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 978-0-86698-532-1. Softcover. \$45.00 from Amazon.com.

Barry Keane

Franciszka Urszula Radziwiłłowa (1705–1753) is a remarkable historical figure of the late Baroque era, whose life and considerable literary achievements have been explored, presented, and celebrated in this major work of scholarship and translational endeavor. Barely known to Polish letters, although nominally occupying the title of Poland's first woman dramatist, Radziwiłłowa brought to her plays and poetry the worldview of aristocratic women, which proffered cautionary advice to young ladies on matrimonial issues whilst also providing a confessional perspective, in particular about the challenging position of marital life for a woman surrounded by the "spying" eyes of court.

Franciszka Urszula née Wiśniowiecka was born into an influential noble family with historically royal links, and who possessed vast tracts of land in Ukraine. Indeed, many of the male members of her family occupied the highest positions in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the females were charismatic and powerful members of the royal

court. Franciszka's education was overseen by her father Janusz Wiśniowiecki, governor of Kraków who in his youth had undertaken the European tour and who himself had harbored literary ambitions with a penchant for writing frivolities. Janusz would engender in his daughter an understanding of literature that was seen as the possession of powers that were both formative but also self-creating; a perception that "the treasure must be there" (195).

Perhaps because of her close relations with her enlightened parents, Franciszka was able to spurn suitors and choose a husband who would make an "impetuous advance." The fortunate individual was Michał Radziwiłł (1702–1762), who was both governor of Vilnius and Field Commander of Lithuania, and whose residence was in Nieśwież located in today's Belarus. Their marriage was a tender affair, and founded on strong emotions and mutual regard, although Franciszka would in time come to harbor warranted suspicions about her husband's fidelity, and conveyed to him in her letters and poetry complaints of his neglect and indiscretions:

Men often break faith, so I have heard tell.
Deceive your eyes, they're good at that as well.
Though onto his checks no cheat rouge applies,
The virtuous face mask conjugal lies. ("Response to her husband," p. 357)

Franciszka experienced some twenty-nine pregnancies, although she succeeded in raising only three children to maturity. She undertook to take a direct hand in the raising of her children and the orphans of her close relations, and following her father's example she engendered in her charges the importance of artistic achievement and self-fulfillment in respective fields. To this end, she established a theater at her residential court, which relied principally on the participation of family and friends. Needless to say, it came to be "a unique kind of school for young actors and audiences." As Barbara Judkowiak writes, "these short plays, thanks to their clear, concentrated dramatic structure, were eminently suited to the formation of the theatrical taste of an unsophisticated audience. Their compactness was also better suited to the

abilities of the youthful performers and audience including Radziwiłłowa's children." The plays performed were often her own, some of which were idiosyncratic reworkings of Moliere's farces and comedies. Radziwiłłowa also attempted mystery plays which incorporated folkloric and classical motifs, indicating the extent to which literary traditions inhabited the spaces of the imagination and religious practices, and transacted with life's realities. The plays themselves represent a fascinating window into courtly entertainment taking place in the furthest reaches of Europe in the early eighteenth century.

Seven plays are included in the publication and each and every one is an intriguing piece. They are also eminently readable and performable thanks in no small part to the considerable achievements of the translator Patrick Corness. The play *An Act of Divine Providence* is a dramatization of the Snow White theme, whereas *Gold in the Fire* is a version of the Griselda story, which first appeared in Boccaccio's *Decameron*. The literary merits and importance of the plays are wonderfully set out by Barbara Judkowiak, who in an extensive historical-biographical introduction not only incorporates interpretations of Radziwiłłowa's works but stakes a claim for their pioneering aspects. The accounts, arguments, and interpretations here are both insightful and perceptive, allowing the reader to understand the extent and context of Radziwiłłowa's creative achievements. The editor also convinces us that a historical neglect has taken place and that it is time to reassess the importance of "female voices" at the beginnings of the Polish theater.

