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**Chen Duxiu's Early Years: The Importance of Personal
Connections in the Social and Intellectual Transformation of
China 1895-1920**


by

Anne Shen Chao

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APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE:



Richard J. Smith, Chair, Professor
History, George and Nancy Rupp
Professor of Humanities



Nanxiu Qian, Associate Professor
Chinese Literature



Sarah Thal, Associate Professor
History, University of Wisconsin-
Madison

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ABSTRACT

Chen Duxiu's Early Years: The Importance of Personal Connections in the Social and Intellectual Transformation of China 1895-1920

by

Anne Shen Chao

Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), is without question one of the most significant figures in modern Chinese history. Yet his early life has been curiously neglected in Western scholarship. In this dissertation I examine the political, social and intellectual networks that played such an important role in his early career--a career that witnessed his transformation from a classical scholar in the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), to a reformer, to a revolutionary, to a renowned writer and editor, to a university dean, to a founder of the Chinese Communist Party, all in the space of about two decades.

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INTRODUCTION

Chen Duxiu (1887-1942) is without question one of the most interesting and significant figures in modern Chinese history. Yet he has been poorly understood, especially in Europe and America. Relatively few studies of Chen's life and times have appeared in Western languages, and although there has been a huge outpouring of Chinese scholarship on Chen over the past three decades or so, most of it emphasizing his life from 1920 onward--from the period in which he co-founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to his solitary death in 1942. Moreover, the bulk of this literature in China reflects a deep-seated historiographical tendency to allocate "praise and blame" (*baobian*). Thus, Chen generally appears in the literature as a hero, a villain, or some combination of the two, whose personal virtues and/or character flaws explain his tumultuous career and his role in China's turbulent twentieth century history. In these politically driven and teleologically oriented accounts, Chen's early experiences led him inexorably to Communism and his later mistakes led inevitably to failure and humiliation.

This study attempts a more more nuanced view of Chen's life and times, focused primarily on the comparatively neglected period from 1895-1920. Drawing not only upon his own writings and those of his friends and associates but also upon the vast body of secondary literature in Chinese and other languages, I have tried to go beyond politically motivated or morally based evaluations of Chen and his career. Moreover, I have tried to place him in a larger historical and interpretive framework. In this framework he remains an undeniably central and significant figure, but his significance is

in large measure a product of his relationships with a great many other individuals who worked together, and occasionally also at cross-purposes, to solve the pressing problems of their place and time. Since these problems are of crucial importance to an understanding of the way China's twentieth century history unfolded, the effort seems worthwhile.

In order to give a general sense of Chen's place in the picture, I begin with a brief overview of his life, and a discussion of the way that it has been depicted in the past. This discussion is followed by an outline of my methodology in this study.

Chen Duxiu in History and Historiography

Chen Duxiu was born in the area of Anqing, Anhui province, in 1887. Bright and well-educated, he placed first in the district-level civil service examinations and gained the prestigious title of *xiucai* ("cultivated talent") at age seventeen. A year later he failed the provincial-level exam but wrote "A Treatise on the Defense of the Yangzi River"--a reflection of his rapidly growing patriotism. He studied in Japan on five different occasions and, while there, joined a revolutionary overseas Chinese student organization, the Youth Society (Qingnian hui), in 1902.¹ He was expelled from Japan in 1903 for

¹ Symptomatic of much of the scholarship on Chen's early life, biographers differ on the number of trips Chen made to Japan (Chen Wanxiong says four while Wang Guanquan says five); the years in question are between 1900 and 1902. Prof. Shen Ji, in his definitive analysis of Chen's early life, concludes that he made five trips to Japan, and did not attend Qiushi Academy after his failed second level civil service exam in 1898; nor did he attend Nanjing's Jiangnan Military Academy. Therefore he did not meet Zhang Shizhao, Zhao Sheng, and Qin Yuliu there. See Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua yundong qian di Chen Duxiu*, 7. Wang Guanquan, *Bei bang di Puluomixiusi*, 56, 60, 64, 69. Shen Ji ed. *Chen Duxiu yanjiu*, vol. 2, 236-242. There is also some disagreement among the biographers on whether or not Chen went to Japan first in 1901 or 1902. Along with the problematic attendance of Qiushi Academy, there is insufficient evidence to document his activities between 1898 and 1902. Zhi Yuru thought Chen went to Japan four times, and the first time was in 1902. See Zhi, Yuru. *Chen Duxiu nianpu*, 7. Wang Guanquan seems to have resolved the

cutting off the braid (*bianzi* or queue) of a Chinese official--an expression of his disgust for the ineffective and corrupt Qing dynasty (1644-1912). (The queue had been imposed on all Chinese males as a sign of submission to the Manchus when they conquered China in 1644). Chen returned home and formed the Anhui Patriotic Society (Anhui aiguo hui). In 1903, with the closing of the revolutionary paper, *Subao* (the Jiangsu News), Chen and his friends edited its replacement, the *Guomin riribao* (Citizen's Daily). When this enterprise fell apart due to internal dissent, Chen returned to his home province and published the *Anhui suhua bao* (Anhui Vernacular Paper) in 1904. For a brief period he also learned to make bombs with the Shanghai Assassination Squad. Later, in 1905, he formed an anti-Manchu organization, the Yue Fei Loyalist Society (Yuewang hui), and was implicated in Wu Yue's attempt to kill five Qing officials as well as Xu Xilin's assassination of Governor-General Enming.

Following the 1911 revolution, which established the Republic of China, Chen briefly served as Secretary-General of the Anhui Provisional government and helped to develop a military strategy designed to overthrow the warlord President Yuan Shikai, who had no sympathy with the democratic principles on which the Republic had been founded. When this attempt failed, Chen escaped to Japan and edited the *Jiayin zazhi* (Tiger Magazine) with Zhang Shizhao in 1914. He returned to Shanghai in 1915 and founded the *Qingnian zazhi* (Youth Magazine), later renamed *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth). Chen became the Dean of the School of Letters at Beijing University in 1917 at the invitation of Cai Yuanpei, a former revolutionary associate who had become Chancellor of the University.

problem by locating Chen's name in the Qing roster of overseas students in 1901, see Wang Guanquan, 56. Wang Guangyuan (not to be confused with Wang Guanquan) in his *Chen Duxiu nianpu* also states that he went to Japan first in 1901, see Wang, Guangyuan, 6.

Chen galvanized a generation of young people with his eloquent essay in *Xin Qingnian*, titled “Call to Youth” (1915), in which he urged them to adopt six new attitudes: to be self-directed, progressive, proactive, global, practical, and scientific. He hailed French civilization for bestowing upon mankind three gifts: science, democracy and socialism. Chen and Professor Hu Shi played a leading role in transforming written Chinese from a classical form (*wenyan wen*) to one reflecting the spoken vernacular language (*baihua wen*), a development of enormous importance for the education of the less literate population in China.

Disillusioned by the clash between the Western powers in World War I and the outcome of the Treaty of Versailles, and also inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Chen turned to Marxism as a means of building a strong, self-sufficient China. Aided by Russian Comintern agent Grigori Voitinsky, Chen founded the first Communist cell in Shanghai in the summer of 1920, and was elected Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party at its first congress on July 23, 1921. As head of the CCP from 1921 to 1927 Chen Duxiu repeatedly protested Moscow’s contradictory policies, including a directive ordering the CCP to join the Nationalist Party or Guomindang (led by Sun Yat-sen until Sun’s death in 1925) in order to usurp power from within.

Chen was blamed by the Party for carrying out Comintern orders to conduct doomed labor and peasant uprisings in the face of overwhelming opposition by warlords and by Chiang Kai-shek. He was later expelled from the CCP on November 15, 1929, for failure to follow Comintern directives, for being “anti-party,” and for thinking and acting like a Trotskyite. He actually joined the Chinese Trotskyites for a brief period and was jailed by Chiang Kai-shek from 1932 to 1937. In prison he pursued his scholarly

interest in phonetics and philology. Chen died destitute five years after his release from prison.

How can we understand this remarkable man? What historical circumstances helped to shape Chen's career trajectory and how did the activities of Chen and his associates transform the course of modern Chinese history?

A great deal has been written about Chen in Chinese, particularly after the relaxation of censorship approved by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Communist Party Congress in December 1978. Since then, a veritable cottage industry has developed in China, dubbed *Chenxue* ("Chen [Duxiu] studies"). This literature has concentrated mainly on his performance as the founder and first secretary-general of the CCP, and on his subsequent involvement with the Trotskyites. Only a handful of authors have studied his activities leading up to the New Culture Movement (1915-1923).² In the *Chenxue* discourse, he has been variously lauded as the "Plekhanov" of China and "the general-marshal of the May Fourth Movement," or accused of wearing "nine criminal hats" and denounced as a "liquidationist" [Trotskyite], a counter-revolutionary, a Japanese traitor, a rebel, a spy, someone who opposed the party, someone who betrayed the Comintern, a rightist opportunist, and a "rightist defeatist," as well as varying shades of praise and blame in between.³

In non-Chinese language historiography, Chen's involvement with the Chinese Communist Party has been the primary focus of attention in the seven major works

² See Cai Yizhong, *Cong Chen Duxiu di wenxue geming*; Chen Wanxiong, *Wusi xin wenhua de yuanliu*; Liu Changlin, *Zhongguo rensheng zhaxue*; Shen Ji ed., *Chen Duxiu yan jiu*; Shi Zhongyang, *Wenren Chen Duxiu*; Tong Fuyong and Zhang Tianle, *Chen Duxiu Li Dazhao jiaoyu sixiang yanjiu*; Wang Guanquan, *Bei bang di Puluomixiusi*; and Zhu Wenhua, "Zai zao wen ming" de dian ji shi.

³ Ibid.

published since 1949.⁴ The major exceptions to this emphasis on the CCP are Julie Lien-Ying How's excellent but dated masters thesis on the development of Chen's intellectual development from 1915 to 1938, and three works that cover Chen's entire lifespan--two biographies in English by Lee Feigon and Thomas Kuo, respectively, and one in Japanese by Yokoyama Hiroaki. Gregor Benton's book is based on the writings of Chen in the last five years of life; Pierre Broué's study concentrates on Chen's relationship with the Comintern from 1926 to 1927; and Richard Kagan's interest is in Chen's involvement with the Trotskyites.

In this study I seek to avoid both the teleological and the "praise and blame" narratives that characterize so much of the writing about Chen, both past and present. Instead, I will examine the larger political, intellectual and social contexts in which he operated, in order to show the complex and often contradictory ways that his ideas unfolded in the period from about 1895 to 1920. What this analysis will reveal is that the standard dichotomies that are so often used to compare and contrast Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries--for instance, juxtapositions such as "traditional" versus "modern" or "radical" versus "conservative"--are entirely inadequate as descriptions of these individuals, Chen in particular. And even if we were able to agree on what problematical terms such as "traditional" and "modern" might mean, it would be impossible to place Chen comfortably in one category or the other, regardless of the place or the time. As an examination of his voluminous writings, as well as a recounting of his civic and political activities in China and Japan, indicates clearly that at

⁴ See Gregor Benton ed. and tr., *Chen Duxiu's Last Articles and Letter*; Pierre Broué ed., *La Question Chinoise dans L'Internationale Communiste*; Chih Yu-ju, "The Political Thought of Ch'en Tu-hsiu"; Lee Feigon, *Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party*; Julie Lien-Ying How, "The Development of Ch'en Tu-Hsiu's Thought 1915-1938"; Richard Kagan, *The Chinese Trotskyite Movement and Ch'en Tu-hsiu*; Thomas C. T. Kuo, *Ch'en Tu-hsiu*; and Yokoyama Hiroaki, *Chin Dokushū*.

any given moment, Chen's thoughts and actions were the product of a great many influences drawn from a wide variety of sources, both Chinese and foreign. It is time, therefore, to re-assess the multi-faceted transformation of Chinese society from the 1890s to the 1920s without reference to misleading dichotomous categories and simplistic narratives.

Networking: An Analytical Framework

My approach in this study is to focus in particular on the idea of networks--that is, the wide range of formal and informal organizations and associations that influenced Chen's views and activities at various points in his colorful life. These organizations and associations included, but went well beyond, the academies, literary societies and scholarly clubs that for so long had been the hallmarks of Chinese intellectual life. They also went beyond the old-style social groupings based on kinship (real or fictive), shared religious orientation, common occupation, ties of local affinity and so forth (see below). Chen had barely become a teenager when, in response to China's devastating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 (see Chapter 1), the Chinese began to develop all sorts new-style civic associations, publishing houses and other political, social, economic and scholarly organizations--groups that often cut across class lines in membership, sometimes branching out overseas and incorporating languages and symbolism borrowed from abroad. The opening of new public spaces, such as the famous Zhang Garden in Shanghai,⁵ provided venues for the exchange and spread of new ideas.

⁵ The Zhang Garden was built in the nineteenth century by a Wuxi merchant named Zhang Honglu (aka Zhang Shuhe) who worked for Li Hongzhang. After the Sino-Japanese War the Zhang Garden became "a

To understand more clearly the role of personal connections and social relationships that loomed so large in Chen Duxiu's life, I have borrowed a few concepts from the sociology of network analysis. I have chosen in particular to employ what is sometimes known as an "egocentric" approach as a way of analyzing developments in the various stages in Chen's career.

A working definition of a social "network" is a set of actors and their associates, exhibiting both horizontal and vertical configurations, usually based on a theme, and with ties that are fluid and constantly changing.⁶ An individual normally belongs to multiple networks simultaneously, and networks intersect as a result of overlapping membership.⁷ Within any given network the power dynamics shift constantly, but the actors occupying the central positions at a particular moment naturally wield the greatest influence.⁸ The core individuals engage in frequent and close communication, and their relationship is often solidified by bonds of kinship, friendship, and common goals.⁹ Individuals generally join networks that provide a sense of community through the sharing of information and other forms of common experience.¹⁰ Newspaper offices, schools, and military organizations are all examples of networks that facilitate the exchange of information.

Mark Granovetter introduces the useful concept of strong and weak ties. The strong tie signifies the relationship between an individual and his or her close friends, and

crucial site for the dissemination of political criticism directed against both the Qing Empire and outside imperialist powers." Meng Yue, *Shanghai and the Edges of Empires*, 162. For details on Zhang Garden, see Appendix A.

⁶ Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 11.

⁷ Eiko Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility*, 1-64.

⁸ David Knoke, *Political Networks*, 13.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

the weak tie indicates the relationship between an individual and his or her acquaintances.¹¹ Significantly, weak ties often prove to be the crucial “bridges” that are most effective in disseminating information and resources, as they travel a greater social distance and reach more people.¹² Thus, we shall see that although Chen Duxiu remained on the periphery of many of social organizations, particularly in his early life, the impact of these weak relationships became significant as he moved to different levels of political engagement.

Networks of personal ties that reach beyond close friends offer a wider range of opinions, which, in turn, stimulate political participation.¹³ As we shall see, this applies especially to the more politically oriented student organizations that Chen and his cohorts joined, as many of them lived in the same dormitories, where they talked day and night about the political issues affecting China.

In terms of the degree of political participation among members of a network, personal networks involving a substantial degree of political expertise and education naturally tend to generate more politically relevant social capital, which in turn enhances the level of political engagement of members of that network. Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as the sum of all resources and relationships that are linked to a network, giving each member of the network “credit” that can be used for personal benefit.¹⁴ J. S.

¹¹ Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties--A Network Theory Revisited,” 106.

¹² Ibid., “The Strength of Weak Ties,” in *The American Journal of Sociology*, 78:6 (May, 1973), 1360-1365.

¹³ Ronald La Due Lake and Robert Huckfeldt, “Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation,” *Political Psychology*, 19:3, (Sept. 1998), 582.

¹⁴ Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie, and David Wank eds. *Social Connections in China*, 7. For a more detailed definition, see John G. Richardson, *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, 248.

Coleman, for his part, explains social capital as an aspect of social structure that facilitates particular forms of action and cooperation.¹⁵

The decision to continue to participate or withdraw from activism depends largely on how many aspects of the individual's life are connected to the issues at hand. The more points of convergence between one's life orientation and the issues, which provide a personal sense of "coherence and a holistic view," the more likely the individual will continue to engage in political and social action.¹⁶ At the same time, the more frequently members communicate within an organization, the more likely they are to develop similar social and political attitudes. While marginally situated individuals serve as bridges or conduits between social groups, it is the centrally located actors within each network who transmit the information in a vertical, downward flow.¹⁷ As we shall see, these observations shed light on why some of Chen's friends decided to disengage from political involvement while others stayed involved.

In studying Chinese social networks, the concept of *guanxi*, lit. "connections," is of enormous importance. Although social connections are obviously important in all societies, they were particularly well developed in late imperial China. One reason was the absence of a well developed tradition of protective law. Chinese law in imperial times was overwhelmingly punitive, an instrument of state power rather than any sort of bulwark against it. Thus, most members of Chinese society had little protection from bureaucratic exploitation, particularly in times of trouble; in order to gain a significant

¹⁵ Ronald La Due Lake and Robert Huckfeldt, 567-584. Other definitions are: trust in social relations, civic engagement created through participation in voluntary associations, a social fabric that creates a willingness to cooperate in the development of physical capital, etc. See 568-9.

¹⁶ Florence Passy and Marco Giugni, "Life-Spheres, Networks, and Sustained Participation in Social Movements," *Sociological Forum*, 15:1 (Mar., 2000), 117.

¹⁷ Knoke, 12-3.

measure of political, social and economic security, their natural response, which evolved over many centuries, was to develop and carefully cultivate all kinds of personal relationships.¹⁸

The renowned anthropologist Fei Xiaotong has insightfully contrasted the "differential mode of association" (*chaxu geju*) in traditional China with the "organizational mode of association" (*tuanti geju*) in the modern West. The former, he maintains, is marked by "distinctive networks spreading out from each individual's personal connections." The latter involves the attachment of individuals to a preexisting structure, and then the formation of personal relationships through that structure.¹⁹

According to Fei, these two types of social organization reflect different conceptions of morality. In the West, he asserts, "people in the same organizations apply universal moral principles to themselves and so regard each other as equals"--at least theoretically. In premodern China, however, where society tended to be conceived as "a web woven out of countless personal relationships," each knot in the web was connected to a specific, particularistic ethical principle. In this "self-centered" but not "individualistic" society, relationships "spread out gradually, from individual to individual, resulting in an accumulation of personal connections." As a result, Chinese social morality made sense "only in terms of these personal connections."²⁰

Many different types of *guanxi* existed in Chinese political and social life. Sometimes they overlapped or intersected to create especially powerful affiliations. The

¹⁸ Like China, Russia provides an example of a society with "shortage economy [and] weak legal infrastructure," where networking became a necessary device for "self-protection, career advancement and survival." Thomas Gold et al., 15.

¹⁹ Xiaotong Fei, *From the Soil*, 71. Similarly, Liang Shuming argued that Chinese society exhibited a "relationship-based" nature while the British and American social connections were "individual-based" and the Russian model "society-based." See Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, *Gifts, Favors, and Banquet*, 295.

²⁰ Fei, 60 ff., esp. 70.

most common relationships included those based on lineage (*qinshu guanxi*), in-law ties (*yinqin guanxi*), family friendships (*shiyi guanxi*), shared home area (*tongxiang guanxi*), educational ties (*shisheng guanxi* or *tongxue guanxi*), and bureaucratic linkages (*liaoshu guanxi* or *tongliao guanxi*). Most forms of *guanxi* implied a superior-inferior relationship in which the "junior" person owed loyalty, obedience and respect, while the "senior" owed protection and assistance in advancement. Gift-giving from juniors to seniors, a reflection of the deep-seated Chinese social principle of "reciprocity" (*bao*), naturally solidified these bonds.²¹ Unfortunately, institutionalized gift-giving could also lead to corruption, especially in times of economic distress, when superiors might abuse the system, in effect extorting money from their subordinates.

Andrew Nathan points out that *guanxi* facilitated cooperation between individuals in traditional China, not only by delineating status relationships, but also by rendering the behavior of each party predictable, "both with regard to social formalities . . . and with regard to potentially critical questions such as what one person had to ask of the other." Predictability and ease of intercourse, in turn, contributed to the establishment of trust. *Guanxi* as a system of "shared attributes" was thus highly formalized, and extended well beyond the "old boy network" of acquaintances in the West. Furthermore, it implied a much stronger sense of responsibility, obligations and indebtedness.²²

One of the most significant contributions network analysis makes is in revealing how the new periodical press worked in disseminating knowledge and provoking political action. Provincial and other ties of local affinity (*tongxiang guanxi*) seem to have been of tremendous importance to Chen, but unlike associations of this sort in the past, the

²¹ See Richard J. Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 64-65.

²² Andrew Nathan, *Peking Politics*, esp. 48-49. See also Ambrose King, "Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation," *Daedalus*, 120:2 (Spring, 1991), 63-84.

activities of these new reformist and revolutionary organizations, especially in places like Tokyo and Shanghai, had a greater reach because of the way information was shared through the new periodical press and in new public spaces. Information produced and transmitted by groups of students and intellectuals who were bound (or at least influenced significantly) by ties of local affinity but located in other provinces or even in other countries, had an immediate impact on their home areas, just as developments in their home areas had an immediate impact on "expatriates."

It has been observed that a weak government leads to a proliferation of powerful civic groups while a powerful totalitarian state can prevent or destroy these civic networks. A simultaneous expansion of political, economic, and communicative networks can become a serious challenge to the totalitarian state, and these expansions often mark the turning points in history.²³ Just as the black market supplements a dysfunctional economy, the exploitation of *guanxi* ties provides solutions to citizens in a society whose legal system is in some sense disfunctional, and these *guanxi* networks in turn shape history. As in early twentieth century Russia, the fragmentation of central authority in late Qing China made *guanxi* networks an especially important asset for advancement and personal protection. As we shall see, Chen Duxiu was saved several times from persecution because of the *guanxi* ties he and his family held with the provincial authorities, in particular with vague family relations to Li Hongzhang (1823-1901).²⁴

Networks not only provide opportunities for advancement and protection; they also transmit information, enhance political and social influence, and provide material

²³ Eiko Ikegami, 54, 64.

²⁴ Feigon, 76.

resources. At the same time, by their very nature, they are constantly shifting, subject to changing circumstances, including fluctuations in membership, shifting alliances and various forms of competition.²⁵

In short, network analysis provides a useful perspective from which to study historical processes, especially in China. By focusing on Chen Duxiu's "strong" and "weak" ties, we are able to see more clearly and evaluate more effectively the contexts in which Chen operated and the forces that exerted influence upon him. Chen thus becomes less the "heroic" (or "villainous") individual actor and more the product of his many shifting and overlapping associations. By the same token, we come to understand with greater clarity the influence that Chen had on his many friends, colleagues and other associates. Chen's story is one of experimentation--not only with ideas but also with approaches, including education, publication, reformist efforts and revolutionary activities. Rather than viewing his life trajectory as leading inexorably to communism, we should see it as a meandering, motivated by a patriotism/nationalism that took many forms at different times. Above all, we can more easily appreciate the complexity of all historical actors, including Chen, whose lives, like our own, are full of conflicts and contradictions. It is this knowledge that alerts us to the dangers of trying to fit the objects of our historical attention into simplistic models of thought and behavior.

²⁵ Barry Wellman and S. D. Bewrkowitz, *Social Structures*, 29, 43.

CHAPTER 1: THE CRISIS OF LATE QING CHINA

In order to appreciate the environment in which Chen Duxiu came of age and began not only thinking about, but also trying to find solutions for, the pressing problems of his time, it is important to have an understanding of the basic institutional structures and historical events that preceded him. The overview that follows, although by no means comprehensive, is designed to identify the primary political, social, economic and cultural forces that shaped Chen's world and affected his life. This world, as many contemporary observers, both Chinese and foreign, remarked upon constantly, was facing challenges and undergoing changes that had no precedent in the more than two thousand years of China's imperial history.¹

It is also important to appreciate how the political, social, and intellectual resources of "traditional" China could be employed in "modern" ways. One prominent example is the use of "networks," the primary focus of this study. As discussed in the Introduction, networks of various kinds have existed in all societies, but they have been especially powerful and pervasive in China for many hundreds of years. For Chinese intellectuals, at least prior to the late nineteenth century, political and social networks have operated within ideological parameters defined rather narrowly by various long-standing schools of "Confucianism" (see below). More iconoclastic organizations might develop in the lower eschelons of Chinese society, often influenced by millenarian strains of Buddhism or other "unorthodox" belief systems, but they still existed within the framework of "traditional" dynastic politics.

¹ Much of the following discussion has been derived from Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, chapters 3-5. For more detailed overviews, consult Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, chapters 2-14 and Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, chapters 1-11.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, radically new ideas were introduced to China from the West and Japan. Among them were concepts of democracy, constitutional law, political and social equality (including gender equality), fundamental freedoms (speech, the press, etc.) and so forth. But old ideas and institutions proved remarkably adaptable under the new circumstances. Self-styled Confucians, for example, found it possible to accept as part of their evolving world view radically new political and social ideas derived from the West, and old-style Chinese networks, ranging from scholarly associations to secret societies, found themselves involved in reformist and revolutionary activities that went well beyond anything that might have been imagined at any time in the imperial past.

Thus we see that China's search for "modernity" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however it might have been defined or understood at the time, "was not simply a matter of appropriating the new; it was also a matter of finding the proper place for inherited ideas and values."² Viewed from this perspective, "tradition" and "modernity" were not mutually exclusive concepts with fixed characteristics, as they have so often been characterized. Rather they were fluid categories, subject to multiple interpretations, which existed as part of a vast array of cultural choices at any given historical moment. There was never, however, any agreement among all Chinese intellectuals as to how the past should figure in China's present. As a result, vigorous and sometimes violent arguments over this issue continued unabated throughout the entire period covered by this study (and beyond).

² See the argument in the "Introduction" to Nanxiu Qian, Grace Fong and Richard J. Smith, eds., *Different Worlds of Discourse*, 1-25.

The Inherited Political and Social Order

The Qing dynasty (1644-1912), established by a tribal confederation from beyond the Great Wall known as the Manchus, became the largest consolidated empire in all of Chinese history. It was also by far the most successful dynasty of conquest. On the whole, the Qing regime developed to the fullest the inherited political, economic, and social institutions of its predecessor, and achieved the greatest degree of regional integration within China proper of any prior regime, native or foreign. No previous dynasty had been more “Confucian” in outlook or more self-consciously “antiquarian.”³

The key to the success of the Manchus as alien conquerors, in addition to their possession of a powerful army known as the Eight Banners (*baqi*), was their deliberate and fervent promotion of traditional Chinese culture. Even prior to their military conquest they had established a contingency government in their capital at Mukden (modern-day Shenyang) that replicated almost exactly the institutional structure of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). In 1644, after the rebel marauder Li Zicheng (1606-1645) had taken the Ming capital of Beijing, the Manchus joined forces with Ming troops under General Wu Sangui (1612-1678) to expel the insurgents, declaring that they had come to save China (and by implication, Chinese culture) from rebel depredations.

In short order, the Banner armies and the forces of General Wu drove Li Zicheng out of Beijing (he was eventually killed in 1645), allowing the Manchus to claim the “Mandate of Heaven” (*Tianming*). This three thousand year old political concept justified the overthrow of a corrupt regime, whether effected by internal rebellion or external aggression. Thus, having replaced the decadent Ming regime as well as the

³ Ping-ti Ho, quoted in Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 2.

short-lived Shun dynasty of Li Zicheng, the Manchus had inherited the right to rule China, and they could keep it as long as they continued to rule in a just and righteous manner. To put the matter somewhat cynically, a regime could claim the Mandate for as long as it could maintain control.

In an effort to win local and eventually countrywide support from the conquered population, the Manchus immediately began to show their support for the inherited culture, burying the last Ming emperor with honors (he had hanged himself after Li Zicheng's entry into Beijing) and paying tribute to Ming officials who had lost their lives in the turmoil. They also appointed Chinese to many vacant bureaucratic positions and sponsored special civil service examinations to recruit new Chinese scholarly talent. Meanwhile, imperial princes began to be educated in the classical Chinese written language as well as their native Manchu script; thus, in relatively short order, all Qing emperors and their sons came to be thoroughly conversant with Confucian core texts and historical writings as well as commentaries on these works. They were also schooled in many other refinements of Chinese culture, including calligraphy, painting, poetry and music. The Kangxi emperor (1662-1722) and his grandson, the Qianlong emperor (1736-1796), were especially ardent patrons of Chinese philosophy, art and literature. Both composed Chinese verse, collected exquisite examples of Chinese paintings and calligraphy, sponsored and wrote prefaces to huge collections of Chinese poetry and prose, and gave banquets in honor of renowned Chinese scholars and artists.⁴

Although the Manchus tried relentlessly to legitimize themselves as the protectors of China's cultural heritage, they also left a legacy of resentment in the initial stages of their conquest and consolidation of the empire. In the first place, they reinforced their

⁴ For a convenient overview, see Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, esp. 31-32 and 38-40.

image as "barbarian" conquerors by forcing the Chinese to shave a part of their hair near the forehead and to braid the rest of it into the Manchu-style queue (*bianzi*) as a sign of submission. But more important, especially in the long run, was their sometime brutal conquest of southern China. In the course of their military campaigns, the Banner armies committed atrocities in various places--notably the cities of Yangzhou and Jiading in the Yangzi River region--and the memory of their harshness and cruelty lingered in local memory for more than 250 years.

Manchu fears of the Chinese, who outnumbered them at least 100-1, led the Qing rulers to adopt from the Ming dynasty, or to invent for themselves, a number of institutional checks and balances, which contributed greatly to political stability but also had the effect of stifling initiative, making rapid change difficult if not impossible to achieve in both civil and military affairs.

Checks and Balances

From a military standpoint, the Qing government's main priority was to assure that its Banner forces predominated not only in Inner Asia (especially the Manchu homeland known by foreigners as Manchuria) but also in Beijing and the provinces. Although outnumbered at least two to one overall by the 500,000-man Army of the Green Standard (*lüying*; an exclusively Chinese army), the multi-ethnic Eight Banners were carefully concentrated and strategically positioned to assure them superiority over all of the purely Chinese forces in China Proper (i.e. the agricultural area below the Great Wall). Although the principal duty of the Banner armies was the protection of Beijing

and its environs, the Banners also served as a check on the Army of the Green Standard, which was greater in terms of absolute numbers but far more fragmented in its deployment.

Furthermore, military authority was carefully diffused in China Proper: "Although the governor-general and governor exercised administrative jurisdiction over regular provincial military forces, they had no authority over Banner garrisons in the provinces, which were commanded by so-called Tartar generals (*jiangjun*). Governors-general and governors, for their part, shared responsibility for the Green Standard troops in the areas of their jurisdiction with a military officer entitled the provincial commander-in-chief (*tidu*)."⁵ This situation made it virtually impossible for Banner and Green Standard forces, or even units of the Army of the Green Standard itself, to muster quickly or cooperate comfortably.

In Chinese civil administration, an important feature of the Qing check-and-balance system was the appointment of more or less equal numbers of Manchus and Chinese to head most of the high-level metropolitan offices of the empire, including the Grand Council, the Grand Secretariat and the Six Boards (Civil Appointments, Revenue, Ritual, War, Punishments and Public Works).⁶ This dyarchical system of bureaucratic control aimed to balance the power between the Manchus and Chinese in the provinces as well, as a mixture of Manchus and Chinese were appointed in the provincial administration. According to a common formula, a Chinese might serve as a provincial governor, while a Manchu might occupy the position of governor-general. The administrative responsibilities of these two types of officials overlapped substantially,

⁵ Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 64.

⁶ The Manchus deliberately kept themselves apart from the Chinese by forbidding intermarriage till the last few years of the dynasty, and by banning their women from binding their feet.

requiring an extraordinary amount of communication and often creating a great deal of tension if not outright confusion.

Other Qing checks and balances included the effort to balance regular and irregular (i.e., purchased) bureaucratic appointments, the frequent transfer of virtually all officials (usually every three years or less), and rules prohibiting bureaucratic service in one's home area (for example, a provincial governor could not serve in his home province). Ironically, however, this 'rule of avoidance' had the unintended consequence of forcing the officials in unfamiliar areas to rely on clerks, runners, constables, and others, whose powerful local ties and loyalties were precisely what the avoidance rule was meant to overcome.⁷

The problem of local ties and conflicting loyalties was evident at every level of Qing government, and also apparent throughout the Chinese social system. As Qing historian Tom Metzger has observed: "For all its stress on loyalty and hierarchy, Chinese society has been characterized by a remarkably fluid pattern of betrayal and intrigue. Individuals frequently oscillated between cooperation with the centralized state bureaucracy and support for smaller, often more ascriptive groupings, such as lineages, clubs, cliques, or secret societies, inhibiting political centralization."⁸ Fearful of all organizations, large or small, that were not subject to direct or indirect government supervision, the Qing rulers established a policy in 1652 of banning all "private societies."⁹ This blanket provision made it possible for the Chinese state to suppress--at

⁷ Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 64.

⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁹ Hao Chang, "Intellectual Change and the Reform Movement, 1890-8," in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, (COC) 11:294.

least in theory, and often in practice--any club or association that it believed might pose a threat to the Qing political or social order.

Because the prevailing concept in dynastic China had long been government by virtue (*yi de wei zheng* in the stock formulation), Confucian morality remained the overriding consideration in Chinese administration--more important than either abstract law or technical specialization in the eyes of most scholar-officials and the state. Chinese leaders from the emperor down to the lowest centrally appointed official (the district or country magistrate or *xianzhi*, generally in charge of 200,000 to 400,000 people) were supposed to govern primarily by example, inspiring their subordinates in what might be described as a moral "trickle-down" effect.

The Examination System

The Confucian emphasis on learning as the way to moral cultivation thus led to the recruitment of government officials through a series of nation-wide competitive examinations. Moral knowledge derived primarily from the Confucian classics became the focus of the examinations, a system that existed for nearly two thousand years. By Ming and Qing times, the civil service exams had become a regular feature of Chinese political and social life.¹⁰ Success in the initial series of exams at the county level (see below), held twice every three years, brought the *shengyuan* (government student) degree and eligibility for the triennial examinations at the provincial level. Successful candidates at this level won the *juren* ("recommended person") degree and an opportunity to compete for the coveted metropolitan *jinshi* ("advanced scholar") degree. The final

¹⁰ Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 61.

stage in the process was the more or less pro forma palace examination (*dianshi*), held for the top three classes of metropolitan graduates in the Hall of Preserving Harmony (Baohedian) in the Forbidden City.

LEVELS OF EXAMINATION¹¹

Preliminary Examinations

County-level (*xiankao*)

Prefectural-level (*fukao*)

Examination for *shengyuan* (aka *xiuca*) degree (*yuankao*); county quotas

Provincial Examinations

Examination for *juren* degree (*xiangshi*) after preliminary test known as *kekao*; county quotas

Metropolitan Examinations

Major examination known as *huishi* for *jinshi* degree; provincial quotas

Palace examination (*dianshi*)

Further examination for specific official appointments (*zhaokao*)

At each level, scholars were tested on their mastery of certain core Confucian texts--primarily the "Four Books" (the *Lunyu* [Analects of Confucius], the *Mengzi* [Book of Mencius], the *Daxue* [Great Learning], and the *Zhongyong* [Doctrine of the Mean]) and the "Five Classics" (the *Yijing* [Classic of Changes], *Shijing* [Classic of Poetry or Classic of Songs], *Shujing* [Classic of Documents or History], *Chunqiu* [Spring and Autumn Annals], and the *Liji* [Record of Ritual]). In addition examination candidates were expected to master a variety of other important texts, including historical works (especially the *Shiji* [Historical Records], tracts on ritual, such as the *Zhouli* (Rites of Zhou) and *Yili* (Etiquette and Ritual); and various commentaries to the Spring and

¹¹ There were also three basic levels of military exams, but they emphasized physical prowess and lacked the prestige of the civil service examinations.

Autumn Annals--notably the *Zuozhuan* (Commentary of Zuo) and the *Kongyang zhuan* (Commentary of Gongyang).

What is more, examination candidates had to write their essays in beautiful calligraphy, follow a rigid format known as the "eight-legged essay" (*bagu wenzhang*), and interpret each of the above-mentioned texts according to the prevailing state orthodoxy, which for most of the Ming and Qing dynasties was Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucianism. This highly moralistic philosophy, developed by two famous Song dynasty scholars, Cheng Yi (1033-1107) and Zhu Xi (1130-1200), served the interests of the Chinese state in many ways--not least by reinforcing inherited moral values, placing a premium on loyalty to the state, and encouraging China's long-standing and deeply embedded sense of its cultural superiority to all other civilizations--an assumption that lay at the heart of China's age-old tributary system of foreign relations.¹²

Competition for examination degrees at all levels was fierce. As is evident from the chart below, in the late Qing period only about three hundred individuals empirewide could pass the metropolitan level exam at any one time. Most provinces had a quota of from fifteen to twenty *jinshi* per examination. At the lower levels of examination the state's quotas were less restrictive, which meant that about fifteen hundred *juren* degrees could be granted at one time, and there might be as many as thirty thousand *shengyuan* degrees awarded. Still, an aspirant for the lowest degree had only about one chance in sixty of success and only one chance in six thousand of ultimately attaining the *jinshi* degree. Candidates often took the examinations many times; and a person could not

¹² For a discussion of the debate over the nature, structure and function of the so-called tributary system, see Richard J. Smith, "Mapping China's World: Cultural Cartography in Late Imperial Times," in Yeh Wen-hsin, ed., *Landscape, Culture and Power*, passim.

normally hope to acquire the *shengyuan* degree before the age of twenty-four, the *juren* degree before the age of thirty, or the *jinshi* degree before the age of thirty-five.

SUCCESSFUL *JINSHI* CANDIDATES, 1890 (BY ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS)¹³

Beijing

Manchu Bannermen	9
Mongol Bannermen	4
Chinese Bannermen	7

The Provinces

Jiangsu	26
Zhili	24
Shandong	22
Jiangxi	22
Fujian	20
Henan	17
Anhui	17
Guangdong	17
Hubei	15
Sichuan	14
Hunan	14
Shaanxi	14
Guangxi	13
Yunnan	12
Guizhou	10
Shanxi	10
Gansu	9
Taiwan	<u>2</u>
Total	328

And even after earning a prestigious degree, Chinese scholars had limited opportunities for any sort of substantial bureaucratic position:

By design, only a small fraction of the empire's total number of degree holders (over a million during much of the Qing period) could expect to gain one of twenty thousand or so official civil-government positions. *Jinshi* status almost

¹³ *The North China Herald*, June 13, 1890, cited in Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 61.

automatically placed an individual in the middle stratum of the nine-rank bureaucracy, which ranged from metropolitan posts such as deputy commissioner in the Transmission Office (rank 4A) or reader in the Grand Secretariat (rank 4B), to local offices such as circuit intendant (rank 4A), prefect (rank 4B), and county magistrate (rank 7A). But *juren* degree holders could be assured of only the most minor posts, and *shengyuan* had very few opportunities for regular bureaucratic employment. The vast majority of *shengyuan* languished as “lower-gentry” . . . enjoying certain gentry privileges to be sure, but forced to “plow with the writing brush” by teaching in local schools or serving as family tutors. Many of these individuals became small tradesmen or entered other ‘demeaning’ occupations in order to sustain themselves.”¹⁴

Gentry and Merchants

The term translated as “gentry” above (*shenshi* in Chinese) refers narrowly to those individuals who managed to pass one of the three main levels of the examinations. This elite group, which together with their families constituted less than two percent of the entire population of China in Qing times, exerted a profound influence on Chinese social life at all levels. As a class, gentry members were entitled to special terms of address, special clothing, and other badges of rank. They wore clothes that commoners were forbidden to wear and they received favorable legal treatment as well. For instance, a crime committed by a degree-holder against a commoner (a merchant, artisan or peasant) was generally punished far less severely than the same crime committed by a commoner against a degree-holder. Members of the gentry class were also exempt from labor service or the labor service tax.

But the greatest asset of degree holders was comparatively easy access to officialdom, which gave them a great advantage over most other social groups in making “connections” (*guanxi*). These connections, in turn, brought additional advantages and

¹⁴ Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 63.

preferential treatment. After all, Qing bureaucrats were drawn from the gentry class and they returned to gentry status when they left office. Sharing a common culture and enjoying enormous social prestige, degree holders dominated most aspects of Chinese social life.

Contrary to stereotype, the gentry class was not simply a landed elite. Although a majority of degree holders lived in rural areas and many were indeed landlords, by the early eighteenth century,

income derived from local managerial services (such as the mediation of legal disputes, supervision of schools and academies, management of public works and welfare projects, militia organization, and proxy remittance of peasant land and labor taxes to the district [i.e. county, *xian*] yamen clerks) began to replace landed wealth as the key economic underpinning of the gentry class--especially at the lower levels. And for those gentry who were primarily landlords, collusion with officialdom usually enabled them to pay taxes at much lower rates than the rates applied to middle or poor peasants.¹⁵

Rich merchants, for their part, were able to use their wealth to develop connections with both gentry members and officials. As a result, throughout the Qing period, and especially during the nineteenth century, official and gentry families found themselves

readily engaged in warehousing, moneylending, pawnbroking, and various lucrative wholesale and retail enterprises. Commercialization thus increasingly fused merchants and gentry into what Mary Rankin describes as "a vigorous, numerically expanding elite whose power rested on varying combinations of landownership, trade, usury, and degree holding." Ping-ti Ho writes that during the Qing "the social distinction between officials and rich merchants was more blurred than at any time in Chinese history except for the Mongol Yuan period."¹⁶

¹⁵ Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 75.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 81.

Morover, since in Qing times wealthy merchants (or their sons) could take the civil service exams, buy low-level examination degrees, and sometimes even purchase bureaucratic positions, they had every incentive to support the existing social order, attracted by the idea of "commerce for profit and scholarship for personal reputation" (*gu wei louli ru wei minggao*). Frederic Wakeman writes tellingly:

Emulating the gentry's status manner on a colossal scale, they [rich Qing merchants] consumed their capital conspicuously, dissipating the possibility of more productive investments and reaffirming the hegemony of the literati's high culture. There was a uniquely mad and millionarish quality to the "salt fools" . . . who lavished fortunes on mechanized toys, Lake T'ai [Tai] rock decorations, and exotic pets, but this was just a magnified perversion of gentry fashion. And for all the squander, families like the Ma clan of salt merchants not only presided over one of the most famous literary salons of the eighteenth century and patronized many of the noted artists of the day, they also amassed private libraries of rare editions which were the envy of the Ch'ien-lung [Qianlong] Emperor.¹⁷

Thus networks of gentry members and merchant class formed on the basis of kinship, co-provincial and same-examination year ties had been part of Chinese society since the early Qing, if not earlier.

Historical Developments in China from c. 1800 to 1895: The Origins of Late Qing Reform

By the early 1800s, after more than a century of relative political stability and economic prosperity, serious problems began to emerge in Qing dynasty China.¹⁸

Corruption, in part a product of the excesses encouraged by institutionalized gift-giving

¹⁷ Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 81.

¹⁸ The material in this section is drawn largely from my article "Late Qing Reformers;" see also the relevant sections of Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, and Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, esp. 42-44 and 277-87.

as a means of cultivating *guanxi*, was one of them. On Feb. 22, 1799, the Qianlong emperor's favorite courtier, Heshen, was ordered to commit suicide by the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796-1820) after investigators discovered that he had illegally amassed a personal fortune estimated at half the dynasty's total revenue over the past twenty years. In his rapacious extortion of metropolitan as well as provincial administrators, Heshen had left a vast network of corrupt bureaucrats deeply entrenched at every level of the Qing government. In order to produce the necessary funds to satisfy their superiors, county and sub-county magistrates levied surcharges on the people, impoverishing and alienating them from the dynasty.¹⁹

As the country's population doubled from 178 million to 358 million from about 1750 to 1810,²⁰ enormous pressure was put on the land. Individual capital grew scarce, social services declined, landlordism became more exploitive, and competition for fixed-quota examination degrees and bureaucratic offices increased. Opium smoking became an increasingly pervasive habit in the early 1800s, affecting nearly ten per cent of the population by the late 1880s.²¹

These conditions, exacerbated by periodic natural disasters such as floods and droughts, led to popular uprisings in various parts of the empire. The most threatening uprising at the end of the eighteenth century was the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804). This anti-Manchu messianic revolt in the mountainous areas of central China, provoked by famine conditions and bureaucratic corruption, exposed the weakness of the Qing military system. The revolts led by the Turkestan chiefs (1825-1828) and the Uighur

¹⁹ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 124-6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 64.

²¹ Jonathan D. Spence, *Chinese Roundabout*, 238.

uprising in Xinjiang (1820-1827) likewise threatened the dynasty on its northwestern border. Soon thereafter, China faced serious challenges on its maritime frontier, beginning with the first Opium War of 1839-42. The rise of Western, and later Japanese, imperialism from this point onward fundamentally eroded the Chinese tributary system, which had served for centuries as a symbol of China's cultural superiority. This pressure from the European powers and Japan complicated all of China's policy decisions, making the task of late Qing reformers especially difficult.

Qing Intellectual Life

Presaging the unraveling of the political center was China's increasingly fragmented intellectual environment. As indicated above, the early Qing state orthodoxy was based solidly on Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucianism (also called Song Learning), which was reinforced by the civil service examination system. By the early nineteenth century, however, other schools of Confucianism competed for favor. The rise of competing ideology at this time allowed for more creative approaches among the intellectuals in their search for authenticity. The Tongcheng School, centered in Anhui, embraced Cheng Yi's and Zhu Xi's moral idealism, but saw literature as the vehicle of Confucian "faith." The School of Evidential Research (*kaozheng xue*) sought "truth from facts" (*shishi qiu shi*) and questioned the authenticity of certain received Confucian classics. New Text (*Jinwen*) Learning stood between Song and Han Learning (a school of thought that favored Han dynasty materials over those dating from the Song period).²²

²² Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 129-130.

The New Text School grew out of a late eighteenth century revival of an earlier controversy over the authenticity of versions of the Confucian classics written in a form of Chinese characters known as Ancient Script (*Guwen*), leading to a debate over issues such as the place of Confucius in Chinese history and the role of institutional change within the Confucian tradition. On the whole, New Text Scholars, focusing in particular on the Gongyang commentary to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, were more politically radical than Ancient Text scholars, who tended to focus on the more “conservative” Zuo commentary and who predominated in most official circles during the Ming dynasty and into the late Qing. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, as we shall see in the next section, a number of Chinese intellectuals called for fundamental institutional reforms based at least in part on New Text learning.