Patrick Corness's translations of Radziwiłłowa's dramas and plays should delight and intrigue Baroque scholars, who will appreciate the extent to which the translator has looked to explore and elucidate the various literary traditions and sources present in the works. General readers in turn will admire the strength and beauty of dramatic lines made for an actor's delivery, lines such as

I'll see my realm is searched, the coast as well.

We'll gather news and runners will be placed
in all our forests and fields; we'll ride
meanwhile together through the dark forest. (*Love is Born in the Eyes*, p. 225)

What is most deserving of praise when it comes to the translations is the degree to which they seek to accentuate the authentic voice and idiom of Radziwiłłowa. The language of the poetry is quaint in places and perhaps of its time, but the intimations of disappointment with the present and unyielding hope reveal what true-to-life experiences and perceptions really meant for a woman of Franciszka Radziwiłłowa's ilk and stature:

If you can read the characters of people
Their eyes will tell you straight away
that world matters are quite different now. ("If you know how to read people's character," p. 354)

Altogether, a remarkable tome.

Δ

Year Zero A History of 1945

By Ian Buruma. New York: The Penguin Press, 2013. 368 pages. ISBN 978-1-59420-436-4. Hardcover.

James Edward Reid

In *Year Zero: A History of 1945*, Ian Buruma surveys much of the history that unfolded in Europe and Southeast Asia after the Second World War concluded in 1945. He has also made occasional forays into the history of the years immediately before and after 1945. His survey is a challenging task, with notable gaps concerning the war and postwar history of countries such as Poland and Ukraine. While reading *Year Zero*, I accessed some of this missing history for Poland in recent works such as Tony Judt's *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* and for Ukraine in *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, (reviewed here in 2012) and *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning* (2015), both by Judt's colleague and good friend Timothy Snyder.

A lesser writer might have been daunted by the extent and complexities of surveying the histories in countries such as Indonesia before, after, and primarily during 1945. Buruma usually meets this challenge with telling details, lively character sketches, and his capacity for the ironic *aperçu sommaire*. Occasionally, however, his tone fails completely, as in the following statement about the results of a settlement by Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union: “The agreement, following decisions already made by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin two years earlier at a conference in Teheran about shifting a large slice of Poland to the Soviet Union, was in keeping with an atmosphere of peculiar bonhomie” (154). Might the agreement atmosphere be more appropriately described as taking place in another way? Surely the decision to abandon a large area of Second World War ally Poland and its citizens to the genocidal tyrant Stalin must have taken place in an atmosphere of callous obliviousness.

Buruma also errs in his unfortunate references to the wartime service of Günter Grass. When Grass revealed in 2006 that he had served in uniform in Germany during the war, his revelation in *Peeling the Onion* (*Beim Häuten der Zwiebel*) was greeted with a storm of controversy in Germany and beyond. Buruma does not clarify that Grass was in his teens when he was forced into service in Hitler’s Waffen SS near the end of the war, a time when Germany was drafting and sending boys and young men to the front.

Although *Year Zero* is an informative history in many ways, it is not a traditional scholarly work. It does not contain a bibliography associated with the almost 400 endnotes. These notes present article and book titles in French and German, which may be accessible to some readers; unfortunately, Japanese endnote titles are not translated into English, but are anglicized, leaving the reader puzzled by all of the Japanese titles, such as Morita Yoshio’s *Chosen Shusen no kiroku: beiso ryōgun no shinchū Nihonjin no hikiage*. With these minor cavils aside, Buruma’s book is an accessible introduction to the period between the end of the Second World War and the postwar economic

boom that followed. I plan to lend the book to my father. When he and his brothers removed their Royal Canadian Air Force and Army uniforms and returned to civilian life at the end of the war, they may have missed some of the history of 1945 as it unfolded overseas.