The School of Statecraft (*jingshi xue*) took practical administration as its central concern, and gained favor in the nineteenth century as reformers saw the need for practical solutions to China's pressing problems. Some statecraft-oriented scholars, including Gong Zizhen (1792-1841) and Wei Yuan (1794-1856) had a deep and abiding interest in New Text scholarship. It is through their practical interpretation of the classics that they found solutions to society's problems in their times.

Gong, an “emotionally complex” and idiosyncratic man, was a particularly influential thinker. A critic of official corruption, the Qing judicial system, the clichés of the examination system, the unequal distribution of wealth, and social practices such as foot-binding and opium smoking,²³ he advocated moral reengagement and the reform of political institutions according to the needs of the times--a fundamental New Text argument. Gong deplored the narrow scholasticism of *kaozheng*-style textual criticism on

²³ See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 147.

the grounds that it produced amoral scholars who separated learning from governing. Among his practical proposals was a land distribution policy that would allot a hundred *mu* (approximately sixteen acres) to each large clan, twenty-five *mu* to each small clan, and relegate tenancy to the unemployed. To strengthen Qing defenses, he urged the study of the geography and peoples of Mongolia and the Western Regions (modern-day Xinjiang), as well as problems of the southeastern coastal defense.²⁴

Wei Yuan, Gong's friend and fellow statecraft advocate, compiled the *Huangchao jinshi wenbian* (Collected essays on statecraft of the reigning dynasty) in 1826, which became a standard text for guidance on practical governance. Pointing out that a small and closed ruling clique had allowed Heshen to dominate the later part of the Qianlong emperor's reign, he called for widening the circle of policy discussants to include degree holders above the first degree, and not just to higher officials. Wei advocated transporting tribute grain by sea, as it would eliminate the surcharges levied by boatmen and other supernumeraries along the Grand Canal. Like Gong, he argued for developing the Western regions by encouraging Han emigration as a defense measure. His famous maritime defense study, *Haiguo tuzhi* (Treatise on the maritime kingdoms) was the first systematic exposition of Western nations by a Chinese scholar. Wei also suggested stabilizing the monetary system, strengthening the navy, and improving the quality of military recruits. He was friendly with Beijing officials and scholars such as Lin Zexu and Liu Fenglu, all of whom opposed Muchang's (1782-1856), head of the the

²⁴ Ji Zhenghuai, "Gong Zizhen jianlun" (A short discussion on Gong Zizhen), 37-43.

all-important Grand Council in the Daoguang emperor's reign (1820-1850), whose network of corrupt cronies rivaled that of Heshen.²⁵

In Guangzhou (also known as Canton), the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, Ruan Yuan (1765-1849), founded the Confucian-based Xuehai Academy in 1820, which became a stronghold of reformers who later favored legalizing opium. Known as a center for synthesizing Han Learning methodology with Song Learning moral concerns, the Xuehai Academy offered a curriculum that included the study of mathematics, astronomy, poetry, the Classics, and military affairs. Its graduates were influential in local politics, and its reputation as center of new knowledge suggested a shift of cultural activism from the Jiangnan region to Hunan and Guangzhou.²⁶

By early nineteenth century concern with the outflow of silver as a result of the growing but still illegal opium trade led an official named Xu Naiji to suggest legalizing opium. A debate on legalization of opium ensued between the so-called Legalizers and the Moralists at court, and the emperor Daoguang concluded in 1838 that suppressing opium was the ethically correct thing to do. In the same year the court appointed Lin Zexu, the governor of Jiangsu, to be the imperial commissioner in charge of the suppression of opium trade. As an instance of how network dynamics could influence political decision-making, Lin Zexu belonged to the Spring Purification Circle, a group of scholars and officials who advocated the Tongcheng strand of Confucianism. It was this network tie and his friendship with Wei Yuan, the statecraft advocate mentioned earlier,

²⁵ Philip A. Kuhn, "Ideas Behind China's Modern State," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 55:2 (Dec. 1955), 302-306.

²⁶ Dong Tiezhu, "Ruan Yuan chuangan Xuehai tang zhiyin chutan" (Preliminary inquiry into the reason for Ruan Yuan's founding of Xuehai Academy), 93-96.

in the Circle that brought Lin to the inner clique of the hawkish Moralists at court.²⁷ Lin immediately took up headquarters in Canton's Yuehua Academy, a Confucian school which favored opium suppression. Opposing Lin and the Yuehua Academy is the newly established Xuehai Academy led by Ruan Yuan, and the alignment of Confucian schools with political positions on the issue of opium polarized Canton's academia in the 1830s.²⁸ Lin empowered the local gentry to arrest opium dealers, and demanded that foreign merchants turn over their opium stock. Using trade embargos, labor boycotts and blockades, Lin initially made the British surrender their opium stock. But eventually the British retaliated, and so began the first Opium War (1839-1842). British superiority in armaments quickly subdued the Chinese forces, and the British imposed the first of a series of "unequal" treaties on the Chinese.

Chinese Perspectives on the Unequal Treaty System

The so-called unequal treaty system took form between 1842 and 1860, and was not abrogated entirely until 1943. According to the terms of these treaties, the foreign powers gained the right to set up self-governing treaty-port settlements for Western residence and trade. They were also granted access to the Chinese interior, with the privilege of operating foreign ships between the treaty ports on the coast and on inland waterways. They were allowed to promulgate Christianity without obstruction or interference by the Chinese authorities, to limit Chinese customs duties, and to inaugurate formal diplomatic relations at the capital and in the treaty-ports. Westerners enjoyed

²⁷ COC, 10:118. James Polachek, *The Inner Opium War*, 65-102.

²⁸ Polachek, 119.

immunity from Chinese law (a provision known as extraterritoriality) and other nonreciprocal "rights." The entire system of foreign privilege was held together by the most-favored-nation clause, which gave to each of the treaty powers any commercial benefit extracted from the Chinese by one or another of the powers over time.²⁹

Ironically, however, inherited Chinese views toward foreign relations stood in the way of a more realistic appraisal of this new and threatening situation. For instance, the traditional phrase "viewing all [barbarians] with the same benevolence" (*yishi tongren*), came to be used not only to justify the most-favored-nation clause of the unequal treaties but also to determine policy regarding the treatment of foreign employees in the Chinese service. Similarly, reference to China's use of Arab headmen to supervise Arab traders in the Tang dynasty (618-907) made consular jurisdiction over foreign nationals--the means by which extraterritoriality came to be implemented in the treaty ports--more palatable than it might otherwise have been.

An excellent illustration of this problem appears in the documentary record of China's foreign relations in the Tongzhi period (1862-1874) known as the *Chouban yiwu shimo* (A Complete Record of the Management of Barbarian Affairs; 1880). The preface to this remarkable document represents virtually all of the indignities suffered by the Chinese during the Tongzhi reign (1862-1874)--including "Western demands for an audience with the emperor on terms of diplomatic equality; the use of foreign troops to defend the treaty ports from the Taipings; the loss of Chinese territory to the Russians; the failure of the Alcock Convention; the establishment of an Interpreters College to train Chinese in Western languages in order to meet the needs of modern diplomacy; the

²⁹ This account of the unequal treaty system and its reception by the Chinese follows closely the discussion in Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 282-284.

belated establishment of Chinese legations abroad (related directly to a mission of apology sent by China to Great Britain after the murder of a British consular official in 1875); the limitation of Chinese Customs duties, and the establishment of the Imperial Maritime Customs Administration--in terms of imperial condescension."

Even the granting of imperial audiences to Western ministers (i.e. ambassadors) on terms of diplomatic equality--an especially unpalatable condition of the unequal treaties because it challenged the fundamental hierarchical assumptions of the Chinese tributary system--came be rationalized by the idea that "barbarians" were simply too uncouth to be controlled by Chinese rituals. In the view of the censor Wu Kedu, Westerners understood only material gain and not Confucian rites; therefore, requiring them to observe Chinese-style ceremonies was as pointless as "gathering a herd of sheep, dogs, horses, and pigs in a hall and making them dance to music."³⁰

Sinocentric attitudes of this sort were naturally reinforced by the civil-service examination system. One of the topics for the metropolitan exams in 1880 was the following quotation from the Four Books: "By indulgent treatment of men from afar they resort to him from all quarters. And by kindly cherishing the princes of states, the whole empire is brought to revere him." Such quotations, memorized by all examination candidates in the course of their studies, further legitimized the myth of Chinese cultural superiority and the power of the Chinese emperor's universal kingship.³¹

On the other hand, from 1860 onward, the treaty ports, and particularly the foreign settlements, became conduits for the transmission of Western influences of all kinds. Populated by foreign merchants, missionaries, diplomats, and military men, these

³⁰ Cited in Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 283.

³¹ Cited and discussed in *ibid.*, 284.

cities were receptacles of foreign products, ideas, practices, and skills. This influx of Western culture and commodities disrupted the traditional economic system, and ultimately, the Chinese world order. The treaty ports were thus not only showcases for the benefits of Western science and technology but also “vivid reminders of the challenge of foreign imperialism.”³² Later in the nineteenth century, the foreign settlements in some of these treaty port areas also provided public spaces for Chinese political activities, such as the famous Zhang Garden (see appendix A).

Rebellion and Restoration

While the Western powers were working their will on China from without, the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) arose from within. Led by a Hakka zealot named Hong Xiuquan, the uprising came close to bringing down the dynasty as it swept across China from the Guangxi mountains to the Yangzi region, promising the poor and downtrodden a Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace, but taking an estimated 20 million lives in the process. The Qing dynasty survived mainly because of a number of provincial Han Chinese scholar-generals rose to the challenge, fighting with great determination and choosing to remain loyal to the Manchus. Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) and Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) created new types of fighting forces known as *yongying* (brave-battalions) and found new sources of revenue to finance their troops. Zeng’s appointment to imperial commissioner with supreme military authority in the lower Yangzi region marked the Manchus’ acknowledgment of their reliance on Han military commanders. His success in suppressing the Taiping and other large-scale

³² Smith, *China’s Cultural Heritage*, 279.

rebellions in the 1860s and 1870s was a product not only of traditional Chinese military strategies but also the assistance of his talented protégés, Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang, whose provincially based armies had the benefit of Western arms and training.

The Qing dynasty's remarkable recovery from the disasters of the 1860s and early 70s was described at the time as a restoration, or *zhongxing*. It had two major dimensions. One was economic recovery; the other was the strengthening of China's military and naval defenses against both internal rebellion and external threats.

Internally, Zeng had the duty of restoring order to the regions devastated by the rebellion, and of recovering land taxes to fill the imperial coffers. Inspired by eclectic brand of Confucian conservatism that combined Cheng-Zhu idealism, Han Learning, the literary and moral concerns of the Tongcheng School and the practical preoccupations of the Statecraft School, Zeng urged officials to tax all landowners equitably, to reduce corvée service, to aid in water control management, and to assist farmers in various other ways. Leaning on his school ties at the Yuelu Academy, Zeng solicited the help of the governor of Hubei province and co-classmate Hu Linyi to calculate a judicious tax rate. Hu ordered his grain intendant to visit each county and consult with the local magistrate and local elites in order to come up with a realistic figure, taking into consideration factors such as the price of rice, the silver-copper exchange rate, and the fiscal needs of each region.³³

At the highest reach of the Confucian academies, the Hanlin scholar Feng Guifen (1809-1874) and adviser to Li Hongzhang, tried to solve the problem of abusive tax-farming practices by having the villagers elect their own middleman through the use of paper ballots and the counting of votes. He also called for metropolitan officials to be

³³ COC 10:440-441.

elected by lower officials--concepts that were undoubtedly influenced in part by his reading of Western sources in translation. Feng advocated technical improvements in the fields of engineering, flood control, salt monopoly and grain tax, as well as institutional changes at all levels of government. Calling the civil service exam "sterile," he suggested that craftsmen with expertise in military and naval technologies be awarded with provincial-level examination degrees, and that some of these individuals should be eligible for the palace exam as well. He believed that although the Chinese statecraft tradition was strong, the West was far superior in utilizing human and material resources, and in communicating between subject and ruler. Few of Feng recommendations were implemented, however, for vested interests were simply too deeply entrenched.³⁴

Following the death of the Xianfeng emperor in 1861, in the midst of the Taiping Rebellion and immediately after the Western powers had occupied Beijing to assure the Qing government's compliance with the Treaty of Tianjin (1858), Prince Gong, the late emperor's brother, inaugurated a movement for "self-strengthening" (*zhiqiang*), designed to combat the dual threats of "internal disorder and external calamity" (*neiluan waihuan*).

Encouraged by the Empress Dowager, Cixi, and supported to a limited degree by foreign diplomats at the capital, Prince Gong and a few progressively minded metropolitan officials joined provincially based "self-strengtheners" such as Zeng, Zuo and Li to improve China's military and naval technology. They began training Chinese troops in the use of Western firearms and gunboats, and took the lead in building arsenals and shipyards, all of which had translation bureaus. Li sent a group of Chinese youngsters to study overseas and established the Jiangnan Arsenal in 1865. He also

³⁴ COC, 10:501-503.

established the Kaiping Mines and the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company. Zuo and Shen Baozhen (1820-1879), set up the Fuzhou Naval Yard in 1866.³⁵

However, in order to ensure that power was kept in her hands, the wily Cixi played the self-strengtheners against the anti-foreign faction at court; the latter led by Li Hongzao (no relation to Li Hongzhang), Woren, Prince Chun (younger brother of Prince Gong), Xu Tong and Weng Tonghe.³⁶ In the 1860s this group began to accuse reform-minded officials and scholars of appeasing foreign aggressors and betraying China. Adopting a highly moralistic and confrontational style, they gathered strength in the 1870s and 1880s as a militant "purist party," the *qingliu dang*.³⁷ They accused Feng Guifen and others of disloyalty, and attacked enterprises such as the Fuzhou Navy yard and the Jiangnan Arsenal. Similarly, they castigated Prince Gong for proposing that foreign instructors be hired to teach astronomy and mathematics in the Beijing "Interpreters College" (*Tongwen guan*), initially established in 1862. Woren vehemently denounced this idea, calling astronomy and mathematics "magical computations" linked to impostors and heterodoxy. He declared that instead scholars should cultivate righteousness and propriety to strengthen the state. Predictably, this controversy drove away aspiring scholars from the *Tongwen guan*, inhibiting the advancement of science in China for years to come.

Despite such setbacks, provincial advocates of self-strengthening continued to promote efforts to build up the Chinese military and navy, to support commercial and

³⁵ COC, 10:497-500.

³⁶ COC, 10:505.

³⁷ COC, 10:505-506. For a discussion of *Qingliu dang*, see Mary Backus Rankin, "'Public Opinion' and Political Power: Qingyi in Late Nineteenth Century China," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 14:3 (May, 1982), 453-484.

industrial development, and to acquire new knowledge not only from the West but also from a rapidly modernizing Japan, where a dramatic political change in 1868, known as the Meiji Restoration, led to revolutionary transformations in Japanese government, intellectual life and society. This new knowledge from Japan and the West, made available through translations by Western missionaries and by translators in Chinese arsenals and shipyards, came to be disseminated in China's newly emergent "modern" media, including newspapers and periodicals that were first established in treaty port areas.

The limited and piecemeal reforms of the self-strengthening movement proved unequal to the growing military challenge of Meiji Japan, however, and China suffered a devastating loss in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. This conflict, which arose out of contending Chinese and Japanese claims of suzerainty in Korea, ended with the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895). According to the terms of this Western-style unequal treaty, China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores, surrendered Korea to Japan as a protectorate, paid 230 million taels in indemnities, and opened up four new treaty ports. It also allowed the Japanese to establish factories and industries on Chinese soil, a privilege that the Western powers gained by virtue of the most-favored nation clause in their own treaties.

This traumatic event produced a surge of nationalistic fervor among intellectuals in China. Previously, China's sense of universal empire had inhibited the rise of modern nationalism--that is, "the identification of the individual with the nation-state and the general acceptance of a multi-state system of other sovereign (and competing) national

entities.”³⁸ The Sino-Japanese War, however, not only dismantled the pathetic remains of the Chinese tributary system; it also underscored China’s fundamental backwardness compared to Japan and the West. The result was a burst of reform sentiment which well beyond earlier nineteenth century precedents. Ironically, for many Chinese intellectuals, Japan now became a modernizing model.

Reform Efforts in the Immediate Aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War

During negotiations over the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Kang Youwei (1858-1927), a brilliant scholar from Guangdong province, who was to become a metropolitan-level degree holder (*jinsi*) in 1895, drafted a “Ten-thousand word letter” with hundreds of signatures from fellow *juren* degreeholders, protesting the onerous and oppressive terms of the treaty.³⁹ This manifesto not only called for the rejection of the treaty and the continuation of the war; it also advocated political reforms, including the election of representatives in Beijing as “Court Gentlemen for Consultation” (*yilang*) to act as a conduit between the court and the people.

Kang, who had been exposed to both Chinese classical scholarship and Western learning (in translation) during the 1880s, developed an eclectic philosophy in the early 1890s that was grounded in New Text scholarship but which also drew upon Buddhist and Western ideas. In 1891 he published his first book, titled *Xinxue weijing kao* (An inquiry into the classics forged during the Xin period), in which he advanced the

³⁸ See the discussion in Smith, *China’s Cultural Heritage*, 279.

³⁹ Immanuel Hsü indicates that there were only 603 signatures as opposed to the conventional number of 1200. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 367, fn. 17.

iconoclastic claim that there were no Ancient Text versions of the Confucian Classics in the early Han dynasty, thus calling into question the authenticity of several works that had been viewed as sacrosanct by the Chinese state for hundreds of years. And in 1898, Kang produced a book titled *Kongzi gaizhi kao* (Confucius as an institutional reformer), in which he argued not only that the New Text school was the true repository of the authentic teachings of Confucianism, but also that Confucius was himself a reformer. This work created such a stir that it was eventually banned by the state, and Kang was accused of “deluding the world and deceiving the people.”⁴⁰

But in 1895 Kang appeared to be simply an ardent patriot, with progressive ideas about reform based on his knowledge of Western and Japanese history. After having won the prestigious *jinshi* degree in that year, he was eligible for an official appointment at the capital; but discriminated against by a hostile examiner, Kang did not receive an appointment to the prestigious Hanlin Academy as he had expected. For a short while he tried to send reform proposals to various government agencies, but soon decided to concentrate on participating in, and developing, “study societies” (*xue hui*), in concert with his equally brilliant and broadminded disciple, Liang Qichao (1873-1929). Kang’s view at the time was that

As an established habit, Chinese like to function as individuals rather than as members of organized groups. A habit, once established, is most difficult to change . . . Still, organize we must, since without organization, knowledge cannot be renewed or advanced, and there will be no strength. The larger an organization is in terms of membership, the stronger it will be . . . Holding meetings in the

⁴⁰ Kang had some even more radical ideas, which he developed in the 1880s but which were not published in full until after his death. These ideas, expressed in a utopian work known as the *Datong shu* (Book of Universal Community), included the notion of a world without nation-states, families or clans, in which men and women would cohabit for a year and then change mates. See Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 364-66.

nation's capital is like shouting on top of a mountain, forcing all the provinces to listen and to respond . . . Having failed to reach His Imperial Majesty with my petitions, I have concentrated on the calling of meetings among my comrades.”⁴¹

The Formation of New-Style Study Societies

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, a new type of social networking began to appear. No longer strictly adhering to the alignment of Confucian teaching and political positioning, the turn of the century social groups tied together people from a broader socio-economic spectrum as well as varied educational and occupational background. In late 1895, Kang and Liang formed the China Strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui) in Beijing, which included several prominent officials, former officials and even several Westerners. Later, in Shanghai, they established another branch of this organization and began publishing the *Qiangxue bao* (China Strengthening Paper) as their platform for advocating fundamental institutional reform (*bianfa*). That same year, Wang Kangnian (1860-1911), a scholar in the private employment of Zhang Zhidong, then governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, planned to form the China Assembly (Zhongguo gonghui) in Shanghai, with the purpose of “joining like-minded colleagues in investigating the ills of China.”⁴² Wang discussed reform strategies with Liang, and drafted twenty-three articles in his mission statement, emphasizing the “learning of practical knowledge.”⁴³ However, disagreement among Wang’s friends delayed the implementation of his project, and eventually he combined forces with Kang’s China Strengthening Society in Shanghai. Meanwhile, the Beijing branch of China

⁴¹ Hu Sheng, *From the Opium War*, 2:96.

⁴² Lü Xiaopo, 37.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 38.

Strengthening Society had transformed itself into a publishing house that began producing translated works on reform themes.⁴⁴

Liang Qichao, for his part, became a member of the Academy of Current Affairs (*Shiwu xuetang*) in Hunan in 1897. There he circulated an inflammatory pamphlet titled *Ten Days of the Yangzhou Massacre* (Yangzhou shiri ji) which recounted a well-remembered Manchu massacre of the Chinese in 1645, and discussed the need for people to gain political rights.⁴⁵ Liang joined two former classmates who had studied together at Kang's school, the Wanmu Caotang, Han Wenju and Ou Jujia, as well as Tang Caichang, in propagating radical ideas in the school.⁴⁶

From 1896 to 1898 an estimated sixty-three reformist groups of this sort came into existence, despite the Qing court's 1652 ban on the establishment of "private societies" (in practice this applied only to overtly threatening and politically oriented associations).⁴⁷ Across the country scholarly groups adopted names that bespoke their special interests, from the Anti-footbinding Society (Bu chanzu hui), the Cleansing Shame Learning Society (Xuechi xue hui) and the Non-Smoking Society (Bushu yangyan hui) to the Association of Mathematicians (Suanxue she), the Association of Translating and Printing Western Maps (Yiyin xiwen ditu gong hui), and the Translation Society (Yishu hui).⁴⁸

Anti-footbinding and Opium Eradicating Societies

⁴⁴ Lü Xiaopo, 40.

⁴⁵ Philip Huang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism*, 90.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, eds., *The Cambridge History of China* (COC), vol. 11, "Late Qing, 1800-1911, part 2, 294.

⁴⁸ Lü Xiaopo, 230-3.

Late nineteenth century reformers began to focus their attention on the relationship between national strength and personal well-being. Zhang Zhidong spoke for a generation of reformers when he proposed three ways of strengthening the country: enlightening the people's minds, fortifying their bodies, and giving them equality.⁴⁹ But in Zhang's view, before the other two goals could be reached, it was necessary to eradicate opium-smoking and abolish footbinding.

The earliest anti-footbinding society was established by the Reverend John MacGowan in Xiamen in 1875, where the argument against footbinding was predicated on the Christian concept that one's body should be maintained in its God-given state.⁵⁰ The comprador-scholar and erstwhile reformer Zheng Guanying deplored the practice in an essay in 1880,⁵¹ and Kang Youwei himself helped to found the Do Not Bind Feet Society (*Bu guozu hui*) in Canton three years later. By 1895, Chinese reformers were attacking foot-binding in full force,⁵² for in the deformed feet of women they objectified their own sense of national shame. In their eyes, by eradicating this archaic and debilitating practice, China could begin to overcome its malaise. Viewed from this perspective, the drive to abolish footbinding had less to do with women's equality than with exorcising an evil custom that had crippled about half of the elite population of the empire for the past several hundred years. It is true, however, that many reformers also realized that women with natural feet might be more economically productive, and that

⁴⁹ Lü Xiaopo, 234.

⁵⁰ Dorothy Ko, *Cinderella's Sisters*, 15.

⁵¹ Lü Xiaopo, 234.

⁵² Anti-footbinding societies appeared in Canton, Shanghai, and Changsha, among other cities, and memberships reached hundreds in each location, Lü Xiaopo, 230-232.

they could even take up arms against invaders. In 1902 footbinding was outlawed by the Qing government (see below).

The desire to make China a more powerful and prosperous country also led to a push on the part of reformers to eradicate opium-smoking. In this they were joined by the Qing government, which was led to believe that if China could eliminate domestic opium production entirely, the foreign powers would agree to stop importing the debilitating drug. Anti-opium societies were established by the provincial authorities as well as by private benefactors. One might think that eradicating the opium menace would have been a high priority for reform-minded scholars, but the fact is that there were far more anti-footbinding societies than anti-opium societies in the late 1890s. Perhaps the reason was that many of the reformers were smokers and they thus found anti-footbinding an easier cause to champion. In any case, the Qing government was never able to eliminate domestic opium production entirely.⁵³

Organizations Supporting the Education of Women

As a highly influential journalist at the turn of the twentieth century, Liang wrote that learned women could better raise strong, healthy and intelligent children, and therefore “the strongest nation is one with the best education for women.”⁵⁴ He calculated that if all 200 million women in China were trained and able to earn a living, the national productivity would rise, and the entire country would be more wealthy and

⁵³ See Jonathan Spence, “Opium Smoking in Ch’ing China,” in Frederic Wakeman and Carolyn Grant, eds. *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China*, 143-73.

⁵⁴ Liang Qichao, “Lun nǚxue,” (On women’s education), in *Yinbingshi heji* (Combined collection of Yinbingshi), 43.

more powerful.⁵⁵ To that end, in 1897 he joined Xue Shaohui--the scholarly wife of Chen Shoupeng, publisher of the reformist paper known as *Qiusi bao* (The International Review)--and a group of other reformers to plan for the establishment of Shanghai Girls' School (Shanghai Nuxuetang.) The school was jointly funded by gentry reformers and their female relatives (wives, mothers, and daughters) as well as several missionaries and their wives--about eighty people in all.⁵⁶ In December 1897 Xue convened the first meeting of the Women's Study Society (Nüxue hui) and in the following year the first woman's paper, *Nüxue bao* (Journal of Women's Learning) appeared. Xue and her editorial staff advocated women's rights, urged women to study science, medicine, art and literature, and reported on the condition of women workers in Shanghai's textile mills and tea factories.⁵⁷ Emulating the leading reformist journals in language and content, the paper was well-received, with a circulation reaching into the thousands. The Shanghai Girls' School stayed open for two years and enrolled a total of seventy students, before a shortage of funds forced it to close in 1900.⁵⁸ Schools for girls were established in other parts of China as well, but they grew slowly and often fell victim to financial difficulties.⁵⁹ While women's rights to education and equality were championed by all male reformers at the time, however the reality of the women's lives did not match the rhetoric.

Early Oppositional Organizations

⁵⁵ Ibid., 39.

⁵⁶ Lü Xiaopo, 238-9. For a list of the founders of the school, see Qian Nanxiu, "Revitalizing the *Xianyuan* (worthy ladies) tradition: Women in the 1898 reforms," *Modern China*, 29:4 (Oct. 2003), 405.

⁵⁷ Qian, 416.

⁵⁸ Qian, 416-8.

⁵⁹ Lü Xiaopo, 240. As late as 1909 there were only about 13,000 girls enrolled in schools in all of China.

Away from the respectability of the late Qing scholarly world, members from the marginal groups of Chinese society plotted to bring down the dynasty. Sun Yat-sen (aka Sun Yixian or Sun Zhongshan; 1866-1925), a Western-educated medical doctor from the rural community of Canton and a Christian convert, founded the Revive China Society (*Xing Zhong hui*) in 1894 in Honolulu. Having attended school in Hawaii and Hong Kong, Sun was particularly aware of the contrast between these efficient and well-run cities and his hometown of Xiangshan in Guangdong province. At first he hoped that reforming the Qing government would save China, but his first hand observation of the depravity of the Manchus during a visit to Beijing, and a subsequent rebuff by Li Hongzhang after Sun offered his services to Li, pushed him in the direction of revolution. Sun neither possessed a degree nor even sat for the civil service exams, and since he attended high school in Hawaii, he was not well versed in the Chinese classics. Consequently, he was unable to earn the respect of classically educated scholars. As a result he had to seek support among overseas Chinese communities, secret societies, Christian converts, and missionaries.

Sun eventually forged a synthesis of Confucian values and British socialist ideas known as the Three People's Principles (*Sanmin zhuyi*)--generally translated as nationalism (*minzu*), democracy (*minquan*) and socialism (*minsheng*)--and these ideas became his blueprint for the revolutionary transformation of China. But Sun found it easier to write and give speeches about revolution than to carry it out. After his first Canton uprising failed in 1895, Sun fled to Japan, and established a branch of the Revive China Society in Yokohama. By 1897 he had attracted the support of a number of

Japanese *shishi* (“men of purpose”) and even some high officials, such as the leader of the Japanese Liberal Party, Inukai Ki Tsuyoshi(1855-1932). Inukai and the others belonged to a group called the To-A Dobunkai (East Asia Common Culture Society, or TDK), whose members aimed at creating an Asian solidarity block in order to counter Western imperialism. Seeking to establish ties with progressively minded people and groups in China, they considered Sun to be the best person to implement their Pan-Asian doctrine by fomenting revolution in China.⁶⁰

Sun attempted to recruit Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao to his cause, and at one point he chose Liang to head the Revive China Society’s Yokohama Overseas Chinese School.⁶¹ But Kang had other plans for his talented protegee, who turned out to have substantial journalistic skills.

The Emergence of a New-Style Chinese Periodical Press

Not surprisingly, imperial China lacked sophisticated mechanisms for disseminating knowledge to the general populace, particularly in print form. One reason, of course, was limited literacy.⁶² Another was security. By the nineteenth century, however, the situation had changed, especially following the opening of the treaty ports from 1842 onward. China’s ever greater involvement with the rest of the world required ever more reliable information, as well as ever more effective means by which to distribute it.

⁶⁰ See Paula Harrell, *Sowing the Seeds of Change*, 30-32.

⁶¹ This was a school set up to counter the Datong school that the Protect the Emperor Society operated under Kang. See Feng Ziyu, *Zhonghua minguo kaiguo qian gemingshi* (KGQ), 1:35.

⁶² Literacy in late Qing China may have been as high as 45 percent for males and 10 percent for females, but this was not the case for most of the imperial era. See Smith, *China’s Cultural Heritage*, 219, 231.

Late Qing Journalism Prior to the Sino-Japanese War

From about 1815 to 1894, there were, broadly speaking, three types of papers in China: (1) official gazettes (*guanbao*), issued from the court for the purpose of informing the bureaucracy, (2) foreign-language or Chinese-language papers generated either by missionaries or by foreign commercial interests (*waibao*), and (3) small “popular newspapers” (*minbao*), reflecting local interests.⁶³ Although there existed a total of about 150 foreign-managed, foreign language newspapers and 70 foreign-managed Chinese language newspapers between 1815 and 1894, mostly these circulated in the treaty ports and carried commercial news.⁶⁴

Chinese papers prior to 1894 were restricted in their ability to comment on national news, and thus concentrated on reporting imperial edicts, bureaucratic changes, information on the civil service exam, and miscellaneous commercial news. “As a result most newspaper offices began working after lunch and were done before dusk.”⁶⁵ To attract readership many papers included sensational news on fire, murder, ghost stories, and gossip. Intellectuals relied on missionary papers for more substantial information.

Four of the most influential Chinese-language papers established in the pre-Sino-Japanese war period were: (1) *Wanguo Gongbao* (first named “Church News” in English in 1868-1874, then renamed “Chinese Globe Magazine” 1874-1883, and finally known as “Review of the Times” in 1889-1907), published by American missionaries Timothy

⁶³ Joan Judge, *Print and Politics*, 20. Judge estimates that in the period from 1895-1895 more than 60 papers appeared in the cities beyond the treaty ports.

⁶⁴ Judge, 19.

⁶⁵ Ge Gongzhen, *Zhongguo Baoxue Shi* [History of Chinese journals] in *Minguo Congshu*, 49:100.

Richard (1845-1919) and Young J. Allen (1836-1907); (2) *Gezhi huibian* (The Collection of Scientific Articles, 1876-1878, 1880-1882, 1890-1892) published by British missionary John Fryer; (3) the *Shenbao* (full name: *Shenjiang xinbao*, sometimes translated as the “[Shanghai] Morning Post”), founded by an English Merchant, Ernest Major (1841-1908) in 1872, and (4) Wang Tao’s *Xunhuai Ribao* (Universal Circulating Herald, 1874-1947).⁶⁶

The Review of the Times was said to have enjoyed a circulation of five thousand in 1894, and distributed along the coastal provinces free to candidates for the civil service examinations. It set the tone for many reformist papers, carrying current world news, discussing national finance, reporting on projects related to the Self-Strengthening Movement, and urging the government to establish institutions of higher learning. But it also carried reprints of imperial edicts from the *Peking Gazette*, in an effort to be considered a mainstream paper.⁶⁷

Fryer’s popular scientific journal, the *Collection of Scientific Articles*, was created at the Gezhi Science Academy (Gezhi shuyuan), which he founded in Shanghai in 1876. The paper reached a circulation of over four thousand in seventy Chinese cities and towns by 1880.

The *Shenbao*, initially printed every other day, went on to become Shanghai’s most successful Chinese-language daily paper, managing to survive in China until just before the Communist takeover in 1949. From 1872 to 1908 it remained a Western-owned enterprise, protected in the treaty port by the provisions of extraterritoriality.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Lü Xiaopo, 14; see also Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?* and Xiantao Zhang, *The Origins of the Modern Chinese Press*.

⁶⁷ Young J. Allen ed., *Review of the Times*, 9:9, Sept. 1887, 17,143.

⁶⁸ Jerome Grieder, *Intellectuals and the State in Modern China*, 95-96.

Despite its foreign origins and ownership, the *Shenbao* quickly acquired a readership that included both supporters and detractors, contributing in its own way to what might be considered a Chinese version of the public sphere. In its semi-classical style, which featured among other things a lack of punctuation (until at least 1904), the writing of the *Shenbao* presaged the distinctive prose of Liang Qichao, who is often decribed as “the father of Chinese journalism” (see below).

Wang Tao’s Hong Kong-based *Universal Circulating Herald* was the first completely Chinese owned and edited new style paper. It circulated in Canton and along the coast, and its editorials were often carried in the *Shenbao* and *The Review of the Times*. Just as Ernest Major benefitted from extraterritoriality in Shanghai, Wang took advantage of his protection under Hong Kong’s British law to write incisive editorials criticizing the court and the bureaucracy, to push for reform, to discuss China’s foreign policy, and to chronicle events in the West.⁶⁹ As we shall see, the new medium of the editorial column became a politically powerful instrument for subsequent newspaper publishers in China, including Liang Qichao and Chen Duxiu.

All four of the above-mentioned papers hired a great many Chinese writers, producing the first generation of professional newspapermen in China. Until the appearance of these papers and others like them, news writers in China were regarded as mere muckrakers and treated with contempt. In the words of Yao Yunhe, author of *Shanghai Anecdotes* (Shanghai xianhua), “People did not know what a newspaper was...When the delivery boy tried to give them away to the shops, he had to endure the scolding of the shopkeepers, who did not want them... .News editors and their reporters

⁶⁹ Paul Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity*, 78.

had a bad reputation. Not only did the officials hate them, but people in general looked down on them because they were deceitful and fabricated lies.”⁷⁰

While most contributors to the new-style papers wrote in a hybrid classical format, the Shanghai *Minbao* (People’s Paper—not to be confused with the 1905 organ of the Revolutionary Alliance with the same Chinese name), established in 1876, earned the distinction of being the first of its kind to adopt a written version of the vernacular language (*baihua*).⁷¹ The *People’s Paper* carried international, national and local news, social commentary, translations of important Western texts, poetry, essays and commercial reports, providing readers with a wealth of information, much of which was available for the first time to the public.

In the period from 1876 to 1898, about ten vernacular papers emerged in the major cities of Shanghai, Wuxi, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and Chongqing.⁷² In 1897, Kang Youwei’s brother, Kang Guangren (1867-1898), published the *Zhixin bao* (Know the News Paper) in Macao, while Tan Sitong (1865-1898) and Tang Caichang (1867-1900) founded the *Xiangxue xinbao* (New Hunan Learning News) and *Xiang bao* (Hunan News) in Hunan. These papers heralded a new genre of Chinese-owned popular press that printed national, and at times, international news. Their purported aim was to inform as wide a readership as possible on the urgency of saving China.

The China Progress (Shiwu bao)

⁷⁰ Xu Zaiping and Xu Ruifang, *Qingmo shishinian shenbao shiliao*, 14-15.

⁷¹ Wang Guanquan, *Bei Bang di Puluomixiusi*, 85.

⁷² Chen Wanxiong, *Wusi win wenhua de yuanliu*, 135-7.

In 1896, following the Qing government's shut down of the *China Strengthening Paper* after less than a full year for promoting radical views on reform, Huang Zunxian (1848-1905), a career diplomat with substantial experience in, and a deep knowledge of, Japan, invited Liang Qichao to edit a new journal in Shanghai called the *Shiwu bao* (The Paper for Current Affairs--later called "The China Progress").⁷³ Appearing three times a month from August 1895 until August 1898, it was considered by the cosmopolitan, Western-trained scholar Hu Shi to be one of the three most influential newspapers in China from 1898 to 1923.⁷⁴

One of the reasons for its success was certainly Liang's compelling writing style. Breaking free from the hegemony of the then-popular Tongcheng and Yanghu forms of classical composition, with their emphasis on textual exegesis, morality, and literature as a "vehicle of the Way"⁷⁵ Liang adopted an easy classical style of exposition, designed to reach a wider audience.⁷⁶ His writing approximated spoken Chinese to a certain extent, but it did not yield to the distinctive syntax of vernacular speech. Liang was unafraid of using popular idioms and Japanese neologisms, and he avoided the strict rules of contrasting and pairing concepts that were required in many forms of classical Chinese. As a result, his prose seemed, fresh and it proved extremely appealing to readers.⁷⁷

Liang felt that he owed his audience an explanation of the term "timely affairs," thus he wrote: "In the days of the Kangxi emperor, [the expression 'timely affairs'] referred to the study of principle; in the days of the Qianlong and Jiaqing emperors, it

⁷³ Philip Huang, 25.

⁷⁴ The other two publications were, in Hu's view, the *Xinmin Congbao* (New people's miscellany), published in Yokohama in 1902 by Liang, and *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth), published in Shanghai in 1915 by Chen Duxiu. See Chen Pingyuan, *Chumo lishi yu jinru wusi*, 51.

⁷⁵ *Anhui wenshi ziliao* (AWZ), 152.

⁷⁶ Chen Pingyuan, 201.

⁷⁷ Lü Xiaopo, 107.

was the study of the Classics and composition; today, it is Western learning and Western law.”⁷⁸

Liang set four primary goals for his paper, (1) to translate and transmit current events from around the world, (2) to record the progress of reform, especially in the provinces, (3) to seek information on the important interactions between China and the foreign powers, and (4) to broaden the knowledge of the readers by publishing articles on politics.⁷⁹ In order to procure the latest news from abroad, *The China Progress* translated news reports wired from Reuters as well as articles from papers in London, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Russia--over sixty-five sources in all.

Liang's paper offered his readers a broad-ranging, eclectic and fundamentally progressive view of the world: George Washington's biography was serialized alongside stories about Arthur Conan Doyle's legendarily clever hero, Sherlock Holmes; a letter appeared from a British woman exhorting Chinese women not to bind their feet; and in an effort to provide information that would assist the Chinese in developing their own railroad companies, the paper painstakingly printed, in twelve issues, the 314 rules and regulations of a London railroad company.⁸⁰ Sun Yat-sen's name first appeared in *The China Progress* via a Reuters news column, and subsequently his detailed biography and radical views on saving China were published--a reflection, presumably, of Liang's friendly attitude toward Sun.⁸¹ The paper even printed foreign criticisms of China, such as the humiliating claim that the once-glorious "Middle Kingdom" was now one of the four sick countries of the world, along with Turkey, Persia and Morocco.

⁷⁸ Lü Xiaopo, 54.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 55.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 69.

⁸¹ Ibid., 163-166.

Setting a precedent for investigative journalism and intending to inform its readers about the negative effects of imperialism, *The China Progress* released the twelve secret conditions that Russia had imposed on the Qing dynasty before agreeing to pull out of Manchuria in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (see Chapter 2). It also reported on the Socialist Congress of the Second International held in London in 1896, a meeting in which the right to national self-determination and opposition to colonialism were both affirmed.⁸² In a related story, the paper listed the amount of indemnities owed to Britain and Germany in 1896 (6.9 million taels [ounces] of silver), and calculated the breakdown of contributions for repayment from various sources, including not only provincial salt and customs revenues but also a private donation of 240,000 taels from a Cantonese individual named Wei.⁸³

The most powerful impact that *The China Progress* had on its audience was undoubtedly in the realm of politics. In one particularly evocative article, Liang likened China to “a thousand year old mansion, with broken bricks and falling beams” in which its inhabitants either sleep soundly, unaware of the danger, or, seeing the threat posed by the crumbling structure, know only “to cry bitterly, awaiting death.”⁸⁴ And in another seminal piece, titled “*Bianfa tongyi*” (A thorough discussion of institutional change), Liang evoked the laws of nature in advocating a fundamental overhaul of China’s outmoded governmental system: “If change is effected at the right time,” he wrote, then the self holds the power; the country is saved, the race is saved; [and] the teachings are saved. If change is forced on the unchanging, then the power is lost to others and

⁸² Lü Xiaopo, 169, and <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/index.htm>, accessed 7/14/08.

⁸³ *Shiwu bao*, no. 2-13, July-Nov. 1896. (On the indemnity payment, see no. 2, 144-50; on railway regulations, see the small sections in each of the issues no. 2-13).

⁸⁴ Lü Xiaopo, 109.

controlled by others....”⁸⁵ Painstakingly he analyzed the need to reform the civil service examination system, to invest in the education of women and children, and to establish a parliamentary government, among other progressive measures.⁸⁶

Liang deplored the racial prejudice of the Han people toward the Manchus, arguing that over time evolutionary change would erase the distinction between the two “races,” and that only by putting aside their differences could China unite against imperialism.⁸⁷ He urged his countrymen to form associations and study societies, and to work together for a common cause:

The Way is most effective in groups, and not in solitude; solitude leads to blockage; blockage to stupidity; groups lead to comprehension; comprehension leads to wisdom; [and] wisdom leads to strength . . . In the West, there is a society for each branch of learning; thus there is an agricultural society . . . a mineral society . . . a commerce society . . . These societies can gather up millions of people . . . accumulate millions in funds . . . [and] with books to educate, papers to spread the news, and friends and teachers to instruct . . . [them, they will] succeed in their learning, and their skills [will be] high.”⁸⁸

Some of the other journalists in the paper were even more forceful than Liang in championing people’s rights and arguing for the development of a constitutional system. Yan Fu (1854-1921), for instance, published “Bi Han” (Countering Han [Yu]), in which he refuted the Tang dynasty scholar Han Yu’s theory that the role of rulers is to issue orders, the role of officials is to oversee the execution of the orders, and the role of the people is simply “to farm and conduct commerce for the rulers.” Yan, who would later gain great fame for his elegant translations of Western authors such as Thomas Huxley,

⁸⁵ Liang Qichao, “Bianfa tongyi” [A thorough discussion on institutional change], in *Yinbingshi heji*, 1:1, 8.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-95.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, pointed out that Han Yu had not considered the fact that throughout Chinese history rulers had been mostly despotic, deceitful and exploitive. Yan argued that the rights of the people are a gift from Heaven; in the West, he asserted, the people are cherished by the state, while in China they are treated like slaves.⁸⁹

The impact of the paper was electrifying. A *China Progress* fad swept across the intellectual world as progressive schools incorporated it into their curriculum, study associations formed to discuss its content, and Zhang Zhidong, the wily self-strengthener, who once referred to Kang Youwei, as “the best among the younger generation,”⁹⁰ ordered that *The China Progress* be made mandatory reading for all officials under his jurisdiction from the county level up.⁹¹ Within a few months of its creation, circulation of the paper reached 10,000 copies, and many issues were given away to progressive Chinese schools, as well as to missionary schools. The president of Shanghai’s St. John’s University placed regular orders for the paper. Recycled repeatedly, *The China Progress* may have reached between 100,000 to 200,000 readers by early 1897.⁹²

As one important measure of the paper’s impact on an entire generation of reformers (and revolutionaries), we may call upon the testimony of Chen Duxiu himself. In his diary, Chen wrote that shortly after failing the provincial-level examination in Nanjing, he became a convert to the reformist writings of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao by reading *The China Progress*. In his succinct formulation: “[I switched] from

⁸⁹ Lü Xiaopo, 123-4.

⁹⁰ Hu Sheng, 2: 97, 99.

⁹¹ Lü Xiaopo, 181.

⁹² Ibid., 179-84. Lü estimates that each copy of the paper may have been recycled as many as fifteen times.

the study of witches and monsters to the Kang-Liang camp.”⁹³ Later, Chen described the power of the paper on the scholars of his time:

When my generation was young, we studied the eight-legged essay and the Ancient Text, and always despised teachers who spoke about European languages or New Text [Learning], thinking that they were slaves of Western learning . . . Once we studied the writings of Mr. Kang and Mr. Liang, we suddenly realized that the knowledge that resided outside the orthodox sphere, was bright and expansive, unmatched by what we knew before. Today if our generation had learned a little of the knowledge of the world, it stemmed from the gift of Mr. Kang and Mr. Liang.⁹⁴

This, Chen went on to say, was their contribution, not only to China but also to the world, and it ought to be commemorated in a very special way.

State-Sponsored Reform: From the “Hundred Days” to the Inauguration of the “New Policies”

As Chen and all other intellectuals of his generation came to know well, the contributions of Kang and Liang were not only in the realm of writing and ideas; they were also men of action, and although Kang’s early efforts to effect change in the Qing government had yielded little fruit, his time would soon come.

One of the many adverse consequences of the Sino-Japanese War, at least from a Chinese perspective, was what became known as the “Scramble for Concessions.” Since

⁹³ Shen Ji, “Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu” (Chen Duxiu during the 1911 Revolution), *Jianghuai lundan*, no.2 (Dec., 1979).

⁹⁴ Chen Duxiu, “Bo Kang Youwei zhi zongtong zongli shu [Rebuttal of the letter Mr. Kang sent to the President and the Prime Minister], in *Chen Duxiu zhu zuoxuan* [Selection of Chen Duxiu’s writings] (ZZX), 1:214.

China's military weakness had been laid bare in the conflict, Japan, Russia and the European powers came to eye the former "Middle Kingdom" even more covetously than before. What is more, the huge indemnity that the Chinese had to pay to Japan, coupled with the enormous economic advantages gained by all of the foreign powers as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, made China especially vulnerable to exploitation.

Beginning with the Russians in 1896, the foreign powers began to extract various concessions from the Qing government, most of which took the form of long-term territorial leases over broad areas of Chinese land. In 1897, the murder of two German missionaries gave Germany the opportunity to seize a naval base at Qiaozhou (aka Kiaochow) in Shandong province, after which they compelled the Qing government to lease the area for a 99 year period. Other such lease agreements with the major foreign powers followed rapidly, and soon it appeared that China might be "carved up like a melon" (*fengua*, in the Chinese idiom). Under the circumstances, and on the advice of his tutor, Weng Tonghe (1830-1904), the young Guangxu emperor sought the counsel of Kang Youwei. Kang had come to both Weng's and the emperor's attention as early 1895, after submission of the "10,000 word petition," and the time now seemed ripe to implement some of Kang's proposed reforms.⁹⁵

The Reform Movement of 1898

⁹⁵ Hsiao Kung-chuan, "Weng T'ung-ho and the Reform Movement of 1898," *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, 1:1 (June, 1956), 111-235.

After several meeting with high officials, Kang gained an audience with the emperor himself (on June 16, 1898). This interview reportedly lasted five hours and placed Kang in the full confidence of the Qing monarch. But even before this meeting the emperor had begun to act on some of the proposals that Kang had suggested in a series of memorials to the throne. Liang Qichao also exerted considerable influence at this time. We know, for example, that in the summer of 1898 the emperor read, and made notes on, Liang's reformist paper, *The China Progress*.⁹⁶

Starting on June 11, 1898, and continuing for 103 days (hence the so-called "Hundred Days"), the Guangxu emperor issued between forty and fifty edicts decreeing that China should learn from the West in the area of governance as well as in the realms of commerce, agriculture and industry. He ordered the replacement of the eight-legged examination format with essays on current affairs, the creation of a special examination in political economy, the publication of an official newspaper, the establishment of modern schools and an imperial university, the construction of railways and mines, the abolition of sinecures, reform in the Qing legal code, the appointment of progressive-minded officials, and even the solicitation of suggestions from private citizens.⁹⁷

Fearing a loss of power, and in the midst of much political intrigue, the Empress Dowager Cixi managed to place the young emperor under house arrest, rescinding virtually all of his reform edicts, and executing six of his advisors, including Kang's younger brother. Japanese Pan-Asianists and supporters of Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu ⁹⁸ helped Kang and Liang escape to Japan, where they were initially

⁹⁶ Lü Xiaopo, 210.

⁹⁷ For a list of the major reforms and a discussion of the politics of the period, see Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 369-80.

⁹⁸ Philip C. Huang, 47.

welcomed by the overseas Chinese community. Soon, however the Qing government pressured the Japanese authorities to evict Kang, who settled in Canada and established the Protect the Emperor Society (Baohuang hui), which eventually expanded to over one hundred branches all over the world.⁹⁹ Liang stayed in Yokohama and began editing *Qingyi bao* (Pure Discussion Paper) in 1899. Meanwhile, Cixi schemed to depose the Guangxu emperor altogether, but the plot failed when it was leaked to the public.

The Boxer Uprising

The return of the conservatives to power in Beijing, led by Cixi, coincided with a burst of anti-foreign activity on the part of a group known as the Boxers United in Righteousness (Yihe quan), or simply the Boxers. This martial-arts oriented secret society, which first appeared in north China a century or so before in the aftermath of the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804), reappeared in Shandong province during the late 1890s and grew in response to the inroads of imperialism (including foreign economic penetration and missionary activity), government corruption, and a series of devastating natural disasters. From 1896 to 1899, floods and famines had plagued the provinces of Hunan, Anhui, Zhili, Shandong, and Jiangsu provinces, wiping out entire villages and killing hundreds of thousands of people. Zhang Zhidong, then governor-general of Hubei and Hunan, memorialized the throne, reporting that “stricken by hunger and cold, many of the refugees resort to the eating of grass roots, tree barks, and earth. The tragedy is too

⁹⁹ Kang traveled extensively through Europe, the United States, SE Asia and South America, had a birthday gala celebration for his 50th birthday at New York’s Waldorf-Astoria, and even bought an island of the coast of Sweden. See Grieder, 122.

enormous for eyes to behold. Dead bodies can be seen across the landscape.”¹⁰⁰ Foreign papers reported that female children were being sold to save them from starvation, at 50 to 1,000 cash (1 to 20 pence) each.¹⁰¹

Under these deplorable conditions, the Boxers were able to recruit large numbers of peasants and other disaffected elements of Chinese society, including groups of women, to their cause. They also joined forces with secret societies such as the so-called Big Swords, and even managed to gain the support of some anti-foreign provincial officials.¹⁰²

In response to Western demands that the Boxers be suppressed immediately by the Qing government, some leaders of the once virulently anti-Manchu organization came up with a new slogan: “Support the Qing and exterminate the foreigners” (*Fu Qing mie yang*). Supported by, or at least unimpeded by, a number of Qing officials, the Boxers began to spread into urban areas such as Beijing and Tianjin in early June of 1900, harrassing and sometimes killing foreigners and Chinese converts and then laying seige to the foreign legations in the capital. Encouraged by this apparent show of “loyalty” to the dynasty, the Empress Dowager condoned the Boxers’ attack on the legations and encouraged uprisings against foreigners in other cities and provinces. In August of 1900, a foreign expeditionary army of some 20,000 troops from eight nations suppressed the Boxer uprising and forced the Qing court to sign the Boxer Protocol in September of 1901. By the terms of this agreement China had to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels

¹⁰⁰ Hu Sheng, 53.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Yu Xian, the governor of Shandong, supported the Boxers and renamed them Yihe tuan (Righteous and Harmonious Militia). The anti-foreign sentiment was sparked by the retaliation of the German government over the killing of two German missionaries in Shandong by two Big Sword society members in 1897. The Jiaozhou Peninsula was seized; villages were burned and Chinese were killed. Jack Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions*, 135-6.

of silver (around US \$333 million at current exchange rates) for the loss of foreign life and property--a sum well above the 250 million taels of the Qing government's annual income. This amount was to be paid over a thirty-nine year period, by which the total payment, with interest, would come to almost 1 billion taels! Such a devastating outcome finally drove home to even the most conservative elements at court that China needed to change its ways, and that Japan was now a source of modernizing inspiration.

The Beginning of the "New Policies"

In 1901, Zhang Zhidong and another governor-general, Liu Kunyi, submitted three memorials proposing a reform agenda reminiscent of the "Hundred Days" of 1898 but broader in its scope and implications.¹⁰³ This New Policy (*Xinzheng*), called for, among other things, the establishment of modern schools, the phasing out of the civil service examinations, the preparation of a constitution, the modernization of China's armed forces, the promotion of industry and technology, and the sending of students to study overseas.¹⁰⁴ In response, the thoroughly humiliated Qing court issued an edict in absentia (the Empress Dowager had left Beijing in mid-August, taking the hapless Guangxu emperor with her, and establishing a temporary capital in the city of Xi'an, Shaanxi province), stating that it was filled with remorse as it reflected upon "how the accumulated and continued abuses and our excessive attention to empty formalities over the past several decades have contributed to the present calamitous situation." It called

¹⁰³ See Li Xizhu, "Zhang Zhidong yu 'Jiangchu huizou bianfa sanzhe'" (Zhang Zhidong and the three reform memorials from the Jiangchu meeting), *Lishi yanjiu*, no.2 (2002). <http://jds.cass.cn/Article/20050912151530.asp>, accessed 7/22/08.

¹⁰⁴ Jack Gray, 138-9.

for the overhaul of China's outmoded "administrative methods and governmental regulations," an emphasis on learning "the fundamental principles upon which Western wealth and power are based," and a concerted effort to go beyond learning "the surface elements" (i.e. languages and technologies) of the West."¹⁰⁵

As we shall see more fully in subsequent chapters, the New Policies, designed to preserve the dynasty, ultimately had the opposite effect. For now, however, let us focus mainly on the educational side of the imperially sponsored reforms, which brought about a sea change in the way the literati class related to the state and the way that Chinese political and social life came to be organized.

As suggested above, since the civil service examination system was formally institutionalized in the seventh century, rulers of successive dynasties had made the rewards of social prestige and public office contingent upon scholarly attainment, thus tethering the literati class to the ideological orientation of the court.¹⁰⁶ For more than a thousand years, educated men pinned their hopes on passing a series of exams that tested their competence in discussing the Confucian classics, in composing classical poetry, and occasionally in answering questions on current policy, almost invariably by reference to the past.¹⁰⁷ In 1901, however, the state replaced the "eight-legged essay" with policy questions, and ordered that county-level schools be transformed into elementary schools, prefectural schools into middle schools and provincial academies into colleges--all with a mixed a curriculum of classical Chinese and Western subjects. Provincial officials were ordered to send students abroad and even some of the children of Bannermen from the Imperial Clan Court went abroad to study. Hundreds of Japanese teachers were hired to

¹⁰⁵ Douglas R. Reynolds, *The Xincheng Revolution*, Appendix, "The reform edict," 202-204.

¹⁰⁶ Benjamin Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil*, 8.

¹⁰⁷ See the table of curriculum changes from Tang to Qing dynasties in Elman, 729-737.

overhaul the Qing educational system, and Chinese students in Japan reached a peak estimated at between 7,283 and 12,000 in 1906.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile, as ever more Chinese schools adopted varying degrees of Western curriculum, and as criticisms of the examination system continued unabated, the court finally took the drastic step of abolishing the civil service examination system in 1905. This delivered “a staggering blow to the Confucian concept of rule by virtue and eliminated the institutional reinforcement of orthodox Confucian values.”¹⁰⁹ In no time, prestigious Qing educational organs such as the Hanlin Academy became administratively obsolete.¹¹⁰ And although classical education would continue to bring social prestige in Chinese society for another decade or more, especially if accompanied by an examination degree, increasingly the acquisition of Western knowledge became the mark of an educated person in China, as it had since the 1870s in Japan.

This change in educational policy had the greatest effect on the generations born in the late 1880s and 1890s. As over a million examination candidates and office aspirants were thrown off their career track, numerous problems became evident with the new system.¹¹¹ The rapid establishment of primary schools posed an unintended socio-economic barrier as the new schools charged a substantial tuition fee, cutting off educational opportunities for many individuals who previously could have afforded the less expensive system of private tutoring.¹¹² Meanwhile, the majority of the educational reforms occurred only in urban centers. The rapid transfer of the lower level examinees,

¹⁰⁸ Reynolds, 48. Reynolds lists a table in which the numbers differ according to various historians. The lowest estimate, by Futami Takeshi and Sato Hisako, is 7,283; the highest, by Li Xisuo, is about 12,000.

¹⁰⁹ Smith, *China's Cultural Heritage*, 288-289. For details, see Elman, 608 ff.

¹¹⁰ Elman, 609.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 606.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 607.

the *tongsheng* and the *shengyuan*, into the primary schools meant that a similar curriculum was offered at both the upper primary and middle schools in order to accommodate a wide range of ages (from six to thirty-years of age).¹¹³ Most ominously, rural residents began to attack the new schools, not only because they were taxed more to pay for them, but also because their cherished temples and public spaces were sometimes confiscated by the state for educational purposes.¹¹⁴

As the Qing government lost its primary instrument of ideological control over the literati, it ceded a greater role to local elites in the management of schools. Starting from 1902 and continuing into 1904, the court promulgated the Imperially Approved Memorial on the Modern School System (*Zouding xuetang zangcheng*), designed to establish a new-style school system across the nation.¹¹⁵ In 1906, the Qing state created an Education Promotion Bureau (*Quanxue suo*) at each of the district levels in the provinces, and staffed them with qualified gentry to supervise educational districts of about 4,000 households each.¹¹⁶ As state funding was insufficient to maintain the system, financial support from the private sector was used to expand education at the county level.¹¹⁷ The local gentry was involved not only in establishing schools, but also in lecturing, creating newspaper reading rooms, and investigating methods of educational management.¹¹⁸ The increasing engagement of the gentry in the educational system went hand in hand with their active role in forming study societies and other civic associations and in publishing newspapers and magazines.

¹¹³ Stephen C. Averill, "The Cultural Politics of Local Education in Early Twentieth Century China," in *Twentieth Century China*, 32:2 (April, 2007), 9.

¹¹⁴ Paul Bailey, *Reform the People*, 119. See also Averill, 9.

¹¹⁵ Cong Xiaoping, *Teacher's Schools*, 38.

¹¹⁶ Bailey, 98-99.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 103.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 119.

The Post-1900 Role of Japan in Chinese Reform and Revolution

The failure of the 1898 reforms and the Boxer debacle did more than provoke the Qing government to inaugurate the New Policies from above. It also sparked increasing political activity on the part of reform-minded gentry in the provinces and abroad, and accelerated the dissemination of both reformist and revolutionary information through the new-style periodical press. In each of these realms, Japan played an increasingly significant role as a source of new knowledge and a safe haven for political dissidents.

Elite-Led Uprisings in China

Gentry activism of all sorts increased considerably after 1900, as did the complexity of the networks in which it took place. Let us consider, for example, the case of Tang Caichang (1867-1900), founder of the Current Affairs Academy and one of the many illustrious students associated with the famous Yuelu Academy.¹¹⁹ After his friend, Tan Sitong, became a martyr of the abortive 1898 reform movement, Tang vowed to avenge the young reformer's tragic death. His immediate goal was to oust the Empress Dowager, Cixi, and re-install the Guangxu emperor as the head of a constitutional monarchy. He therefore traveled to Japan to seek financial support from Kang, Liang and Sun Yat-sen. Together with some of the more revolutionary overseas students in Japan such as Qin Lishan (1877-1906), Ji Yihui (dates unknown), Feng Ziyou (1882-1958), and

¹¹⁹ Among the illustrious "alumni" of this academy were He Changling, Wei Yuan, Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Guo Songtao, Hu Linyi, and Liu Kunyi. See <http://dm.hnu.cn/english/05people/0503st/st.html>; accessed 2/20/09.

Zhang Binglin (1868-1936, aka Zhang Taiyan), Tang planned an uprising in the Yangzi River delta area.¹²⁰ Returning to China he formed the Correct Spirit Society (Zhengqi hui), creating an organization that linked overseas reformist forces with those in China, as well as with the secret society known as the Elder Brothers (Gelao hui) and certain elements of the so-called New Army.¹²¹ With promises of funding from Kang, Tang's Correct Spirit Society declared its intention to restore the Guangxu emperor to the throne, and to guard China's sovereignty.¹²² Soon, however, internal discord led Tang to withdraw from the Correct Spirit Society and to form the Self-standing Society (Zili hui), with its military arm, the Self-standing Army (Zili jun).¹²³

Tang then invited hundreds of progressive reformers to a meeting in Shanghai's Zhang garden, and transformed his organization into the China Assembly. Yung Wing (1828-1912), China's first college graduate from Yale, was elected president of the assembly, and the scholar-translator Yan Fu became its vice-president.¹²⁴ The membership roster represented a coalition united by their opposition to the Qing, consisting of Kang and Liang's Protect the Emperor faction, a group of anti-Kang reformers from Zhejiang province led by Wang Kangnian, Beijing intellectuals who came to Shanghai to escape the Boxers, entrepreneurs such as Yung Wing and Zheng Guanying, some members of Sun's Revive China Society, some secret society members,

¹²⁰ KGQ, 1:58.

¹²¹ See Sang Bing, *Gengzi qinwang yu wan Qing zhengju* (The 1900 save-the-emperor movement and the political situation in late Qing), 111 and KGQ, 1:58-9. The New Army was a provincially based creation of the New Policies in the early 1900s. Many units of the New Army became radicalized after exposure to revolutionary propaganda.

¹²² KGQ, 1:63.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 1:60.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

and recruits from the New Army.¹²⁵ The Assembly's manifesto contained a remarkably oxymoronic platform calling for the establishment of a new republic and the restoration of Guangxu emperor to the throne at the same time.¹²⁶

Among its various organizational activities, the China Assembly instigated a Resist-Russia movement in 1901. From March to May of that year, members of the Assembly spoke out against the cruel treatment of their countrymen at the hands of the Russians occupying Manchuria (see Chapter 2). They called for officials, gentry and businessmen from all provinces in China to telegraph their respective governors to refuse the twelve demands that Russia had imposed on China for further withdrawal from Manchuria, and for China to protect its railroads and send troops to the Northeast.¹²⁷

Meanwhile, in 1900, Tang and the Self-standing Army staged an uprising in Hankou, Hubei province. The rebellion failed, however, due to lack of adequate funding and poor organization. Tang was captured and executed. The student survivors Qin Lishan and Ji Yihui made their way back to Japan, and blamed Liang and Kang for reneging on a promise to deliver funds to procure more weapons.¹²⁸ They charged that Kang had been raising millions of dollars from overseas Chinese in the name of supporting military uprisings in China, but never forwarded the funds to help Tang and the Self-standing army.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Sang Bing, *Gengzi qinwang*, 109. Zheng Guanying (1842-1922) was an entrepreneur who wrote "Words of warning to an affluent age," an essay exhorting practical economic reform at the end of the Qing dynasty.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹²⁷ Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhong, *Ju E Yundong: 1901-1905* (Resist Russia movement: 1901-1905), 2.

¹²⁸ Philip Huang presents a more charitable view of Kang's failure to deliver the promised funds, although he does not excuse Liang's role in this debacle. Philip Huang, 96.

¹²⁹ Martin Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 133. KGQ, 1:70.

The bitterness caused a split in the overseas Chinese community. Tang's martyrdom and his posthumous fame threatened Kang, who attempted to play down Tang's role in the Protect the Emperor movement.¹³⁰ Having little military action to show for the dollars he raised, Kang falsely claimed credit for an uprising by secret society members in Guangxi province, representing it as a campaign orchestrated by the Protect the Emperor Society.¹³¹ He was further discredited by charges of misappropriating funds, and by 1901 the Protect the Emperor Society had already ceased to be an effective organizers.¹³² Complicating matters for the reformer-conspirators, in the aftermath of the failed Self-standing Army coup, the Qing authorities discovered the roster of the China Assembly and began to hunt down its members, who either went into hiding or fled abroad.¹³³

Japan as a Safe Haven

As we have already seen, Japan was the destination of choice for a great many Chinese reformers and revolutionaries seeking refuge from Qing government persecution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was, after all, geographically close, it had a long history of cultural borrowing from China, and by 1890 it had a Western-style political system. Although Japan had become an imperialist power after the Sino-Japanese War, and continued to exploit China in a variety of ways, it was also a source of inspiration for many Chinese intellectuals--an East Asian "success story." The Japanese,

¹³⁰ Sang Bing, *Gengzi qinwang*, 85.

¹³¹ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie di shetuan yu huodong* (The social groups and activities of the new intellectual sphere at the end of Qing, 65.

¹³² Sang Bing, *Gengzi qinwang*, 80.

¹³³ Ibid., 130.

for their part, found legitimacy for their country's imperialist adventures in the language of Social Darwinism. Thus, a Japanese newspaper asked rhetorically: "What is there to mourn over in the survival of the fittest, in the replacing of the bad by something good? . . . If imperialism forced reform on those who would not otherwise adopt it, where is the harm?"¹³⁴

In November 1898, Prince Konoe Atsumaro, a prominent leader of the Pan-Asia oriented East Asia Common Culture Society and President of the House of Peers in the Japanese Diet,¹³⁵ proposed to Zhang Zhidong that the Qing government should train Chinese students in Japan, invite Japanese teachers to China, and encourage Chinese educators to investigate Japan's school systems.¹³⁶ Zhang was especially receptive to the idea of sending Chinese abroad, having written in his famous *Exhortation to Study*, that "one year of study abroad is worth studying Western books for five years...."¹³⁷

The East Asia Common Culture Society's ostensible aim was to impart new knowledge to the Chinese, especially in the areas of the "physical and social sciences" and "educational methods and systems."¹³⁸ Toward this goal, it set up five branch organizations in China, helping to convey information to the various Chinese reformist groups in yet another form of political, social and intellectual networking.¹³⁹ The Japanese government, for its part, tolerated the activities of Sun, Kang and Liang in its own backyard, but as a matter of policy favored supporting the reformist elements in the Qing government, such as Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi and Yuan Shikai--in the hope, of

¹³⁴ *Japan Weekly Mail* (Feb. 22, 1902), 207 in Harrell, 29.

¹³⁵ Harrell, 30.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹³⁷ Saneto Keishu, *Zhongguo ren liu xue Riben shi* (A history of Chinese studying in Japan), 15.

¹³⁸ Harrell, 33.

¹³⁹ Sang Bing, *Gengzi qinwang*, 305-311. Among its varied activities, in 1900 the Society opened a college in Nanjing known as the To-A Dobun Shoin, which was relocated to Shanghai in 1901.

course, of currying favor and gaining influence with these powerful provincial officials.¹⁴⁰

Overseas Students and the Spread of Reformist and Revolutionary Ideas

The overseas Chinese student community in Japan forged a new force in Chinese new style journalism.¹⁴¹ Out of the reach of Qing censors and free from official reprisals, the Chinese students in Japan were free to discuss politics, and to introduce Western political and philosophical works to their compatriots. Seventy to eighty Chinese overseas student publications appeared in Japan in the period from 1900 to 1911, reaching a height of production in 1906, the year after the official abolition of the civil service exams in China. These journals were generally issued by provincial student associations, and financed by their respective co-provincial associations in China, indicating the strength of provincial networks.¹⁴² Sadly for their sponsors, most of these publications suffered from a high turnover in staff, a short lifespan, and a few printings (see Chapter 2).¹⁴³

A survivor of the Self-standing Army uprising in Hankou, Ji Yihui, along with other members of the Self-standing Society, founded the Translation Society (Yishu huibian she) in Tokyo in 1900, in order to “introduce civilization into China.”¹⁴⁴ This marked the first instance of overseas students translating Western and Japanese texts into

¹⁴⁰ Harrell, 32.

¹⁴¹ See Judge, 17-18.

¹⁴² Wang Xiaoqiu, *Jindai Zhong Ri wenhua jiaoliushi* (History of modern Sino-Japanese cultural exchange), 373.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 374.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 406.

Chinese. Zhang Binglin, Cai Yuanpei, and Wang Guowei were among the best-known of these early translators.¹⁴⁵ The Society's organ, the *Yishu huibian* (Translation Journal), focused on European, American and Japanese social science writings and provided the earliest systematic introduction of Western and Japanese political knowledge to China. Among the materials selected for translation were passages from Rousseau's *Social Contract*, Johann Kaspar Bluntschli's *A General Discussion of Public Law*, Ariga Nagao's *Contemporary Political History* (which referred to Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lasalle), and Fukuzawa Yukichi's *A General Outline of Civilization*.¹⁴⁶ Of the sixty-six titles of monographs translated as of July 1901, twenty-six focused on law and politics, eight on history, and six on economics. Lu Shifen and several editors also set up a textbook translation service called the Textbook Translation Society (Jiaokeshu Yijishe), translating mainly high school textbooks for Chinese use.¹⁴⁷ The Hunan students, led by Huang Xing, established their own translation bureau, the Overseas Study Translation Society (Youxue Yibian she), while the Zhejiang students set up another translation group, the National Learning Society (Guoxue she).¹⁴⁸

This enthusiasm for translation was motivated not only by the patriotic impulse to enlighten their countrymen (and especially their fellow provincials), but also by the prospect of remuneration that ranged from two to four silver dollars per thousand words of translation.¹⁴⁹ In China, publishing houses such as the Broadening Wisdom Press

¹⁴⁵ Saneto Keishu, 164.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 93.

¹⁴⁷ Wang Xiaoqiu, 409-10.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 410-13.

¹⁴⁹ Chen Mingyuan, *Wenhua ren de jingji shenghuo* (The economic life of the cultured people), 20. Chen calculates that in the 1900s one silver yuan would be equivalent to seventy renminbi/yuan in China's 2004 currency (about eight and a half U.S. dollars at 2004 exchange rates). Liang Qichao paid about three yuan per thousand words for contributions to his journals *Xinmin congbao* and *Xin xiaoshuo* in 1901, *ibid.*

(Guangzhi shuju), the Shanghai Make-new Society (Shanghai Zuoxin she), the Civilization Translation and Editing Press (Wenming bianyi yinshuju), the Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuju), the New People's Miscellany Branch Office (Xinmin Congbao zhidian), the Mirror of Today Press (Jingjin shuju), the National Learning Society (Guoxue she), and the East Mainland Press (Dong Dalu tushuju), all provided outlets for these translated texts. In addition, translation magazines appeared, such as the *Yilin* (Forest of Translation) in Hangzhou and the *Lixue Yibian* (Compendium of Great Learning Translations) in Suzhou.¹⁵⁰ In the first decade of the twentieth century, translations from Japanese sources vastly outnumbered those from English and other European languages.

Liang Qichao remarked on this phenomenon: "From 1902 to 1903, translations were most plentiful. As soon as Japan issued a new book, several translators would set about to work; the introduction of new thoughts came at a furious pace, but the manner [of translation] was what would be termed 'Liang Qichao style'." By this, Liang meant that the translations were not very organized, selective, coherent or discriminating. Quantity was all that mattered. Nonetheless, these works were "totally welcomed by society."¹⁵¹

Liang believed that translating political novels from Japanese to Chinese was the best means by which to convey new knowledge to his less-educated countrymen. But many of the novels translated by Liang and others were not rendered faithfully, either because the translators lacked proper training, or because they were careless, or because

¹⁵⁰ Wang Xiaoqiu, 414. See also Feng Ziyu, *Geming Yishu*, 1:170.

¹⁵¹ Wang Xiaoqiu, 414.

they took liberties with the original material.¹⁵² Another problem facing translators of Japanese texts of all sorts had to do with terminology. Japanese neologisms using Chinese characters (known in Japanese as Kanji) were introduced at a rapid pace in the reform era, and they were often preferred to preexisting Chinese equivalents. For example, Liang tells us that although he personally favored the Chinese term “*biange*” for revolution, his readers preferred the Japanese coinage, “*geming*.” Similarly, for economy, the Chinese term “*zishengxue*” was yielded to the Japanese neologism “*jingjixue*.” For philosophy, the Chinese expression “*zhixue*” surrendered to the Japanese “*zhexue*,” and for sociology, the Chinese term “*qunxue*” took a back seat to the Japanese “*shehuixue*.”¹⁵³

Meanwhile, overseas students in Japan were gravitating more and more toward revolution. In 1900, Zheng Guanyi and Feng Maolong established in Yokohama a publication titled *Kaizhi lu* (Record of Enlightened Wisdom), which offered a politically radical counterpoint to the more moderate *Pure Discussion Paper* published by Liang Qichao in the same city. In the following year Ji Yihui and two other survivors of the Self-standing Army uprising, Qin Lishan and Wu Luzhen, published the *Guomin bao* (Citizen Paper) in Tokyo from May to August. Severing their relationship with Kang Youwei and the Protect the Emperor Society, Qin and his comrades were increasingly committed to revolution, thus effectively making *Citizen Paper* one of the earliest overseas student revolutionary publications.¹⁵⁴

The Hubei, Hunan, Zhili, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Jiangxi provincial student associations all created their own publications between 1901 and 1903 in Tokyo, with the

¹⁵² Wang Xiaoqiu, 428.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 435.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 364-369.

Zhejiang Chao (The Tides of Zhejiang) attaining the widest circulation (5,000 copies a month).¹⁵⁵ During this time Liang Qichao converted *Pure Discussion* into *Xinmin cong bao* (New People's Miscellany) in Yokohama, and launched a literary magazine, *Xin Xiaoshuo* (The New Novel), to wide acclaim. As we shall see in the following chapter, such publications provided a crucial impetus for the development of reformist and revolutionary activity on the part of Chinese intellectuals in China and abroad after 1900.

Looking back over the broad expanse of nineteenth century Chinese history, we can see that the discursive world of journalism in the waning years of the Qing dynasty played a crucial role in the transformation of the social and political landscape in China. First, it was supported by intellectuals who were severed from the traditional route to officialdom, and who parlayed their educational status into a profession. Second, these scholars were grounded in the Confucian classics but increasingly well versed in Western knowledge. Third, their exchange of information was transmitted by a wide variety of networks and carried across national boundaries, with the Shanghai-Tokyo corridor serving as the main conduit. Fourth, they readily communicated with foreign scholars, both Western and Japanese, about current affairs. Finally, they frequently sought refuge overseas to escape political persecution at home.

At the same time, however, because of the comparative weakness of the central authority in late Qing times, Chinese intellectuals were relatively free to shape public opinion and to propagandize their beliefs, both at home and abroad. From the journals and newspapers they published, to the societies and organizations they formed and joined, to the lectures that they gave in schools and in public spaces (notably, Shanghai's Zhang Garden), the intellectuals of late Qing China created a vibrant network of ideas

¹⁵⁵ Wang Xiaoqiu, 369.

and activities that approximated a “public sphere.”¹⁵⁶ Accompanying the development of print journalism is the growing awareness that China is a nation on the margins of an international world order. The rising sense of nationalism was in direct correlation with the proliferation of the new popular press.¹⁵⁷

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1

The table below demonstrates how the members of Kang Youwei’s China Strengthening Society were enmeshed in a number of overlapping networks, with ties to the editorial staff of Liang Qichao’s iconic *The China Progress*, to the supporters of the anti-footbinding societies, to the founders of the Shanghai Girls’ School, to figures in 1898 Reform movement, and even to the *mufu* (secretaries) in the service of governor-general Zhang Zhidong. These societies were precursors to the sort of social networks that Chen joined in just a few years. What this table reveals is the fluidity of late Qing networks and the dangers of pigeon-holing intellectuals of the period into neat categories such as “conservative” or “radical.” There were, after all, many visions and versions of reform in late nineteenth century China. Not all supporters of women’s education were in favor of abolishing footbinding, and not all reformers worked to eradicate opium.

¹⁵⁶ Jurgen Habermas: *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 23-4. Although conditions in China at the turn of the twentieth-century were a far cry from those of eighteenth-century Europe, Jurgen Habermas’s concept of a mediating space between the state and society is not an entirely inappropriate description of the late Qing social and political context.

¹⁵⁷ Without drawing strict parallels, Benedict Anderson’s concept of print capitalism has similarities in this situation. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

smoking. Thus, this chart may help to remind us of the complexity of human action, and the pitfalls of trying to label historical actors with any precision, especially over time.¹⁵⁸

Table 1. The ties of Qiangxue hui members to other groups and activities.

Name	Zhang Zhidong's mufu	1895-6 China Strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui)	1896 The China Progress (Shiwu bao)	1897 Anti-footbinding Society	1898 Shanghai Girls' School	1898 Reform Movement
Kang Youwei		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liang Qichao		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wang Kangnian	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chen Baochen		Yes		Yes		
Chen Sanli	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Huang Shaoji	Yes	Yes				Yes
Huang Zunxian		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Jing Yuanshan		Yes		Yes	Yes	
Liang Dingfen	Yes	Yes				
Liu Kunyi		Yes			Yes	
Long Zehou		Yes		Yes	Yes	
Mai Menghua		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Miao Quansun	Yes			Yes		
Shen Yuqing		Yes			Yes	
Tan Sitong			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

¹⁵⁸ The table is compiled from name lists in Lü Xiaopo, 41-2, 60, 182, 236-240. It is, however, by no means inclusive of all those involved in these various networks.

Zhang Jian		Yes			Yes	
Zhang Zhidong	Yes (leader)	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Zheng Guanying			Yes	Yes	Yes	
Zou Daijun	Yes	Yes				

CHAPTER 2: NETWORK-BUILDING IN ANQING, TOKYO AND SHANGHAI

As we have seen in the previous chapter, one of the most important developments in the history of China after 1895 was the rise of Chinese nationalism and its public expression in new forms of political activity and new forms of print media. New-style political, social and intellectual associations, together with new-style journals, newspapers and propaganda organs, disseminated information designed to make the Chinese public aware of the continued threat of imperialism and the need to build a strong and self-sufficient China. Meanwhile, new public spaces, such as the Zhang Garden in Shanghai (see appendix A and below), provided gathering places for political activists. Within these organizations, publications, and physical spaces, nationalistic Chinese discussed and debated the various means by which China could achieve wealth and power. The options that emerged ranged widely and varied significantly.

Intellectuals took the lead in these discussions and debates. Some reform-minded individuals sought inspiration from ideas derived primarily from the West and Japan. Others held out the hope that some version of the so-called *ti-yong* (substance and function) model, made famous by Zhang Zhidong but criticized vociferously by Yan Fu, might provide a means by which the Qing government could "graft" certain branches of foreign learning (*yong*) onto an essentially "Chinese" cultural foundation (*ti*), thus preserving the dynasty's basic institutions and values while effecting meaningful change. Still others believed that only revolution could save China from inner collapse and complete imperialist domination. Debate over what to do and how to do it--marked, as

we have seen, by significant shifts in opinion and changes in tactics on the part of many Chinese intellectuals--continued unabated during the period from 1895 to 1911 (and in fact well beyond).

From about 1900 onward, Chen Duxiu moved from the margins to the mainstream of late Qing political activity. As he entered this new world of ideas and action, he found himself involved in a great many overlapping networks of personal and professional relationships. As we shall see, these fluid but still substantial networks assumed a bewildering variety of forms, dissolving and reconstituting in response not only to changing political and social conditions but also to the evolving ideas, actions and the personalities of their constituent members. In the process, the lines that seemed so clear between "reformers" and "revolutionaries" began to blur, particularly in the eyes of Qing officials.

At the risk of oversimplification, Chen's networks can be grouped into four main clusters for the years from 1901 to 1904--a period marked by multiple trips between his hometown of Anqing in Anhui province, Shanghai and Tokyo. The first cluster, shaped significantly by Chen's experiences with the Determination Society (Lizhi hui), introduced him to like-minded classmates in Tokyo and connected him to some of the more radical activities undertaken by overseas Chinese students in Japan. The second cluster strengthened Chen's connections with his fellow provincials in Anhui, helping to kindle the revolutionary movement there. The third cluster, which developed during Chen's second and third trips to Japan, focused on the Youth Society (Qingnian hui) and marked the emergence of Chen as a leader among the radical Chinese students abroad. The fourth cluster, which took shape after Chen founded the Anhui Patriotic Society

(Anhui Aiguo hui) and began editing the *Guomin riribao* (Citizen's Daily), brought Chen increasingly into the public eye.

But before examining how Chen became a public figure, we need to look carefully at the formative experiences in his life up to 1900.

Chen Duxiu's Pre-Revolutionary Life

Born in the vicinity of modern-day Anqing,¹ in Anhui province in 1879, Chen was descended from a long line of scholars who, in his own description, "practiced the Confucian trade for twelve generations, but never achieved fame or glory."² His original name, as it appeared on the family registry, was Chen Qingtong, and his given name (*zi*) was Zhongfu. Chen Duxiu was the name that he gave himself after the 1911 revolution--one of a great many self-selected aliases, a common practice among the Chinese gentry.³

When Chen was three years old, a devastating flood swept through the Anqing area, causing extensive loss of life and destruction of property.⁴ The Chen family

¹ The city of Anqing, located Huaining county, was known as Huaining from 1912-1949. See *Anqing wenshi ziliao* (Materials on the literary history of Anqing) (AQZ), vol. 11, 128.

² Zhang Jun, Xie Shunsheng and Shi Chunnan eds. "Chen Duxiu jishi kaolue" (A few inquiries into Chen Duxiu's family history), 185-194, in CKZL, vol.1, 188. Chen belonged to the 19th generation of the Chen clan which migrated to Huaining county, in Anqing prefecture, during the Southern Song dynasty, 1127-1279.

³ Chen's school name was Chen Qiansheng (陈乾生). Many of his aliases were variations on his given name, Zhongfu (仲甫), but three of them expressed Chen's political values and aspirations. "Youji," (由己) for example, was a variation on the word "ziyou" or freedom, and "San'ai" (三爱)(three loves) referred to his love of country, science, and freedom and democracy. The name "Duxiu," (独秀) referred to a small mountain on the outskirts of his hometown, and not to describe himself as "uniquely handsome," which would be the normal meaning of the words. The characters for Chen's various names follow: Chen Duxiu (陈独秀), Chen Qingtong (陈庆同), Chen Qiansheng (陈乾生), Chen Zhongfu (陈仲甫), Zhongfu (众甫), 重甫 (Zhongfu), Cheng Zhongfu (程仲辅), Chen Zhongfu (陈重甫), Chen Youji (陈由己), Xizhou zhongzi jushi (熙州仲子居士), Shengtang shanmin (盛唐山民), Chen Zhong (陈仲), Zhong (仲), CC Sheng (CC 生), Duxiu Shanmin (独秀山民—Duxiu Mountain person), Duxiu (独秀). See Shen Ji's detailed explanation in ZL, 127-132.

⁴ AQZ, vol.6, 43.

subsequently bought land in the area of modern-day Hefei, close to the family of the famous leader of the Self-Strengthening Movement, Li Hongzhang, and it was rumored that the two families were remotely related. Some scholars have attributed Chen's numerous escapes from persecution in Anhui to this family connection.⁵

Chen lost his father at the age of two,⁶ and was raised by a stern grandfather, a doting mother, a kindly older brother and two older sisters. His father, Chen Yanzhong (1848-1882), and grandfather, Chen Zhangxu (1820-1890), made their living mostly as tutors, neither attaining a higher degree than the first level of the civil service exam. However his uncle, Chen Yanshu (1851-1913), passed the provincial level of the examinations and was assigned to Zhili and Fengtian provinces (present day Hebei and Liaoning provinces) as a county magistrate.⁷ The uncle adopted Chen Duxiu because he did not have a son. The family fortunes improved when Chen's uncle profited from taxing the bustling local horse trade that had been brought about by the fighting during the Boxer Rebellion, but a poor investment in soybeans shortly thereafter reduced the family's circumstances once again.⁸ In later years, during the time of Chen's anti-government activities, Chen's uncle made a pretense of disowning him in order to avoid persecution, but the true rift occurred when Chen became involved with the sister of his uncle's wife shortly before the 1911 revolution.⁹

⁵ Feigon, 76.

⁶ CKZL vol.1, 188. Chen stated in his autobiography that his father died when he was a few months old, but biographers checked his family records and determined that Chen lost his father in 1881, when he was two years old.

⁷ CKZL vol.1, 191.

⁸ Zheng Xuejia, 9.

⁹ Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu" (Chen Duxiu during the Xinhai revolution), in Wang Shudi et al. eds., *Chen Duxiu pinglun xuanbian* (Selected edition of commentaries on Chen Duxiu) (PLXB), vol.1, 91-2.

By his own account, Chen enjoyed a happy, but somewhat impoverished, childhood. He was tutored from age six to nine by his grandfather in preparation for the civil service examinations. Later, he received instruction from his older brother, Mengji, who, in order to relieve his younger brother of the tedium of reciting the Four Books and Five Classics, allowed him to read from the *Zhaoming wenxuan*, a famous collection of poems and essays assembled by Prince Zhaoming (Xiao Tong, 501-531) in the sixth century C.E., whose prose was a welcome distraction from the mind-numbing classics.

Anhui was the center of the so-called Tongcheng School of Confucianism, which, as indicated briefly in the previous chapter, endorsed Zhu Xi's School of Song Learning and placed special emphasis on moral cultivation and a particular form of "ancient prose" (*guwen*) that had been popular in the Tang and Song dynasties.¹⁰ Advocates of Tongcheng Learning were generally hostile to Han Learning and particularly critical of the "parallel prose" style of writing (*pianpi wen*) favored by Han Learning scholars. They also vigorously condemned the "eight-legged essay" form that was required of all examination candidates.¹¹ Little is known about the particular features of Chen's early education, but it is probable that he was exposed to several varieties of Confucian thought and several forms of late-Qing prose.

It was Chen's mother's fervent hope that he would bring honor to the family by distinguishing himself in the civil service exams, and Chen did not disappoint her--at least not initially. In 1896, at the age of seventeen, he won first place at the county level,

¹⁰ Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology*, 286.

¹¹ The eight-legged essay format was a formal prose style that structured sentences in parallel forms, and tested the student's ability to expand the given topic by matching the parallel structure in grammar and content; the main body of the essay was comprised of four units of double parallel lines, hence the "eight legs." See Andrew Plaks, "The Prose of our Time," in *The Power of Culture*, in Willard Peterson, Andrew Plaks, and Ying-shih Yu eds., 206-217.

much to his own surprise. In his autobiography, written in the 1930s, Chen disparaged his success, describing the exam as a farcical game of words, in which the essay question was an apparently incomprehensible jumble of words: “鱼鳖不可胜食也材木” (a literal translation would be: “fish, turtle, cannot surpass as food, wood”). In fact, this was a standard type of examination question, composed of two partial quotations from a classical work. In this instance, the two partial quotations came from a famous passage in the *Mencius* pertaining to benevolent rule, which roughly translates as “When there is more grain and there are more fish and turtles than can be consumed, and when there is more wood than can be used, [then] people will be able to nourish the living and mourn the dead without resentment.”¹² Chen’s response to the question, he claimed, was to fill the page with “every difficult word from the *Zhaomin wenxuan* having to do with fish, animals, grass, and wood, and the ludicrously archaic prose of the *Kangxi Dictionary*, irrespective of its meaning.”¹³ It is clear, however, that Chen recognized the provenance of the quotation and he must have answered the examination question by reference to the basic theme; his intention in telling the story was simply to indicate his early disdain for such an archaic and irrelevant literary exercise.

In any case, Chen’s success in the examination brought many marriage proposals from prominent families in Huaning county, and Chen’s proud mother selected Gao Xiaolan,¹⁴ the daughter of a lieutenant-general (*tongling*) in the Anqing garrison of the

¹² See section 3 at http://www.yasue.cc/mang_chi1.html, accessed 3/3/09. The full sentence is 穀與魚鼈不可勝食，材木不可勝用，是使民養生喪死無憾也。

¹³ Chen Duxiu, “Shian zizhuan” (Autobiography of Shian), in CKZL, 8.

¹⁴ Most biographers claim that her childhood name was Dazhong, but Lee Feigon asserts that her name was Xiaomen. See Wang Guangyuan, 4; Tang Baolin and Lin Maosheng, *Chen Duxiu nianpu* (The chronology of Chen Duxiu), 8; Cf. Feigon, 34.

Army of the Green Standard.¹⁵ Gao was three years older than Chen, and did not receive a new-style education. According to Pan Zanhua, one of Chen's oldest friends, the union was not a happy one, as "more than a century separated the thinking between Chen and his wife, and they quarreled a great deal."¹⁶ Nevertheless, three sons and a daughter were born to Chen and his first wife.¹⁷

In 1897, Chen traveled with his older brother to Nanjing, the capital of present-day Jiangsu province, to take the provincial-level examination. But he failed. What he witnessed of the behavior of the examinees--stealing from shops, demanding discounts from prostitutes because they were the "emperor's scholars," and smuggling goods in boats by hoisting a yellow colored flag (the emblem of the emperor)--discouraged him from taking the examination again and pursuing an official career.¹⁸ "These strange beasts," he mused, "if successful, would they be a scourge or a boon to our country? The so-called 'selection of the best talent' is no better than hauling out a bunch of monkeys and bears every few years as an exhibit!"¹⁹ At this point, in 1897, both disappointed and disgusted, Chen began to have doubts about all aspects of Qing administration, and became, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, an avid reader of *The China Progress*.

Chen returned home and soon wrote *An Account of the Topography of the Yangzi River*, an essay drawn from two articles in the *The China Progress* that were written by Germans and translated into Chinese: "A Discussion of the Defense of the Yangzi River"

¹⁵ ZL, 139, and Wang Guangyuan, 4.

¹⁶ ZL, 139.

¹⁷ They are Chen Yannian, (1898-1927), Chen Yuying (1900-1928), Chen Qiaonian (1901-1927), and Chen Songnian (1903-1990).

¹⁸ Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu" (Chen Duxiu during the Xinhai revolution), *Chen Duxiu Pinglun xuanbian* (Selected edition of commentaries on Chen Duxiu), PLXB, vol.1, 92-3.

¹⁹ Chen Duxiu, "Shian zizhuan" (Autobiography of Shian), in CKZL, 14.

(“Yangzi jiang choufang chuyi”) and “An examination of the cannon bulwarks along the [Yangzi] river,” (“Chayue yanjiang paotai bing”).²⁰ He supplemented this twelve-page tract with details about his hometown and even references to passages in the historical novel, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (*Sanguo yanyi*).²¹ Chen’s purpose in publishing this booklet was to remind the Qing government, and especially his countrymen, both “in and out of China,” of the strategic importance of the Yangzi River. Referring explicitly to the recent territorial encroachments of the Russians, French, Japanese, Germans and British, he warned of even greater imperialist expansion in the near future. According to Chen, the British planned to blockade the Yangzi River, controlling access to and from Sichuan province, Tibet, and India. Ultimately, he believed, the British goal was to “control the seven provinces in the Southeast [of China].” If this were to occur, Chen claimed, merchants and the laborers would be paralyzed and the transportation of food and tax revenue would be impossibly difficult. “What is happening in our times,” he wrote with passion and anger, “is unthinkable....”²²

Shortly after composing the *Account*, Chen went to work for his uncle as a secretary in the Northeast, but he returned home in 1899 when his mother fell ill.²³ During his travels back and forth he witnessed first-hand the brutality of the Russians,

²⁰ Lü Xiaopo, 227. The two articles are from *Shiwu bao* nos. 21-26, and no. 28-30 respectively.

²¹ Prof. Shen Ji compared the writings of a German expert named Reynold, who was hired by the governor-general of Liangjiang, Liu Kunyi, to inspect the defense from Wusong to Nanjing, in *Shiwu bao* issues No. 21-26, and found that Chen summarized his salient points in his *Account*. See ZL, 60. For Chen’s description of the strategic importance of the cities of Jiangling and Xiangyang from *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, see ZL, 170. Chen’s interest might have been piqued by the fact that Anqing had been an important trading and military post during the Three Kingdoms period (220-280).

²² Chen Duxiu, “Yangzi Jiang xingshi lunlue” (An account on the topography of the Yangzi River”) in CKZL, 180.