A history of 1945 is a history that continues to extend its long reach through more than half a century. Just before the turn of this century I was a member of a Canadian delegation that met with a delegation of government officials from Indonesia. One of the Indonesian officials smiled as he reached out to shake my hand. I smiled in response, and said, “My name is James Reid.” As I clasped his outstretched hand in mine, he smiled broadly and his eyes brightened as he said with great pride “My name is Hitler.”

Kaleidoscope of Poland A Cultural Encyclopedia

By Oscar E. Swan with Ewa Kolaczek-Fila.
Foreword by Adam Zamoyski. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2015. xxvii + 366 pages. English and Polish indexes. ISBN 13-978-0-8229-4438-6. Hardcover. \$39.95.

James S. Pula

Published as part of the University of Pittsburgh Series in Russian and East European History, *Kaleidoscope of Poland’s* editor states that the book should be “of particular interest to tourists and foreign residents in Poland who want to acquire a broader context for the many unfamiliar cultural terms they will encounter while in the country.” This self-imposed audience seems rather small for a volume that ought to resonate with a broader spectrum of the general public. While most of the genre of reference works focus on political events, here the emphasis is on material culture rather than history or politics. The editor’s somewhat pedantic knowledge of the subject matter is evidenced by the inclusion of such obscure topics as the ritual first haircuts (unknown to most Poles) or a bat sanctuary (*ditto*). It is

unfortunate that there is no explanation of the inclusion criteria. There appears to be a preference for contemporary individuals and topics. *Wigilia* is included as an entry, but not *święconka*. *Oczepiny* is included, but neither *stypa* nor *gwiazdka*.

Kaleidoscope of Poland is an illustrated volume with images on glossy paper. As a volume aspiring to serious presentation of things Polish, it has considerable drawbacks. Entries suffer from the editor's self-imposed limit of about 150 words which precludes adequacy concerning such events as the Second World War or such figures as Tadeusz Kościuszko. The latter entry makes no mention of Kościuszko's exceptional service at the Battle of Saratoga in the American Revolution, his participation in the Polish-Russian War of 1792, or his famous attempt to free and educate the slaves. Although the book contains a colorized cross-reference system, none of the entries are accompanied by any reference nor is there a bibliography, yet the editor identifies one of the book's purposes as being a reference source.

Using the volume can also be needlessly cumbersome. Although it is intended for English speakers, the entries are listed in Polish and there is a Polish index. While this poses no difficulty for such relatively well-known words as *Piłsudski*, listing "martial law" as "stan wojenny" or "the Second World War" as "druga wojna światowa" is a great way to make sure that few readers will consider the volume useful. These inexplicable choices are compounded by the use of the Polish alphabet which includes diacritical marks rather than the English for arranging the entries. Would someone not familiar with Polish know to look in a different place for an entry containing an *e* or an *ę*, an *l* or an *ł*? There is an English index in the back but no reference to it in the table of contents which reflects only the page numbers on which the different beginning letters of entries start.

Similarly incomprehensible ways of presenting material are seen in the appendices. There is a "Timeline of Polish Historical Months" (what's that?) that includes seven major risings and crises, but why it is listed by month is uncertain.

Two of these are the November and January Risings in the nineteenth century, while the other five reference anticommunist activities with the last entry being August 1980. Why not include the Mierosławski revolt? Why not the Silesian or Wielkopolska risings? The Warsaw Rising in 1944? There is likewise a "Timeline of Polish Literary Figures Cited," but it is arranged by period rather than the author's last name, so if one does not know that Gabriela Zapolska was associated with Young Poland one has to look through the entire list to find her. Why timelines were chosen as an organizing principle for these is not stated. There is also a listing of "Major Polish national and Regional Risings" (again by the Polish names) and a section listing "Important Twentieth-Century Conferences Affecting Poland."