²³ Biographers differ on Chen’s movements from 1897 to 1901. Shen Ji has refuted the undocumented claim made by several historians that Chen had attended Qiushi Academy in Zhejiang, and used Chen’s biographical data to place him in the Northeast for this period. See ZL, 149.

who had occupied parts of Manchuria during the Boxer Rebellion.²⁴ He also heard chilling stories about Chinese people who had bought train tickets only to be “chased off the train, beaten or killed ... by drunken Russian soldiers who used their drunkenness as an excuse.” The cowardly local Chinese officials, Chen claimed, were simply afraid to investigate. He also heard tales of Chinese people living alongside the Russian-controlled railroad tracks who were “raped and plundered countless times.” In his speech at the Anhui Patriotic Society (see below) in 1903, Chen reported:

The year before last, a Russian soldier raped and killed a woman from Jinzhou, and when village elders led 200 of the inhabitants to reason with the Russian officials, not only were they rebuffed, but Russian soldiers slaughtered them all. Russian officials set up vaccination stalls in cattle pens, and if the cattle owner paid extra money then he was allowed to go; otherwise even [if there were] no diseased cows, the owner was locked up in black [sic] jails and forced to pay a bribe. I heard of some who had no money and died in jail.”²⁵

Chen’s beloved mother passed away before he reached home, and Chen spent twenty-seven months in Anhui observing mourning.²⁶ Little information exists on this period of his life, but it was most likely spent learning intensely about China and its position in the world.²⁷ After concluding the mourning period, Chen left home with his

²⁴ Shen Ji, “Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu” (Chen Duxiu during the Xinhai revolution), in PLXB, vol.1, 93.

²⁵ Chen Duxiu, “Anhui aiguo hui yanshuo” (Speech at the Anhui Patriotic Society), in ZZX, vol.1, 13-16.

²⁶ Chen Duxiu, “Wuren zuihou zhi juewu (My people’s last enlightenment)”, in ZZX, vol.1, 176. Proper Confucian ritual dictate a three year period of mourning when one loses a parent, but in actuality it takes anywhere from twenty-five to twenty-seven months (as long as it continues into the third year). See Kurtis Hagen, “Xunzi and the Nature of Confucian Ritual,” in *Journal of the American Religion*, 71:2 (2003), 390, fn.18. <http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/content/vol71/issue2/index.dtl> (accessed 6/26/08.)

²⁷ Some biographers report Chen as entering Qiushi Shuyuan in Hangzhou, precursor to today’s Zhejiang University. In 1897-98 Qiushi Academy was considered a hotbed of revolutionary thinkers and activists in Zhejiang province, as its faculty was comprised of returnees from Japan and other political radicals.²⁷ Supposedly Chen was expelled in 1900 when he declared his support for “Zuibian Wen,” an anti-Manchu essay written by teacher Sun Yizhong. Feigon believes that How states this as fact without substantiation, see How, “The Development of Ch’en Tu-Hsiu’s Thought 1915-1938,” 42, and Feigon, 35 fn 41. Zheng Xuejia thinks it probable that Chen attended the Academy in 1897, but that How is wrong in stating that

older brother. His older brother returned to the Northeast, while Chen went to Tokyo to further his studies. His good friend Pan Zanhua was selected as a recipient of an official scholarship to study in Japan around this time, and Chen apparently traveled with him overseas.²⁸

At about this time, approximately 60 percent of the thousand or so Chinese students in Japan were enrolled in specially established senior secondary school programs--for example, the Kobun Institute, the Chinese student division of the Seijo School, the Tokyo Dobun Academy, and the Seika School.²⁹ About 15 percent of the students were enrolled in Waseda University or Tokyo Imperial University, and the rest found themselves in professional or vocational schools. The majority of these individuals studied liberal arts, teacher-training or military affairs--an indication not only of the

Chen studied naval shipbuilding, because no such subject was offered. See Zheng Xuejia, 30. A fourth biographer, Ren Jianshu leaves the entire episode out of his biography, see Ren Jianshu, *Chen Duxiu da zhuan* (the big biography of Chen Duxiu), 44-45. Wang Guanquan, however, supports the claim based on the fact that Chen wrote two poems to his friend Shen Yinmo, intimating their times together at the Qiushi Academy. See Wang Guanquan, 53. Shen Ji argues that the timing between Chen's traveling from Anhui to Zhejiang and then to Manchuria did not allow him to study in Hangzhou, see Shen Ji ed., *Chen Duxiu yanjiu*, vol.2, 236-42.

²⁸ Biographers differ on the number of trips Chen made to Japan (Chen Wanxiong says four while Wang Guanquan says five); the years in question are between 1900 and 1902. Shen Ji, in his definitive analysis of Chen's early life, concludes that he made five trips to Japan, and did not attend Qiushi Academy after his failed second level civil service exam in 1898; nor did he attend Nanjing's Jiangnan Military Academy. Therefore he did not meet Zhang Shizhao, Zhao Sheng, and Qin Yuliu there. See Chen Wanxiong, *Xinwen hua yundong*, 7; Wang Guanquan, 56, 60, 64, 69; Shen Ji ed. *Chen Duxiu yanjiu*, vol. 2, 236-242. There is also some disagreement among the biographers on whether or not Chen went to Japan first in 1901 or 1902. Along with the problematic attendance of Qiushi Academy, there is insufficient evidence to document his activities between 1898 and 1902. Zhi Yuru thinks he went four times, and the first was in 1902. See Zhi Yuru, *Chen Duxiu nianpu* (The chronology of Chen Duxiu), 7. Wang Guanquan seems to have resolved the problem by locating Chen's name in the Qing roster of overseas students in 1901, see Wang Guanquan, 56. Wang Guangyuan (not to be confused with Wang Guanquan) in his *Chen Duxiu nianpu* (Chen Duxiu chronology) also states that he went to Japan first in 1901, see Wang, Guangyuan, 6.

²⁹ Harrell, 69. The figures are for 1903. The number of students in Japan at this time is said to have been between 1,000 and 1,300. Saneto Keishu offers the low estimate, while Li Xisuo suggests the higher number. See Reynolds, 48.

needs of the Chinese state but also a reflection of the students' lack of training in the sciences.³⁰

In 1901, Chen was enrolled in Tokyo's Yakuroku Shoin in a short Japanese language course designed by Kanō Jigorō, the principal of the Tokyo Higher Normal School,³¹ but he stayed in Japan for only four months. Like many of his fellow students who were well versed in the Chinese Classics but had not been exposed to a Western curriculum before, Chen needed basic instruction in mathematics, chemistry, physics, and English. (As one indication of the obstacles faced by him and his fellow students, Japanese educators bluntly told the Chinese educator, Wu Rulun, who visited their country in 1902, that China lagged about thirty years behind Japan in its curriculum.³²)

In addition to creating short courses, Kanō Jigorō designed a three-year program for Chinese students at the Kōbun Institute. This program concentrated on Japanese language instruction in the first year, with a few extra hours of ethics, history, mathematics, laboratory experiments and physical education. In the next year, algebra, geometry, and drawing were added.³³ In the last year, the curriculum focused on botany, trigonometry, biology and English. Students who wished to concentrate on the humanities could, however, substitute history for algebra, geometry, and chemistry.³⁴

Once in Japan, Chen became exposed to a new world of political activities and intellectual currents. Although he did not make many non-Chinese friends in any of his

³⁰ Harrell, 69.

³¹ Chen Duxiu did not report the name of his school when he registered in the Qing roster of overseas students, *Qingguo liuxuesheng diyici baogaoshu-tongyinglu*. Wang Guanquan agrees with Saneto Keishu that Chen must have entered the precursor to Kōbun Gakuin, the Yakuroku Shoin. See Wang, 59. Shen Ji also concurs that the most popular and available Japanese language program for overseas students in 1901 was the Yakuroku Shoin. See ZL, 94.

³² Saneto Keishu, 36.

³³ Dong Shouyi, *Qingdai liuxue yundong shi* (A history of the overseas study movement in the Qing dynasty), 240.

³⁴ Harrell, 70.

trips to Japan, Chen read voraciously and observed keenly the differences between China, Japan and the rest of the world. He found many kindred spirits and began to think concretely about ways to save China.

The Determination Society and Its Vicissitudes

While he was in Tokyo, Chen joined an organization of overseas Chinese students called the Determination Society (Lizhi hui). It had been formed in 1900 by students brought together by shared anger, sadness and disappointment over the failure of the Self-standing Army's uprising in Hankou earlier that year, and the attendant loss of student lives. This organization served as an umbrella network for several different Chinese student associations, which totaling over a hundred people in 1900.³⁵ Of this number, about one-third received government scholarships and resided in the same dormitory; another third came from the military academies in Hunan and Hubei and lived in the Seijo School dormitories; the rest were self-funded and lived on their own.³⁶ Chen was a private student, supported in part by his wife's dowry.

Despite their shared bitterness and disappointment over the failure of the Hankou uprising, the members of the Determination Society could not agree on a course of action. Moderate students, led by Zhang Zongxiang, Cao Rulin, Wu Zhenlin, and Wang Jing, wanted to work with Kang Youwei's Protect the Emperor faction, believing that the

³⁵ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 148-155, 336-337. There is some confusion over the actual date of the founding of the society; Feng Ziyou and historian Zhang Yufa suggest that it was formed before the Self-standing Army's uprising, but Sang Bing supports Qin Lishan's account that it was in preparatory stage before the uprising and actually formed after the debacle of the uprising. Qin was a participant of the Self-standing Army and the Determination Society. As Feng Ziyou's account was an eye-witness account and had been challenged by historians, I favor Sang Bing's facts.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 151.

popular will had to be safeguarded by a constitutional monarchy. However, Chen Duxiu, Qin Yuliu, Zhang Ji, Shen Xiangyun, Ji Yihui, Cheng Jiacheng, Yang Yinhang, and Lei Fen were increasingly unhappy with what they perceived to be the “sell-out” of their comrades, a number of whom planned to sit for a special modified civil service exam that would give them an official post in the Chinese bureaucracy.³⁷ At this time the more “radical” students were not yet outright revolutionaries, but they were obviously searching for an alternative to the politically weak and ineffective Qing regime.

In 1901 the overseas students in Japan created the Citizens’ Assembly (Guomin hui) in an effort to join together as a unified group. Its draft document called for the “banishment of [China’s] slave-like character,” the “reinvigoration of [its] citizens’ spirit,” and freedom for the 400 million people of China so that all could “enjoy their natural rights [lit. rights conferred by Heaven].” The *Citizen Paper* (Guomin bao) was issued as its newspaper, and on its editorial staff were Shen Xiangyun, Ji Yihui, Lei Fen, Qin Lishan, Yang Tinglian, Yang Yinhang, Wang Chonghui, and Feng Ziyou.³⁸

Solidarity was ephemeral, however: the Citizen’s Assembly lasted only two months.³⁹

In the same year, newspapers in Japan reported that the Qing government was planning to cede Canton to France, causing an uproar in the overseas Chinese student community.⁴⁰ The Cantonese students, including two editors of *Citizen Paper*, Feng Ziyou and Wang Chonghui, joined their fellow Cantonese, Zheng Guanyi, Li Zizhong, Feng Siluan, and Liang Zhongyou in calling for their home province of Guangdong to

³⁷ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 153.

³⁸ KGQ, 47.

³⁹ Yan Changhong, “‘Guomin’ zhi faxian—1903 nian Shanghai Guomin gong hui zai renshi” (“The discovery of ‘the citizen’—A revisit of the 1903 Shanghai Citizens’ Association”), *Jindaishi yanjiu*, no. 5, 55. Yan states that the Association lasted for two months, while Sang Bing thinks that it never existed. See Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 329.

⁴⁰ Dong Shouyi, 248; Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi* (Unofficial history of the [1911] Revolution) vol. 1, 146.

secede from the Qing empire. To that end they established the Guangdong Independence Association (Guangdong duli xie hui), and many members of the Chinese overseas community joined them. Another Cantonese, the increasingly radical Sun Yat-sen, praised their effort and invited Feng, Li, Zheng and Wang to his residence in Yokohama. This began Sun's involvement with the Cantonese overseas students, much to the dismay of individuals who were still sympathetic to the Protect the Emperor Society in Japan.⁴¹

With growing confidence in their political strength, a group of Chinese students in Japan created the Qing Overseas Student Club (Qingguo liuxuesheng huiguan) in early 1902. When the Qing diplomat, Minister Cai Jun, offered to provide the organization with some financial support, he was invited to speak at their lunar New Year party, where he announced that "The devastation that our country has suffered...can only be blamed on ourselves. If we can make ourselves strong, even if the foreigners regard us as animals, it will not hurt us" He went on to urge the students to "be loyal to the ruler and patriotic," indicating that their loyalty and patriotism would allow them to "become successful."⁴² In defiance, however, one student representative, Wu Luzhen, made it clear that in his view the Qing Overseas Student Club should not become a tool of the Chinese government; rather, he insisted, the historical role of Club was akin to that of Independence Hall in the establishment of the United States, where the Declaration of Independence was adopted.⁴³

⁴¹ KGQ, vol. 1, 47. Ibid., *Geming yishi*, vol.1, 145-6.

⁴² Dong Shouyi, 229.

⁴³ Ibid., 230.

The Qing Overseas Student Club had a governing body and a board, and collected an annual membership fee of three silver dollars.⁴⁴ The club's facilities included a reading room, a restaurant, a lecture hall, classrooms for Japanese instruction, a publishing house, and a small bank. It was partly subsidized by the Qing government, which viewed it as a social organization. Dubbed the "headquarters of Chinese overseas students," it was the first student-run institution of its sort outside of China, providing the student membership with an opportunity to exercise democratic self-rule. Chen did not play an active role in either the Citizen's Assembly or the Qing Overseas Student Club, possibly because the former lasted only a short time, and the latter was formed by the more pro-Qing and moderate members of the student group.⁴⁵ But the nature of the student associations was such that Chen was familiar with most of these members through their involvement in other social networks.

Chen's Return to Anhui and His Early Ties with Fellow Provincials

Although Chen did not spend much time in Japan during his first visit to the island nation, his experiences there certainly helped to shape his subsequent experiences in Anhui. Soon after his arrival in China in early 1902, Chen published *A New Edition of World Geography for Elementary School* (Xiaoxue wanguo dili xinbian), a popular textbook with a second printing by the Shanghai Commercial Press. Similarities between this book and the geography text Chen used at the Yakuroku Shoin, titled *Instruction*

⁴⁴ See names of the board members of the club Appendix B. Three silver dollars in 1901 is equivalent to RMB \$210.00 today, see Chen Mingyuan, *Wenhua ren de jingji shenghuo* (The economic life of the cultured people), 15.

⁴⁵ See Appendix B for names of the members of the Qing Overseas Student Club.

Method for Geography (Dili jiaoshou fa), strongly suggest that Chen used the latter as a blueprint for his own book.⁴⁶

Designed for students in new schools with progressive curricula, Chen's primer presented an overview of fifty or more countries. It included a discussion of the planetary system, the topography of the earth, and, significantly, a section on what he termed "the geography of political affairs (*zhengshi dili*).⁴⁷ In this latter section, Chen divided human beings into five skin colors: yellow, white, brown, black and red. He further separated them into three categories of cultural attainment:

The first is called civilized, [whereby the people's] ethics, wisdom, skill and knowledge are developed and still improving; the second is called half-civilized, [whereby] literature and morality distinguish them from the barbarians, but [they are] uninformed of the sciences, superstitious, stubbornly conservative and ignorant of change and renovation; the third is called barbarian, where everyone has a mind of his own, with no sense of common good or sociability . . . and no knowledge of literature or morality."⁴⁷

He classified the white race as civilized, the yellow race as half-civilized, and all others as barbarian.⁴⁸

By most, but not all, accounts, in March or April of 1902 Chen established a small library (*cangshulou*; lit. book repository) at the Shangzhi xuetang (Higher Aspiration Academy) in Anqing,⁴⁹ stocking it with books he found in Tokyo. Among these works

⁴⁶ ZL, 94.

⁴⁷ Chen Duxiu, *Xiaoxue wanguo dili xinbian* (A New Edition of World Geography for Elementary School), 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ This episode occurred at various times according to whether the biographer recognized a first trip in 1901 or 1902. Those who do not recognize the first trip in 1901, would place this occurrence in 1902, along with Chen's involvement in a Youth Determination Study Society (Qingnian lizhi xue hui) and his founding of the first major Anhui revolutionary group, Anhui Patriotic Society, (Anhui aiguo hui). See Feigon, 40, Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua yundong*, 25, 70, and Zheng Xuejia, 45.

were probably books by Rousseau, Montesquieu, Arigao Nagao and Takata Sanae.⁵⁰

People in the area referred to his repository as “the Western books library.”⁵¹

During this period, libraries were costly and therefore scarce in China; only the imperial university in Beijing and certain missionary schools could afford to support them. It therefore fell to local gentry to set up *cangshulou*, which became social spaces that facilitated the creation of new political, social and especially intellectual networks. Readers often shared their subscriptions, exchanged materials, and came to listen to lectures.⁵² By 1904 there were approximately 116 such reading rooms in the provinces of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, Anhui, Sichuan, Shandong and Guizhou. The largest of these libraries, in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, boasted more than 20,000 books.

In an effort to stimulate political activism in his hometown, Chen organized the Youth Determination Study Society (Qingnian lizhi xue hui) with his fellow co-provincial Pan Zanhua and two students, Bo Wenwei of the Anhui Military Preparatory School and Zheng Zancheng of Anhui University.⁵³ Amidst rumors of a secret Qing government treaty signed with Russia, Chen gave public lectures at his own library, inviting two other fellow provincials, Wang Xiyan and Ge Wenzhong, to join him.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Wang Guanquan, 75.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 286.

⁵³ Shen Ji, “Xinhai geming shiqi de Yuewang hui” (Yuewang hui during the Xinhai revolution), PLXB, vol. 1, 72-88.

⁵⁴ Wang Yuanfang, *Yadong tushuguan yu Chen Duxiu* (Yadong publishing house and Chen Duxiu), 6. In Nanjing, Ge had introduced Chen to Wang and two other fellow provincials, Zhang Shizhao and Zhao Sheng, in early 1902. According to Wang, Chen met them in Nanjing after he fled Anqing for making inflammatory speeches at the library. See footnote 51.

Wang, in turn, asked co-provincial He Chuntai, organizer of the 1901 Shanghai Resist-Russia speech, to speak at the library as well.⁵⁵ Chen and his friends urged their co-provincials to become more aware of the perils facing their country, especially the threat posed by Russia.⁵⁶ These increasingly visible activities marked the beginning of what would become Chen's life-long career as a political organizer, public intellectual and author. Within his ever-expanding network of co-provincials, Chen found a group of like-minded individuals, with whom he could comfortably discuss and debate new knowledge and reformist ideas. At this point, Chen was not yet advocating the overthrow of the dynasty, only measures designed to reform and rescue the country. But to some Qing officials his activities were considered subversive. Thus, when news of Chen's talks came to the attention of Duan Fang, the governor-general of Liangjiang, he ordered the Anhui governor to issue an arrest warrant for Chen and his friends. Ironically, Chen escaped to Nanjing, the capital of Liangjiang!

Chen Duxiu's Return to Japan

In September 1902, still under the threat of arrest by the Qing authorities, Chen left for Japan with co-provincial Pan Zanhua. According to one of Chen's biographers, Chen enrolled in a military training program at the Seijo School, but another biographer

⁵⁵ Wang Guanquan, 75. There is some ambiguity on the exact date of this occurrence, Shen Ji placed this in 1902, but did not give a specific month in 1902. See Shen Ji, ZL, 47.

⁵⁶ ZL, 146.

maintains that he took a short course at the Tokyo Police Officer Training Academy (Dongjing jingshi tingji jingguan suchengke).⁵⁷

Much had happened in the Chinese overseas student community in the seven months of Chen's absence from Japan. In March, 1902, Zhang Binglin, a highly respected Confucian scholar and zealous anti-Manchu revolutionary, proposed to commemorate the "242nd anniversary of the death of China" with a service to be held on April 27th,⁵⁸ the day that the Chongzhen emperor (r. 1628-1641) of the native Chinese Ming dynasty had died.⁵⁹ Zhang had once been an enthusiastic member of Kang Youwei's China Strengthening Society in China, and had been hired by Liang Qichao as a journalist for *The China Progress*, but a falling out occurred when Zhang vigorously opposed Kang's idea that Confucianism should be China's official state religion.⁶⁰

By 1902, however, Zhang and Liang had become friends again, and Zhang was now an editor for Liang's publishing office, the Guangzhi shuju (Broadening Wisdom Publishing House) in Yokohama. Zhang's announcement of the commemorative service for the Chongzhen emperor made a point of blaming China's weakness on its present rulers, the alien Manchus, and asked the people not to forget their "Chinese origins." Interestingly, Zhang used the Japanese transliteration of the word China, *Shina*, to denote ethnic purity.⁶¹ Joining Zhang were some radical Chinese students who had been linked to Chen through the Determination Society network, including Qin Lishan and Feng

⁵⁷ Shen Ji believes that Chen enrolled in the Seijo School's military training program, based on a *Subao* news item that labeled Chen as a student of the said program, see ZL, 95-6. Wang Guanquan, however, argues that the Japanese official who granted admission to the Seijo program was out of the country, and thus Chen was unsuccessful in gaining entrance. He deduces that Chen enrolled in a short course offered by a Tokyo police officer's academy, see Wang Guanquan, 60.

⁵⁸ The date of the event was recorded by the Japanese authorities as taking place on April 27th, while Feng remembered it to be March 19. See Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 159.

⁵⁹ KGQ, vol. 1, 105.

⁶⁰ Ibid., vol. 1, 101.

⁶¹ Ibid., vol. 1, 104-6.

Ziyou, as well as Ma Junwu, Li Qun, Zhou Hongye, Zhu Lingxi, Wang Xiong, Chen Youlong, Feng Siluan, and Tang Mang,⁶²

In advance of the event, Zhang obtained Sun Yat-sen's signed sponsorship as well as Liang Qichao's tacit approval, and hundreds of students planned to attend. The meeting was cancelled, however, at the last minute by the Japanese police at the request of the Qing Minister, Cai Jun. Naturally, the aborted event only intensified the hostility of the anti-Manchu students, especially the core group from the original Self-standing Army.⁶³

Three months later, the antagonism between the Chinese students and Qing officials boiled over in the so-called Seijo School incident. The affair involved Minister Cai's refusal to provide the necessary letters of recommendation to nine self-funded Chinese students in their applications to the Seijo military program. As the students' request to meet the minister was ignored, they staged a sit-in at the Chinese embassy. At that point, Cai called upon the Japanese police to remove the students from the embassy grounds. Outraged that their own officials would use Japanese police on them, hundreds of angry Chinese students boycotted classes and declared their intention to return to China.⁶⁴ The leaders of the sit-in, Wu Zhihui (1865-1953) and Sun Kuijun, were deported. Wu, in an effort to draw attention to the plight of the students and the shameful behavior of the Qing government, attempted suicide by jumping into the sea.⁶⁵ The news was first reported in several issues of Liang's *New People's Miscellany* and widely

⁶² Sang Bing found by comparing Feng Ziyou's memoir and the roster in the Japanese Foreign Affairs archives that the names of the attendees differed, but a few were the same. He combined the two lists. Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 159. Tang Mang was the son of the Self-standing Army leader and martyr, Tang Caichang.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Harrell, 120.

⁶⁵ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 166.

printed in Japanese papers, which generally backed the students' position. In the end Cai Jun was recalled and the nine students were admitted to the Seijo School.⁶⁶

Scornful of the "sell-out" of those comrades who refused to break with the Qing, Chen and twenty of his friends, including Qin Lishan, Zhang Ji and Feng Ziyou, who would later play prominent roles in the 1911 Revolution, broke away from the Determination Society and formed the Youth Society (Qingnian hui) in 1902.⁶⁷ Its name was inspired by the revolutionary Young Italy Society, the *Giovine Italia*,⁶⁸ founded by Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872)--one of the leaders of the Italian unification and independence movement.⁶⁹ Initially the new organization was to be named the Young China Society, but fearing that this designation would attract too much attention from the Qing authorities, the students changed its name to the Youth Society.⁷⁰ Feng Ziyou, one of the original members of the group, later recalled that the first principle of the Society was to observe racial purity, and the second was to destroy the status quo.⁷¹ Members of the society translated a history of the French Revolution and published Liu Shipai's racially incendiary *A History of the Chinese People* (Zhongguo minzhu zhi).⁷² They also invited the daughter of Kang Youwei to offer a critique of the treatment of women under the Qing.⁷³ By all accounts the Youth Society was the first truly revolutionary organization to be formed by the Chinese students in Japan.⁷⁴

⁶⁶ Saneto Keishu, 254, 270.

⁶⁷ See Appendix C for names of the members of the Youth Society.

⁶⁸ From <http://www.ohiou.edu/~chastain/ip/mazzini.htm>, accessed 10/11/2007.

⁶⁹ Wang Guanquan, 62.

⁷⁰ Chen Wanxiong, 26.

⁷¹ Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi*, vol.1, 154.

⁷² Wang Guanquan, 62.

⁷³ No author was mentioned. Harrell, 98, who cites the source from *Yuxue yibian*, no. 4, p.5.

⁷⁴ Harrell, 98; Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 158; and Ren Jianshu, 47.

During the first half of 1903, while the Qing government was in the midst of what would become a decade long effort to reform and refashion itself, events conspired to increase the distance between the struggling state and its new-style students, both at home and abroad. In Tokyo, at the annual festival celebrating the lunar New Year, one of the Chinese student leaders, Ma Junwu, denounced the Manchus, to the delighted cheers of five to six hundred fellow students.⁷⁵ In response, the overseas Manchu students immediately formed a society with three explicitly anti-Chinese goals: (1) to press the Qing government into prohibiting Chinese students from enrolling in any military schools; (2) to remove the authority of all Han Chinese officials; and (3) to exterminate the Han race.⁷⁶ An exception to this dramatic display of anti-Chinese sentiment was the Manchu student Chang Fu, who felt remorse over the mismanagement of China by the Manchus, and later joined the Military Citizen's Education Society (Jun guomin jiaoyu hui) (see below), along with three other Manchu students.⁷⁷

In April of 1903, the Japanese press released an interview with the Russian Chargé d'Affaire G. A. Planson in Beijing, in which Planson revealed that the Russians planned to annex the three Northeastern provinces of China (i.e. the area known by Westerners as Manchuria). It was further discovered that instead of carrying out phase two of its promised pull-out from Manchuria, Russia had presented a list of Seven Demands to the Qing government, extracting further concessions from the weakened and vulnerable state. Agitated by an anti-Russian Japanese media, the Chinese overseas students decided to undertake a patriotic project of collective self-sacrifice. Two

⁷⁵ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 243.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 182.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 180.

members of the Youth Society, Tang Erhe and Niu Yongjian,⁷⁸ convened a meeting of about five hundred students in the Kanda district of Tokyo, and proposed the formation of a Resist-Russia Volunteer Corps (Ju E yiyongdui).⁷⁹ They spoke eloquently and declared tearfully that: "This is an opportunity for real men to shed blood . . . Today, if there are students who are not afraid to die, who are willing to sacrifice their lives for China, please sign up immediately for an army to Beiyang [i.e. northern China] . . ."⁸⁰ About one hundred and thirty students enlisted in the Corps, including Chen,⁸¹ and another fifty students volunteered to coordinate operations behind the front line. The meeting ended with several resolutions, including one to notify the revolutionary China Education Society (see below) by telegram that a volunteer force had been formed and another to send Tang and Niu to meet with Yuan Shikai, then governor-general of the metropolitan province of Zhili and commander of the Beiyang Army, expressing the students' desire to help.⁸²

The telegram reached Shanghai on April 30, just in time for Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), an eminent Hanlin scholar, to announce to a patriotic crowd of some twelve hundred gentry, merchants and students assembled at the Zhang Garden: "The Russian trouble is imminent. We have sent a telegram to the superintendent of trade for the North to fight [the Russians.] Students studying abroad are organizing a group of volunteers to go and fight the enemy. Please help."⁸³ Moved by the passion of the overseas students, the Shanghai congregants "walked out to the vast lawn, [and] facing east . . . bowed in

⁷⁸ See Appendix D for names of those who spoke at the Resist-Russia meeting in Tokyo.

⁷⁹ Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi*, vol.1, 155; Harrell, 133-39; *Zhejiang chao* no.4, 131-138; Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhuan, 84-105.

⁸⁰ *Zhejiang chao*, no. 4, 131.

⁸¹ Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu" (Chen Duxiu during the Xinhai revolution), PLXB, vol.1, 94.

⁸² *Zhejiang chao*, no. 4, 133.

⁸³ Huang Fu-ch'ing, *Chinese Students in Japan in the Late Ch'ing Period*, 210.

order to show their respect [to their comrades in Japan].”⁸⁴ The group also passed a resolution to form a Citizens’ General Assembly (Guomin zonghui) designed to protect China’s sovereignty.⁸⁵

At about the same time, a Resist-Russia Women Comrades Society (Dui E tongzhi nü hui) was organized in Shanghai. Its plans included sending letters to Switzerland, to the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the various provincial governors, condemning Russian actions. Preparing for possible conflict, the Society also decided to elect a representative to connect with the Japanese Red Cross and to set up a medical department in the Shanghai women’s school, Zongmeng nüxuetang (Ancestral Mencius Women’s School).⁸⁶ These displays of collective political action were impressive to Western observers, one of whom--a reporter for the Shanghai-based, English-language newspaper known as the *North China Herald*--wrote: “That the Chinese, of their own initiative, should convene public meetings to discuss political questions is an indication of a trend of thought which marks a new departure.”⁸⁷ The Qing authorities were also impressed by such displays, but in a far less positive way. By May of 1903, the Manchu court, suspecting that the students were plotting a revolution, not only instructed Yuan Shikai to ignore their request for an interview but also threatened the student representatives with reprisals.⁸⁸

The overseas students’ provincial associations voted unanimously to support the Volunteer Corps, and a fourteen year-old student from Fujian wept openly as he begged

⁸⁴ Huang Fu-ch’ing, 210.

⁸⁵ Harrell, 136; Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhuang, 67.

⁸⁶ Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhuang, 212.

⁸⁷ Harrell, 130-1.

⁸⁸ KGQ, 117.

to be allowed to join the Corps.⁸⁹ Not to be outdone, the overseas women students formed a Mutual Love Society (Gong'ai hui), volunteering to go to the front to care for the wounded, despite the objection of Shimoda Utako, their mentor and president of the Imperial Women's Association, who did not want to see their education interrupted.⁹⁰

The formation of the Resist-Russia Volunteer Corps represented an unprecedented outpouring of patriotic sentiment that united the overseas students across provincial and even ideological lines, marking a new level in their political awareness and engagement. The Japanese authorities, however, became increasingly concerned about the militant nature of the Resist-Russia Volunteer Corps. In an effort to downplay the explicit theme of confrontation and conflict, the students voluntarily changed the name of their organization to the Military Citizen's Education's Society.⁹¹

At this point, eleven members of the Youth Society joined the newly named group, many of whom became future leaders of the 1911 revolution.⁹² The Military Citizen's Education Society now consisted of three rather amorphous groups of students: revolutionaries of various sorts, "Protect the Emperor" monarchists, and a majority in the political middle, who were patriotic and anti-Russian, but not anti-Manchu.⁹³ Although Chen Duxiu did not support the virulent anti-Manchu sentiment expressed by some of his friends, notably Zhang Binglin, he was clearly moving in the direction of challenging the legitimacy of the dynasty.

⁸⁹ *Zhejiang chao*, no. 4, 135.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 136; see also Harrell, 73.

⁹¹ *Zhejiang chao*, no. 4, 138. See list of names of the Volunteer Corps as well as those of the Military Citizen's Education Association, in Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhuan, 103-7.

⁹² Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 261.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 259.

Among the prominent revolutionaries in Japan at the time was Huang Xing (1874-1916), the future right-hand man to Sun Yat-sen in the 1911 Revolution. Huang acquired some command of Japanese from his year in Tokyo, and returned to his hometown of Changsha in Hunan province in 1903 to teach the language. The following year, he established the China Revival Society (Huaxing hui), with an initial membership of some five hundred individuals--most of whom had either been, or would be, overseas students in Japan--and, with the support of several members of the Military Citizen's Education Society, he staged an uprising in Changsha on the Empress Dowager's birthday, Nov. 16, 1904.⁹⁴ The uprising failed, and Huang escaped to Shanghai, where, along with Yang Dusheng, Chen Tianhua, Zhang Ji and He Meiqiao, he joined the Shanghai Assassination Squad (Shanghai ansha tuan)--an offshoot of the Tokyo Military Citizen's Education Society.⁹⁵

Meanwhile, although Chen Duxiu had still not become a full-fledged revolutionary, he seems to have grown ever more inclined to resist the authority of his Qing overseers. In the Spring of that year, for example, he and a few of his fellow students, including Zou Rong, Zhang Ji, Weng Hao, and Wang Xiaoshen, decided to punish a student supervisor named Yao Wenfu, who had previously sabotaged their application to schools in Japan, and had also abused his position of authority by making improper advances to the wives of certain students.⁹⁶ Entering Yao's residence at night, they confronted him and enumerated his many transgressions. Eventually, Yao conceded that he had been wrong and that he deserved to be punished, whereupon Zou held him

⁹⁴ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 66.

⁹⁵ ZL, 74.

⁹⁶ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 184. It is not clear whether or not Chen joined the Resist-Russia Volunteer Corps, biographers differ on this point.

down while Chen lopped off his queue (*bianzi*). This extremely defiant act, normally a sign of intense anti-Manchu sentiment, humiliated Yao. Adding to Yao's humiliation, the co-conspirators displayed his queue prominently in the business office of the Qing Overseas Student Association with a note of explanation. The upshot of this affair was that Yao was recalled but Chen, Zou and Zhang were all deported back to China.⁹⁷

Patriotic Organizations in Anhui and Elsewhere

As we have already seen, and we shall see again, Chinese anti-Russian sentiment in the first few years of the twentieth century proved to be an especially powerful motivation for the development of nationalistically oriented associations, both in China and abroad. These associations created strong personal connections that persisted even after the networks in which they originally developed became defunct.

The Rise and Fall of the Anhui Patriotic Society

Upon his return to Anhui in the spring of 1903, Chen Duxiu immediately organized an Anqing Determination Study Society (Anqing lizhi hui), modeled on his anti-Russian efforts in Tokyo.⁹⁸ Despite the dangers, he quickly assumed a high public profile, giving speeches that reflected his extraordinary gift for using simple words to express powerful ideas. On May 15, 1903, Chen delivered a speech to approximately three hundred people who braved the rain to hear the talk at his new library. More than

⁹⁷ Ibid., 185.

⁹⁸ Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu" (Chen Duxiu during the Xinhai revolution), PLXB, vol.1, 95.

two-thirds of the attendees were students from the three major institutions of higher learning in the province, the Anhui Upper Level School, the Military Preparatory Academy, and the Tongcheng Public School.⁹⁹ Many of them had to stand outside the lecture hall, since the room could not accommodate so many people. It was the first large-scale assembly of its kind in all of Anhui province, but it would certainly not be the last.

Chen began his public presentation by reading letters from students in Hubei, who wrote as part of a nationwide letter-writing campaign started by the students at the Beijing Imperial University (later known as Beijing University). The letters decried the “imminent carving up of China,” and declared that it was “far better to die fighting than to die sitting.” Chen then spoke eloquently of the terrible crimes committed by the Russians against Chinese living in the Northeast (some of which he had witnessed firsthand), and denounced Russian encroachments on China’s “political, commercial, mining, military and tax rights in the Northeast.”¹⁰⁰ Chen urged his audience to embrace a “martial spirit” and called upon the attendees to display a willingness to sacrifice themselves for their country. About twenty people rose to speak afterward, and the audience was moved to tears.

This large-scale public event produced two immediate consequences. One was the establishment of the Anhui Patriotic Society (Anhui aiguo hui). This group was begun when nearly half of Chen’s audience stepped forward to declare their loyalty to the idea. Not surprisingly, Chen was elected as one of the main leaders of the group, along with Pan Jinhua (the brother of his good friend Pan Zanhua), Fang Zhiwu (1877-1966)

⁹⁹ Feigon, 40.

¹⁰⁰ Weng Fei ed., *Anhui Jindai Shi* (Modern Anhui History), 341.

and four students from the three above-mentioned schools. The mission statement for the Anhui Patriotic Society naturally emphasized love of country and the recovery of China's national sovereignty, but it also placed special emphasis on the need for the Chinese people to develop a "martial spirit."¹⁰¹ As we shall see below, this idea was a particularly important theme of the period, expressed repeatedly in the new-style Chinese periodical press.¹⁰² The Society planned to issue its own publication, to be called the *Aiguo xin bao* (New Patriotic Paper), but the idea never came to fruition.¹⁰³

The second consequence of Chen's speech was to mobilize students in the area. Returning to their schools, they demanded that their "useless" classes be terminated and that instead they be trained militarily to "fight the Russians." At first, school officials were sympathetic, but they soon retracted their support. Bo Wenwei, at the time a student at Anhui Upper Level School, and later a good friend of Chen's, withdrew from the school along with several fellow students when the school's supervisors banned further student meetings. When one teacher tried to dissuade Bo, he angrily replied "[You] may be willing to be the teacher of a dead country, but [I] do not want to be the student of a dead country."¹⁰⁴ Bo and his comrades then joined a Military Preparatory Academy.

Local gentry, fearful for Chen's safety, tried to dissuade Chen and Pan from speaking again, but their speeches continued. Meanwhile, Minister Cai in Tokyo warned the Qing authorities that the "Resist-Russia" students were in fact revolutionaries in

¹⁰¹ Weng Fei ed., 342. This emphasis may explain the plan of the Society's leaders to create two divisions in the organization, one to focus on disseminating knowledge and the other to focus on practicing military drills.

¹⁰² Ibid., 342

¹⁰³ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 29.

¹⁰⁴ Bo Wenwei, *Bo Liewu wushi nian da shiji* (Fifty-year highlight of Bo Liewu).

disguise. As a result, the Liangjiang governor-general once again ordered Chen's arrest, closing his library, shutting down progressive schools in the area and expelling any and all students from the Anhui Upper Level School who "talked of resisting Russia."¹⁰⁵ Fortunately for Chen, he was forewarned about the arrest warrant and therefore able to escape.¹⁰⁶ Ironically, until their persecution by the Anhui provincial authorities, Chen and the other speakers at his library had supported the Qing, stating that "we consider ourselves patriots and [we] must observe the security of the nation." They even went so far as to argue that personal freedom could not be tolerated if it proved to be "detrimental to the nation."¹⁰⁷

The Qing authorities failed to perceive that anti-Russian sentiment was in fact a unifying force for the country. Instead, the Foreign Ministry ordered overseas students not to return until their three-year study period was completed, threatening to arrest any returnees who had participated in the Resist-Russia Volunteer Corps in Japan.¹⁰⁸ The Beijing Imperial University students, for their part, were given one demerit for participating in anti-Russian activities, and many of them received failing grades in their exams as punishment for their political activities. Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Liangjiang, despite his own nationalistic sentiments, discouraged the students from protesting, alarmed by the spread of protest activities outside of Shanghai and Hankou.¹⁰⁹

Efforts to quash anti-Russian political activities fueled anti-Manchu sentiment and alienated Chinese citizens across a broad social spectrum,¹¹⁰ but they did not succeed in

¹⁰⁵ Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu" (Chen Duxiu during the Xinhai revolution), PLXB, vol.1, 95.

¹⁰⁶ ZL, 65.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhuang, 276.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 272.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 219.

discouraging such activities. In the Northeast, for example, patriotic associations bearing names such as the Iron and Blood Association (Tiexie hui), the East Asia Volunteer Brave Battalion (Dongya yiyong dui), and the Resist-Russia Iron and Blood Army (Kang E tiexie jun) brought students, members of secret society and even bands of thieves together.¹¹¹ And in other parts of the country, similar nationalistically motivated organizations arose. For instance, in Nanjing, Qin Yuliu, a survivor of the Self-standing Army debacle and, like Chen, a member of the now-defunct Determination Society, organized a Recognize Shame Society (Zhichi Xueshe).

Schools as Sites of Protest

Meanwhile, student protests began to occur sporadically, as “progressive” teachers were able to introduce “subversive” ideas. In Zhejiang’s Xunxi Public School, for instance, students refused to attend classes because the authorities would not permit them to conduct an assembly to oversee school affairs. In Suzhou, Canton, Anqing, Kaifeng and elsewhere, students protested “unreasonable” policies such as bans on celebrating certain events (such as the Self-standing Army uprising) or reading progressive papers. They also protested the mandatory reading of “traditional” works such as the *Xiaojing* (Classic of filial piety) and the *Xiaoxue* (Elementary learning), and the meting out of severe corporal punishments.¹¹² The consequences of student protests could be severe. At the Hangzhou Qiushi Academy, for example, students were expelled for composing a poem commemorating the death of the Self-standing Army martyrs.

¹¹¹ Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhuan, 242. At one point, horse-thieves in the Northeast became folk heroes for tearing down Russian constructions.

¹¹² Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 72.

One of the most famous incidents of this sort took place at the Nanyang Public School (Nanyang Gongxue) in Shanghai. There, the faculty instigator was Cai Yuanpei, the eminent Hanlin scholar who spoke at Zhang Garden (and whom we will meet time and again in this study). Cai was a distinguished classical scholar who served for a time as the superintendent of the Shaoxing Chinese-Western School (Shaoxing Zhong Xi xuetang) in Zhejiang province. In 1902, he left Shaoxing to teach at the Nanyang Public School.

That summer, hoping to heighten the political awareness and engagement of the students, Cai urged them to form a speech society and to publish their views. The results were predictable; by stages, the students became ever more active and ever more threatening to the school authorities. In one of their publications they announced: “We have no reason to love today’s China, but we must love the good country of the future.” Later, they formed a book club in which they discussed how “to shoulder the responsibility of representing a new China and new social concerns.” They also created a secret “action club,” in order to be prepared for “any sudden eventualities.”¹¹³ These activities led the school authorities to ban the student publications.

Several months later, in November 1902, a student prank, involving the placing of an ink bottle on an unpopular instructor’s chair, led to the expulsion of an entire class of fifty students, and in protest two hundred students walked out of the Nanyang Public School.¹¹⁴ Declaring that their withdrawal constituted a “revolutionary act,”¹¹⁵ the students sought help from various sympathetic faculty members. In response, Cai, together with Wu Zhihui and Zhang Binglin, founded the Patriotic School (Aiguo xueshe)

¹¹³ Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 74.

¹¹⁴ *Xinhai geming huiyi lu* (HYL), vol. 4, 70.

¹¹⁵ Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 73.

for the expelled students,¹¹⁶ which they modeled after Yoshida Shoin's Village School under the Pines, and the military school of Saigo Takamori. The special emphasis on "spiritual education" in these two Japanese institutions seemed particularly appropriate to the founders of the new Patriotic School.¹¹⁷

The walkout of the students from the Nanyang Public School attracted a great deal of attention from the press, in part because a number of faculty members in the school were closely connected with publications such as the *Subao* (Jiangsu Journal), the *Yadong shi bao* (East Asia News), the *Shaonian Zhongguo bao* (Youth China Paper), the *Eshi jingwen* (Russian Affairs Alarm), the *Nü bao* (Women's Journal), *Nuzi shijie* (Women's World), and the *New People's Miscellany*. Students from other schools called the Patriotic School their "republican" school, and regarded withdrawal from their own schools as a symbolic break with the Qing government, and a step toward the realization of their democratic aspirations. They began to appreciate the importance of organizing, but sought a peaceful path marked by "civilized antforeignism" (*wenming paiwai*) and "orderly revolution" (*zhixu geming*).

The China Education Society

In contrast to the "peaceful path" advocated by some students, the China Education Society (Zhongguo jiaoyu hui) had a more violent vision of revolutionary change. It was founded in 1902 by Cai Yuanpei and several of his like-minded friends, including Ye Han, Jiang Zhiyou, Wang Jitong, Wang Deyuan, Huang Zongyang, Zhang

¹¹⁶ Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi*, vol.1, 71.

¹¹⁷ Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 76.

Binglin and Wang Mutao. The ostensible purpose of this organization was to systematize the disparate translations of textbooks produced by overseas Chinese students for schools in China, but its actual purpose was to provide a training ground for republican revolutionaries.¹¹⁸ In particular, the goal of Cai and his colleagues was to educate and mobilize young Chinese men and women “for the purpose of recovering our national sovereignty.” In order to do so, they argued, “we must establish a republican education society.”¹¹⁹

Most members of the China Education Society belonged to the class of “new-style” intellectuals, including the editors and journalists of newspapers as well as teachers and students in newly established “progressive” schools. In the six years of its existence (1902-1908), it managed to develop ties with almost every major Chinese revolutionary organization of its time. It played a role in the creation of Huang Xing’s China Revival Society in Hunan, and it also contributed to the establishment of Cai Yuanpei’s Restoration Society (Guangfu hui) in Zhejiang. Over time, it assisted in the development of revolutionary cells in Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian.¹²⁰ At the same time, the China Education Society sought to establish and strengthen its ties with overseas Chinese students in Japan. For this reason, the Society invited membership on the part of students who wished to return to China in the wake of the Seijo School incident, and in subsequent years its student members traveled frequently in the Shanghai-Tokyo corridor.

The Society’s popular newspaper, *Xuan bao* (Selection Paper) published excerpts from the Revive China Society’s articles, as well as pieces from other radical publications

¹¹⁸ Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi*, vol.1, 170, 197.

¹¹⁹ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 198.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 211.

in China, encouraging public discussion of revolution, and challenging the long-standing hegemony of Liang Qichao's reformist papers, *The China Progress*, the *Pure Discussion Paper*, and the *New People's Miscellany*.¹²¹ Using the *Selection Paper* and other forms of propaganda to raise revolutionary consciousness, the China Education Society endorsed a number of radical views, including the use of violence (including assassination) as a means of overthrowing the Qing monarchy and establishing a republic.¹²² The organization differed from Sun Yat-sen's Revive China Society, however, in being neither a secret society nor explicitly anti-Manchu. Despite these differences, The China Education Society supported Sun in promoting the revolutionary transformation of China.¹²³

Not all members of the China Education Society were revolutionaries, however. The "moderates" of the Society, comprised mainly of intellectuals from the Jiangnan region of China--that is, southern Jiangsu province, southern Anhui province, northern Jiangxi province and northern Zhejiang province--were connected on many levels with reformers, court officials and even secret societies. They disagreed with the assassination tactics of the China Education Society, and advocated reform through education. Eventually, in fact, the Society fragmented as the more radical elements of the association joined overtly revolutionary organizations linked with Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng hui; established in Tokyo in 1905), while many of its more moderate members became involved with the so-called Constitutionalists.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 204.