These are serious shortcomings. However, the encyclopedia is attractively produced; the photographs are of good quality and include portraits of individuals, images of food, famous places, historical sites, and artwork. The boldfaced cross-references within the entries provide useful cross-listings of related topics. Δ

MORE BOOKS

Cienie moich czasów [The shadows of my time], by **Bronisław Wildstein**. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zysk (www.zysk.com.pl), 2015. 451 pages. ISBN 978-83-7785-701-4. Paper. In Polish.

It is frustrating to review books like this. They reveal and teach so much, yet they are kept away from the vast sea of potential readers by being written in a little-known language. Many English-language readers are anxious to learn what has really happened in Eastern Europe over the last half-century. So many mistakes, inaccuracies, and plain lies have circulated in academia and the media about Eastern European history that books like this are like a breath of fresh air. Yet they are also irritating because the reader knows that their content has so far been locked up.

This autobiographical book tells the story of a man who actively participated in the political and social events in Poland starting with the pre-Solidarity period. He observed with his own eyes the transformation of people like Adam Michnik from promoters of anticommunist revolution to supporters of the former communist policemen and propagandists, such as Czesław Kiszcak or Jerzy Urban. He saw Lech Wałęsa give in to his enormous ego and become a “salon clown.” One can also find here paragraphs about Western pundits being spectacularly wrong in pontificating on Polish anti-Semitism. The book does not lament the naivety of the Western cultural establishment that has reified Eastern and Central Europe beyond recognition, and has not progressed beyond the 1980–81 vision of naïve Eastern workers trying to abolish communism. The author is too smart for that. Western readers could learn a great deal about how the world works from reading this book. Needless to say, a possible publisher for this excellent volume is welcome to call. (SB)

***Comparisons and Contexts: Essays on Central-Eastern European Literature and Culture*, edited by Bogusław Bakula, Dobrochna Dabert, and Emilia Kledzik.** Poznań: Biblioteka Porównań, 2015. 300 pages. Index, photographs. ISBN 978-83-62298-75-4.

Published by the most active center for comparative studies in Poland, this volume tries once again to bring to focus the specificities of literatures in non-Germanic Central and Eastern Europe. Over a dozen essays address methodological issues, postcolonial problems, cinema, the Holocaust and its role in the perception of Eastern Europe in the West, Polish-German relations, and the literary canon. The essays by Bakula, Kledzik, Kołodziejczyk, and Skórczewski should be singled out because of their outstanding value. Last but not least, it should be stressed that only through tomes like this can Central and Eastern European literatures be introduced into the Western mainstream. The secondhand opinions culled from Russian and German writers that still circulate in academic circles in America falsify the picture according

to the needs of the empires in which they originated. What is needed is a broader distribution of books written by the Eastern Europeans themselves, as well as inclusion of these books in the literary curricula of Western universities. How many chairs of Central and Eastern European literatures at American universities have recently been founded? Zero? Therein lies the problem. (JB)

Scriptorum: Fragmenty Pism, czyli uwagi o wojnie i pokoju [Notes on war and peace, 1660], by Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro. Translated from Latin by Jagoda Chmielewski and Bartłomiej Bednarek. Introduction and notes by Marek Tracz-Tryniecki. Warsaw: Narodowe Centrum Kultury (www.nck.pl), 2014. 845 pages. Index, notes, photographs. ISBN 978-83-7982-063-4. Hardcover. In Polish.

Andrzej Fredro was excised from Polish memory by colonialism. This is one of the hundreds of instances in which a wise statesman and writer from whom generations of Poles and others could have learned a great deal has been thoroughly forgotten. Dropped in the memory hole. Under partitions of Poland there was no institution whose task it was to publish and make known the great works of Polish literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Normally, a country takes care of promoting its writers. For nearly two centuries Poland, a midsize European nation, was deprived of this basic right because it was militarily occupied by Russia, Germany, and Austria. No restitution here.