¹²² Ibid., 220

¹²³ Ibid., 210.

¹²⁴ Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 213, 216.

In the early 1900s, Cai Yuanpei, Wu Zhihui and Zhang Binglin were certainly among the more radical members of the China Education Society. In pursuit of their goals, they not only organized revolutionary networks and produced revolutionary propaganda, but also made public speeches and encouraged their students to do the same. According to one contemporary observer, "Every Sunday, when people went to the Zhang Garden for tea... there were always people making speeches. The speakers were all from the Patriotic School, including Cai Yuanpei, Zhang Taiyan [i.e. Zhang Binglin], and Zou Rong, and sometimes students would also go up and speak."¹²⁵

As co-founders of the Patriotic School, Cai, Wu and Zhang underwrote some of its costs with money they earned from writing for the *Subao*, a paper registered in the International Settlement and owned by Chen Fan, whose feminist daughter, Chen Jiefan, not only founded the Patriotic Girls' School (Aiguo nǚxiao) in Shanghai but also established the *Women's Journal* (begun in 1902, and renamed the *Journal of Women's Learning*, or *Nǚxue bao*, in the following year).¹²⁶ After Chen Fan bought the *Subao*, he turned it from a trade paper into a progressive paper and then into an organ of the China Education Society. When Chen Fan left for Japan in 1903 he turned over editorship of the *Subao* to Zhang Shizhao.¹²⁷

In July 1903, the infamous "*Subao* Incident" occurred. The trigger was an article, to be discussed more thoroughly below, published that month in the journal by Zhang Binglin in rebuttal to a piece by Kang Youwei. In this article Zhang violated long-standing Manchu law not only by writing out the personal name of the emperor (Zaitian)

¹²⁵ HYL, vol. 4, 67-8.

¹²⁶ Yang Tianshi and Wang Xuezhuang, 67.

¹²⁷ Harrell, 148.

but also by prefacing it with the highly denigrating term “small clown” (*xiaochou*).¹²⁸ Zhang suggested that the emperor should be executed for losing Manchuria to the foreigners, and called explicitly for the overthrow of the Qing dynasty.¹²⁹ Zhang compounded his crime by writing in the same issue of the *Subao* a favorable review of *The Revolutionary Army* (*Geming jun*), an eloquently worded anti-Manchu tract written by a precocious eighteen year old named Zou Rong (1885-1905) from the Shanghai Patriotic School.¹³⁰ Zou had composed *The Revolutionary Army* during a recess between classes, as students sat around snacking on sausages; as a result, this inflammatory and highly influential work was dubbed the “Sausage Book” by his friends.¹³¹

Following publication of this issue of the *Subao*, six of its staff members were arrested; Cai Yuanpei fled to Qingdao, Wu Zhihui left for England, and the Patriotic School was dissolved. In an unprecedented legal maneuver, the case of *Subao* was tried in the Mixed Court of the International Settlement, where the Qing government brought charges against its own subject in a foreign court, thus assuming an equal status with its citizens.¹³² Convicted of libel, Zhang Binglin spent three years in jail; Zou died of illness a month before his release from prison.¹³³ Zhang Binglin subsequently went to Japan where in 1906 he became editor of the Revolutionary Alliance publication, *Min bao* (the People’s Journal—different from the 1870 Shanghai vernacular paper of the same name).

Chen Duxiu and the *Citizen’s Daily*

¹²⁸ 小丑载活 in Zhang Nan and Wang Ren eds. *Xinhai Geming qian shiniannian shilun xuanji*, (Selected collection of contemporary writings in the ten years before the Xinhai revolution) (SLXJ) vol. 1 (b), 756.

¹²⁹ Harrell, 150.

¹³⁰ KGQ, 116.

¹³¹ Xiao Zhizhi ed., *Lingxiu yu qunlun*, 80.

¹³² Harrell, 147.

¹³³ KGQ, 127.

In August 1903, two months after the *Subao* Incident, Zhang Shizhao and two of his colleagues, Zhang Ji and Xie Xiaoshi, founded the *Citizen's Daily* in Shanghai. Chen Duxiu, Zhang's longtime friend, was invited to join the paper, along with He Meishi, Su Manshu (1884-1918), Chen Qubing, and Liu Qiji. Soon, the publication became known as "*Subao* number two" because of its editorial radicalism.¹³⁴ Significantly, the *Citizen's Daily* used a dating system that was based on the birth year of the Yellow Emperor rather than the traditional Chinese lunar or Western solar calendar. This distinctive approach to chronology was popular among radicals at the time because it celebrated a native (albeit mythological) Chinese culture hero who was generally credited with "creating civilization;" thus it implicitly indicated dissatisfaction with alien Manchus and their corrupt and inefficient rule.¹³⁵

Zhang Shizhao and Chen, who roomed together, did most of the work for the paper, and Chen seems to have labored long hours with particular intensity, often skipping meals and even disregarding personal hygiene. One day, according to Zhang, he looked up and "suddenly found moving white particles on Chen's black tunic." Zhang exclaimed: "Zhongfu, what is that?" Chen Duxiu looked down impassively and calmly responded: 'Lice.'¹³⁶

In the course of carrying out his editorial responsibilities at the *Citizen's Daily*, Chen Duxiu forged a close and enduring friendship with Su Manshu (1884-1918), who, born in Japan, was fluent in Japanese and conversant in English. In 1903, Chen and Su

¹³⁴ Bai Ji'an, *Zhang Shizhao zhuan* (The biography of Zhang Shizhao), 34.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 35. Wu wei, "Huangdi jinianlun" (On marking years with the Yellow Emperor), in SLXJ, vol.1b, 720-1.

¹³⁶ ZL, 230.

collaborated on a very loose translation of Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* from an English edition, adding characters and even whole chapters, while imbuing the text with a critique of contemporary Chinese society. The translation was serialized in the *Citizen's Daily*, but the paper ended before the serialization did. The book was later published as a single volume, titled "*Tragic Society*" or "*Tragic World*," depending on the edition.¹³⁷ Among the characters invented by Chen and Su were a knight errant named Nande (homonym for "hard to come by"), who harbored a socialist streak, a French petit-bourgeois character named Fantong (a homonym for "idiot"), and a vagrant named Wuchi (a homonym for "shameless"). As one example of the social critique embedded in the "translation," Nande says at one point: "We Frenchmen are not like the lowly Chinese in the East, who consider the murderers of their ancestors as saints," and again: "those so-called patriots in Shanghai are useless; twenty-four hours a day they never think about the loss of their country and the extermination of their race, but only care to wear nice clothes, ride in carriages, and drink fancy wine."¹³⁸ Chen admitted to a friend years later that "While Manshu translated *Les Misérables*, I helped embellish the work . . . Manshu's translation, adding and creating in an ad hoc manner, was highly unfaithful to the original. As to my embellishment, it was sloppy to the extreme."¹³⁹

Zhang Shizhao was equally busy at the time, but not as sloppy. In 1903 he translated Miyazaki Torazō's Japanese biography of Sun Yat-sen, in which he hailed Sun as the "North Star of active revolutionaries."¹⁴⁰ This Chinese translation gave legitimacy to Sun's revolutionary efforts, and led to an alliance between the radical Japanese *shishi*

¹³⁷ Zheng Xuejia, 1221-2.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 1223-4.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 1221.

¹⁴⁰ Bai Ji'an, 12.

(men of purpose) such as Miyazaki Torazo and Chinese overseas students such as Huang Xing.¹⁴¹ At the same time that he was editing the *Citizen's Daily*, Zhang also founded the Dongdalu publishing company in Shanghai, producing revolutionary tracts, such as a book on the wrongful execution of the martyr Shen Jin, works by Chen Tianhua, including *Jingshi zhong* (A Bell to Warn the World) and *Meng huitou* (About Face), and Liu Shipai's (1884-1919) racist *Rangshu* (Book of Expulsion). These publications were often distributed in the New Army to revolutionary sympathizers.¹⁴²

Although the *Citizen's Daily* only lasted only four months,¹⁴³ it proved to be highly influential among the radical intellectuals. Moreover, because Chen played such an important role in the publication as an editor, translator and writer, a closer look at some of its content allows us an opportunity to examine at least a few of his major preoccupations, as well as those of Zhang Shizhao. Indeed, Zhang's life intersected with Chen's multiple times, with the former coming to the rescue of the latter at crucial times.

The Legacy of Liang Qichao

One of the most interesting features of the *Citizen's Daily*, and most other newspapers of the early 1900s as well, is the debt they owed to Liang Qichao. Although radical publications such as the *Selection Paper*, the *Subao* and the *Citizen's Daily* marked a dramatic new stage in Chinese journalism, Liang's persistent influence is unmistakable. From 1896 to 1903, in *The China Progress*, the *Pure Discussion Paper*, and the *New People's Miscellany*, Liang set the standard for politically motivated

¹⁴¹ Bai Ji'an, 13.

¹⁴² Ibid., 31.

¹⁴³ ZL, 73.

journalism in China. In Liang's own words, the duty of a good paper was to "advocate for people's rights . . . spread new knowledge . . . decipher political situations . . . oversee the actions of the government . . . and tutor the people on their responsibility as good citizens."¹⁴⁴ He argued that for the Chinese people, it was more far more important to know about the Westerner's sense of independence and patriotism than to know about their ships, clothes, food and weapons.¹⁴⁵

Over the years from 1896-1903 Liang argued eloquently for both monarchism and revolution, as he wavered between these two positions. In the process, he introduced a vocabulary and a style that enabled young intellectuals to grapple with Western concepts of the nation-state, citizenry, individual rights, military spirit, and other tropes of political governance. Drawing upon a repertoire that included his own neologisms, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Japanese-European loanwords, and classical Chinese (re-infused with new meaning through Japanese Kanji),¹⁴⁶ Liang played an instrumental role in publicizing new concepts and providing sophisticated analysis of current events for an increasingly politically conscious readership.

Liang's language was echoed in the inaugural issue of the *Citizen's Daily*. Explaining that in the nineteenth century European journalists constituted a fourth estate, after the nobility, the church and the people, the editors (Zhang Shizhao and Chen Duxiu) sought to liberate the Chinese people from their three thousand year [sic] servitude as

¹⁴⁴ Liang Qichao, "Benguan di yibaice zhuci bing lun baoguan zhi zheren ji benguan zhi jingli" (A congratulatory note on the hundredth anniversary of our publication, and on the responsibility and experience of our newspaper), in SLXJ, vol.1a, 49-50, 220, 232.

¹⁴⁵ Liang Qichao, "Guomin shida yuanqi lun" (Ten big essences of a citizen), in *Yinbingshi heji*, 1:3, 61-2. Liang does not seem to have finished the other eight attributes.

¹⁴⁶ For a discussion on the creation of new terminologies in translated text, see Lydia Liu, *Translingual Practice* and Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung and Joachim Kurtz eds., *New Terms for New Ideas*.

“ants and peasants, playthings of the dictator and bandit king.”¹⁴⁷ They promised to warn the people of the perils facing China, explore new knowledge, bring in news from the outside world, report on local events, and introduce new books and new literature. By creating a multi-faceted journal, they hoped to encourage the emergence of a “new citizen” in China.¹⁴⁸

In the sections below I highlight some of the most prevalent themes that appeared in the *Citizen's Daily*, indicating, where appropriate, the legacy of Liang Qichao and other Chinese writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although by no means comprehensive, this discussion is designed to show a few of the issues that preoccupied intellectuals in China during the waning years of the Qing dynasty, binding like-minded authors to their readers, and setting the stage for discussions and debates that would continue to preoccupy Chinese thinkers and political activists for the next two decades.

Anti-Imperialism

Imperialism was, of course, a prominent theme in the *Citizen's Daily*, since foreign encroachments were literally inescapable. In one of its early issues, the paper reported that 20,000 Russian troops were amassed in the Manchurian cities of Dalian and Lushun, and more soldiers were arriving each day.¹⁴⁹ The editors translated from Russian sources news that a Russian lumber conglomerate planned to monopolize all of

¹⁴⁷ Zhang Shizhao, “Guomin riri bao fakan chi,” (Statement of publication of the *Citizen's Daily*), *Guomin riri bao huibian* (Collection of *Citizen's Daily*) (CCD), vol. 1, 11-13.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 14.

¹⁴⁹ CCD, no. 1, 0142.

the mines in Manchuria and Korea, and to take over all of the forests in the region as well. The paper also noted with alarm that the lumber company was working in conjunction with the Russian army, which spearheaded an exploration of the Liao River under the pretext of investigating a means of transporting lumber.¹⁵⁰ The editors were especially dismayed to report that the Qing troops sent to the Northeast in order to safeguard the Chinese railroad there had looted and plundered the Chinese people, selling their own weapons to the Russians and completely disregarding the law.¹⁵¹

The *Citizen's Daily* explained to its readers that rights of mineral extraction, railroad construction and navigation were all inviolate, and that selling or otherwise surrendering any of these rights was tantamount to selling Chinese territory.¹⁵² The paper went on to depict the foreign powers' efforts to obtain mining rights as equivalent to a military invasion, with their demands for railroad construction and navigation rights serving as two major flanks, and with missionary groups in China operating as guerrilla forces.¹⁵³ The editors printed an extensive list of banks, railroads, gold mines and shipping companies throughout China that were owned by Russia, France, Italy, England, the United States and Japan. Foreign holdings extended from Manchuria to Mongolia in the North to Fujian and Guangdong in the South.¹⁵⁴ The paper noted wryly that the Russians had to buy off at twenty yuan a month twenty leaders of local horse thieves to keep them away from the Russian-occupied Chinese land.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ CCD, no. 1, 0156.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., no. 1, 0175.

¹⁵² Ibid., no. 1, 0353.

¹⁵³ Ibid., no. 3, 0575.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., no. 4, 0765-0772.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., no. 2, 0444.

Most of the other discourses in the *Citizen's Daily* involved imperialism in some way, either directly or indirectly. Some were designed to show how the Qing government and the Chinese had allowed it to happen, while others focused more directly on what needed to be done to eliminate it. For our purposes, the important point is that discussions of both the reasons for China's malaise and the possible remedies for it were part of a single discursive fabric, one that would continue to be a part of Chinese intellectual life for many years.

The Slave-like Nature of the Chinese

For a number of years, progressive writers in the late Qing period deplored what they identified as the "slave-like nature" of the Chinese, debating among themselves the difference between servitude under the Manchus and submission to the foreign powers. Kang Youwei argued that by the process of cultural assimilation and intermarriage, the Manchus were no longer an alien race, and that unlike the Poles under Russian domination or the Indians under British colonization, the Han Chinese enjoyed equal status with the Manchus and occupied high positions in the government. Rather than focusing attention on the issue of race, Kang argued, attention should be turned to fighting foreign imperialism.¹⁵⁶

Zhang Binglin lambasted this reasoning in his "Letter Rebutting Kang Youwei," which precipitated the "Subao Incident." In this highly polemical piece Zhang listed the various injustices inflicted on the Chinese by the Manchus, from the required queue for Chinese males, to the Yangzhou massacre by the Manchus in 1645, in which a reported

¹⁵⁶ Kang Youwei, "Bo Geming shu" (Rebutting 'A Revolutionary Army'), SLXJ, vol.1a, 210-17.

800,000 Han Chinese perished. He also pointed out that the majority of high-level government positions were occupied by Manchus..¹⁵⁷

Zhang's intellectual accomplice in the *Subao* affair, Zou Rong, made an equally powerful case against the Manchus in his inflammatory tract, *The Revolutionary Army*. Zou denounced the slave-like mentality of his countrymen, urging them to overthrow the Manchus and establish a "China for the Chinese." He also advised them to harbor the spirit of independence, progress, mutual respect, love, morality and self-rule, and to "ring the bell of freedom." The scope of Zhang's essay was broad, not only covering issues such as the mistreatment of Chinese laborers in Cuba, but also alluding to the British and American revolutions and offering a blueprint for a democratic China--one with voting provincial assemblies, equal citizenship for men and women, military duties for all male citizens, tax-paying responsibilities for everyone, and freedom of speech, thought and publication for all. He even suggested a name for China: Zhongguo Gongheguo (The Republic of China). Like Zhang, Zou showed his contempt for the Qing leadership not only by calling the Guangxu emperor a clown but by referring to the Empress Dowager Cixi as "the whore Nara [i.e. Yehenala, her clan name]."¹⁵⁸

The theme of China's enslavement at the hands of the Manchus and/or of the imperialist West suffused the writings of the time. Chinese writers acknowledged that their country was a second-class nation, and saw the world as being overrun by the "White peril."¹⁵⁹ In his "Advice to Slaves" (*Zhen nuli*), published in the first issue of the *Citizen's Daily* in 1903, Zhang Shizhao described China as having endured over two thousand years' of enslavement. He identified four causes: (1) China's long history of

¹⁵⁷ Zhang Taiyan, "Bo Kang Youwei shu" (Letter retorting Kang Youwei), SLXJ, vol.1b, 752-764.

¹⁵⁸ Zou Rong, "Geming jun" (The Revolutionary Army), SLXJ, vol.1b, 649-677.

¹⁵⁹ Yang Dusheng, "Xin Hunan" (New Hunan), SLXJ, vol.1b, 612-3.

dictatorial rulers, spanning from Han “despots” to Jurchen (i.e. Manchu) “bandits;” (2) cultural conditioning induced by the Three Bonds (*sangang*) and five relationships (*wulun*) of the allegedly “sacred and inviolable” imperial ideology; (3) the Chinese education system in which the search for wealth and fame overrode a sense of “integrity, emotion, and competition;” and (4) the teachings of the various Chinese philosophical schools, all of which, with the exception of Mencius, distorted the true teachings of Confucius. Among the estimated 400 million Chinese, Zhang calculated that half of the male population fit the description of “slaves,” including “bureaucrat-slaves,” “scholar-slaves,” and “merchant-slaves” or some other category of slaves. He therefore concluded that China had one hundred million slaves.¹⁶⁰

Orthodoxy of the Way

As indicated by Zhang Shizhao, many Chinese intellectuals blamed ideological orthodoxy for the slave-like mentality of the Chinese. In 1902, Liang Qichao had discussed the concept of “political orthodoxy” (*zhengtong*), claiming that “The biggest mistake made by Chinese scholars lies in their conception of “orthodoxy.” They believe, he wrote, “that there has to be one ruler under Heaven; that there is only one Heaven and that the people [of the world] cannot have more than one king.” A further mistake, he argued, was “to assume that Heaven establishes the rules that people must follow, that there is only one truth and everything outside of [that truth—*zhen*] is false.”¹⁶¹ In Liang’s

¹⁶⁰ Zhang Shizhao, “Zhen nuli” (Advice to slaves), SLXJ, vol.1b, 702-713.

¹⁶¹ Liang Qichao, “Lun Daotong” (On discussing political orthodoxy), SLXJ, vol.1a, 190.

mind, this interpretation of political authority led inexorably to despotism; that the only true political orthodoxy, he argued should rest with the people.

In the following year, Chen Duxiu wrote an article for the *Citizen's Daily* titled "On Clarifying the Orthodoxy of the Way." In this essay he maintained that the concept of the orthodoxy of the Way did not exist before the Sui and Tang dynasties (581-618, 618-907) and that it was the Confucian scholars of the Tang and Song (960-1279) periods who propagated the false belief that Heaven is immutable and that the Way is dictated by Heaven. According to Chen, this ideology became a manipulative tool for scholars to discriminate against those who differed from them, and for the ruler to keep the people ignorant. Chen blamed this narrow point of view for the stagnation of Chinese political philosophy, arguing for the adoption of freedom of thought, speech and belief as a means of reinvigorating China.¹⁶²

Bolder than many other late Qing intellectuals, Chen totally rejected the orthodox point of view. Referring to the Chinese habit of attributing to Heaven all inexplicable phenomena, Chen pointed out that this unreflective attitude fostered superstition, mental lethargy, and stagnation in thinking. He postulated that although the theory of evolution in the West involved its own mysteries, Westerners nonetheless tried to correct the cruelty that they found in nature. Therefore, Chen called for a "revolution against Heaven," by which he meant that human beings needed to go through the process of revolutionizing their conception of nature. Only by this means could other revolutions take place."¹⁶³

¹⁶² Chen Duxiu, "Daotong bian" (On clarifying the orthodoxy of the Way), SLXJ, vol.1b, 735-739.

¹⁶³ Chen Duxiu, "Getian" (On revolutionizing Heaven), SLXJ, vol.1b, 714-9.

Chen's colleague in the *Citizen's Daily*, Zhang Binglin, however, maintained a diametrically opposite view on the process of cultural transformation. Along with a group of scholars who shared a thorough knowledge of the classics, but who had also studied Western learning, such as Huang Jie, Zheng Shi, Lin Xie, Liu Shipei and even the wayward Liang Qichao, Zhang argued that the current trend of rejecting Chinese heritage would lead to the destruction of China as a nation. As a result, rediscovering the meaning and value of China's "national essence" (*guocui*) was indispensable to the nation's survival. Zhang Binglin and his colleagues did not reject learning from the West, and they distinguished their effort to recover the "authentic" Confucian teaching from the ideological orthodoxy imposed by the Qing state.¹⁶⁴ To that end, he explained that the great outpouring of Chinese philosophical wisdom that occurred in the late Zhou period--China's national essence--had been suppressed during the Qin dynasty and then distorted by later "Confucian" scholars. This misinterpreted version of Confucian teaching, he maintained, became the reigning ideology for thousands of years, as a tool of oppression rather than a source of cultural pride.¹⁶⁵

The Need for a New Chinese Spirit

Closely related to the "orthodoxy of the Way" concept was the writers' fascination with the word "spirit," a single English word used to render a wide variety of Chinese terms, including *shen*, *hun*, *jingshen*, *ling*, *linghun* and so forth. According to

¹⁶⁴ Ye Ruixin, "Guoxue zai xinwenhua yundong qian de yichang zijiu yundong-lun 20 shiji chu de baocun guocui sichao zai zhongguo wenhua fazhan shi shang de jiazhi" (The self-saving movement of the national learning before the New Culture Movement—a discussion of the value of the early 20th century national essence preservation thought in the development of Chinese culture), 34-40.

¹⁶⁵ Ye Ruixin, 34-40.

the Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucian orthodoxy of the Qing state, the cultivated human spirit could overcome any obstacle, large or small. Confucian rectitude, in this view, was all that was necessary for the moral transformation of the individual and, by extension, the entire world. The Song scholar Cheng Yi (the Cheng of the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy), expressed this idealistic view in the following way: "With the most highly developed sincerity, [the heart/mind of a human being] can penetrate metal and stone, and overcome water and fire, so what dangers and difficulties can possibly keep it from prevailing?"¹⁶⁶

This idea of the transformative power of the human spirit was not necessarily incompatible with the democratic ideals espoused by a great many Chinese reformers and revolutionaries. The problem, in their view, was not the power of the mind; it was the content. Often, however, the discussion was framed explicitly by the notion of spirit itself, especially collective spirit. Thus, for example, a writer from the overseas students' provincial magazine, *Jiangsu*, suggested that the Chinese needed to reconceptualize their notion of "spirit" (*linghun*). Non-Chinese, he claimed, regarded the spirit as "the beautiful and noble cherry blossom for which Japan is named; the ferocious birds, horses and beasts for which Russia is named; and the magically transformative and powerful lion for which England is named." The Chinese, however, viewed spirit as something threatening that hovered "between man and ghost," a source of collective weakness and shame. Deploring China's lack of resistance against foreign invaders, the author maintained that the Chinese needed five elements to forge a new spirit: (1) the essence of mountains and seas to reflect China's vast expanse of land; (2) the essence of the soldier to embrace military service as an honorable profession; (3) the essence of the knight-errant (*youxia*) to counterbalance the effete-ness of the scholar; (4) the essence of a social

¹⁶⁶ Quoted in Richard J. Smith, *Fathoming the Cosmos*, 216.

conscience that would remove the oppression on the lower class by the upper and middle class, the idea of common sharing of wealth, or communism [sic]; and (5) the essence of mystery, to keep government officials guessing.¹⁶⁷

References to “martial spirit” (*shangwu jingshen*) and to the need for “broad communication” (*yunguang changshe*; a phrase indicating the education of the mind),¹⁶⁸ were ubiquitous in speeches and writings of both reformers and revolutionaries at the dawn of the twentieth century. As early as 1899, Liang Qichao observed in the December edition of the *New People's Miscellany* that while the Japanese esteemed martial affairs, the Chinese had a decidedly literary--and therefore effete--culture. In order to survive in the new environment of accelerating imperialism, Liang argued, the “Chinese soul” had to include a substantial measure of martial spirit.¹⁶⁹

In an essay titled “On valorizing the martial” (*Lun shangwu*), Liang evoked Bismarck’s famous quotation about the position of Prussia, and how it would be determined by “iron and blood,” not by liberalism. Similarly, Liang credited Sparta’s success in overcoming larger enemies to their strong fighting spirit. In order for the Chinese to change centuries of bad habits, such as shirking battles and favoring literary pursuits, Liang argued that China needed to rekindle a martial spirit that had dissipated since the days of Qin and Han dynasties. The Chinese, he claimed, needed to regenerate their sense of courage and to develop their physical strength.¹⁷⁰ He blamed a distorted perception of proper Confucian teaching for the country’s lack of martial spirit:

“Confucius said that inaction in the face of injustice is cowardice, and cowardice in the

¹⁶⁷ Zhuang You, “Guomin xin linghun”, SLXJ, vol.1b, 571-6.

¹⁶⁸ Kotoku Shusui, whose socialist and anarchist writings were widely read by overseas Chinese students, had used the phrase “yunguang changshe” to indicate education of the mind. See Bernal, 83-99.

¹⁶⁹ Liang Qichao, “Qizhansi” and “Zhongguo hun anzaihu?” in *Xinmin congbao*, no. 33 (Nov. 1899), 2-3.

¹⁷⁰ Liang Qichao, *Xinmin shuo* (A discussion about new people), 190.

face of battle is unfilial. Is this not evidence that one should inspire the spirit of the people with bravery and strength?"¹⁷¹

In 1903 Chen Duxiu gave a famous speech in which he invoked similar ideas. "We Chinese," he said, "live as if in a dream, not realizing the tragic fate of becoming slaves of an annihilated country . . . We must change our ways, and revive our independent martial spirit [*shangwu jingshen*]. I humbly offer three suggestions: (1) [Improve] communication—the Russian secret accord happened a month ago, yet Shanghai only learned of it earlier this month? If we do not yet know about this, how could we defend ourselves? (2) [Improve] thoughts—I do not believe what they say about the Chinese, that we are by nature not patriotic . . . we must communicate broadly [*yunguang changshe*], and activate the patriotic switch in people's brains, thus it would not be possible to forbid us to love our country. 3. [Improve] physique and spirit—our countrymen are without energy, how can we operate the industries and defend our country? Let alone fight and protect our country? . . . Those of us who are aware of the plight of our country may be the minority of the minority, but we must shoulder the responsibility of running our country . . ." ¹⁷²

The Period in Retrospect: A Brief Analysis

Examining the content of several major Chinese newspapers published in the period from 1901 to 1904, historian Sang Bing has identified two hundred and seventy-one reform-oriented associations in the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong,

¹⁷¹ Liang Qichao, *Xinmin shuo* (A discussion about new people), 186.

¹⁷² Chen Duxiu, "Anhui Patriotic Speech," in ZZS, 13-16.

Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, Shandong, Zhili, Henan, Fengtian, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guangxi, as well as the city of Shanghai.¹⁷³ Although the names of these organizations seem to suggest sometimes radically different orientations--consider, as a small sample, the China Education Society, the Citizens General Assembly, the Recognize Shame Society, the Reading Newspaper Club, the Society of Comrades Against Russia, the Survival of the Fittest Society, and the Natural Foot Society--they shared several important features: (1) a powerful patriotism; (2) an emphasis on the importance of gaining and transmitting new knowledge, especially knowledge derived from foreign sources; (3) an acute awareness of the effectiveness of networks of all kinds, from ties of local or provincial affinity and shared education to affiliations based on personal friendship and common experiences; and (4) a strong sense of the important connection between political activities at home and abroad.¹⁷⁴

As we have seen in the case of the Determination Society, these common denominators might not be sufficient to hold a given association together, but they enabled individuals within any of associations that shared these features to interact and recombine. Consider, for example, Ye Han, who served as executive director of the Correct Spirit Society, secretary of the China Assembly, and a leader of the moderate faction of China Education Society.

Of the two hundred and seventy-one associations identified by Sang Bing, one hundred and twenty-seven were based in large cities, including thirty-four anti-footbinding groups, twenty-five speech-making societies, and sixteen women's

¹⁷³ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 275.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 278.

associations.¹⁷⁵ But the social organizations that were formed in small towns reflected the trend in big cities. In 1903, for instance, local gentry in Changshou, Jiangsu province, founded an Enlightening Society (Kaizhi hui), a branch of the Education Society, a Clear Principle Society (Mingli hui), a Sports Society (Tiyu hui), a Wide Learning Society (Tongxue hui), a Lecture Society of the Normal School (Shifan jiangxi hui), a Physical Exercise Society (Tichao hui), and a Musical Society (Yinyue hui). Elsewhere similar organizations developed, including a Society for Small Children (Youtong hui), a Newspaper and Books Society (Shubao hui), a Chemistry Study Society (Huaxue yanjiu hui), a Women's Study Society (Nüxue hui), and a Society for Reading Newspapers (Yuebao hui).¹⁷⁶ These associations reflected the ever-broadening interests of intellectuals in Chinese urban environments large and small.

One important feature of these new-style organizations was their emphasis on educating and mobilizing women. In 1902, a Women's Study Society was set up in Fuzhou, Fujian province, in which ten women presided over a group of sixty additional members. In Shanghai, a similarly oriented organization attracted twenty members; most of them were bilingual, well educated and eager to promote women's education.¹⁷⁷ Progressive schools for young women also began to spring up, notably the Patriotic Girls School, established by Chen Jiefan in 1902. Organizations such as these sought to enlighten (*kaizhi*) the people and encourage social assimilation (*hequn*), using techniques

¹⁷⁵ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 276.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 280.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

and strategies that had become commonplace by 1900: namely, publishing papers, establishing schools, giving lectures and opening reading rooms.¹⁷⁸

Increasingly, the emphasis on cooperation in the interest of “national salvation” brought different Chinese social groups together. Women were urged to become educated and to join men in saving the country; merchants of all kinds were encouraged to work together in resisting imperialism; and some organizations transcended not only provincial and national boundaries but also long-standing class divisions. A striking example of collaboration across class lines was the Shanghai Four People’s Assembly (*Shanghai simin zonghui*), which united farmers, laborers, scholars and merchants in an effort to serve China’s best interests.¹⁷⁹

New-style publications reinforced this sense of shared purpose. In December 1903, for example, Cai Yuanpei organized a Society of Comrades Against Russia (*Dui E tongzhi hui*), which published a journal titled *Eshi jingwen* (Warnings on Russian Affairs). Its editors included Zhang Shizhao, Wang Deyuan, Lin Xie, and Bei Shoutong, and it offered a wide range of articles, appealing explicitly to the interests of merchants and farmers as well as scholars.¹⁸⁰ Renamed *The Alarm Bell* in 1904, it produced 338 issues before being shut down in January of 1905.¹⁸¹

TABLES SHOWING TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

¹⁷⁸ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 288; Sang Bing contrasts these new-style organizations and new-style intellectuals to those of the 1898 period.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 287.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 262.

¹⁸¹ Harrell, 152.

Table 2: The Shanghai-Tokyo networking of intellectuals in 1900. In this group of sixty-eight intellectuals, thirty-one of them had ties to more than one network.¹⁸² (Those who had ties to Chen Duxiu are in bold).

Names	Networks	Self-standing Army (China) 1900 and those who died in the uprising	Self-standing Society (China) 1900	Zhang Garden (China) 1900	Translation Society (Tokyo) 1900	Determination Society (Tokyo) 1900	Citizen Paper (Tokyo) 1901
Bi Yongnian				Y			
Cai Chengyu		Y (died)				Y	
Cai Kenyin(Songbo)		Y					
Cai Zhonghao		Y (died)					
Cao Rulin					Y	Y	
Chen Duxiu						Y	
Chen Jiacheng						Y	
Chen Weihuang		Y					
Chen Youlong		Y					

¹⁸² These names are compiled from Dong Shouyi, 193, 247; Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol.1, 84, 143-4, 147; vol. 2, 77; KGQ, 58; Saneto Keishu, 146; Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 153. They are by no means an exhaustive list of members, and due to the use of aliases, some of the names may actually be the same person.

Di Baoxian ¹⁸³		Y	Y			
Feng Yuemo					Y	
Feng Ziyou	Y					Y
Fu Cixiang	Y				Y	
Fu Liangbi	Y					
Fu Shiyong				Y	Y	
Gao Shuqi					Y	
Guan Bingrong					Y	
Ji Mutao					Y	
Ji Yihui	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
Jin Bangping				Y	Y	
Lei Fen				Y	Y	Y
Li Binghuan	Y(died)					
Li Ke	Y(died)				Y	
Li Qun	Y					
Liao Shilun					Y	
Lin Shutang	Y					
Lin Xigui	Y(died)	Y				

¹⁸³ Feng mentions a Di Baoyuan as an officer of the Self-standing society, but it is most likely a typo for Di Baoxian, who spoke at Zhang Garden in 1900. Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol.2, 77.

Liu Bogang	Y					
Long Zehou		Y	Y			
Lu Shifen				Y	Y	
Ma Xiangbo			Y			
Qian Chenzhi				Y	Y	
Qin Lishan	Y				Y	Y
Qin Yuliu					Y	
Shen Jin			Y			
Shen Kun					Y	
Shen Xiangyun	Y				Y	Y
Song Shu		Y	Y			
Tang Caichang	Y(died)	Y				
Tang Caizhi	Y				Y	
Tang Caizhong	Y(died)					
Tian Bangxuan	Y(died)					
Wang Chonghui					Y	Y
Wang Jing					Y	
Wang Rongbao				Y		
Wang Zaishan					Y	
Wang Zhishan				Y		

Weng Tingshi		Y	Y			
Wu Baochu		Y	Y			
Wu Luzhen	Y				Y	
Wu Nianci	Y					
Wu Zhenlin				Y	Y	
Xia Xunkai					Y	
Xue Jinbiao					Y	
Yan Fu		Y	Y			
Yang Tingdong				Y		
Yang Tinglian						Y
Yang Yinhang				Y	Y	Y
Ye Han			Y			
Ye Haowu		Y				
Ye Jizhen					Y	
Yung Wing		Y	Y			
Zhang Kui					Y	
Zhang Ji					Y	
Zhang Taiyan(aka Zhang Binglin)	Y	Y	Y			
Zhang Tingdong					Y	
Zhang Tongdian		Y	Y			

Zhang Yingxu					Y	
Zhang Zongxiang				Y	Y	
Zheng Baosheng ¹⁸⁴	Y(died)				Y	
Zheng Guanyi	Y					
Zhou Zupei				Y		
Zhu Lingxi	Y					

Table 3: Names of members of the China Education Society, the Patriotic School, the speakers at the Resist-Russia meeting at Zhang Garden in 1903, the contributors to *Subao*, to the *Citizen's Daily*, and to the *Warnings on Russian Affairs*.¹⁸⁵

Names	Networks	China Education Society (1903)	Patriotic School (1903)	Resist-Russia meeting in Zhang Garden (April 27, 1903)	<i>Subao</i> (1903)	<i>Citizen's Daily</i> (1903)	<i>Warnings on Russian Affairs</i> (1903)
Ao Mengjiang			Y	Y			
Bei Jimei			Y				
Cai Zhimin					Y		

¹⁸⁴ There is a Zheng Baocheng 郑葆丞 listed in Self-standing Society and a Zheng Baosheng 郑葆晟 listed in the Self-standing Army, with the same last name and the same middle character of the first name. I am assuming that they are one and the same.

¹⁸⁵ These names are compiled from Dong Rui, "Subao and Social Changes in Late Qing Dynasty", 24-36; Feng Ziyu, *Geming Yishi*, vol. 1, 170-195; and Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 214.

Cai Yuanpei	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
Cao Liangxia		Y				
Chen Fan		Y		Y		
Chen Chunsheng			Y			
Chen Duxiu	Y				Y	
Chen Heng					Y	
Chen Qubing					Y	Y
Chen Tianfu					Y	
Chen Zhongjian	Y					
He Meishi		Y	Y		Y	
He Zhensheng		Y				
Hu Dunfu		Y				
Hu Zhang				Y		
Hua Mingchu			Y			
Huang Zongyang	Y	Y		Y		
Ji Liegong		Y				
Jiang Weiqiao		Y	Y			
Jiang Zhiyou	Y	Y				
Jiang Zenghui			Y			
Jin Songcen			Y			
Jin Tianhe					Y	
Kuai Shoushu	Y					
Li Shutong				Y		

(Hongyi Dashi)						
Lin Li		Y				
Lin Sen			Y			
Lin Xie	Y				Y	Y
Lin Zongsu						Y
Liu Qiji					Y	
Liu Shiwei				Y		Y
Liu Yazhi				Y		
Long Zehou				Y		
Lu Hesheng					Y	
Ma Junwu			Y			
Ma Xulun			Y			
Mu Shuzai		Y				
Mu Xiangyao (Ouchu)		Y	Y			
Qin Jingyang			Y			
Qiu Jiancen		Y				
Qiu Tingliang				Y		
Shen Buzhou			Y			
Sheng Juyue				Y		
Su Manshu					Y	
Wang Deyuan	Y					
Wang Jitong	Y					
Wang Kangnian			Y			

Wang Mutao	Y					
Wang Suilan		Y				
Wang Wenpu				Y		
Wang Xiaoxu		Y				
Wang Yunzhang			Y			
Wu Danchu		Y				
Wu Zhihui	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Xie Wuliang				Y	Y	
Xu Baosi			Y			
Xu Jingxiang			Y			
Xu Yuanyin			Y			
Ye Han	Y					
Yu Heqin		Y				
Yu Tongbo		Y				
Yu Ziyi		Y				
Zhang Ji				Y	Y	
Zhang Shizhao		Y		Y	Y	
Zhang Taiyan	Y			Y		
Zhang Xiangwen				Y		
Zhou Kaiji			Y			
Zhu Erkang			Y			
Zhu Wensi			Y			
Zou Rong				Y		

Zou Tao				Y		
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Table 4: The Tokyo Radicals: Names of members of the Qing Overseas Student Club, the participants of the 242nd anniversary of the death of China, the Youth Society, the speakers at the Resist-Russia meeting in Kanda, and members of the Military Citizen's Education Society.¹⁸⁶

Name	Network	Qing Overseas Student Club (1902)	242 nd Anniversary Participants (1902)	Youth Society (1902)	Resist-Russia meeting speakers Kanda, (April 29, 1903)	Military Citizen's Education Society (1903) ¹⁸⁷
Bei Yongli						Y
Cai E		Y				
Cao Rulin		Y				
Chen Bingzhong						Y
Chen Duxiu				Y		Y
Chen Jiasheng				Y	Y	Y
Chen Qubing						Y
Chen Tianhua						Y
Chen Youlong			Y			

¹⁸⁶ Chen Wanxiong, 26; Dong Shouyi, 232; Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol.1, 151-2, 155, 165, 181; KGQ, vol. 1, 103; and Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 257.

¹⁸⁷ Names of other members of the Military Citizen's Education Society, as listed by Sang Bing, who did not reappear in other networks are as follows: Huang Zhen, Liu Chengyu, Yang Yulin, Gong Baoquan, Li Yongxi, Wu Jiajie, Li Xiqing, Gui Tingluan, Qu Jinjun, Lu Motai, Zhu Shaomu, Xu Shoushang, Zhou Weizhen, Yi Yuanyi, Yu Dachun, Hu Junji, Sa Junlu, Bei Jun, Chen Dingbao, Wang Xiaozhen, Yu Deyuan, Zhang Songyun, Fei Shanji, Zhao Shixuan, Liu Zhonghe, Qu Dezhe, Chen Fuchang, Shi Chuangsheng. See Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 257.

Dong Hongwei			Y	Y	Y
Dong Jitang			Y		
Fan Yuanlian	Y				
Feng Siluan		Y			
Feng Ziyou		Y	Y		
Gao Yi	Y				
Gui Shaowei					Y
Hu Jingyi			Y		Y
Hua Hong					Y
Huang Honghui			Y		
Huang Xing					Y
Ji Jing			Y		
Jiang Baili			Y		
Jin Bangping	Y		Y		
Kuai Shoushu			Y	Y	Y
Lan Tianwei					Y
Li Qun		Y			
Li Shucheng				Y	Y
Lin Changmin				Y	
Lin Xie					Y
Liu Kunyi					Y
Lu Shaoqi					Y
Lu Shifen	Y				

Ma Junwu		Y			
Niu Yongjian			Y	Y	Y
Niu Xiangqing			Y		
Pan Zanhua			Y		
Qian Chenzhi	Y				
Qin Lishan		Y			
Qin Yuliu			Y		Y
Sa Rui			Y		Y
Shen Xiangyun			Y		
Su Manshu			Y		
Tang Erhe				Y	
Tang Mang (son of Tang Caichang)		Y			
Tao Chengzhang					Y
Wang Jiaju		Y	Y		Y
Wang Jingfang	Y			Y	
Wang Rongbao			Y	Y	
Wang Sicheng		Y			
Wang Xiong		Y			
Weng Hao				Y	Y
Weng Yougong					Y
Wu Guanzhang			Y		
Wu Luzhen	Y				

Wu Zhenlin	Y				
Xie Xiaoshi			Y		Y
Xiong Gai			Y		
Ye Lan			Y	Y	Y
Zhang Ji			Y		Y
Zhang Shaozeng	Y				
Zhang Taiyan		Y			
Zhang Zongxiang	Y				
Zhang Zhaotong			Y	Y	Y
Zheng Xiancheng					Y
Zhou Hongye		Y	Y	Y	Y
Zhu Lingxi		Y			

CHAPTER 3: CHEN DUXIU AND THE *ANHUI SUHUA BAO*

When the *Citizen's Daily* closed down at the end of 1903 as a result of internal disputes,¹ Chen returned to the city of Anqing to start his own newspaper. His objective in establishing this new publication was to inform as many people as possible about the perils facing China, and to this end he used colloquial, or vernacular language in the text. Calling it the *Anhui suhua bao* (Anhui Vernacular Paper, hereafter ASB), Chen wrote for "the poor, the farmers, the artisans, the merchants, the officials, the soldiers, and the girls," to inform them of important developments both at home and abroad. The paper began on March 31, 1904, and ended on August 15, 1905, after publishing twenty-two issues.

These twenty-two issues can best be understood as part of a broader pattern of development in the history of Chinese journalism. As we have seen in the previous chapter, and we shall see again in the following two, newspapers in China during the first two decades of the twentieth century derived their inspiration not only from the present but also from the past. During the period from 1904-1905, for example, even when publishers and journalists like Chen Duxiu had begun to move away from the politics of individuals such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, some of the ideas and rhetorical

¹ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 57-58, fn. 110. The dispute began when the publisher of the *Citizen's Daily* allowed a co-provincial to sleep over in the office, but the latter smoked opium and brought in women of ill repute to spend the night. The reporters of *Citizen's Daily*, feeling that their reputation and safety were compromised, confronted the publisher who defended his co-provincial friend. When news leaked out to a rival paper, it published this information and erroneously attributed this sort of behavior to all the reporters at the *Citizen's Daily*.irate and indignant, the publisher and a few *Citizen's Daily* reporters descended on the rival paper office and a fight broke out, and later articles in the *Citizen's Daily* attacked the rival paper. Subsequently the rival paper sued the *Citizen's Daily* for libel with the British Consulate, since both papers had their offices in the International Concession, and this stopped the publication of the *Citizen's Daily*.

strategies of these early reformers continued to have a certain appeal. At the same time, the editorials, news stories and other features of the contemporary Chinese periodical press were circulated and re-circulated, time and again, in complex networks of associations, individuals and ideas. In a sense, then, every major Chinese newspaper, past and present, was an intertextual source for every other paper.

None of the major ideas that circulated in China during 1904-05 were new, but they came to be understood in somewhat different ways, as China's domestic and international circumstances changed. The overarching and inescapable theme of imperialism, for instance, continued to generate discussions in virtually every major newspaper of the day, but the various manifestations of foreign aggression and exploitation, as well as the particular problems that it caused, created different discourses in different places and at different historical moments. At the same time, as local newspapers told their distinctive stories and shared their distinctive opinions--and as these stories and opinions were then disseminated through various media and other networks in China, Japan, and among overseas Chinese communities throughout the world, certain issues not only became ever more clear, but they also acquired ever more weight.

Thus it was that the omnipresent specter of imperialism, and the pressing question of what to do about it, kept Chinese intellectuals, and, increasingly, other Chinese social groups as well, thinking, talking and writing about nationalistically inspired ideas, including strategies for political, social and economic change, movements for rights recovery and other forms of resistance to imperialism, the establishment of new schools, the promotion of new knowledge, and so forth. And behind all of these closely

interwoven issues and ideas lay fundamental questions about how the foreign powers were able to exert their will on China in the first place. What was it about the West (and Japan)--and what was it about China--that allowed imperialism to become so prevalent in the once-mighty "Middle Kingdom?" These questions brought into ever sharper focus issues of national spirit, national pride, national shame and national character.