Fredro writes about society and politics. His learning is vast: he throws in comparisons from the little known ancient and Renaissance writers, and concludes that in many cases the Polish system has provided more liberty than any other and that it should therefore be treasured and defended. Fredro did not anticipate that the European Christian order in which he believed would disappear within two centuries. He thought that countries within Europe would behave honorably toward each other. He was not a utopian thinker and anticipated wars, but he could not imagine that three European countries would cannibalize Poland by dividing her into

three parts and absorbing each part, with the hope expressed in the last partition treaty that the word “Poland” and “Polish” would eventually disappear from world vocabulary. That the nation survived under these circumstances should be a point of wonder and a source of strength for contemporary Poles who grapple with the inevitable uncertainties and storms of the postcommunist era. Was it Poland’s Catholicism that made Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia so hate the Polish nation? Interestingly, it was the Catholic empire of the Habsburgs that was placed next under the guillotine of history. Austria, one of the partitioning powers, came out of World War I stripped of its non-Austrian possessions and condemned to the status of a minor European republic, eventually becoming less important than Poland who, in spite of strenuous efforts to liquidate or corrupt its elites, emerged out of the two world wars renewed in many ways.

No, Fredro does not write about all this. But his book inspires these reflections. Much recommended for those who enjoy serious reading. (JB)

Historia według poetów: Myślenie metahistoryczne w literaturze polskiej, 1764-1848 [History according to poets: Metahistorical thinking in Polish literature, 1764–1848], by **Andrzej Waśko**. Kraków: Arcana, 2016. 515 pages. Bibliography, index of names. ISBN 978-83-65350-03-9. Hardcover. In Polish.

Professor Waśko’s specialty is Romantic poetry, a subject rather alien to those accustomed to the exclusion of spirituality from contemporary literary scholarship. He has written important books on the transfer of Polish identity from Baroque diarists to Romantic bards, and has now come up with an ambitious work outlining the spiritual dimension of the literary reflection of Polish risings in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The book ignores the contemporary trends in literary criticism and defiantly follows the style of writing that combines history with poetry. Waśko persuasively contests the *idées reçues* of Polish post-Enlightenment writers who despised the achievements of the Polish Baroque and Renaissance. He corrects a number of

misconceptions about Old Polish literature. One of his examples of “metahistorical poetry” is Zbigniew Herbert’s *Report from a Besieged City*.

Ojczyzna literatura: O środowisku skupionym wokół Związku Pisarzy Polskich na Obczyźnie, by **Regina Wasiak-Taylor**. London: Poets’ and Painters’ Press (Oficyna Poetów i Malarzy, 103 Colindeep Lane, London NW9 6DD), 2013. 294 pages. Index of names, biographies of writers, Reproductions of paintings and drawings. ISBN 978-0-9570372-1-2. In Polish.

This beautifully published volume contains articles and interviews related to the now-legendary group of Polish literary émigrés in London during World War II and afterwards. Regina Wasiak-Taylor is a talented writer and interviewer whose style resembles Andrzej Bobkowski’s *Szkice piórkami*: it seems to barely scratch the surface, but the end result remains vividly in memory. Among the writers discussed are Melchior Wańkowicz, Bolesław Taborski, Stanisław Baliński, Florian Smieja, Marian Hemar, Włada Majewska, Józef Garliński (who also wrote the preface), and a couple dozen others. The book reads extremely well, one of those little pearls of literary culture that should be known to everyone claiming even minimal expertise in the subject of Polish émigré writers or literary life in the mid-twentieth century.

The Quest for a Free Ukraine, by **Olena Chekan**. Edited by **Bohdan Rodyuk Chekan**. Vienna: Der Konterfei, 2015. 94 pages. ISBN 978-3-903043-04-6. Paper. In English and Ukrainian.

The book consists mostly of interviews conducted by Ukrainian journalist and actress Olena Chekan for *Ukrainian Week*. The volume came out *in memoriam*, following Olena’s death from brain cancer on December 21, 2013. Her son Bohdan made an earnest effort to preserve her memory. In addition to the interviews, he included in this volume notes about Olena Chekan written by Serhiy Trymbach, Maksym Striha, Volodymyr Melnichenko, and others. The book’s cover features Olena Chekan in the

role of a woman from Kievan Rus, perhaps meant to symbolize Ukraine. A reader undeterred by the book's vague title and a mystifying cover design will find inside a collection of conversations with various Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles on topics ranging from Ukraine, Russia, and Europe to arts and politics, Holodomor, Chernobyl and Chechnya, solidarity and integrity, and the role of the elites and ordinary citizens in society. These conversations suggest that Ukraine's quest for a place of its own on the world map did not begin in 2013–2014 during the so-called Dignity Revolution; this period only finalized one stage in a long journey toward the European family. In 2010–2011, or during Victor Yanukovich's presidency, *Ukrainian Week* was able to provide a platform for discussion about Ukraine's future.

Olga Chekan belonged to both Russian and Ukrainian cultures. She studied at the Boris Shchukin Theater Institute in Moscow, and her career was launched on the Soviet screen. This hybridity is reflected in the biographical section: the editor uses the Russian spelling of her name, Elena Vasilievna Chekan, adding the Ukrainian version in brackets. The hybridity is confirmed in an article by Andrew N. Okara, a Russian-Ukrainian political and cultural analyst from Moscow, titled "Ukraine between Freedom and an Iron Calf of an Empire." The piece explores Russian-Ukrainian relations, and it is not until the end that a connection is made with Chekan herself.

The interviews are placed in a sequence that is neither chronological nor alphabetical. Some of the interviewees are well known: Boris Nemtsov, Vaclav Havel, and Krzysztof Zanussi; others, like Kerstin Jobst, Natalya Gorbanevskaya, or Ahmed Zakayev, may be question marks for the uninitiated readership. The volume gives voice to those representatives of the Russian empire who are no longer welcome in Russia (Yuri Shevchuk); those who have been killed (Boris Nemtsov); and those who, like the Chechen Ahmed Zakayev, live abroad with their dream of an independent Chechnya.

Better proofreading and more meticulous work with the English translation would have made this volume more trustworthy. As it stands, the bits of trivia on Olena Chekan are repeated over and over. There are discrepancies in the English spelling of proper names owing to a lack of consistency in transliterating from either Russian or Ukrainian. These details are indicative of the Ukrainian situation today. Ukraine is a work in progress, much like this cluster of interviews. Raw material may be cooked, a chrysalis may transform into a butterfly, and Ukraine may achieve independence, prosperity, and an agency of its own. Undoubtedly Olena Chekan has been a part of this process. (*Tetyana Dzyadevych*)

About the Authors

Krzysztof Brzechczyn is Professor of Humanities at the Institute of Philosophy at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań.

Tetyana Dzyadevych is Instructor in Russian at the Department of Slavic and Baltic Languages and Literatures, University of Illinois at Chicago.

Barry Keane is Lecturer in Comparative Studies specialising in Polish and Baroque literature at the University of Warsaw.

Jacek Koronacki is Professor of Statistics and Director of the Institute of Computer Science at the Polish Academy of Sciences. He is also a political and social commentator and a regular contributor to the conservative Polish bimonthly *Arcana*.

Rafał Malczewski (1892–1965) is a Polish painter and writer.

James S. Pula is Professor of History at Purdue University Northwest and a noted specialist in things Polish.

James Edward Reid is a Canadian writer. His "On Translation: An Interview with Peter Dale Scott" was published early in 2016 in Volume 42 of the journal *Paideuma* at the University of Maine in Orono. The interview touches on Scott's time as a Canadian diplomat in Poland in the late 1960s, on his contact with Zbigniew Herbert, and, at some length, on his relationship with Czesław Miłosz.

Adrian Lucas Smith is a Briton enamoured of Zakopane.