The Beginnings of the *Anhui Vernacular Paper*

Drawing upon on his already extensive network of contacts in the Anhui Patriotic Society and elsewhere, Chen Duxiu put together a news organization consisting of about thirty people, each involved in diverse and sometimes multiple tasks. He invited Fang Zhiwu to be in charge of the education and poetry sections of the ASB and he asked Wu Shouyi to write a serialized novel for the paper. Another Anhui Patriotic Society member, Wang Mengzou, owner of the Wuhu Science Bookstore (Wuhu kexue tushushe), drafted the current events section, and, importantly, offered Chen boarding upstairs from the bookstore, where Chen lived with the cook.² Wang recalled that "in 1904 Duxiu with a suitcase in one hand and an umbrella in the other, alighted at the Science Bookstore in Wuhu. When I explained that all I had to offer were two meals of thin gruel a day, he replied without hesitation: 'Two bowls of thin gruel will do.'"³ The staff of the Wuhu Science Bookstore, Zhang Gushi and Cao Fusheng, were also enlisted to write for the

² ZL, 103; *Anqing wenshi zhiliao xuanji* (AWZX) vol. 2, 174.

³ ZL, 103.

science section.⁴ Printing was done with the help of Chen's former *Citizen's Daily* co-editor, Zhang Shizhao, head of the Dong Dalu publishing house in Shanghai.⁵

With the experience he had gained in editing *The Citizens' Daily*, and the knowledge he had accumulated in his studies and his trips abroad, Chen created a newspaper that was at once informative, lively, and wide-ranging in content. Each article was no more than two or three pages in length; Chen wrote the bulk of them--fifty-two in all--and he selected for himself the pen names Youji [follow myself] and San'ai [three loves], referring to his love of "the motherland, science and freedom."⁶⁷

The cost of publishing the ASB was shouldered primarily by the China Education Society and by Hu Zicheng, a financial backer of Wang Mengzou's Wuhu Science Bookstore.⁸ Hu, ever the wary businessman, cautioned Chen at the outset that the Qing authorities would censor any inflammatory publications, and thus he (Chen) should be careful if he wanted to stay in operation.⁹ Besides, argued Hu, the Chinese reading public was probably not sophisticated enough to appreciate the refinements of new ideas such as democracy: "In China today," he told Chen, "the people's morality is debased, and their knowledge is infantile. If one wishes to establish enlightened constitutional rule, it cannot be done overnight. One must begin with local rule and individual self-rule [zizhi] . . . [If] we convened a Chinese assembly now, I am sure that among one hundred people, there would be ninety or more who would oppose the opening of [progressive] schools and the abolition of the eight-legged essay."¹⁰ The ASB carried only three

⁴ Shen Ji, "Anhui suhua bao" in XQJ, vol. 2, 165.

⁵ ZL, 106.

⁶ Ding Miaomiao, "'Anhui suhua bao' yanjiu," 28.

⁷ Ding Miaomiao, 8.

⁸ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 207.

⁹ Ding Miaomiao, 14.

¹⁰ ZL, 104-5.

advertising notices: one from the Tokyo Overseas Anhui Co-Provincial Association, one from the Anhui Public School (see Chapter 4), and a third from an Anhui mining company. As a result, the paper was frequently short of cash and it sometimes had difficulty meeting its payroll.¹¹

Because of Chen's deliberately subdued political tone, his paper became recommended reading not only in Anhui schools, but also in some offices of the provincial government. The ASB was nevertheless suspended from publication twice--once from October 1904 to February 1905, and again from May to August, 1905. While there was no clear explanation given for this punishment, it was widely understood at the time that Chen had angered the Qing authorities--in the first instance by criticizing their accommodating stance toward a request by a British merchant for extensions on Anhui mine leases, and in the second for encouraging a boycott of American goods (see below for a discussion of both issues).¹² Moreover, the older generation in China considered the paper as threatening as "floodwaters and ferocious beasts."¹³ Cai Yuanpei and his friends recalled that while the publication "spread knowledge on the surface . . . [secretly it] promoted revolution."¹⁴

The paper began with a printing of 1,000 copies but its circulation increased to 6,000 within six months. It was distributed in fifty-nine outlets, including stationery and fabric stores, in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Baoding, Nanchang, Wuchang, Zhengjiang, Nanjing, and Changsha. Although several other papers were published in Anhui at the turn of the century, such as the *Anhui baihua bao* (Anhui Colloquial Paper),

¹¹ Ding Miaomiao, 15-16.

¹² Shen Ji, "Anhui Suhua bao" in XQJ, 168.

¹³ *Anhui xiandai geming shi ziliao changbian* (The long edition of modern revolutionary materials of Anhui) (AGS), 87.

¹⁴ Ding Miaomiao, 4.

the *Anhui chuan* (Anhui Boat), the *Xie bao* (Blood Paper), the *Anhui guan bao* (Anhui Official Gazetteer), and the *Anhui xuewu zazhi* (Anhui Scholarly Paper), the ASB was by far the most well-received.¹⁵

The *Anhui suhua bao* was part of an explosion of non-official publications that erupted in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War. From 1895 to 1911, approximately three hundred and forty-five privately-owned papers appeared in Chinese cities and in overseas Chinese communities.¹⁶ Of this number, approximately one hundred and forty were written in the vernacular language (*baihua wen*).¹⁷ In early 1904, when the ASB was first issued, about thirty-two vernacular papers circulated in China.¹⁸

The vernacular language had long been employed in various forms of Chinese popular fiction,¹⁹ but for some two thousand years it had been stigmatized as an inferior form of writing by classically educated elites. In the words of one famous author, Zhou Zuoren (1885-1967), the vernacular written language was considered by most scholars in late Qing times to be a tool for enlightening the “servants,” while the classical language remained the domain of the “masters.”²⁰ It was not until the late 1890s that reform-minded intellectuals began to use the vernacular language as a means of disseminating their political views to a wider readership, and still there was some resistance. As we have seen in Chapter 1, vernacular texts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries period generally appeared in the form popularized by Liang Qichao’s *The*

¹⁵ AGS, 107.

¹⁶ Ge Gongzhen, 115-20.

¹⁷ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 160. See his table for a list of all vernacular papers from 1876-1911, 135-59.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 135-42. The ASB was often compared favorably to some of the best-known Chinese vernacular newspapers, including the *Hangzhou baihua bao* (Hangzhou Vernacular Paper), the *Zhongguo baihua bao* (China Vernacular Paper), and the *Yangzi jiang baihua bao* (Yangzi River Vernacular Paper).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 160. Over fifteen hundred novels were produced in the colloquial style during the late Qing period.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 163.

China Progress, known as “translation of the classical style.”²¹ But Chen’s written words reflected more natural speech patterns, a sure sign that despite his classical training and examination degree, he was uninterested in displaying his classical skills and intent on establishing a broader base of readers.

In the ASB Chen adopted a breezy and chatty tone, while at the same time his moralistic and pedantic point of view befitted that of a traditional Chinese scholar lecturing his students. He did not offer much “soft” news with entertainment value, but chose instead to deliver “hard” news on national and current affairs. With his selective news reports, Chen aimed to bridge the gap between the isolated towns of Anhui on the one hand and the metropolitan centers of China and other countries of the world on the other. For international news, he culled information from sources such as the *Jingzhong ribao* (Alarm Daily), the *Zongwai ribao* (China-Foreign Daily), and the *Shi bao* (Times Daily), as well as the Japanese *Osaka Asahi Shimbun*, (Osaka Morning News), the London *Times*, the Hong Kong based *China Daily*, and the *Zhongfa huibao* (Sino-French General Paper).²² The paper did not have the manpower necessary to conduct much first-hand investigative reporting, so the ASB’s writers often had to refashion articles from other papers and print the correspondence of friends that had been sent from China and Japan.²³

In format, the ASB reflected current journalistic trends: It was divided into thirteen sections: editorial matters, important news, (consisting mainly of national and a

²¹ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 163. In a 1901 essay titled “On Discussing the Vernacular as the Foundation of Reform,” Liang listed several reasons why the vernacular language was good for reform, including efficiency in learning and being accessible to the poor. He also claimed that the vernacular had been the written language of ancient kings, but later scholars who favored artifice over substance, creating the complex and difficult classical texts. SLXJ, 1a, 38-40.

²² Ding Miaomiao, 54. Translations of paper titles my own.

²³ Ding Miaomiao, 51.

few articles on international news), provincial news, history, geography, education, business, novels, poetry, miscellany, trade news, urgent news, and reader's contributions.²⁴ More than one-third of the reportage focused on political and social developments in Anhui province.

The following sections provide a rough content analysis of the ASB, which includes discussions from a variety of contemporary and earlier Chinese newspapers to show some of the many ways that the past and the present intersected in Chinese journalism of the early twentieth century.

Imperialism and Its Lessons

As indicated above, many of the themes discussed in the ASB were related to each other, and most were framed in some significant way by the specter of imperialism. But imperialism had its ironies. Although fundamentally a source of concern and outright dismay for virtually all Chinese, at times it brought strange satisfactions. For instance, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which was fought over competing Russian and Japanese interests in Manchuria, involved two imperialist powers that were fighting on Chinese soil and causing the deaths of thousands of Chinese over the course of events. Yet after Japan prevailed in the struggle, nationalistic Chinese reformers hailed Japan's victory as a triumph of constitutional monarchy over feudal autocracy, and a great many Chinese citizens took vicarious pleasure in seeing the "yellow race" triumph over the "white race"--despite the inconvenient fact that China had suffered mightily from

²⁴ Weng Fei ed., 346.

Japanese military aggression, territorial expansion and economic exploitation in the recent past.

The first issue of the ASB appeared only a month after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in February of 1904. In this issue, and in almost every subsequent installment of the paper, Chen discussed the fighting in Manchuria. Trying to arouse the indignation of his readers, he cited the number of innocent Chinese civilians killed in the crossfire between the two foreign nations. He deplored Russia's forced conscription of Chinese for hard labor, and decried the warring parties' refusal to allow the Red Cross to save wounded Chinese.²⁵ Reprinting a story from the *China-Foreign Daily*, Chen told of the heroic deeds of a group of Chinese horse thieves who, calling themselves the East Asia Patriotic Victory Corps, volunteered to fight the Russians on behalf of the Japanese.²⁶ He also published a poem by Ms. Fang Yingzi, from the city of Tongcheng, commemorating the drowning death of 6,000 Chinese in the Heilong River that had been caused by the Russians--a tragedy that was also memorialized in an opera set to the music of the classical play *Xuelü Jijiang* (Xuelü performing memorial rite at the river).²⁷

Chen also drew his readers' attention to acts of imperialism committed by countries other than Russia in different parts of the Chinese empire. At various times he reported on the British occupation of Tibet; on France's acquisition of navigation rights from Shaoxing to Shanghai (which provoked resistance on the part of the Zhejiang gentry); on the killing of Chinese officials by German soldiers; and on Japan's demand

²⁵ Chen Duxiu ed., *Anhui suhua bao* (ASB), no. 12 (Aug. 15, 1905), 6; no. 2, (Mar. 15, 1904), 8; no.3, (April 1, 1904), 5.

²⁶ ASB, no. 7 (June 1, 1904), 8.

²⁷ ASB, no.4 (April 15, 1904), 27; no. 14 (Sept. 15, 1904), 33-36.

for 210,000 taels of silver²⁸ in compensation for the death of two Japanese soldiers near the Guangdong railroad.²⁹ Chen also made sure that his readers knew about the U. S. government's refusal to allow China to observe the negotiations between Japan and Russia in the aftermath of their war, even though the battles occurred on Chinese territory.³⁰ And, of course, Chen gave substantial attention to the mistreatment of Chinese citizens abroad, from Africa to the Americas (see below).³¹

Closer to home, imperialism continued to rear its threatening, Medusa-like head. By the turn of the century, Anqing, the city where Chen conceived of the ASB, and Wuhu, the city where it was actually published, were thriving port cities on the Yangzi River, both bustling with foreign trade. In 1876 the Chefoo Convention opened Wuhu as a treaty port with its own customs office, and Anqing was designated a port of call for international ships. Naturally, the increased presence of foreigners in these cities, and particularly in Wuhu's new international settlement, brought ever more opportunities for Sino-foreign friction. Meanwhile, foreign-run mines and other imperialist enterprises became increasingly evident in Anhui (see below), as they were elsewhere in China, and Christian missionaries seemed to be ubiquitous.

By 1905 there were hundreds of Christian churches in Anhui alone.³² In addition to establishing places of worship, missionaries from Europe and the United States set up schools, hospitals and orphanages in a number of cities, including Wuhu and Anqing.

²⁸ 210,000 taels of silver is equivalent to US \$3.1 Million today, Chen Mingyuan, 15.

²⁹ ASB, no. 12 (Aug. 15, 1904), 7; no. 19 (May 1, 1905), 3-4; no. 20 (May 15, 1905), 3.

³⁰ ASB, no. 21/22 (Aug. 15, 1905), 4-5.

³¹ See, for example, the report from South Africa about 800 Chinese laborers who were chased out of a town by the locals who resented their presence. ASB, no. 21/22 (Aug. 15, 1905), 4-5.

³² AGS, 22.

Although the services provided by these missionaries generated a certain amount of goodwill among the local population,³³ there were many disputes and grievances.

Most of these problems revolved around the misuse of church power. Incidents varied in seriousness. In Shiyi county, for instance, converts harassed villagers who had called them "Rice Christians." In He county, an American missionary picked up a seven-year old boy by the leg and shook him to his death because the boy called him a "foreign devil" (*yang guizi*). In Xiao county, bodyguards hired by the Catholic Church raped and robbed some villagers, but they escaped punishment because of collusion between the missionary and the magistrate.³⁴ In Fengyang county, a farmer committed suicide after being jailed by a preacher for late payment of a three hundred-yuan debt.³⁵

Accounts of the wages of imperialism that appeared in the ASB and other newspapers of the time were not confined to China or to the contemporary era, however. The partition of Poland in the late eighteenth century was an especially alarming historical event in the eyes of twentieth century Chinese intellectuals because it offered such striking and unpleasant parallels with the infamous "Scramble for Concessions" following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Article after article in the ASB and other contemporary publications sang the sad refrain that readers must take to heart the lessons learned from Poland's unhappy fate.³⁶

There were other lessons to be learned from imperialism as well. In 1902, for example, the *Waijiao bao* (Foreign Affairs Paper) discussed the protracted Transvaal War

³³ Ibid., 24.

³⁴ AGS, 10-12.

³⁵ Ibid., 11-12. Three hundred yuan was a huge amount for a farmer when eight silver yuan could feed a family of eight for a month, Chen Mingyuan, 12.

³⁶ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 20. The author of an article in *Record of Enlightened Wisdom* attempted to explain the "root" of such imperialism by surveying the political and economic conditions of various foreign nations. Ibid., 58.

(the Second Boer War, 1899-1902), commenting on the massive number of soldiers and weapons poured into this effort by the British, who had expected a quick victory. The author marveled at the determination of the Boers and concluded his article by quoting Yan Fu, T. H. Huxley, and Legalist philosopher, Guanzi--all to support of the basic idea that a nation's survival depended neither on its material resources nor its size, but on the will of its people to resist.³⁷ Other writers, however, appreciated the importance of material factors, holding to the view expressed by Liang Qichao in the *New People's Miscellany* that the twentieth century was a century of economic politics, and that imperialism was not limited to gunboats and bullets.³⁸

In 1903, the *Foreign Affairs Paper* offered an interesting, albeit rather simplistic theoretical model of the development of nation-states, characterizing nations as organic units that grew by stages. China, the author asserted, was presently at stage one, the most rudimentary level of material and moral development. Since the imperialist nations had reached a second stage whereby their material wealth outstripped their moral development, they resorted to the immoral invasion of less developed nations. Therefore China must bypass this amoral second stage and go directly to stage three, where material and moral development were at their highest level.³⁹ But regardless of whether China had the capacity to skip a stage, as the writer of this piece earnestly and idealistically proposed, the fact was that, at least in his eyes, China had slipped from the apex of civilization to its very nadir. Imperialism, for all of its moral failings, had brought China to its knees.

³⁷ SKXJ, vol. 1a, 114.

³⁸ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 206.

³⁹ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 326.

National Pride and National Shame

A persistent theme in Chinese writing about the wages of imperialism was thus a narrative of national shame. It took many different forms over time, but it was always linked with discussions about what could and should be done to restore China's national dignity. And as these conversations developed, they usually led back to the question of how much cultural and institutional change was necessary for China to acquire and maintain competitive presence with Japan and the West.

China's "shame" discourse was often shaded with racial overtones. As early as 1901, *The Citizen's Paper* argued that China was losing its sovereignty and that the Chinese were becoming slaves of the "white people."⁴⁰ In 1903, the Hunanese publication *Youxue yibian* (A Collection of Translations of Studies Abroad), spoke of the "white peril overrunning the Far East," urging an alliance of the Han people with the Manchus, the Mongolians, and the Tibetans in an effort to achieve a unified Asia.⁴¹ A writer for the *Xin Hunan* (New Hunan) made a nearly identical remark,⁴² providing an excellent example of the way news circulated during this period, especially among fellow provincials.

But in the eyes of many nationalistic Chinese, the Manchus were the heart of the problem. In an editorial titled "Discussing a Dying Country," Qin Lishan wrote that he would rather have China die than dance under the Tartars."⁴³ In a takeoff on Nakae Chōmin's *A Discourse on Government by Three Drunkards*, Chinese students in Japan

⁴⁰ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 64.

⁴¹ SLXJ, vol. 1b, 613.

⁴² SLXJ, vol. 1b, 632.

⁴³ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 90.

published “Four Guests Discussing Politics” in which they argued that white men would make better masters than the Manchus, and that given the slave-like nature of the Chinese, a revolution would only change their slave masters from the Manchus to warlords and bandits.⁴⁴

Some people placed the blame on both the Manchus and the “white race.” “[We Chinese] should be ashamed to be the slaves of the Manchus as well as of the foreigners,” wrote one contributor to the *Record of Enlightened Wisdom*.⁴⁵ Upon learning about Maria Stewart (1803-1879)⁴⁶ and reading an article titled “An Appeal to the Colored People of the World” by David Walker (1796-1830),⁴⁷ a contributor to *Juemin* (Awakened People) “cried for the author, thinking of the suffering of the black people and also of the yellow race.”⁴⁸

As we have already seen, since the late 1890s many Chinese intellectuals had placed the blame for China’s weakness and humiliation squarely on Chinese culture, arguing that by late imperial times China lacked any sort of collective martial spirit. Because Chinese education focused only on the Confucian classical literature, so the argument went, the Chinese people had become physically and spiritually weak.⁴⁹ Chen Duxiu held similar beliefs, as we have also seen. But reports of Japanese bravery during the Russo-Japanese War provided him with a new opportunity to discuss the advantages of having a national culture with a strong military character. In an ASB article titled “An

⁴⁴ SLXJ, vol. 1b, 508; vol. 1a, 212; vol. 1b, 759.

⁴⁵ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 64.

⁴⁶ Maria Stewart was an African American woman abolitionist who called for equality and justice in a famous essay, “Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality.”

http://afroamhistory.about.com/od/mariawstewart/p/bio_stewart_m.htm (accessed 4/8/2009)

⁴⁷ David Walker was an African American activist whose anti-slavery pamphlet “Appeal” was deemed for a time “the most notorious document in America.” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2930.html> (accessed 4/08/2009)

⁴⁸ SLXJ, vol. 1b, 871.

⁴⁹ SLXJ, vol. 1b, 837-849.

Account of the Spirit of the Japanese Soldiers” he made this case powerfully.⁵⁰ As a counter-example, in a complementary but decidedly uncomplimentary piece titled “An Account of the Spirit of the Chinese Soldier,” Chen pointed out that although Chinese military men had fought bravely in the Spring and Autumn period (c. 770-476 BCE), they were not so courageous in more recent times.⁵¹

Chen and others realized, however, that China’s weakness was not merely the result of a long history of emphasizing civil virtues (*wende*) over military ones (*wude*); it also had to do with the nature of the Chinese polity itself. For too many centuries China had viewed itself as the center of the world, a culturally defined “empire without neighbors” rather than a nation-state existing in a world of theoretically equal and competing nation-states. It was difficult, therefore, for the Chinese as a people to develop a sense of nationalism.

An editorial on “national spirit” (*guohun*) for the 1903 inaugural issue of the overseas student magazine *Zhejiang Chao* (The Tides of Zhejiang) highlighted the problem. In it, the author argued that the “soul” of a nation resides in the spirit of its soldiers, and the spirit of its soldiers depends, in turn, on the existence of two vital conditions: a sense of national unity and patriotism. China seemed to have neither—at least not on a significant scale. The paper quoted Matsumura Kaiseki (1859-1939), a Japanese educator and religious leader, on his understanding of the four “great spirits” that distinguished Westerners from most other peoples of the world. These included a spirit of risk-taking, a religious spirit, a warrior spirit, and the spirit of the commoner. The author concluded that the Chinese people must abandon their old spirit, which lacked

⁵⁰ ASB, no. 9 (July 1, 1904), 11-4; no. 8 (June 15, 1904), 12; no. 1 (Mar. 1, 1904), 14.

⁵¹ ASB, no. 17, “Bing shi” (Nov. 1, 1904; but published 3/1905), 1; no. 20, “Zhongguo binghun lu” (May 15, 1905), 1-6.

all of these qualities, and acquire these four new spirits in order to build a strong and self-sufficient nation.⁵²

But what, exactly, was a “nation?” Naturally there could be no universal agreement on this issue, but Chen Duxiu offered the following basic definition in the ASB: “First, a nation must have land . . . Second, a nation must have people of the same race, with the same history . . . and third, a nation must have its own sovereignty.” Sovereignty, he went on to say, is “a commonly shared right of the people of a nation . . . such as the right to decide law, to collect taxes . . . to build railroads and excavate mines.”⁵³ (For Chen’s further thoughts on sovereignty and related rights, see the last section of this chapter.)

As to the question of nationalism, Chen was somewhat ambivalent on the point. On the one hand, he hoped that his compatriots would all learn to love their country and not fear dying for it.⁵⁴ On the other hand, he embraced a pan-Asian vision of the world, arguing that all of the peoples who inhabit the area called “Asia” belonged to the same Mongoloid stock, and by virtue of their shared or at least similar histories, customs and languages, they were part of what he called “the race of the Central Efflorescence” (*Zhonghua minzhu*). He did not embrace the virulent anti-Manchu racism that was popular with many revolutionaries, and, like Kang Youwei, he looked to a future in which there would be no national boundaries.⁵⁵

What mitigated Chen’s idealism was a strong strain of Social Darwinism in his thinking. For example, in a 1904 poem titled “The Good Earth: Anger at Japan’s

⁵² “Guohun pian” in *Zhejiang Chao*, no.1 (Jan. 20, 1903), 1-17.

⁵³ ASB, no. 5 (May 1, 1904), 1-4.

⁵⁴ ASB, no. 14 (Sept. 15, 1904), 4.

⁵⁵ ASB, no. 3 (April 1, 1904), 15-18.

Stealing of Our Land,” we find phrases such as “the yellow man loses while the white man triumphs,” and “the strong survives while the weak dies.” Shedding tears for his country in this poem, Chen begs the Chinese authorities not to “offer up our sacred nation with both hands and betray our good mountains and rivers.”⁵⁶

In one of his most compelling essays in the ASB, titled “Wangguo pian” (On a Dying Nation), Chen elaborated on some of the above-mentioned ideas. Contrasting China and Japan, Chen asserted not only that his countrymen lacked any sort of military spirit but also that their obsession with the family system and with efforts to gain and hold bureaucratic posts stood in the way of any sort of genuine Chinese patriotism. The Japanese, by contrast, “think only of their country, and not about their family. If the husband dies fighting, the wife recognizes this as part of his duty, and [considers it] an honorable feat.”⁵⁷ Chen went on to warn that “the [Chinese] nation could die without changing dynasties; as long as its land, resources and sovereignty were snatched up by foreign nations, the country could die without enthroning a foreign emperor or a changing officials.”⁵⁸

Chen argued in this essay that China had already lost much of its sovereignty. As evidence he listed the many foreign spheres of influence that existed in the country, and the number of railroads built and owned by foreign powers. He also pointed out that China no longer controlled its legal system (because of extraterritoriality and other special treaty port arrangements), it could not protect its borders, and it had turned over a large part of its tax collection system to foreigners (i.e. the Imperial Maritime Customs Service under Robert Hart). Chinese could not even control its own currency, he

⁵⁶ ASB, no. 2 (Mar. 15, 1904), 36.

⁵⁷ ASB, no. 14 (Sept. 15, 1904), 1.

⁵⁸ ASB, no. 8 (June 15, 1904), 1-4.

asserted.⁵⁹ Chen's explanation for all this was starkly simple: "I say that the reason why the Chinese have lost their country is because the people recognized only the family, and not the nation."⁶⁰

Variations on a Theme

Chen and his staff tried to vary their delivery by interspersing news stories, reports and editorials with other forms of exposition, including parodies, songs, illustrations and letters from individuals. But their messages remained the same.

Among the ASB's illustrations were pictures of a foreign soldier beating a wealthy Chinese merchant, and foreign soldiers grabbing Chinese men by their queues and then conscripting them for hard labor.⁶¹ Parodies included Wang Xiaonong's well-received play, "Xin pai guazhong lanyin banben" (A new stage version of the causes of Poland's partition), in which inept officials were given Chinese names, such as "Slave of a dying nation" (Wangguo nu), and acts of corruption, cowardice, opium-smoking, and betrayal by government officials received prominent attention. Set to the music of a folk ballad, the author managed to weave into his parody both anti-Manchu and populist sentiments.⁶²

New lyrics, sung to the tune of well-known Chinese folk songs such as "Lament at the Fifth Watch" or "Ten Sighs," described the humiliations suffered by China and remarked upon the deplorable weakness of its people, urging them to emulate the bravery

⁵⁹ ASB, no. 15 "Wangguo pian," (Oct. 1, 1904), 1-6.

⁶⁰ ASB, no. 17 "Wangguo pian," (Nov. 1, 1904, published Mar., 1905), 4.

⁶¹ ASB, nos. 13 (Sept. 1, 1904) and 14 (Sept. 15, 1904).

⁶² ASB, nos. 11-13 ((Aug. 1, Aug. 15, and Sep. 1, 1904); and Guo Yuqing, "Jiumin de zhuanyi—Yi Anhui suhua bao wei lie" (A shift to save the people—using the *Anhui suhua bao* as an example), 19.

of the Japanese.⁶³ The most famous works of this genre were Chen Tianhua's *Menghui tou* (About Face), and his *Jingshi zhong* (A Bell to Warn the World). Written in three- to four- character short verses, the songs were easy to sing and easy to remember. Printed in pamphlets, they were distributed to students and to soldiers in the New Army, and became an important means by which to spread revolutionary messages.

Here are the beginning lines of Chen's "Lament at Fifth Watch:" "In the first watch, sitting in the flower room, thinking back and forth . . . My China, subjugated to foreigners, has suffered many humiliations. [一更里，坐兰房，前思后想 . . . 我中国，受洋人，许多欺负。]⁶⁴ The following lines from "About Face" convey a similar sense of shame and despair: "My China, was at one time, a famous big country . . . Just afraid [now], to be India, unable to defend the big land." [我中华，原是个，有名大国...怕只怕，做印度，广土不保。]⁶⁵ Hammering home the same theme, the ASB printed a "National Shame Song" sent in by the Tongcheng Practical Learning Academy and also published a letter from an overseas student on a ship bound for America, who reported being treated in an insulting way by an Italian passenger and then having to endure further humiliations.⁶⁶

Although Chen most often used popular literary forms to emphasize themes of imperialism, national shame, official misconduct and backwardness, he also offered occasional tales of redemption. For instance, he transformed the lyrics of the popular opera "Yangzi meng" (Dream of Rouge Powder) into a story in which a protagonist

⁶³ ASB, no. 1 (Mar. 1, 1904), 35-37; no. 10 (June 15, 1904), 27-29.

⁶⁴ ASB, no. 1 (Mar. 1, 1904), 35.

⁶⁵ Guo Yuqing, 21.

⁶⁶ ASB, no. 3 (April 1, 1904), 33-36.

named "Protect China" establishes Western military academies, and women join the army and live in a village called Iron and Blood.⁶⁷

Perhaps to avoid sounding patronizing, Chen used his own awakening as an example of personal redemption: "Ten years ago," he wrote, "when I was at home studying, all I knew was eating and sleeping . . . [but] in order to honor my family, I would read a few essays, hoping to bluff my way into a few degrees. Who knew what a nation was, and what it had to do with me? Then, in 1895 I first heard of Japan, and that it had defeated our China. Then came 1900, when countries called England, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, America, Austria, and Japan, put their troops together and defeated China again . . . That is when I realized that I was part of China, and that my nation's rise and decline had to do with everyone's welfare . . . I had to be twenty years old to know that there was such a thing as a nation . . . What a shame!"⁶⁸

The Anti-US Boycott

There was one source of national shame that Chinese at all levels tried to do something about in 1904: the notorious Chinese Exclusion Act, first passed by the U.S. Congress in 1882 and not repealed until 1943. This act prohibited Chinese laborers, both "skilled and unskilled," from immigrating to the United States to work, and it also made life more difficult for those who had already arrived in America. In 1904, however, the so-called Burlingame Treaty--a Sino-American agreement that in effect sanctioned the

⁶⁷ ASB, no. 18, "Yanzhimeng" (Nov. 15, 1904, published April, 1905), 1-4.

⁶⁸ ASB, no.1, "Speaking about the country" (May 1, 1904), 5.

Chinese Exclusion Act--was due to be renegotiated. This prospect brought forth an unusually coherent and passionate response from the various sectors of Chinese society.

For several years stories of the mistreatment of Chinese immigrants that appeared in the new-style periodical press added fuel to the burgeoning nationalist sentiment in China. In 1903, for example, the *Citizen's Daily* reported on the harsh living conditions of the Chinese in Hawaii, and on how they had been prohibited from seeking work after Hawaii became a territory of the United States. The paper described the insulting manner in which Chinese passengers and their well-wishers were treated in Honolulu by the staff of a Korean ship, and the unlawful arrests of Chinese immigrants by the police in the United States.⁶⁹ In the same year the Honolulu-based *New China Daily* proposed a boycott (*dizhi*) of American goods to protest the mistreatment of the Chinese in Hawaii.⁷⁰

By 1905, the minister of the Chinese Embassy, Liang Cheng, saw the treaty renegotiation as an opportunity for the Qing government to protest the mistreatment of its subjects.⁷¹ In May of 1905 the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce resolved to organize a boycott of American products in order to influence the negotiations. The importance of newly created newspapers and social networks in China became apparent when the boycott spread rapidly to Canton, Xiamen, Tianjin and elsewhere. While Shanghai took the lead, Canton followed quickly, as did most other major Chinese cities.⁷²

The ASB first joined the resistance discourse with its May 1905 report, indicating that the Beijing government had ordered Minister Liang in Washington to protest the extension of the treaty sanctioning the exclusion of Chinese laborers. The report also

⁶⁹ CCD, no.1, 0239, 0248; no.3, 0669-0670.

⁷⁰ Wong Sin-Kiong, "Mobilizing a Social Movement in China," 378.

⁷¹ Wang Guanhua, *In Search of Justice*, 83.

⁷² Spence, *In Search of Modern China*, 236; Edward Rhoads' review of Wang Guanhua, in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 61:3, (Aug. 2002), 1040-1041.

talked about the anger of the Chinese people, especially the Cantonese, whose co-provincials comprised a majority of the immigrants, and who had opened their provincial association in Shanghai to discuss the possibility of a boycott.⁷³ When news reached China that the Exclusion Act would extend to students and businessmen as well, Chinese merchants in Guangzhou, Fujian, Shanghai, Suzhou, Huzhou, Hankou and Changsha telegraphed the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, requesting a halt to the negotiations while they prepared for the boycott.⁷⁴

Despite American protests to the contrary, the ASB reporter commented that “everyone knew the Chinese were mistreated in the States. We could not use force, and our words fell on deaf ears, so . . . [our only option is to] boycott American goods.”⁷⁵ A letter from a reader explained that because the Chinese worked so diligently on the railroads and in the mines of California they provoked the jealousy and the anger of American laborers, which was important because, in a democracy, laborers possessed tremendous political power.

Noting that the terms of the Exclusion Act had become progressively harsher with each extension, the writer urged the Chinese people band together and fight the unjust legislation. He remarked that foreigners “laugh at us” and “look down on us,” and say that we are nothing but “a sheet of loose sand.” Fearful of foreign intervention, he wanted the boycott to be viewed as a private initiative by the people, and not a state-sanctioned act that might invite retribution from the American government.⁷⁶ At the same time, however, he urged kind treatment of Americans who resided in China, for

⁷³ ASB, no. 19, “Current news” (May 1, 1905), 1, 3-4.

⁷⁴ ASB, no. 20, “Current news” (May 15, 1905), 1.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ For more information on this concern, see SLXJ, vol. 2a, 4.

(May 15, 1905), unlike their compatriots in the United States, they were well-disposed toward the Chinese.⁷⁷

As indicated above, like the ASB, many other Chinese papers carried articles discussing the boycott in the years from 1904 to 1905.⁷⁸ The themes of mistreatment and humiliation suffered by the Chinese at the hands of the foreigners were repeated endlessly, in a variety of media that included not only newspapers but also handbills, leaflets and even illustrations on kites and fans. Performances in emerging public spaces, including tea house lectures, street corner speeches and plays, contributed to the spread of knowledge about the event.⁷⁹ The determination to fight back by stopping trade appealed to disparate social classes, galvanizing merchants, officials, students, intellectuals, journalists, women, shopkeepers, coolies, boatmen and illiterate villagers both at home and abroad.⁸⁰

The Hong Kong based *China Daily*, an organ of Sun Yat-sen's Revive China Society, enthusiastically supported the boycott. In Canton, the Resist-Treaty Society (Juyuehui) issued a paper, the *Juyue bao* (Resist-Treaty Paper), expressly to protest the American exclusion of Chinese laborers.⁸¹ The famous translator Lin Shu, in rendering Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (*Heinü yutianlu*; Black slaves plead to Heaven), suggested explicitly that the treatment of black people by the "white race" had

⁷⁷ ASB, no. 21/22, "Important news" (Aug. 15, 1905), 1-16.

⁷⁸ Wang Guanhua provides a table of selected publications on Chinese emigration, but this is not a comprehensive list, 52.

⁷⁹ Wong Sin-Kiong, "Mobilizing a Social Movement in China," 375-6, 386, 388, 391, 394.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 376.

⁸¹ XQJ, vol. 2, 14, 327.

now been transferred to the “yellow race.”⁸² At the same time, boycotters compared their actions to those of American revolutionaries at the Boston Tea Party.⁸³

The Chinese periodical press was increasingly mindful of foreign opinion in the midst of the boycott. The *Foreign Affairs Paper*, for instance, translated a number of articles from sources such as the *London Times* and Boston’s *North American Review*. This material included a speech by the former U.S. minister to China, George Seward, in which Mr. Seward remarked that the exclusion laws were the most unjust acts the United States had ever perpetrated against the Chinese. This pronouncement led one staff writer to declare optimistically that once the American population became better educated, the exclusion would end.⁸⁴

The *North China News*, the longest running English paper in China (1864 to 1951), also entered the fray, publishing the views of Western diplomats in the fashion of the *Foreign Affairs Paper*, and also seeking to link the more “positive” side of Sino-American relations to the present crisis. In calling on the U.S. government to reconsider the Chinese Exclusion Act, a writer for the paper noted that many of the organizers of the boycott were in fact the products of American missionary schools, and the methods they were using, such as organizing meetings, making speeches and distributing pamphlets, were all taught to them by the missionaries.

One newspaper article reported that the Chinese-operated Wuben Women’s School convened a meeting of two hundred women, who persuaded the men in their families to come and discuss the boycott. Once the boycott began, however, the paper cautioned patience on the part of Chinese and asked the Qing government to suppress any

⁸² Wong Sin-Kiong, “Mobilizing a Social Movement in China,” 383-386.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 383.

⁸⁴ Wang Guanhua, 53-54.

violence.⁸⁵ There was little violence initially because public meetings were banned, but on July 16, 1905, a Cantonese returned student named Feng Xiawei committed suicide in front of the American Consulate, hoping to inspire his countrymen to continue protesting against the exclusion law.⁸⁶ The boycotters staged elaborate memorial services as a cover for continued meetings, and a crowd estimated between 10,000 and 30,000 came to pay tribute to Feng, who instantly became a martyr of the movement.⁸⁷

In the end, the Qing court eventually yielded to American pressure and issued an edict prohibiting the boycott and any meetings on the subject. However, notices of the proclamation were pasted upside down in public spaces, leading the people to surmise that the court was ambivalent about enforcing the ban.⁸⁸ Meanwhile, the protesters pressured Cantonese rickshaw coolies to quit pulling American visitors, causing a stir in September when they refused to serve visiting dignitary Alice Roosevelt, the daughter of the U. S. president, and the American Secretary of War, William H. Taft.⁸⁹ Under pressure from the American Consul-General in Canton, three members of the Resist-Treaty Society were arrested for instigating the rebellious behavior of the rickshaw coolies.⁹⁰

For a few more months, the Chinese refused to purchase imported American cigarettes, flour, kerosene and cotton, but the overall economic effect on the American economy was negligible.⁹¹ To be sure, by the end of 1905 there was a growing awareness, both in China and abroad, of the political power of collective economic action,

⁸⁵ SLXJ, vol. 2a, 697.

⁸⁶ Wong Sin-Kiong, "Die for the Boycott and Nation," 570, 573.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 574.

⁸⁸ Spence, *In Search of Modern China*, 236. Spence suggests that this speculation about the court's ambivalence was correct.

⁸⁹ Wong Sin-Kiong, "Die for the Boycott and Nation," 573.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 573.

⁹¹ Ibid., 566.

but the Burlingame Treaty and the Exclusion Act remained in place, and so did China's sense of national shame.

Strategies to Strengthen China

In order to wash away shame, China naturally had to regain its sense of national pride. But how? The boycott seemed to be a promising start, but it ultimately failed. Where, then, to begin? In the minds of many, the foundation of a "new China" had to be built on moral and practical education.⁹² At the same time, however, China needed to continue looking for concrete ways to resist imperialism.

The Critical Role of Education

Practically every progressively minded intellectual around the turn of the century agreed on the need to revamp the educational system in China. Chen Duxiu was certainly no exception. In his four-part essay for the ASB, titled "How to Reform Elementary School," he offered a stinging critique of the Chinese system of elementary education based not only on the time he had spend in various Chinese educational institutions but also his experiences at the Yakuroku Shoin in Japan. He remarked on the uselessness of studying the Confucian classics, and noted that ten-year olds in the West were far more

⁹² *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 10 (Oct., 1903) "Jiaoyu," 1-7. The authors of this article argued that Poland and India had both lost their independence because of faulty educational systems. They hoped that their countrymen would emulate Mazzini in unifying China and expelling alien races, and that they would be fortified with the spirit of blood and iron in order to avoid the fate of the people of the Philippines and the Transvaal.

familiar with modern subjects such as geography, biology and astronomy than even progressive grown-ups in China.

In Chen's opinion, both the form and the content of Chinese education had to be changed. So did the instructors themselves. Generalizing from what he knew of small town Chinese academies, he wrote: "There are two types of teachers, one who never asks any questions of the students and does not seem to care whether the students study or recite well." This sort of teacher merely "begs and cajoles friends into sending over small clumps of kids to earn some money." The other type of teacher, "whom everyone praises," never leaves the school. "With a dark face, a frown and staring eyes, as if he were the devil himself, he slaps the kids with his five inch stick, telling them to 'hurry up' and 'hurry up!' The scared and confused kids mumble without knowing right from wrong . . . and the evil teacher, without warning and at the slightest mistake, slams down the stick, not caring whether he hurts their body or their brain . . ." ⁹³

In addition to arguing for better teachers, Chen advocated cleaner classrooms, textbooks that were both age- and content- appropriate, and the regular use of a written form of the national language, or *guoyu*. ⁹⁴ *Guoyu* was a type of vernacular speech (*baihua*), also known as "official speech (*guanhua*), which was commonly used by people across the country, a *lingua franca*. In earlier days, when newspapers began to convert from classical Chinese to the vernacular, editors justified their "dumbing down" of the written language by euphemistically calling the vernacular style "abridged speech" (*jianshuo*). ⁹⁵ But there was no need for euphemisms now. The simple fact was that textbooks had to be written in the national language in order to standardize educational

⁹³ ASB, no.1 (Mar. 1, 1904), 23-4.

⁹⁴ ASB, no. 3, "Guoyu jiaoyu" (April 1, 1904), 19-20.

⁹⁵ Tan Bi'an, *Wanqing de baihua wen yundong*, 13.

curriculum across the country.⁹⁶ In an effort to put his proposals in comparative perspective, and to show that rapid educational progress could in fact be made, Chen examined the curriculum of elementary schools in Russia, where he discovered, despite that country's late start, that it was able to create 78,699 elementary schools with 75% women teachers and a total of 4,203,246 students.⁹⁷

At this stage in his intellectual development, Chen still saw value in the basic moral teachings of Confucianism. In "An Explanation of the Lessons of Master Wang Yangming [1472-1529]," he pointed out that Wang--a famous exponent of the Neo-Confucian School of the Mind (*Xinxue*), which was harshly critical of the scholastic emphasis of Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucian orthodoxy and emphasized the discovery of one's own "innately good mind [*liangxin*]--strongly believed that the Chinese education system in late imperial times had distorted the original teachings of the Master. Instead of developing the eight virtues of filial piety, brotherly love, loyalty, trust, propriety, fairness, integrity and honesty (*xiao, di, zhong, xin, li, yi, lian, chi*), latter day scholars focused their attention on passing the civil service examinations and becoming officials.⁹⁸

Thus, although Chen urged that primary schools in China emulate foreign schools by providing music and physical education classes, in order to nurture the playfulness and creativity of young children, he also felt that students still needed to be trained in certain subjects that Confucius valued, including poetry and ritual. What children certainly did not need, in Chen's opinion, was an education system like the one too many Chinese elementary students still had to endure--one in which the focus was on essay composition,

⁹⁶ ASB, no. 3 (April 1, 1904), 19-20.

⁹⁷ ASB, no. 18, "Jiaoyu" (Nov. 15, 1904, published April, 1905), 1-4.

⁹⁸ Cf. Liang Qichao's belief that Confucianism would always have a place in the world. Although Liang, unlike Kang Youwei, did not see Confucian teachings as a religion, he believed that they would always be relevant to moral life, philosophy and political theory. SLXJ, vol. 1a, 163-172.

where there was no emphasis on character training, and children were harshly disciplined, verbally abused and sometimes literally tied up with rope. In Chen's words, such children felt that "their schools were prisons and their teachers were enemies). Students naturally could not benefit from such circumstances, he said. Rather, they would "lose all sense of shame and honesty," and instead develop "a base, conniving, crude, and shameless character."⁹⁹

Chen did not develop a systematic plan for reforming the Chinese educational system in the ASB. At this stage, Chen seemed more intent on broadening his readers' horizons than on discussing specific institutional changes. Thus, he gladly placed an advertisement by the Anhui Co-provincial Association in Tokyo that encouraged students to study abroad, and he also printed a news item commenting on how few Anhui provincial students applied to study in the capital of Beijing.¹⁰⁰ In an effort to recruit students to the progressive Anhui Public School (see Chapter 4), he published the curriculum of the school as a form of advertising.¹⁰¹

Perhaps because the readership of the ASB included a number of people with comparatively little formal education, and also because so few of his countrymen had even the most rudimentary knowledge of hygiene, Chen placed a great deal of emphasis on early child-rearing practices as well as the reform of elementary education. In fact, he allocated space in eight issues of the ASB for contributors to write about basic hygiene in the home. These authors advised Chinese mothers to become knowledgeable about how and what to feed a baby, and also to teach their children about the need to brush their teeth, get plenty of exercise, and drink milk. Readers were also told to take cold baths, to

⁹⁹ ASB, no. 14 (Sept. 15, 1904), 11-14; no. 16, "Jiaoyu" (Oct. 15, 1904, published Feb. 1905), 1-5.

¹⁰⁰ ASB, no. 8 (June 15, 1904), 8; no. 14 (Sept. 15, 1904), backpage.

¹⁰¹ ASB, no. 17, "Supplement" (Nov. 1, 1904, published Mar., 1905), 4.

maintain good posture, and not to walk too fast.¹⁰² One ASB writer indicated that in his opinion five- or six-year olds should not drink liquor or smoke.¹⁰³

Although the ASB gave comparatively little attention to post-elementary education during its brief run, many other Chinese publications of the early 1900s explored it in depth and at length. Education was a popular and safe subject for reformers and revolutionaries alike, and so discussions about revamping the Chinese educational system were both imaginative and informative.

To most reform-minded individuals of the time, Western knowledge was critical to China's "modern" transformation, however modernity might have been construed. But disagreement naturally existed on how much Western knowledge China needed and how best to inculcate it. In 1902, the translator Yan Fu, had already put forward the radical proposal that in order to expedite the absorption of Western knowledge, high school students in China should be instructed solely in a foreign language, and that 70% of the homework they were assigned should be written in the foreign language.¹⁰⁴ The writers of *Dalu* (The Continent) argued in 1903 that it was necessary for the Chinese to adopt Western philosophy, which they saw as the underpinning of Western science.¹⁰⁵

In 1903 the *Tides of Zhejiang* published an article comparing "Anglo-Saxon Education" with the Chinese system, and found several differences that contributed to the superiority of education in Britain and the United States.¹⁰⁶ In the first place, according

¹⁰² ASB, no. 8, (June 15, 1904), 21; no. 9 (July 1, 1904), 15-18; no. 10 (June 15, 1904), 35-40; no. 11 (Aug. 1, 1904), 21-22; no. 12 (Aug. 15, 1904), 27-30; no. 13 (Sept. 1, 1904), 21-24; no. 15 (Oct. 1, 1904), 25-8.

¹⁰³ ASB, no. 6 (May 15, 1904), 25-28; no. 7 (June 1, 1904), 24; no. 9 (July 1, 1904), 19-20.

¹⁰⁴ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 112.

¹⁰⁵ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 413-415.

¹⁰⁶ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 1, "Jiaoyu" (Jan., 1903), 1-7; no. 4, "Jiaoyu" (April, 1903), 9-16. To emphasize the interaction between schooling and society, the *Tides of Zhejiang* introduced John Dewey's educational philosophy to its readers. As a means to explain Dewey's thesis that education is life, they published

to the author, Anglo-Saxon parents did not consider children to be their possessions; instead, children were taught to be patriotic citizens first and foremost. A corollary was that Anglo-Saxon parents seldom gave orders to their children, preferring instead simply to give them advice.¹⁰⁷ Also, Anglo-Saxon parents taught children to take responsibility for themselves and to engage in social activities at an early age.

Such children were expected to think of the future and not of the past, and to find useful and pragmatic occupations once they became adults. No job was considered too menial. And since children were aware that their parents would not provide for them financially as adults, they learned to become self-sufficient at an early age. The alleged result of European and American child-rearing practices was that Anglo-Saxons were a “happy race,” who harbored an image of a utopian society in their hearts, and were thus able to tackle each challenge with confidence and hope.¹⁰⁸ This idealistic interpretation of the Other’s education reflected the author’s opinion that the Chinese educational system produced selfish and weak-willed adults.¹⁰⁹

Economic Development

Resistance to imperialism remained a major motive behind proposals to develop the Chinese economy. For instance, the Hunan student publication, *Collection of Translations of Studies Abroad*, in reporting that the Japanese media had urged the Japanese government to acquire its share of Chinese railways in order to gain a firmer

Dewey’s diagram showing the school at the center of a square, with links to the four sides representing job, family, village, and research institution.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 6 (June, 1903), “Jiaoyu,” 18-19.

foothold on the mainland, argued that the only way for China to counter such encroachments was to develop its own economy and especially its industry.¹¹⁰ Yet change came slowly for a variety of reasons.

Part of the problem lay in the rural sector, where approximately 80% of the Chinese population lived and worked. In this essentially subsistence economy, taxes and rents were high, natural disasters were frequent, and remedies were few. In Anhui province, land ownership was reportedly concentrated in the hands of six large clans, with Li Hongzhang's family the wealthiest of them all.¹¹¹ Although a 1905 survey found that 59.5% of Anhui farmers were self-sufficient, 22.6% were semi-tenants, and 17.9% were tenant farmers¹¹²--a rather favorable ratio compared to several other provinces of China at the time--the situation in the countryside was still often dire. In the four years previous to the survey, for example, up to forty-four counties (out of fifty-one in the province) suffered natural disasters, ranging from floods and droughts to wind storms and locust invasions.¹¹³ Adding to the people's misery, in 1901 the Qing government had imposed extra taxes across the province to meet the fiscal demands of the Boxer Indemnity.¹¹⁴ From 1896 to 1905, in the wake of severe flooding and drought, protests against rent and tax increases erupted with annual regularity in several counties of Anhui province, including Wuhu.¹¹⁵

Despite such circumstances, virtually all reformers and revolutionaries, including Sun Yat-sen, focused their attention primarily on the urban sector, apparently believing

¹¹⁰ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 380.

¹¹¹ AGS, 26.

¹¹² AGS, 29.

¹¹³ AQZ, vol. 6, 47.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., vol. 6, 45.

¹¹⁵ AGS, 52.

that China's difficulties were not too pressing in the agrarian sector.¹¹⁶ A partial exception to this general neglect of the countryside in the writings of the time was an occasional article on a rural activity such as silkworm farming. The ASB, for example, reprinted articles from the *Zhongguo baihua bao* (China Vernacular Paper) describing the intricate steps involved in raising silkworms and harvesting silk. One ASB author claimed that he had actually observed silkworm farmers for several years and had visited the Hangzhou Westlake Silkworm Study Institute before filing his report.¹¹⁷

As for the articles that focused on the Chinese urban economy, there was a woeful ignorance on the part of most literati journalists regarding the capitalist foundations and commercial development of the major industrialized nations. This apparent lack of interest in commercial matters may reflect in part the long-standing bias of most Chinese scholars against the merchant class--a prejudice with decidedly detrimental effects, and one that had to be overcome if China sought to compete in the global marketplace.

Chen Duxiu shared this general prejudice, but it did not keep him from investigating at least some dimensions of commercial life. As the co-editor of the *Citizen's Daily*, he devoted a special section entirely to business issues, and published a variety of articles on trade and different types of agricultural and industrial production in China. His writers discussed, for example, the display of Chinese goods at the Osaka World Exposition of 1903,¹¹⁸ and they reported on the development of the lumber industry along the Yalu River. They covered the drop in the volume of exports in Shanghai that year, as well as the heavy export of tea to Russia from the city of

¹¹⁶ Mary Wright, *China in Revolution*, 464.

¹¹⁷ ASB, no. 1 (Mar. 1, 1904), 25-27; no. 11 (Aug. 1, 1904), 11-14.

¹¹⁸ CCD, no. 1, 0221-0225.

Hankou.¹¹⁹ The brisk sale of tea to the Russians in a year when anti-Russian sentiment was at its height reflected the complexity of the interaction between China and the foreign powers.¹²⁰

In his ASB essay "On a Dying Nation," discussed above, Chen published statistics for imported goods and contrasted them with figures for Chinese exports from 1894 to 1899. By his calculations, China had incurred a trade deficit of 223,795,970 taels of silver during these five years.¹²¹ Chen admitted that part of the problem was what he described as the "reality" that "Western goods are better than Chinese goods; for example, [with respect to] Western cloth, matches, soaps, candles, needles, nails, paper and such things, is there anyone [in China] who doesn't like to use them?"¹²² But instead of improving Chinese products, Chen complained, Chinese entrepreneurs knew only to "buy land, build houses, open stores and purchase offices," and scholars knew only to "teach, find jobs, write essays and sit for the civil service exams." No one in China, he lamented, was focusing on manufacturing; "the whole nation [is] in a coma . . ."¹²³

In an effort to raise the consciousness of his countrymen, Chen published an article explaining how paper could be made from straw, and how bleach could be produced from quick lime and caustic soda. But his larger and more fundamental point was clearly that China needed to set up factories and technical schools to promote industry.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ CCD, no. 1, 0226-0233. In this article the *Citizen's Daily* writers warned of the negative effects on the Chinese economy that would attend the completion of the Trans-Siberian railroad.

¹²⁰ *Guomin riri bao* (Citizen's Daily) (CD), no. 56 (Aug. 1903), 268-269.

¹²¹ ASB, no. 13 (Sep. 1, 1904), 2.

¹²² ASB, no. 13 (Sep. 1, 1904), 1.

¹²³ ASB, no. 13 (Sep. 1, 1904), 4.

¹²⁴ ASB, no. 19, "Shiye" (May 15, 1905), 1-6; SLXJ, vol. 1b, 882-886, 890-892.

The highly regarded Zhejiang provincial student magazine, the *Tides of Zhejiang*, published a number of important articles on economic issues. More intent on introducing a larger conceptual economic framework to their readers than on providing the specifics of silkworm-raising or tea shipments, the paper discussed relatively sophisticated issues, introducing new concepts and new terminology in the process. In an article on China's currency flow, for example, the author explained that every economic activity, whether shipping, manufacturing, or agriculture, depended on the strength of silver and gold currency in the country.¹²⁵ In comparing Western-style banks to traditional Chinese money shops, the article pointed out that the larger monetary reserves and tighter regulations of Western-style banks gave them much more credibility.¹²⁶ Such banks were also able to offer many more transactional choices. It was in this context that the writer introduced several new terms that had been translated directly from English, including "deposit," "current account," "check," and "discount."

In an effort to persuade readers of the importance of switching to a new banking system, the *Tides of Zhejiang* described Japan's attempts to adopt Western banking practices after Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi's investigation of American banks in the United States in 1900. Japan, the article noted, made the conversion to a unified currency system via several complicated steps, involving the creation of a central bank, the issuance of government bonds, silver-backed legal tender and strict legislation to maintain the central government's control of gold and silver reserves.¹²⁷

This sort of banking system was entirely out of China's reach in the early 1900s. A brief look at the ASB's coverage of certain financially related facets of the New

¹²⁵ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 3 (Mar. 1903), "Jingji," 1-10.

¹²⁶ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 5 (May, 1903), "Shiye," 1-10.

¹²⁷ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 7 (July, 1903), "Shiye," 1-13.

Policies (see also Chapter 4) will indicate some of the reasons why. On May 14, 1904, the Qing government issued a edict ordering all provincial governors to submit an end-of-the-year report on the name and tenure of each subordinate official down to the prefectural level, and the total amount of revenue collected in their district. In addition the court required each governor to provide information on the number of crimes committed, the number of lawsuits filed, the number of prisoners incarcerated, and the number of schools created.¹²⁸ The next month, the government ordered that each governor submit a separate report on the estimated and actual taxes collected as well as a detailed account of the various amounts of rice collected. This financial information was to be published in the official gazette, and any false accounting would be severely punished.¹²⁹

Follow-up reports in the ASB indicate some of the ad hoc financial strategies adopted by the cash-strapped Qing government. One was to send Vice Minister Tieliang to press the Shanghai Arsenal into contributing 800,000 taels of silver to pay the army, and then to have him solicit additional funds from the cities of Suzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Anqing, and elsewhere.¹³⁰ Historically, this sort of bureaucratic coercion was commonplace, especially in periods of dynastic decline. A proposal by the President of the Board of Revenue and approvingly reported by the ASB, was to create a lottery, modeled on a "European and American method of borrowing money from the people," which involved the issuing of 1,000,000,000 tickets at ten silver dollars apiece, setting

¹²⁸ ASB, no. 7 (June 1, 1904), 8. The governors were also required to indicate the degree of their compliance with the New Policy directives.

¹²⁹ ASB, no. 8 (June 15, 1904), 6.

¹³⁰ ASB, no. 12 (Aug. 15, 1904), 9.

aside \$100,000,000 as prize money.¹³¹ In the next issue of the ASB, published in November 1905, readers learned that the lottery idea had been nipped in the bud by the foreign powers, who were concerned that their own citizens would buy tickets, thus inadvertently filling the Qing coffers. The next plan of the President of the Board of Revenue was to consider taxing opium, which had proven to be a lucrative source of income for the Japanese colonial government on Taiwan.¹³²

In December, the ASB learned that the Shanghai Customs office had telegraphed the Foreign Ministry with the news that the Qing government owed ten million British pounds of indemnity payments to various nations. Naturally the financially strapped court had to seek assistance from the provinces: Anhui was asked to put up 500,000 taels of silver to offset the debt, and the Wuhu Customs administration was expected to contribute an additional 100,000 taels.¹³³ The ASB also reported that the foreign nations demanded the indemnity be paid in gold, which meant that the Qing government would owe an additional 10,000,000 taels of silver to compensate for the difference between the price of silver and the price of gold in the three years since the indemnity payments had begun.¹³⁴

Rights Recovery

China also needed revenue for the building and recovery of railroads and mines. The development of railways in early twentieth China was a particularly volatile issue,

¹³¹ ASB, no. 16, "Current events" (Oct. 15, 1904, published Feb. 1905), 1.

¹³² ASB, no. 17, "Current events" (Nov. 1, 1904, published Mar., 1905), 2.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³⁴ ASB, no. 16, "Current events" (Oct. 15, 1904, published Feb. 1905), 2.

with important political and economic implications for all parties, from the Qing central government to local officials, gentry and merchants. Since a more detailed analysis of railway questions follows in the next chapter, our concern here will be primarily with mines. But as with most matters covered by the ASB and other publications up to 1905, mines and railways were closely connected to each other, and, of course, to imperialism.

Chen published about twenty articles on the subject of rights recovery in the twenty-two editions of the ASB. Three articles in particular reveal his clear thoughts and powerful feelings. In the first two issues, Chen editorialized on the "Inside Story of the Sale of All of Anhui's Mines,"¹³⁵ and in the ninth issue he published a related article, "Warning: Crisis in the Yangzi River, Fatal Blow to Anhui Province."¹³⁶

Noting that foreign control of Chinese mines would inevitably involve the building of railroads and thus ever greater foreign influence, Chen warned his co-provincials to form their own mining companies and to pressure the Chinese authorities in Anhui into refusing to sell mining rights to foreigners. Chen encouraged action saying, "With 30 million of us in the province . . . even if only the powerful men would pitch in fifty cents each, we would have three million dollars, [so] how can we say that we are poor? The mines of our province have to do with the sons and grandchildren of our province . . ."¹³⁷ He conducted a survey of twenty Anhui mines, and found that seventeen were either co-owned or owned outright by foreign concerns. He noted with anguish that villagers would allow a mine to be opened even if it violated their belief in "[the spirits of] wind and water" (*fengshui*) as long as a foreign company was involved.

¹³⁵ ASB, no. 1 (Mar. 1, 1904), 17-18; no. 2 (Mar. 15, 1904), 1-6.

¹³⁶ ASB, no. 9 (July 1, 1904), 1-4.

¹³⁷ ASB, no. 2 (Mar. 15, 1904), 6.

As a result, he argued, Chinese mine owners needed to front their own businesses with foreigners.¹³⁸

Of particular interest to Chen was the Tongling shan copper mine in Anhui, which held vast reserves of copper. He deplored the fact that earlier Chinese excavations of the mining area stopped after the surface supply had been exhausted, simply because China lacked the technological resources to dig deeper into the earth; and he reported that foreigners often laughed at the Chinese for having mines and not fully exploiting them, just like a miser who buries his money only to have others spend it.¹³⁹

Chen's greatest fear was that the abundant resources of the Tongling shan mine would attract not only the British, who controlled it at the time, but also American and German merchants, and as they built railways and docks and established their territorial claims, the people of Anhui province would become their subjects. Chen found it particularly irksome that the Anhui provincial government was willing to allow foreign merchants like Sir John Kaye, to ignore expiration dates for his leases on Anhui mines.¹⁴⁰ "Alas," wrote one ASB writer, "the white race is the race of annihilation; on the surface they use soldiers and on the inside they use merchants. The British destroyed India not with the British army and navy, but with the British East India Company."¹⁴¹

In "On a Dying Nation," Chen listed fourteen of the most famous mines from Shanxi to Yunnan, and found that all of them were owned and operated by foreign powers. The British had six mines, the lion's share, and they enjoyed monopoly rights for fifty years or more, which naturally prevented any other parties from operating in

¹³⁸ ASB, no. 2 (Mar. 15, 1904), 25-6.

¹³⁹ ASB, no. 20, "On evil customs" (May 15, 1905), 5.

¹⁴⁰ ASB, no. 9, "Jinggao" (July 1, 1904), 1-4.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

these areas. The rest of the mines belonged to France, Italy, Spain and Brazil; their monopolies were good for from thirty to fifty years. Chen's survey was accompanied by the unsettling revelation that Chinese officials and gentry who facilitated deals with foreigners were personally rewarded with 100,000 taels of silver.¹⁴² News that the Russian government was approaching the magistrate of Xinjiang about leasing oil and coal fields in Xinjiang and Mongolia, as well as reports that Beijing had granted permission for Germany to excavate various mines in a two hundred kilometer area near Huayi county, further alarmed ASB readers.¹⁴³

Lest the public despair of any hope for reclaiming mining rights, Chen culled upbeat news from various papers and the correspondence of friends to report on instances in which gentry and/or merchants were able to operate their own mines. Some Sichuan mines, the ASB reported, were now back in Chinese hands,¹⁴⁴ and at home, in Anhui province, the Japanese owners of the Xuan county mines had defaulted on their payments, paving the way for Chinese merchants to take possession of them.¹⁴⁵ The Anhui business community then selected an official who had experience supervising gold mines in the Northeast to head their private mining effort, and the ASB advertised and provided office space for the sale of shares in a Chinese-owned coal mine.¹⁴⁶ But alas for Chen Duxiu, the Tongling shan mines did not return to Chinese ownership until the end of the decade.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² ASB, no. 10 (June 15, 1904), 4.

¹⁴³ ASB, no. 20/21, "Important May news" (Aug. 15, 1905), 3; no. 19, "Current events" (May 1, 1905), 1.

¹⁴⁴ ASB, no. 20/21, "Current events," 3; no. 15, "Current events," 8.

¹⁴⁵ ASB, no. 8 (June 15, 1904), 7.

¹⁴⁶ ASB, no. 7 (June 1, 1904), 9; no. 17, "Supplement" (Nov. 1, 1904, published Mar., 1905), 5.

¹⁴⁷ Wang Xianming and Shi Chunfeng, 22.

Playing It Safe

By definition, most reform proposals of the late Qing era amounted to a critique of the Qing government, including, of course, the ones described in the preceding sections. But some critiques were more or less direct than others. In the subsections below, I offer some additional examples of the ways that Chen Duxiu and his journalistic colleagues and friends approached questions of political and social change in the period from 1904-1905.

The Politics of Indirection

Generally speaking, the ASB refrained from outright attacks on the Qing government. The reasons are understandable. In the first place, the paper's financial backer, Hu Zicheng, had warned Chen against it. Second, as we have already seen, the ASB was temporarily shut down twice for irritating the provincial authorities in Anhui. Chen's strategy was thus to explain than to admonish or exhort. Still, as Cai Yuanpei perceptively understood, the revolutionary implications of what Chen and his associates wrote about in the ASB lay just below the surface.¹⁴⁸

One common rhetorical device for the writers of the ASB and other journalists of the time was the comparative essay, in which two or more countries or civilizations were contrasted. In earlier chapters and above we have seen this technique employed with particular effect in discussions of military spirit, childhood socialization and other culturally oriented topics in the societies of China, Japan, Europe and America.

¹⁴⁸ Ding Miaomiao, 4.

Sometimes this kind of essay might also draw comparisons between the past and the present.

This strategy also applied to writing about politics. An early example is Liang Qichao's famous 1901 essay in which he compared "old" and "new" political beliefs and practices in Europe with those of China. In this essay, Liang explained that the rulers of early Europe claimed their authority from the spiritual and religious realms (for instance, the idea of the "divine right" of kings), and the rights and privileges of the people differed according to their status. But in recent times, he pointed out, the power of the ruler in Europe was derived from a contract with his subjects, and all people were equally subject to the same laws, including the ruler. The Chinese, however, still saw their emperor as having received his "mandate" to rule from Heaven itself, and the people were still viewed as having no individual rights. The Qing legal code distinguished between classes, and the ruler remained above the law.¹⁴⁹

In a sophisticated analysis of European history offered two years later, the *New People's Miscellany* declared that the three "big" concepts in contemporary Europe were the rights conferred on the majority of the citizens, the rights of the taxpayers, and the racial unity of each country. To support his point, the author referred to the histories of the French Revolution, the American Revolution, the unification of Italy, and the federation of Germany. He also mentioned the failure of Hungary's bid for independence and Ireland's failure to obtain self-rule.¹⁵⁰

Aside from a few broad general discussions, the ASB ignored the topic of political activism--in part, no doubt, for fear of inviting unwanted attention from the Qing

¹⁴⁹ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 26-32.

¹⁵⁰ SLXJ, vol. 1a, 343.

authorities. Yet the topic was clearly growing ever more relevant to Chinese life, both at home and abroad. From the Resist-Russia movement in 1903 to the Anti-America boycott and the rights recovery efforts of 1904-05, Chinese intellectuals (and others) became ever more inclined toward political activism and ever more interested in the theories that supported and/or justified it. It is no accident that during Chen Duxiu's tenure as editor of the ASB he spent several months in 1904 learning to make bombs with the Shanghai Assassination Squad, an offshoot of the Tokyo Military Citizen's Education Society that later became known as the Patriotic Association (see Chapter 4).¹⁵¹

In the early 1900s, publications such as the *Tides of Zhejiang* began to discuss philosophies such as communism and various kinds of socialism, including anarchism, or "extreme democracy."¹⁵² Information about the activities of the Russian *narodniki*, or populist revolutionaries, and their newly formed Social Revolutionary Party, fired the imagination of radically inclined Chinese intellectuals, especially overseas students, who reported on the *narodniki*'s role in the assassination of Russian officials and their work with the labor movement.

Meanwhile, Japanese authors such as Kemuyama Sentaro (1877-1954) began translating texts on the 1905 Russian revolution and on anarchism into Japanese. Kemuyama's *A History of the Russian Revolutionary Struggle* identified Herzen, Chernyshevsky, and Bakunin as revolutionaries who resorted to violence and destruction in order to achieve the goals of liberty and equality.¹⁵³ In 1905, Kemuyama's work inspired part of the Chinese novel *Niehai hua* (1905), written by Zeng Pu (1872-1935) as

¹⁵¹ ZL, 70.

¹⁵² According to Martin Bernal, the years from 1905 to 1906 witnessed the greatest interest in Marxism and other forms of socialism among Chinese intellectuals until the New Culture Movement.

¹⁵³ Bernal, 100. The students identified Babeuf and Marx as proponents of communism, and Proudhon and Bakunin as champions of anarchism.

well as an unfinished work by Luo Pu (pen name Lingnan yuyi nüshi) called *Dong'ou nühaojie* (Heroines of Eastern Europe).¹⁵⁴ Chen Duxiu, for his part, mentioned the Russian Nihilists in his unfinished novella, *Heitian guo* (Black Sky Country), which was published in the ASB in 1905.

Black Sky Country was a double-entendre, describing on the one hand the harsh treatment in Siberia of ordinary Russians who criticized the government, and serving as a veiled critique of the Qing on the other: "It seemed," Chen wrote, "that Russia was also a dictatorship, where power was only in the hands of the ruler and the aristocracy, where punishments were severe and the taxes were burdensome."¹⁵⁵ Chen apparently planned to have his protagonist, named Proud and Heroic (*Ronghao*), bring about an insurrection, but the novel abruptly stopped when the paper was suspended for three months in October, 1904.

Other politically oriented literary works appeared in the ASB. A novel, serialized in eight issues of the paper, was cleverly titled "A Madman Narrating his Dream," in which the author, Wu Shouyi, created two characters whom he dubbed "madmen," each of whom offered suggestions on how to reform China. Structured as an explanation of a dream, the novel touched on the grave issues facing China, from the Russian encroachment on Manchuria, to the foreign possession of mines and railroads, to the demand of the people for a constitutional form of government. The protagonists were a Madman from the South, described as a twenty-fifth generation descendant of the Song Confucian master, Zhu Xi, and a Madman from the North, a seventy-second generation

¹⁵⁴ Don Price, *Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution*, 122. See an explanation of Luo Pu's book in David Der Wei Wang, *Fin-de-Siècle Splendor: Modernities of Late Qing Fiction, 1849-1911* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

¹⁵⁵ ASB, no. 11 (Aug. 1, 1904), 23.

descendant of Min Zijian, a disciple of Confucius. The two became each other's soul mate because each of them rejected the civil service examination system in order to save China.

The Madman from the South feels that China can only be saved if it enters into an alliance with Japan, England and the United States to expel Russia from Manchuria. He calls for the creation of a national assembly, popular elections, the unification of the school system, mandatory public education, universal conscription, the development of agriculture, commerce, industry and mining, the overhaul of the legal system and the cancellation of extraterritoriality.¹⁵⁶ In a dream he meets a comely heroine who demonstrates that a woman can fight as well as any man. He also explains Bismarck's concept of iron and blood in terms of the need to develop martial skills, survive hardship and not to fear death.¹⁵⁷ Other acquaintances of the madman in the novel indicate their familiarity with the Russian Nihilists. For instance, one character says, "it turns that these Nihilists were Russians who, because of the wanton behavior of their government, killing people at will and taxing people at will . . . were forced to conduct assassinations [themselves], ambushing a ruler today, killing a lord tomorrow, in an attempt to reform the government."¹⁵⁸ The novel also told of the suffering of the Jewish people under czarist Russian occupation, and the need to avenge the deaths of 6,000 Chinese who were drowned by the Russians in the Amur River.¹⁵⁹

The ASB also used Chinese opera as a satiric vehicle. The object of the satire was the powerful eunuch Li Lianying, whose influence over the Empress Dowager Cixi

¹⁵⁶ ASB, no. 2 (Mar. 15, 1904), 28.

¹⁵⁷ ASB, no. 4 (April 15, 1904), 22.

¹⁵⁸ ASB, no. 9 (July 1, 1904), 29.

¹⁵⁹ ASB, no. 7 (June 1, 1904), 29; no. 9 (July 1, 1904), 30; no. 16, "Novel" (Oct. 15, 1904, published Feb. 1905), 4-5.

was legendary. The eunuch in the opera says, "I was sold into the court . . . and have become a favorite of the ruler . . . Don't you see that in this court full of big and small officials, everyone is a godson of mine! I abhor these so-called "reformers" today, who say that every person in the country has a right to interfere in government, and who want to keep us eunuchs from taking power and running the show . . . "160 Veiled attacks on the Manchu aristocracy and their mistreatment of Chinese subjects were also couched in lyrics sung to a popular ballad, titled "Freedom Flower." They told the story of despotic Mongolian rulers and evil mandarins in the Yuan dynasty, who framed and murdered loyal Han officials.¹⁶¹

The Vagaries of Late Qing Social Reform

In 1904, a woman's publication, *Women's World* (Nuzi shijie), stated that the twentieth century was the time for a revolution in women's rights, emphasizing that women needed to gain knowledge, socialize outside the home, and learn to conduct business. They also needed to have freedom of movement and the right to choose their own marriage partners. Listing ten reasons why an uneducated woman was a detriment not only to herself and her family but also to society and to the nation, the *Women's World* article warned that only by respecting women's rights and educating them could a nation become strong. Educating women would ultimately be good for the nation because informed mothers would help to create better citizens.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ ASB, no. 3 (April 1, 1904), 29.

¹⁶¹ ASB, no. 19, "Novel" (May 1, 1905), 1-8; no. 20, "Novel" (May 15, 1905), 1-8.

¹⁶² SLXJ, vol. 1b, 926-932.

Naturally, *Women's World* and a number of other "progressive" publications of the time, including the ASB, denounced the crippling practice of foot-binding, even though it had been officially outlawed by the Qing government in 1902. In an investigative report on the formation of the "Hangzhou Foot-unbinding Society," the *Tides of Zhejiang* reported in 1903 that the founder of the Society, Mrs. Jin, felt it was necessary not only for young Chinese women not to bind their feet, but also for older women to unbind their feet. By doing so, she argued, the older women would reassure young mothers that it was all right not to bind the feet of their daughters. According to Mrs. Jin, unbinding women's feet was the first step into a "new world;" the next step was to promote women's education by founding new schools for women.¹⁶³

Chinese women were also urged to play new political roles. For instance, since they used so many American products, including soap, perfume and make-up, the *Women's World* called upon them to join the 1905 boycott against American goods, suggesting that women set up headquarters in Shanghai, investigate the market and learn to manufacture these products themselves. The paper called the boycott a great opportunity to advance women's rights, a gesture that emulated American behavior while boycotting American goods.¹⁶⁴

Somewhat surprisingly, women's issues did not receive a great deal of coverage in the ASB. On one level, Chen Duxiu, like many "progressive" intellectuals of his time, was sympathetic to the plight of women; he felt that they should be educated and that they should enjoy equal rights with men. He also deplored many of the gender-related popular customs that surrounded "traditional" marriages, from negotiations over the size

¹⁶³ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 2, 173-6.

¹⁶⁴ SLXJ, vol. 2a, 30.

of the dowry to the ritualized teasing of newlyweds, which involved raucous behavior on the part of men, who made lewd remarks that debased and embarrassed the wife.¹⁶⁵ The manner in which Chen treated his own wives, however, showed him to be hypocritical. He abandoned his first wife and their four children to marry his wife's stepsister, and then left his second wife dying and destitute while he studied abroad.

At times, Chen seems to have believed that to a certain degree women perpetuated their own misery, binding their feet, adorning themselves with bracelets that weighed down their arms, and wearing earrings that rotted their ears. Chen abhorred the practices by which women slapped themselves to bring a pink flush to their cheeks and applied lead-laced rouge powder to their faces.¹⁶⁶ Scolding women for their vanity, the ASB printed an illustration titled "National Shame," which depicted a Southern woman with bound feet about to be assaulted by a foreign soldier, while a Northern woman with "large" feet escaped.¹⁶⁷ In a poem titled "Advice to women," one anonymous author of the ASB urged women not to be gluttonous or to admire pretty clothes, but rather to be diligent and frugal in order to earn the praise of her in-laws and her husband.¹⁶⁸

To be sure, the ASB promoted some progressive policies, but at times in rather condescending ways. It announced, for example, the formation of an anti-footbinding society in Tongcheng and urged women to attend school.¹⁶⁹ The author's argument was that women needed to be educated because as the teachers of their children they were also the mothers of their country. But he then employed a somewhat dubious cross-cultural comparison, arguing on no apparent authority that Chinese women had a certain

¹⁶⁵ ASB, no.4 (April 15, 1904), 4.

¹⁶⁶ ASB, no.12 (Aug. 15, 1904), 1-4.

¹⁶⁷ ASB, no. 13 (Sep. 1, 1904), inside cover.

¹⁶⁸ ASB, no. 18, "Poetry" (Nov. 15, 1904, published April, 1905), 1.

¹⁶⁹ ASB, no. 4 (April 15, 1904), 35-40.

physical and psychological power over their husbands that Western women lacked--namely, the ability to inspire fear in their spouses by wringing their ears and forcing them to kneel in repentance.

What made this argument peculiar is that the author went on to assert that Chinese men were only indulging their wives in such instances, regarding them as immature playthings. Furthermore, he claimed that women agreed with this assessment. His conclusion, then, was that Chinese women required practical, moral and physical education so that they would be able manage their homes, set the proper moral tone, safeguard the hygiene of the family, and take care of its finances.¹⁷⁰ In the last issue of ASB, this same author offered Chinese women basic child-rearing advice predicated on Western practice, urging that infants be taken out for fresh air and that children observe oral hygiene and be vaccinated against smallpox. The author explained that “the inoculation method from overseas safely allows the exodus of evil energy (*qi*),” so that the Chinese people no longer had to suffer from outbreaks of smallpox.¹⁷¹

Other Chinese publications of the early twentieth century approached women’s issues from a variety of perspectives. In the minds of many contemporary Chinese intellectuals, including Chen Duxiu himself, the real cause of so many of China’s political and social woes was the old-style family system, which stifled women and preoccupied men. The *Jiangsu* magazine, for example, published an article in 1904 that denounced the Chinese family as the root of all China’s social problems. Comparing China with Europe, where “even women, children and servants know politics,” the author maintained that Chinese family protocols were so complicated and restrictive that they

¹⁷⁰ ASB, no. 20, “Education” (May 15, 1905), 1-6.

¹⁷¹ ASB, no. 21/22, “Education” (Aug. 15, 1905), 4.

did not allow people to have any concerns outside of the family itself. Pointing out that clan rules, funerary, celebratory and worshipping rituals, methods of honoring spirits and of teaching filial piety were so numerous and well-developed in China that “people had no business outside the family . . . and no society outside the family.”¹⁷² In order to bring about a political revolution in China, the author argued, there first had to be a family revolution.¹⁷³

Like Chen Duxiu, a number of authors deplored the preoccupation with dowries and with elaborate marriage ceremonies that proved to be such a drain on energy and resources in China.¹⁷⁴ According to an article in the *Citizen's Daily*, the so-called Chinese “social contract” system was manipulated by a despot and his thieving subjects, enslaving citizens and especially robbing 200 million women of their freedom.¹⁷⁵

But there were also more encouraging stories to tell. For example, Chinese readers learned of the rapid gains of the German Social Democrats in the 1903 elections, which had led to the enlightened policy of allocating one vote for each person, regardless of gender. In addition, the Social Democrats mandated legal equality for both men and women.¹⁷⁶ The *Tides of Zhejiang*, for its part, reported on an inspiring survey of *Who's Who in America* (1901), which revealed that American women were prominently listed as authors, artists, scientists and lawyers, among other occupations, and that their average age was only fifty.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² SLXJ, vol. 1b, 834.

¹⁷³ SLXJ, vol. 1b, 835.

¹⁷⁴ SLXJ, vol. 1b, 858.

¹⁷⁵ CCD, no. 1, 0017, 0032.

¹⁷⁶ CCD, no.1, 0183-0184.

¹⁷⁷ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 10, 141-142. Editing in this journal was not always rigorous. For instance, the author claimed a fifty-year old person would consume 79,000 lbs. of grain in his lifetime, ostensibly averaging around 1,580 lbs. per year--an amount twice the per capita grain consumption of a United States citizen in 1995!

The colorful and heroic life of the Russian Nihilist Sophia Perovskaia was extensively covered in the *Tides of Zhejiang*, along with two articles in the same paper that commented on the "Russian character," which reportedly encouraged women to act independently, thus producing not only great scientists, writers and religious leaders, but also leading Nihilists.¹⁷⁸ By contrast, Chinese anarchists, while advocating women's liberation, including the elimination of the "traditional" family system, discouraged women from participating in politics and feared that if women worked as laborers they would become subject to other forms of exploitation.¹⁷⁹ The *Tides of Zhejiang* also occasionally provided egregiously erroneous bits of news; it reported, for instance, that one difference between men and women was that after the age of thirty, women's brains began to shrink while men's brains remained healthy, even past the age of forty, thus demonstrating to the author (a man) that women were inferior to men!¹⁸⁰

The problem of erroneous information was a constant problem in the journalism of the early 1900s in China.¹⁸¹ In the first place few Chinese intellectuals had an adequate background in the related realms of math and science.¹⁸² Second, the scientific knowledge of commoners was virtually non-existent. Thus, the ASB devoted a total of twenty articles to the subject of Western-style science in the hope not only of exposing the Chinese to new ways of thinking and new kinds of knowledge, but also to dispel a number of common but misguided views about the natural world and the larger universe.

At times, the blind seemed to be leading the blind, so to speak. In the first article of the ASB dealing with the elements of an electrical storm, the author confidently

¹⁷⁸ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 7, 125-128; no. 1, "Russian character," 6; and no. 4, 25-26.

¹⁷⁹ SLXJ, vol. 2a, 20-21.

¹⁸⁰ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 1, "Miscellany," 15.

¹⁸¹ ASB, no. 19, "Wanguo pian" (May 1, 1905), 1-3.

¹⁸² ASB, no. 19, "Wanguo pian" (May 1, 1905), 1-3.

announced that it was possible to save a lightning victim by filling his stomach with water and pressing his chest a few times until he resumed breathing!¹⁸³ Nevertheless, for the most part the ASB provided a basic understanding of rudimentary science to its readers. ASB authors described the chemistry behind air, and explained the origins of wind and steam.¹⁸⁴ They discussed the concept of the moon revolving around the earth and other planetary matters.¹⁸⁵ Readers learned about the origins of life from the union of a sperm and an egg, and about carbon and nitrogen compounds that compose most of the human body.

One article dwelt at length on a description of the planetary and solar systems in an effort to dispel the popular myth that eclipses were caused by evil “sky dogs,” who ate the sun.¹⁸⁶ More importantly, perhaps, the author argued against the practice of interpreting astronomical phenomena as signs of Heaven’s approval or disapproval of human behavior. He wrote, for example: “Question: The ancient books say that solar eclipse indicates an emperor’s bad rule, as a warning sent by Heaven. Is this believable? Answer: No, this is the way an official uses the [occurrence of a] solar eclipse as a way to remonstrate with the emperor.”¹⁸⁷ This discussion of Heaven was closely related to one of Chen Duxiu’s pet peeves: the problem of “fatalism.”

In the seventh and final installment of his essay, “On a Dying Nation”, Chen complained bitterly that we, the Chinese people, “. . . always leave things up to ‘Heaven,’ and are not willing to exert our human strength . . . Just open up *The Twenty-Four*

¹⁸³ ASB, no.3 (April 1, 1904), 39-40.

¹⁸⁴ ASB, no. 18, “Science” (Nov. 15, 1904, published April, 1905), 1-5.

¹⁸⁵ ASB, no. 14 (Sep. 15, 1904), 19-22.

¹⁸⁶ ASB, no. 11 (Aug. 1, 1905), 17.

¹⁸⁷ ASB, no. 11 (Aug. 1, 1905), 17. The author of this article also endorsed a reader’s thoughtful explanation on how superstition arose--that people were naturally fearful of unusual occurrences, and out of a desire to avoid any unpleasantness they developed a sense of hopefulness, and from these two thoughts came the act of praying, and hence superstitious practices. Ibid, no. 11, 38.

Histories to any page and read carefully. Didn't every founding emperor, at the time he was to usurp the throne with his army, use words like 'Obeying the Mandate of Heaven' and 'Those who obey Heaven live, while those who oppose Heaven die' to fool the people?"¹⁸⁸ He concluded this section of his essay by urging his readers to discard the notion of Heaven as the arbiter of fate, and to take personal responsibility for the future of the country. For Heaven, he wrote, was "really nothing but a swell of air," and fate was "something the fortuneteller concocted with heavenly stems and earthly branches to cheat you out of a few meals."¹⁸⁹

Many articles in the ASB and other papers of the early twentieth sought to use Western science to rectify popular and long-standing Chinese social customs--in particular, beliefs concerning evil and benevolent spirits, as well as a wide range of divinatory practices, including *fengshui*, astrology, numerology, physiognomy, spirit-writing and so forth.¹⁹⁰ In the minds of late Qing reformers and revolutionaries, such "superstitious" beliefs and practices misled the common people, causing them to waste valuable time and money on unproductive activities.¹⁹¹

Thus, for example, several issues of the ASB printed a synopsis of an article that originally appeared in the *Tides of Zhejiang* titled "A discussion of the non-existence of ghosts." In it, the author explains that "the human body is made up of phosphate, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen, and a dead body decomposes because the nitrogen flows out easily . . . Thus one has no soul after death, and there are no ghosts in the night."¹⁹²

The author also disparaged using the eight trigrams and the *Taiji tu* (Diagram of the

¹⁸⁸ ASB, no. 19 (May 1, 1905), "Wangguo pian," 1-3.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁹⁰ *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 2, "Philosophy," 1-6; no. 3, 59-64.

See For details, see Richard J. Smith, *Fortune-tellers and Philosophers*.

¹⁹² ASB, no. 13 (Sept. 1, 1904), 36-39. See also *Zhejiang Chao*, no. 2, "Philosophy", 1-6.

Supreme Ultimate), to protect buildings and rooms, and ridiculed the popular attribution of four gods to the four seasons, arguing that “in the tropics, where there are only two seasons, wouldn’t two of the gods be unemployed?”¹⁹³ Using a logic similar to Chen’s above, he also tried to dispel peoples’ superstitious beliefs about the omens associated with comets and earthquakes.¹⁹⁴

In the end, one suspects that in 1904-05 Chen and his fellow editors and associates had far more success in raising awareness about the dangers of imperialism and the importance of rights recovery than they did in eradicating “traditional” Chinese folk beliefs. Given the power of Chinese nationalism at the time, this is hardly surprising.

¹⁹³ ASB, no. 15 (Oct. 1, 1904), 37-40.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER 4: CHEN DUXIU AT THE CROSSROADS: ENLIGHTENMENT OR ENGAGEMENT?

The publication of the ASB came to an inconclusive end as Chen's attention was captured by a series of events that drew him away from writing and into more direct involvement with politics. His growing restiveness was matched by the mood of the country, as the middle years of the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed momentous changes in nearly every sector of Chinese society. These changes included major shifts in the Qing power structure, the growing political sophistication of the gentry, the strengthening of anti-Qing revolutionary elements, and the spread of doctrines such as anarchism and other forms of socialism, which fed the fires of radicalism. With the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, which seemed to signal the triumph of constitutional monarchy versus autocracy, the Qing court decided to relinquish its autocratic control and announced its plans for a constitution. Perceiving an opportunity to gain an even greater measure of political participation under the new circumstances, the Chinese gentry elite began organizing local and provincial assemblies, learning to practice parliamentary democracy in a remarkably short time. Self-rule (*zizhi*) became a popular trope in Chinese discourse, as reformists used it to defend parliamentarianism while revolutionaries invoked the term to justify overthrowing the monarchy.

As we have seen briefly in Chapter 3, concurrent with their rising political consciousness, and motivated by an ever-growing and increasingly vibrant Chinese nationalism, the progressive gentry instigated a Rights Recovery Movement designed to gain back concessions made to various foreign mining and railroad companies in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War. Their confidence was buoyed when their activities

met with some success. A wider sector of Chinese society, including merchants, felt similarly energized after a boycott of American goods in protest over U.S. policy toward Chinese immigrants. This newly developed sense of empowerment, especially among the gentry, was in part the result of a weakened central government, which also made possible the proliferation of revolutionary societies in the heartland of the country.

Two of the most well-known revolutionary societies credited with overthrowing the Qing dynasty, the Restoration Society, led by Cai Yuanpei, was ensconced in Zhejiang, while the China Revival Society, led by Huang Xing, was embedded in Hunan. Sun's Revolutionary Alliance established many cells in central China, even linking up with a revolutionary cell in Anhui that was started by Chen Duxiu. Assassination attempts became a popular method of subverting the established regime, as the ideas of Russian nihilists and anarchists took hold among the revolutionaries. In short, the country was consumed by unrest and uncertainty; as the gentry extracted ever greater political concessions from above, the revolutionaries subverted the Qing social order from below.

For Chinese intellectuals, the new schools with their "progressive" curricula became the educational institutions of choice after the civil service examination system was irrevocably terminated in 1905. Chen Duxiu was at the forefront of the educational movement, as he helped to establish several progressive schools in Anhui province and also published a colloquial paper to educate the less literate people on the state of affairs in the country. Ironically, with the increasingly militant revolutionary sentiment among his comrades, Chen retreated to a quiet state of contemplation and study toward the end of this decade.

The attempt on the part of the Qing government to court Han power brokers and extend popular representation came too little and too late. On October 11, 1911, a tenuous coalition of New Army soldiers, revolutionary underground elements and extremist intellectuals--led at least nominally by Sun's Revolutionary Alliance (while Sun himself was in Denver, Colorado)--managed to overthrow the Qing government and establish the Republic of China. However, the euphoria of ousting the Manchus, abandoning thousands of years of monarchical rule, and installing a republican government was short-lived. Lacking adequate military power, financial support, coordination and planning, the revolutionaries lost control of the nation to the anti-Republican Yuan Shikai.

Appalled by Yuan's blatant disregard for republican ideals and for the well-being of the nation, Chen swung back into action as secretary of the Anhui provisional government, and, together with his comrades, attempted to challenge Yuan Shikai. When Yuan's powerful armies crushed their resistance, Chen escaped to Shanghai. Unable to sell his written work and forced to watch the republican dream crumble in China, Chen sank into a deep despair. But a network of friends was there to give him much-needed support, as they would provide it so many times in his life.

The Rising Tide of Revolution

As noted in earlier chapters, a flood of newspapers and associations appeared in the first decade of twentieth century China, allowing torrents of new knowledge to flow into China from abroad. Meanwhile, the "New Policies" of the Qing government,

inaugurated in 1901 and continuing for a decade in bits and pieces, had begun to produce significant changes in the realms of Chinese civil administration, education and military affairs. Most of these reforms were implemented at the provincial level or lower because the central government was simply too weak and too impoverished to undertake centralized reform in the fashion of Meiji Japan. Nonetheless, the Qing state's mandated reforms had far-reaching, indeed, revolutionary, effects.

After the imperial court dispatched five high-level envoys to investigate the constitutional systems of Japan and Europe in December of 1905, societies devoted to the study of constitutional government quickly arose.¹ Gentry-led chambers of commerce, agricultural associations and study societies soon totaled close to two thousand.² Membership in these various associations often overlapped, not only with respect to the organizations in China, but also often with their counterparts overseas. The majority of these associations and study societies also published newspapers, which, however ephemeral, served to spread patriotic, anti-imperialist and progressive ideas among the readership. In all, organizations of this sort created a "public sphere" of knowledge and opinion that existed beyond the reach of Qing censorship.

At the same time, on the fringes of "respectable" society stood individuals and groups who aimed to overthrow the monarchy and create a republic. Frequently led by returned students, dissidents formed disparate networks comprised of radical intellectuals, students in China's new schools, overseas merchants, disenchanted gentry, secret society members and soldiers in the provincially based New Army. The returned students spread anti-Qing messages by teaching in progressive schools and by publishing newspapers in

¹ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 289-290.

² Ibid., 266. He estimated 900 merchant associations, 723 educational associations, 19 main agricultural associations and 276 branches, see 274.

their home provinces. Many of the students had been members of the Military Citizen's Education Society in Japan, and upon their return connected with the extensive network of revolutionaries in Shanghai's China Education Society.

As mentioned previously, some returned students moved on to create the China Revival Society in Hunan, the Restoration Society in Zhejiang, and the Yuewang hui (Yue Fei Loyalist Society) in Anhui, among other groups. During the first few years of the twentieth century, discussions of socialism, nihilism and anarchism became ever more prominent in public discourse, and assassination became the weapon of choice for revolutionaries. The Shanghai Assassination Squad, an offshoot of the Tokyo Military Citizen's Education Society, was well-known at this time. In addition to staging uprisings and engaging in assassinations, many revolutionaries successfully infiltrated the New Army. The more "romantically minded" of these individuals heroically sacrificed themselves in unrealistic assassination plots and soon became martyrs of the 1911 revolution.³

Along with the rise of revolutionary sentiment in the aftermath of the 1903 Resist-Russia movement, Sun Yat-sen's reputation enjoyed an ascendance in the overseas Chinese intellectual community. Leaders in the community such as Zhang Binglin, Liu Shipei, Ji Yijun and Huang Zongyang praised Sun's mission, publicized his writing in their papers, and hailed him as the Napoleon or Washington of China.⁴ By August 1905 when Sun's Revolutionary Alliance (*Tongmeng hui*) was established in Tokyo, he had attained the status of a national hero. At the same time Liang Qichao, whose paper, the

³ Mary Rankin speculated that assassins such as Wu Yue, Qiu Jin and Xu Xilin were partially inspired by a romantic concept of the knight errant hero of the Chinese martial novels. See Mary Backus Rankin. *Early Chinese Revolutionaries*, 176.

⁴ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 315-316.

New People's Miscellany, had profoundly influenced opinions in the overseas intellectual community, began to lose credibility as he waffled between advocating revolution and constitutional reform. Liang lost many students to Sun after the debacle of the Self-standing Army in 1900; among them were friends of Chen Duxiu, including Su Manshu, Qin Lishan, and other well-known future revolutionaries such as Feng Ziyou, Zheng Guanyi, and Ma Junwu.⁵

A lively debate developed between Liang and Wang Jingwei, editor of the revolutionary publication, *The People's Journal*, over the merits of a constitutional monarchy versus a republican government. By 1905 Liang was disillusioned with the idea of revolution, and although he agreed that power must be shifted from the ruler to the people, he now preferred a gradual transition. His fear was that if the people who carried out the revolution were unaccustomed to democracy, they would likely lose the political mandate to a strong man, who would simply create a new dictatorship. In light of what followed in the 1911 revolution, Liang proved to be prescient. At the time, however, Wang and the revolutionaries demonized the Manchus and argued that removing them from power was the only possible way for China to be saved; adopting a constitutional government would not change the fundamental problem.

Liang pointed out that it was difficult to tell the culturally assimilated Manchus apart from the Chinese, and went on to expound upon the evils of revolution and the benefits of a constitutional monarchy, quoting the German jurists Johann Kaspar Bluntschili, Max von Seydel, and Conrad Bornhak.⁶ Twisting the arguments of the monarchists Paul Laband and Georg Jellinek, Wang countered that if the sovereignty of

⁵ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 335.

⁶ Michael Gasster, *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911*, 109.

the state belonged to the parliament, the people would not be objects of the state, and that therefore they would enjoy the right to vote and to be elected.⁷ Wang omitted, however, Laband and Jellinek's assertions that the power of all organs in the German state derived from the monarch.⁸ This selective use of arguments to gain rhetorical advantage was a common occurrence among Chinese intellectuals, who found it necessary to cite Western sources of authority but who often felt no obligation to present a balanced picture. The problem persisted during the New Culture Movement--a time when intellectuals with little time for study were suddenly exposed for the first time to a great number of Western theories.⁹

In the course of the debate between Liang and Wang, readers received a valuable lesson in the basic elements of democracy and constitutionalism. Among the issues discussed were: how to guarantee the accountability of elected officials; how to execute the popular will; how to determine the role of the monarch in a constitutional monarchy; how to assure the separation of powers; and how to figure out the role of the law.¹⁰

Meanwhile, revolutionaries introduced different terms to define and describe republicanism. The manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance used *minguo*, or "people-state;" Sun Yat-sen used *minzhu lixian zhengti* or a "democratic constitutional form of government," while Wang used *minquan lixian*, or "constitutional democracy." Hu Hanmin, a co-editor of the *People's Journal*, used *gonghe*, or "together-harmony" for republic.¹¹

⁷ Gasster, 112.

⁸ Ibid., 121.

⁹ Michael Gasster provides a fine analysis of the theoretical borrowings done by Liang Qichao and Wang Jingwei, see 106-124.

¹⁰ Wright, 73-80.

¹¹ Gasster, 107.

Remarkably, Sun's somewhat disjointed Three People's Principles offered the most coherent articulation of concepts that had been entertained by disparate groups of revolutionaries.¹² Moreover, he offered a blueprint for their realization. Sun projected that it would take nine years for the establishment of a constitutional government in China. The first three years would be spent removing the "evils" of the Manchu regime, such as wearing the queue and binding women's feet; this would be a period of military government. The next six years would witness the development of a government with a provisional constitution, in which people could elect local officials. At the end of this period the people would elect the president and members of the parliament, and the government would operate under a constitution.¹³

Sun's co-editors on the *People's Journal*, Wang and Hu, believed that the foundation of liberty, equality and fraternity could be found in Chinese antiquity, and that the founding emperors, Yao and Shun, had considered the people the basis of the state; furthermore, since China no longer had a class of aristocrats, the country could establish a constitutional government successfully and quickly.¹⁴ In 1905 the Revolutionary Alliance had only attracted three to four hundred people, but by the following year about half of the 10,000 overseas students had joined.¹⁵

Changes were taking place at almost every level of society except for among the peasants, whose financial burdens had doubled, if not tripled, since the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁶ Adding to their hardship were floods, windstorms, droughts and insect infestations that too often plagued their existence (see Chapter 3). From 1886 to 1911,

¹² Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 323.

¹³ Gasster, 130.

¹⁴ Ibid., 139.

¹⁵ Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 356.

¹⁶ COC, vol. 11, 594.

for example, sixty counties in Jiangsu and forty in Anhui suffered disaster in one form or another every single year; the lives of the Chinese peasants provided an unmitigated tale of woe throughout these decades.¹⁷

The Patriotic Association and the Network of Assassination Squads

When the Shanghai Assassination Squad was expanded and renamed the Patriotic Association (Aiguo xie hui) in 1903-4, Chen Duxiu was invited to join.¹⁸ The organization attracted most of the prominent revolutionaries in the Shanghai area, such as Cai Yuanpei, Liu Shipei, Xu Xilin, Tao Chengzhang, as well as the son and grandsons of provincial governors, many of whom became leaders of the 1911 revolution. (See table 6) As mentioned earlier, Chen took a leave from publishing the ASB, traveled to Shanghai, and pledged an oath administered by fellow revolutionary Yang Dusheng. He stayed for several months, learning how to make bombs from the chemistry teacher, Zhong Xianchang.¹⁹ Li Guangjiong, Liu Shipei and Bo Wenwei were dispatched to create an assassination group in the Anhui Public School, while Yang, Zhang Ji and He Meiqiao formed one in Tianjin.²⁰

Assassination groups abounded during this time, espousing such names as “China Assassination Group” (Zhina ansha tuan), and its offspring “Chengji Import Store Assassination Squad” (Chengji yanghuodian ansha tuan). After the establishment of the

¹⁷ COC, vol. 11, 594.

¹⁸ It is not clear who was in charge of the Shanghai Assassination Squad, various biographers claimed Huang Xing, Zhang Shizhao, Yang Dusheng, and or Cai Yuanpei as head. It is also unclear at exactly what time the Squad became the Patriotic Association, see Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 67.

¹⁹ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 67.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 67.

Revolutionary Alliance, Sun Yat-sen designated Fang Junying as head of the assassination department, and under his purview were Wang Jingwei's "Jingjin Assassination Group," and others such as the "Beijing Assassination Squad," the "Tianjin Assassination Group," the "East Assassination Squad," and the "China Dare to Die Troop." In addition, lone operatives or smaller groups of two to three would-be assassins prowled the country.²¹

In August 1904 Zhang Shizhao and Wan Fuhua targeted the Qing's Minister of the Army, Tieliang, on his visit to Jiangsu, but they could not get within striking distance of their target. Chen's return to Anhui from Shanghai at this time may have been part of the preparation for this assassination.²² The ineffectuality of intellectuals-turned-assassins became even clearer a year later when Yang, Cai Yuanpei, Zhang Shizhao, Liu Shipai and Wu Chunyang concocted a plan for Wan Fuhua to assassinate the governor of Guangxi, Wang Zhichun. This governor was considered a traitor because of his dealings with foreign powers, but again, the hapless assassins had no success. This attempt failed at about the same time as Huang Xing's planned uprising in Changhsa in October, 1904.

The Anhui Public School

The most drastic change affecting Chen's cohort was the abolition of the civil service exams in 1905, a move that eliminated the time honored path to officialdom and socio-economic advancement. Until this point the Court attempted to accommodate the system to the times, by doing away with the eight-legged essay writing format in 1901,

²¹ <http://sophist4ever.pixnet.net/blog/post/20801307>, accessed 12/5/08.

²² Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 67.

and shifting the content from a concentration on the Four Books and Five classics to history, government, and Western politics in 1902.²³ In 1904 the Court created a three tier system of schooling, which divided into elementary, secondary and higher institutions of learning.²⁴ In order to ease the transition of the examinees into the new system, the Court allowed graduates of the new schools and the returned overseas students to sit for special exams and receive the traditional degrees.²⁵ The age limits for elementary, middle, senior high schools and universities were set loosely at fifteen, twenty, twenty-five and thirty years of age, respectively, and in most instances high school students were over twenty years of age.²⁶ Chen, however, had already rejected this sort of career trajectory; he was driven instead by an immediate desire to save China—a common denominator for many intellectuals of his generation.

When Chen Duxiu started his ASB in 1904, there were a total of forty-one new schools in the province; a year later the figure had almost doubled. From 1903 to 1909, the average increase was about one hundred new schools in Anhui province per year. But despite the court's 1904 edict ordering the creation of a new curriculum, many schools still emphasized respect for Confucius, loyalty to the ruler, and a curriculum solidly based on the Four Books and the Five Classics. Although supplemental courses on Chinese and foreign political affairs, the fine arts and physical education were advertised as part of the school curriculum, in reality art and physical education classes were seldom offered, and qualified physics and chemistry instructors were almost never available.²⁷

²³ COC, vol. 11, 377.

²⁴ Some levels were further subdivided: the elementary level consisted of junior and a senior primary schools, and the higher education was divided into the higher school, the university, and the academy of sciences. See COC, vol. 11, 378.

²⁵ COC, vol. 11, 378.

²⁶ Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 154.

²⁷ *Wenjiao shizhong*, 4-5.

The shortage of teachers meant that new schools had to hire degree holders who were educated in the old curriculum.²⁸ Students still crammed for civil service exams, and on the fifteenth of every month they performed the ritual kowtow, involving three kneelings and nine prostrations, in front of the spirit tablet honoring Confucius. Whipping was a common punishment, and students were severely penalized for discussing politics or school affairs, or for exhibiting behavior or speech that was not “orthodox.”²⁹ The dismal circumstances facing students in such “new” schools help to explain the impetus behind Chen’s article on “How to Reform Elementary School” in the first issue of ASB.

By 1904, Chen Duxiu’s co-provincials, Li Guangjiong and Lu Zhongnong, had returned from Japan and established the Anhui-in-Hunan Public School (*Anhui lü Xiang gongxue*) in Changsha, Hunan province, as a cover for their revolutionary activities.³⁰ Li subsequently invited Huang Xing, Zhang Ji and Zhao Sheng to teach at the school. Why they decided to move the school back to Anhui is not clear, but some have conjectured that the move had to do with the botched assassination attempt on the Empress Dowager Cixi by Huang Xing. In any case, Chen assisted Li in the move back to Wuhu in March 1905, and renamed it the Anhui Public School (*Anhui gongxue*).³¹

Historians have described the founding of Anhui Public School and the publication of ASB as the impetus for revolutionary activity in the mid-Yangzi area.³² The school sheltered some members of the China Revival Society after Huang Xing’s aborted coup, including Su Manshu, Zhang Tongdian and Zhou Zhenlin, all of whom

²⁸ *Wenjiao shizhong*, 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁰ Shen Ji, “The Yue Fei society during the Xinhai Revolution,” in ZL, 45.

³¹ Ouyang Yuefeng, “Anhui gongxue de xingban jiqi yingxiang” (The establishment of Anhui Public School and its influence), 658-659.

³² ZL, 35. Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 48.

took teaching positions there. Li and Chen also hired several members of the Restoration Society, including Yu Ziyi, Tao Chengzhang, Liu Shipei, and Gong Baoquan,³³ the latter was on the run after the Qing authorities shut down the revolutionary paper, *Alarm Daily*, of which he was editor. Anhui revolutionaries Bo Wenwei, Liu Kunshu, Jiang Tongou and Wei Wuliang also joined the faculty.³⁴

Supported by their principal, these faculty members exposed students to revolutionary literature, and recruited actively for their respective revolutionary organizations.³⁵ As a way to avoid official interference, Chen invited Li Jingmai, a descendant of the late governor-general Li Hongzhang, as well as the Qing magistrate Kuai Liqing, to serve as honorary directors.³⁶ About fifty students were enrolled in the school, which was divided into a middle school and a teachers' training school.³⁷ Money was tight, however, as provincial authorities begrudgingly allotted the school a small budget, and then only because the government was urging the provinces to prepare for imminent dismantling of the civil service exam system. In the end, the school was primarily funded by proceeds from salt and rice taxes, donations from the community, and by tuition.³⁸

Chen assisted the Huizhou Native Place Association of southern Anhui in setting up the progressive Huizhou Public School and served as its superintendent. Around the same time, Li Guangjiong appointed a revolutionary comrade, Zhang Bo, to serve as the head of the progressive Wanjiang Middle School. A report by the regional educational

³³ Lu Desheng, Xu Chenglun, and Zhang Wei eds., *Zhengzhi Fengyun* (Political currents), 141, 151.

³⁴ Ouyang Yuefeng, 66.

³⁵ ZL, 34.

³⁶ ZL, 69.

³⁷ ZL, 46.

³⁸ Ouyang Yuefeng, 659.

authorities mentioned that students in these three schools, the Anhui Public School, the Huizhou Public School and the Wanjiang Middle School used these institutions as a front, studying very little and mostly engaging in subversive activities. To indicate their revolutionary spirit, many of the students followed their faculty in having their queues cut off.³⁹ These schools in turn were in communication with other progressive schools in the province, such as Anqing's Shangzhi School, Tongcheng's Chongshi School, and Hefei's Chengxi School, as well as with branches of the Revolutionary Alliance in Tokyo, Nanjing, Shanghai and Hefei.⁴⁰ Chen had become impatient with trying to enlighten people through the printed word, and turned to teaching and more overt political activism instead.

The Yuewang Hui (Yue Fei Loyalist Society)

After the collapse of China Revival Society's in the aftermath of the failed attempt on Cixi's life in 1904, Cai Yuanpei's Restoration Society became the most prominent organization in the mid-Yangzi region. The Shanghai Military Citizen's Education Society membership overlapped with those of the China Revival Society and the Restoration Society. Other members went on to establish smaller anti-Manchu networks: Zhao Sheng, Wu Yue and Ma Hongliang formed the Youth China Strengthening Society (Shaonian Zhongguo Qiangxue hui); Wu Chunyang and Cheng Jiacheng created the Martial Strength Society (Wuyi hui); Zhang Rong led the Defense

³⁹ ZL, 69.

⁴⁰ Su Ye, "Brief biography of Li Guangjiong," in *Renwu Chunqiu* (The biography of historical people), 207.

Army (Baowei jun); and Ding Kaizhang spearheaded the Resist-Russia Iron and Blood Society.⁴¹

In August 1905, Chen Duxiu formed the revolutionary organization, Yuewang hui, with his friends Bo Wenwei and Chang Hengfang at the Anhui Public School. The society was named after Yue Fei (1103-1142), the loyal general of the Song dynasty who defended his country against the invading Jurchens of the Jin Dynasty (1115-1234).⁴² As the Jurchens were the ancestors of the Manchus, the anti-Manchu aim of the group was clear. The Yuewang hui thus became part of the wave of revolutionary societies that derived from the Shanghai Military Citizen's Education Society.

At first, about thirty members, mainly faculty and students from both the Anhui Public School and the Anhui Military Preparatory School joined the Yuewang hui. A secret organization devoted to assassination called "the Huang School" developed within the school.⁴³ At times the meetings convened in a temple commemorating the god of war, Guandi, and at other times they convened at one of two rented houses in Wuhu.⁴⁴ Members used pseudonyms, burned incense, swore the required oaths, and mixed nonsense words into the text of the party platform in order to confound informants. While they all pledged to overthrow the Manchus, the members were vague about the need for a constitution and a tripartite division of governmental power.⁴⁵ Recognizing the importance of recruiting men with military expertise, however, members of the Yuewang hui infiltrated the provincially established units of the New Army with

⁴¹ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 68.

⁴² F. W. Mote, *Imperial China: 900-1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 299-307.

⁴³ Shen Ji, "Bo Wenwei yu fan qing fan ming geming", 333.

⁴⁴ Chang Yanxun, "Brief biography of Chang Hengfang", in *Renwu Chunqiu*, 113.

⁴⁵ ZL, 47.

considerable success. Chen targeted the divisions stationed in Wuhu, and had immediate success with the help of his friends Chang Hengfang and Bo Wenwei.

In 1904, after the first class of the Anhui Military Preparatory School graduated, three hundred students were drafted by the governor into the Anhui Preparatory Army. Bo Wenwei joined the Preparatory Army after having been expelled from the Anhui Upper Level School for attending Chen Duxiu's lectures in the Anhui bookroom (see Chapter 2).⁴⁶ In the army Bo founded a Classmate Society (Tongxue hui) and circulated revolutionary literature, including Chen Tianhua's *Alarm Bell* and *About Face*, Zou Rong's *The Revolutionary Army*, and the *Ten Days of the Yangzhou Massacre*.⁴⁷ Two years earlier Bo had befriended Zhao Sheng, who had established a revolutionary society with secret society members in Nanjing. In 1905 when Zhao became an officer in the Nanjing New Army, he recruited Bo, who founded a chapter of the Yuewang hui there.⁴⁸ Chen Duxiu was friends with Zhao Sheng as well, and later honored him in a poem that eulogized five of his deceased friends: Zhao, Yang Dusheng, Wu Yue, Chen Tianhua, and He Meishi.⁴⁹

Chang Hengfang had met Chen when he attended the Anhui Public School's teacher training division.⁵⁰ Chang joined the Yuewang hui, and led the Anqing branch of the society. In order to avoid Qing suspicion, the Yuewang hui created cover-up satellite groups to conduct its anti-Manchu activities. Like many revolutionary societies across China, groups such as the Reform Society (Weixin hui) and Efflorescence Race Society

⁴⁶ ZL, 47.

⁴⁷ ZL 48.

⁴⁸ Zhu Yan, "Chen Duxiu yu Yuewang hui de chuangjian" (Chen Duxiu and the creation of Yuewang hui), 48.

⁴⁹ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 70.

⁵⁰ *Huaishang xian xian Chang Hengfang*, 5.

(Huazu hui) were led by intellectuals but relied on the fighting skills of their other members.⁵¹ The Preparatory Army recruited not only from the citizens of Anqing but also from the Green Standard troops stationed in the city. Chang observed that the Green Standard soldiers were still using spears and swords; they did not receive rifles from the Qing until much later. So successfully did the revolutionaries convert the soldiers that there were Yuewang hui members in all five regiments of New Army.⁵²

Bo Wenwei and Chang Hengfang headed the Nanjing and Anqing chapters of the Yuewang hui, respectively, while Chen retained the overall chairmanship of the society's headquarters in Wuhu, despite his lack of military background. Apparently, Chen commanded respect not only for being a tireless champion of the revolution but also for his kindness and compassion.⁵³ In the summer of 1905, during a hiatus in the publication of the ASB, Chen toured Northern Anhui with Bo and Chang Hengfang, recruiting men for the Yuewang hui. They were looking for individuals of "sound body and mind," including those who were members of secret societies, who presumably could engage in fighting more readily than the intellectuals.⁵⁴

On this trip Chen befriended Sun Yujun, who would later play an important role in the post-1911 Anhui government.⁵⁵ One of Chen's comrades later recalled that "Mr. Duxiu, with his [traveling] bag on one side and his umbrella on the other, left his footprints all over the South and North of Anhui province, selecting revolutionary

⁵¹ *Huaishang xian xian Chang Hengfang*, 6; ZL, 51.

⁵² *Huaishang xian xian Chang Hengfang*, 7.

⁵³ In his autobiography, Chen faulted himself for being too soft-hearted, a trait he claimed to have inherited from his mother. This trait seems have been borne out when a member of the Yuewang hui misplaced confidential papers that were entrusted to him, and Chen refused to impose a heavy punishment on the offender, despite Bo Wenwei's recommendation that he be dealt with severely. See Bo Wenwei, 10.

⁵⁴ ZL, 48-9.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 70.

comrades everywhere.”⁵⁶ In 1905 Chen, together with Yang Dusheng, Bo Wenwei and Zhao Sheng, helped to plan the assassination of the five Qing officials who were traveling abroad to investigate constitutional systems in Japan and the West. Wu Yue, a member of the Restoration Society, was designated to carry out the plan.⁵⁷ The conspirators met upstairs in the apartment of the Science Publishing House, home of Chen’s ASB.⁵⁸ When the time came to execute the plan, however, Wu’s bomb detonated prematurely, killing Wu and barely wounding the officials. Chen was particularly close to Wu Yue, who had requested that his last letter be turned over to Chen in the event of his death. In 1911 Chen served as the delegate from Anhui at a memorial service for Wu.⁵⁹

Table 5. The activities of selected members of the Military Citizen’s Education Society upon their return to China.⁶⁰

Members of the Military Citizen Education Society returned students ⁶¹	Schools in China where they taught	China’s Revival Society (Huaxing hui)	Restoration Society (Guangfu hui)	Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui)	Other Associations

⁵⁶ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 71. Interestingly, this description of Chen Duxiu arriving or going somewhere with a shoulder bag and an umbrella was also used by Wang Mengzhou to depict how Chen arrived at his bookstore to establish the ASB in 1903. See ZL, 103.

⁵⁷ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 67.

⁵⁸ Shen Ji, “Bo Wenwei yu fanqing fanyuan geming,” 333.

⁵⁹ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 68.

⁶⁰ Table culled from Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 264-5. See Appendix J for the Chinese names of these societies.

⁶¹ Sang Bing lists 22 more names of the Tokyo Military Citizen Education Society members who returned to China and taught, but does not name the schools, see Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 264.

Huang Xing	Mingde School etc. ⁶² in Changsha, Hunan province	Y		Y	
Su Manshu	Mingde etc.	Y		Y	
Wen Hao	Mingde etc.	Y			
Chen Jie	Mingde etc.				
Qin Yuliu	Mingde etc. and Lizhe Academy	Y			
Xie Xiaoshi	Mingde etc.				
Liu Zhonghe	Lizhe Academy				
Fei Shanji	Lizhe Academy				
Lin Xie	Tongli Self-Rule Study Society				Fujian Student Association, Resist-Russia Comrade Society
Chen Duxiu	Anhui Public School				Yuewang hui
Ye Lan		Y			East Asia Discussion Group
Zhang Shizhao		Y			Resist-Russia Comrade Society
Chen Tianhua		Y		Y	
Cai Yuanpei	Patriotic School		Y	Y	Resist-Russia Comrade Society*
Wang Jiaju			Y		

⁶² Sang Bing does not specify who taught where, but names four schools where they had taught. Sang Bing, *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 263.

Dong Hongwei			Y	Y	
Xu Shoushang			Y		
Ao Jiaxiong			Y		Wentai Chu Native Association
Qu Dezhe					Wuchang Garden Mountain Bureau (WG)
Huang Liyou					WG
Li Shucheng				Y	WG
Zhou Weizhen				Y	WG
Gong Baoquan					Shanghai Assassination Squad
Yang Yulin				Y	Shanghai Assassination Squad
Sa Rui					Fujian Student Association
Lin Zongsu				Y	Fujian Student Association
Xin Han					Tokyo Speech Society
Yan Zhichong					Tokyo Speech Society
Wang Deyuan					Resist-Russia Comrade Society
Bei Shoutong					Resist-Russia Comrade Society
Kuai Shoushu				Y	China Industrial Study

					Society
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*It was later renamed Survival Society.

Table 6. Names of Tokyo Assassination Squad and Shanghai Patriotic Association members.⁶³

Names	Tokyo Assassination Squad	Shanghai Patriotic Association
Yang Dusheng	Y	Y
Su Peng	Y	
He Haiqiao	Y	Y
Huang Xing	Y	
Chen Tianhu	Y	
Liu Yusheng	Y	Y
Jing Ruomu	Y	Y
Zhang Ji	Y	
Wang Weicheng	Y	
Su Fengchu		Y
Cai Yuanpei		Y
Chen Duxiu		Y
Zhang Shizhao		Y
Cai E		Y
Hang Shenxiu		Y
Wan Fuhua		Y
Liu Shipai		Y
Xu Xilin		Y
Zhao Sheng		Y
Yu Youren		Y
Ao Jiaxiong		Y
Gong Baoquan		Y
Tao Chengzhang		Y
Zhang Ji		Y
Xiong Chengji		Y
Wu Chunyang		Y
Li Maozhen		Y
Li Chunxu		Y
Li Guangjiong		Y

Table 7. Names of Yuewang Hui Members and their activities 1905-1911.⁶⁴

⁶³ The names are culled from Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 66-7

⁶⁴ Table is a simplified version of Chen Wanxiong's table, in Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 72-75.

Name	Membership in Other Revolutionary Societies	Activities
Chen Duxiu		Secretary of Anhui Provisional Government
Bo Wenwei	Trust and Loyalty Society Tongmenghui (TMH) Guomindang (GMD) Huang School	Natural Foot Society, Strengthen Nation Society, 1913 Head of Anhui Provisional Government
Chang Hengfang	TMH GMD	Dean of Shangzhi School
Song Yulin	TMH	1907 helped Xu Xilin's assassination of Enming and in Qiu Jin's plot 1911 died in the April Huanghuagang uprising
Ni Yingdian	TMH	Nanjing New Army 1908 Anqing uprising 1910 died in the 1910 Guangzhou New Army uprising
Fang Gang	TMH China Revolutionary Party Member of Anhui Provisional Government	Created West Anhui Newspaper Reading Society 1906 Escaped to Jilin for subversive activities 1911 organized merchant troop in Northeast 1915 executed
Xue Zhe	TMH	1907 Anhui New Army 1908 killed in Anqing uprising
Zheng Zancheng	Trust and Loyalty Society TMH China Revolutionary Party	1907 conducted uprisings in Anhui, Canton, and Jiangxi Anhui Provisional Government 1914 died in Tokyo.
Wu Yanggu	Shanghai Assassination Squad Martial Strength Society TMH	Created Self-Strengthening Society, Martial Strength Society, Shanghai Youth Bookstore, 1906 set up TMH branch in Anhui New Army Principal of City West School Died in battle for Anqing's

		independence
Zhang Jingfu		Died in 1908 Anqing uprising
Xiong Chengji	Shanghai Assassination Squad	Commander of Anqing Revolutionary Army in 1908, died in 1909.
Fang Beiyang		New Army 1911 Huanghua gang uprising 1913 Led student army against Yuan Shikai
Ling Yi	Trust and Loyalty Society	1907 joined Xu Xilin's plot 1907 Anqing uprising 1910 New Army uprising 1911 Huanghua gang uprising 1911 Fought with the revolutionaries in Shanghai and Nanjing
Fan Chuanjia	Self-standing Society Same Heart Society Martial Strength Society Renewal Society	1908 died in Anqing uprising
Shi Renjun		Taught at Police Academy under Xu Xilin
Liao Shaozhai	Renewal Society TMH	1907 joined in Xu Xilin's plot 1913 died in Anhui's battle against Yuan Shikai
Shi Jianmin		New Army 1908 Anqing uprising 1913 led student army against Yuan 1914 died
Wang Zhengfan		New Army 1907 joined Xu Xilin's plot Fought in the 1911 revolution
Liao Chuanqi	Self-strengthening Society	New Army 1907 joined in Xu Xilin's plot Killed in fighting Yuan Shikai
Liao Chuanshao (younger brother)	Self-strengthening Society TMH	1908 joined Xiong Chengji's uprising

		Died in 1911 battle in Anhui
Gong Zhenpeng		New Army Fought in the 1911 Revolution
Hu Weidong	Yuewang hui	
Liao Zhuancshao	Yuewang hui Renewal Society TMH	1908 Anhui uprising Died in battle after 1911

Table 7 (A) The Anhui Network⁶⁵

Names	Anhui Patriotic Society	Yuewang Hui	Anhui Public School	Huang School (Assassination Squad in Anhui Public School)
Chen Duxiu	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bo Wenwei	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pan Jinhua	Y			
Pan Zanhua	Y			
Wang Guozhen	Y			
Pan Xuanhua	Y			
Ge Guangting	Y			
Chang Hengfang		Y		
Xiong Chengji		Y		
Ni Yingdian		Y		
Wu Yanggu		Y		
Gong Zhenpeng		Y		
Fan Hongxian*		Y		
Yuan Yongsheng*		Y		
Song Shaoxia*		Y		
Yang Duanfu*		Y		
Sheng Taiwan*		Y		
Li Xinbai*		Y		
Liu Shipai			Y	Y
Li Guangjiong			Y	Y
Lu Zhongnong				Y

⁶⁵ Table is from Zhu Ge and Ma Huihong, "Bo Wenwei yu Anhui zaoqi Xinhai geming" (Bo Wenwei and the early Xinhai revolution in Anhui), 91.

Huang Xing				Y
Zhang Ji				Y
Zhao Sheng				Y
Su Manshu				Y
Zhang Tongdian				Y
Zhou Zhenlin				Y
Yu Ziyi				Y
Tao Chengzhang				Y
Gong Baoquan				Y
Liu Kunshu				Y
Jiang Tongou				Y
Wei Wuliang				Y

* These names did not appear in the previous table of members of Yuewang hui.

Toward a Universal Outlook: Anti-racism, Pan-Asianism, and Anarchism

After the ASB was closed by the Qing authorities in September 1905, Chen stayed in Anhui and established the Huizhou Normal School. Thereafter, in the summer of 1906, he traveled to Japan with his good friend and close collaborator, Su Manshu.⁶⁶ Chen's departure from Anhui seemed to have severed his connection to the Yuewang hui (see below), and for the next few years he wrote little but poetry describing his state of mind. In Tokyo he enrolled in the English section of Seisoku Gakkou, joined the Asia Friendship Society created by Zhang Binglin, and wrote a poem commemorating the publication of Su Manshu's Buddhist dictionary. Chen's interest in Buddhism was piqued not only by Su's conversion to Buddhism and his becoming a monk, but also by his recollections of his mother's faith. His 1904 poem dedicated to the memory of his deceased friend, He Meishi, was infused with Buddhist references: "By chance we met in

⁶⁶ I am indebted to Shen Ji, who clarified some of Chen's travel dates in a letter to me dated March, 2006.

a dream,/ Your laughter and colors were as before,/ Even though I knew you were a bold ghost./ You considered sailing back but could not forsake the beauty of the Western Paradise....”⁶⁷

This self-imposed hiatus from active revolutionary engagement may indicate, at least in part, Chen’s distaste for the narrow racist attitude exhibited by many of his fellow revolutionaries. Biographers have long wondered why Chen never joined the Revolutionary Alliance in 1905, even though most of his comrades and a number of highly respected scholars in the overseas community did. Cai Yuanpei, Zhang Binglin, Wu Zhihui and Liu Shipai, for instance, were all members of Sun’s organization. Moreover, Sun dispatched his trusted lieutenant, Wu Yanggu, to establish a branch of the Revolutionary Alliance in Anhui, where Wu recruited Chen’s good friends Bo and Zhao Sheng.⁶⁸ A year later the entire Nanjing branch of the Yuewang hui joined the Tongmeng hui, and soon thereafter, all of the branches of the Yuewang hui voted to merge with the Revolutionary Alliance as a single entity. Chen, for his part, expressed neither approval nor disapproval over the merger; he simply left for Japan.⁶⁹

Chen later wrote (in 1924) that the Revolutionary Alliance was “single-mindedly focused on military actions, disregarding propaganda to educate the masses, and lacking in party discipline.”⁷⁰ This Marxist analysis came at the height of his responsibility as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party, and ignored the fact that the Yuewang hui was also focused on military action and lacking in party discipline. The more

⁶⁷ “Composing the Chant on Dreaming of Deceased Friend He Meishi at Night,” in *Chen Duxiu shicun* (Depository of Chen Duxiu’s poems), 5.

⁶⁸ ZL, 83.

⁶⁹ Zhu Yan, 48.

⁷⁰ ZL, 71. Shen quoted from an article CDX wrote in 1924.

immediate concern for Chen seems to have been the Revolutionary Alliance's strong anti-Manchu racism.

Chen's friendship with Zhang Binglin might have also been a factor in his disengagement at this time. Although Zhang was one of the first overseas luminaries to join the Revolutionary Alliance, by 1907 he had become estranged from Sun, whom he accused of embezzlement. A feud developed between the Restoration Society, of which Zhang was a member, and Sun's Revolutionary Alliance, as they competed for funding and membership in Tokyo, Shanghai and Southeast Asia. Perhaps to sidestep the problem, Chen joined neither of the two feuding organizations,⁷¹ opting for Zhang's Asia Friendship Society instead. The Asia Friendship Society membership included Zhang Ji, Liu Shipai, He Zhen, Su Manshu, Lu Fu, Luo Xiangtao and Tao Zhigong from China, Kotoku Shushui, Yamakawa Hitoshi, and Ōsugi Sakae from Japan, as well as four Indian nationals.⁷² Zhang's society called for an alliance of Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, emphasizing the sentiment of compassion to counter the "fake morality" of the West. The mission of the Asia Friendship Society was to "resist imperialism and to regain sovereignty for the Asia peoples." It welcomed anyone into the society who did not support aggression, whether they were "democrats, republicans, socialists, or anarchists."⁷³

Chen returned to Anhui briefly in 1906, and left again in 1907 when Xu Xilin's assassination of Anhui Governor Enming prompted the Qing authorities to crack down on revolutionary activities in the province. Xu was a member of the Restoration Society and

⁷¹ Shen Ji refuted conclusively other biographers' claim that CDX joined the Restoration Society, see ZL, 73-86.

⁷² Zhang Xiangbing, *Shihai Beilang Ji: Chen Duxiu Bing Xinhai Geming Wenti Yanjiu* (A collection of historical stories: A study of the questions of Chen Duxiu and the Xinhai revolution), 216.

⁷³ Ibid., 217.

had been teaching in the Anhui Police Academy. It was indicative of the disorganized state of the revolutionaries that Xu neither attempted to contact the Yuewang hui in Anqing nor reached out to the branch of Revolutionary Alliance in the northern part of the province. He even failed to notify his comrades in the New Army when he launched his assault.⁷⁴ Although Xu succeeded in killing the governor, he was captured quickly and his plan to stage a massive uprising never materialized. Xu's execution dealt a harsh blow to the Restoration Society, sending many of its members fleeing to Shanghai and Tokyo.⁷⁵

By 1907 Zhang Binglin and Liu Shipei, along with many of their mutual friends from previous social networks, had formed in Tokyo the Society to Study Socialism, a group that advocated anarchism and explored Marxism. This was Chen's first significant exposure to these theories, a topic to be further explored in the next chapter.

Following the merger in 1906 of the Yuewang hui and the Revolutionary Alliance in Anhui, the newly combined organization set up two satellite groups in the New Army and in the schools: the Martial Strength Society (Wuyi hui) and the Efflorescence Race Society (Huazu hui).⁷⁶ Taking advantage of the nearly simultaneous deaths of Cixi and the Guangxu emperor in 1908, a major uprising occurred in the New Army cavalry and cannon garrisons that were stationed in Anqing, (an event commonly known as the "Mapao ying" uprising). Xiong Chengji was the leader, and thousands of soldiers were involved. In Anhui the saying was, "The first year Xu Xilin; the second year Mapao ying; the third year, revolution succeeds."⁷⁷ Because of its large scale,

⁷⁴ Rankin, 179-180.

⁷⁵ Rankin, 190.

⁷⁶ Zhu Yan, 48.

⁷⁷ Lu Desheng, 145.

historians consider this uprising a landmark in pre-1911 revolutionary activities, but the instigators were severely punished and the revolutionary cells in Anqing were decimated.

From 1906 to 1911, the direction of revolutionary activities in China seemed to be veering away from Chen's plan of action, and so he stayed on the sidelines. These years were a period of introspection and reflection for Chen, and he expressed himself eloquently in a proliferation of poems, which revealed conflicting feelings about his life as well as doubts about the choices made by his fellow revolutionaries. He never wavered, however, in his view that the Qing government had to be overthrown.

In 1908, upon visiting the Kegon waterfall in Nikkō Japan, a site of many suicides, Chen wrote as if interrogating the cascade: "At times [the water] drops hundreds of meters deep; dare I ask what the meaning of all this is?" and again, "In the hollow valleys and mysterious springs, how many kindred spirits do you have?"⁷⁸ The wistful tone suggests that Chen may have been reassessing his own life up to this point.

An Interlude of Poetry and Wine

At the end of 1908 Chen returned to China and settled down in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. There he taught history and geography in the Hangzhou Military Primary School, and made friends with faculty members including future novelist, Shen Yinmo, and the future educator, Ma Yifu.⁷⁹ In the same year, the Qing government

⁷⁸ "Huayan baobu" [Kegon Waterfall], *Chen Duxiu shicun*, 20. The verses in Chinese are: 时垂百丈深, 敢问意如何...空谷秘幽泉, 知音复几许."

⁷⁹ ZL, 438. With regard to the period from 1909 to 1911, little is known about Chen's activities. While Shen argued that Chen began teaching in Hangzhou as early as 1909, Zhang Bingxiang disagreed and believed that Chen sought seclusion when he first returned from Japan to Hangzhou in 1909, and taught in Hangzhou only in 1911. Both support their viewpoints with memoirs and newspaper reports, and I agree

issued nineteen articles titled "Outline of the Constitution." In response, Chen, ever the rebel, penned several revolutionary proclamations and nailed them to the door of the yamen office. In the following year, Chen's beloved older brother died, and so he traveled to Mukden to bring back the coffin. Soon thereafter, Chen married Gao Junman, the step-sister of his wife, although he had never divorced his first wife. Gao had attended Beijing Women's Normal School, loved literature and shared many interests with Chen. The marriage scandalized Chen's adoptive father and uncle, who had always lived with Chen's first wife and her children, and he barred Chen from ever returning home. Subsequently, Chen addressed his adoptive father as "Dear Sir" and not "Dear Father" in his rare letters home.⁸⁰ This episode was later described by Hu Shi as Chen's "family revolution."⁸¹

Despite the problems with his uncle, this was a period of conjugal bliss for Chen. He quoted from the Tang poet Li Shangyin (812-858) to provide friends with a glimpse of his satisfying life: "I would not receive the early morning visitor,/ For I just acquired a beauty named Mochou" (清晨不报当官客,新得佳人字莫愁).⁸² This was a time, he wrote, of "billowing wine banners [fanning] youthful passion" (酒旗风暖少年狂).⁸³ Chen kept in touch with some of his friends who were engaged in direct political

with Shen that it is unlike Chen to seek seclusion and live off his wealthy adoptive father, which is Zhang's explanation for this period of time. See Zhang Bingxiang, 251-280; ZL, 433-444.

⁸⁰ ZL, 440.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² "Mochou" is the name of the beauty in Li Shangyin's poem, "Fuping shaohou", where this verse was taken, albeit Chen switched the phrases around. Li wrote: "当官不报清晨客", while Chen wrote: "清晨不报当官客." See Liu, Xuekai and Yu Shucheng, *Li Shangyin shi ge ji jie* (An explanation of Li Shangyin's poems and chants), vol. 1, 1-4.

⁸³ The full poem is as follows: "Drooping willows [and] drifting flowers perfume the village road; billowing wine banners warm youthful passion; sunrays tie my colt by the bridgehead, [and] I think of Lady Xiao the Ninth of yore." [My translation--Lady Xiao the Ninth is a famous beauty]. In Chinese the verses are: "垂柳飞花村路香, 酒旗风暖少年狂, 桥头日系青骢马, 惆怅当年萧九娘".

activities, praising Zheng Zanchen in a poem as possessing a “chest full of [hot] blood,” and Zhao Sheng as “journeying with his sword far beyond the five mountain ranges,”⁸⁴ but his words were often laden with misgivings about the political activities all around him.

Perhaps the most illuminating of Chen's literary works at this time was his “Musings on My Innermost Thoughts in Twenty Poems” (Ganhuai ershi shou). He modeled this piece after Ruan Ji's (210-263) “Singing of My Innermost Thoughts in Eight-two Poems” (Yonghuai baishier shou).⁸⁵ In it, Chen drew parallels between his situation and Ruan Ji's unrequited political ambitions. Ruan Ji, like Chen, was unable to assume an important role in the political turmoil of Wei and Jin Dynasties (220-420), and therefore indulged himself in wine and poetry, conveying his sadness through the medium of verses.⁸⁶ Similarly, in his “Musings on My Innermost Thoughts in Twenty Poems” Chen indicated his deep concern for the political situation of China with esoteric allusions and metaphors in poetry. He also expressed frustration with the current revolutionary leadership, suggesting that his comrades could not decide upon a proper course of action, and speaking contemptuously of those who vacillated between being monarchists and being revolutionaries.

Adhering strictly to the format of five character verses with the requisite rhyming and tonal pattern, which was a poetic convention also used by Ruan Ji, Chen referred to

⁸⁴ ZL, 72. The five mountain ranges are the largest horizontal formations crossing east and west China in the south, touching on the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Hunan and Fujian.

⁸⁵ For a full text of Ruan Ji's “Yonghuai baishier shou,” see Huang Jie, *Ruan Bubing [Ji] Yonghuai shi zhu* (Commentary on Ruan Ji's ‘Singing of my Innermost Thoughts in Eight-two Poems’), (Beijing: Beijing renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1984).

⁸⁶ Fang Xuanling (578-648) et al., *Jinshu* (History of the Jin), “Ruan Ji chuan” 阮籍传 (Biography of Ruan Ji), 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), *juan* 48, 5:1360. For a thorough discussion of Ruan Ji's life and his *Yonghuai* poetic series, see Donald Holzman, *Poetry and Politics: The Life and Works of Juan Chi [Ruan Ji] (A.D. 210-263)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

himself as “fragrant grass and a beautiful women” (*xiangcao meiren*) as a political statement. “Fragrant grass and beautiful women” was a phrase coined by Qu Yuan (340-278 BCE), a general in the state of Chu of the Warring States period (475-221 BCE), whose loyalty was questioned by his lord. In his famous poem “*Li Sao*” (Leaving sorrow), Qu used this allusion to beauty and nature to indicate his moral righteousness and uncompromising character.⁸⁷ Similarly Chen evoked the image of a young lady wearing sweetly scented orchids and angelicas, who when “not finding a kindred spirit,/ Will shy away from singing./ Behind closed doors I pluck crimson strings,/ Longing for rivers and lakes ten thousand *li* away” (相遇非深恩，羞为发皓齿。闭户弄朱弦，江湖万余里).⁸⁸ In the next few stanzas, he revealed his frustration in not being heard: “A skinny horse neighs at the sky;/ His strong heart filled with unrequited ambition” (瘦马仰天鸣，壮心殊未已). He also remarked on the precariousness of making choices in life, perhaps referring to the ease with which his friends are swayed by various politicians, writing “wins and losses can occur in half a step; Yangzi cries at the fork in the road” (得失在跬步，杨朱泣路岐).

More darkly, Chen lamented that in the absence of true leadership, superior talents were being treated like inferior ones.⁸⁹ Referring to stories of loyal officials who were killed for speaking the truth, Chen warned that even when the relationship between the ruler and the subject was friendly, there was no guarantee that the ruler would not

⁸⁷ I am indebted to Nanxiu Qian for explaining this. For a thorough translation and interpretation of “*Li Sao*,” as well as Qu Yuan’s life, see David Hawkes, *The Songs of the South* (Penguin Books, 1985), 15-95.

⁸⁸ Chen Duxiu, “*Ganhuai ershi shou*” (Musings on My Innermost Thoughts in Twenty Poems), in *Chen Duxiu shicun* 陈独秀诗存 (A depository of Chen Duxiu’s poems), edited by Anqing Chen Duxiu xueshu yanjiuhui (Anqing: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003), 62-76. The following verses can be found in this collection of poems.

⁸⁹ “There had not been a Bo Le [a connoisseur of great horse] for a long time:/ Even a steed would be worn out” (旷世无伯乐，骐骥为弩骀).

turn on the subject.⁹⁰ Lamenting that the leaders could not differentiate between right and wrong, unlike the sage king of Zhou, he wrote: “Righteous men and pugnacious folks, the Zhou army killed or rewarded them accordingly” (义士与顽民，周师异诛赏).

In arguing for a system based on institutional rule and not on individuals, Chen invoked the story of King Mu of Zhou, whose leadership created a just society, but whose death led to the rise of a cruel king: “King Mu had Zhaozi as charioteer,/ And sped throughout the kingdom on eight steeds./ How could one reach a thousand *li*,/ With a hobbled horse and a ruined chariot?” (穆王得造父，八骏共驰驱。如何致千里，辟马丘毁舆). Chen also cautioned that it is important to choose trustworthy comrades: “[When] judging a man we should examine his inner qualities;/ [When] judging a horse, one must not just look at its color./ Pity those young wrens,/ Who entrust their nests to reeds” (取士必取骨，相马莫相毛。哀哉蒙鸠子，托命於苇苕). He further argued that developing the economy was a more urgent issue than concentrating on military campaigns, saying, “The ancient rulers cared for the people,/ The later generations focused on warfare./ Starving faces populate the fields;/ A fortune goes for a precious sword.” (古人重附民，后世重兵车…田野有饥色，千金购莫邪). Moreover, Chen urged that “generals should not fight often, but bide their time like snakes and dragons” (将军不好武，守身龙与蛇).

The next stanza allows a rare glimpse into Chen’s emotional state, as he likened the disasters that had befallen the Qing to “falling comets” which “darken the day,” yet “lanterns brighten the great halls./ The beauty harbors thoughts afar,/ And awakens

⁹⁰ “Loyal words can bring one death;/ Woe to Guan Qisi’s demise!/ While the ruler and his subject may be close,/ Who can foresee when love turns to hatred?” (忠言戮其身，哀哉关其思。周泽即云渥，爱憎谁能期).

restless in the middle of the night” (列星昼陨队，华灯耀疏堂。..美人怀远思，中夜起彷徨). In declaring his decision to separate from his comrades, Chen wrote that “the mythical Jiaoming bird and the phoenix [Chen]/ Lead different lives and have different voices./ Unable to meet the Queen Mother of the West,/ It only remembers the Fairy, Dong Shuangcheng” (鷦明与威风，异命不同声。王母不可见，但亿东双成).⁹¹ Chen declared his love of the land in the following way: “Majestic air rises from the Kunlun ranges;/ Crystal rivers cascade in ceaseless flows;/ Lustrous stones emanate from the Western Pole,/ And with their brilliance fire up the nine states” (魂魂昆仑气，洛洛清溪流。琅玕出西极，光彩粲九州).

Like Qu Yuan, Chen wanted to leave all the troubles of this world behind, but could not forget the suffering of his countrymen: “I think of leaving this web of dust,/ And have blue clouds lift up my feet./ But when I turn back to look at my home,/ I shed tears for my people” (一念脱尘网，双足生青云。回瞰所来地，泣下为人群). In the end, Chen urged that all of the different revolutionary factions should come together, and with one clear vision, bring light to the land: “Rivers meander as the mind looks inward,/ Screaming matches would only bring a loss./ For honing my archery to pierce a rock,/ [I] spent nine years in solitude and hardship./ Dark clouds reign beyond the eight realms,/ Yet my heart is full and clear./ Let ten suns shine on China,/ And righteousness fill the future” (百川深自回，----焰坐相失。饮羽及石梁，九载甘肃瑟。八表同阴霾，虚白自盈室。十日丽芜皋，光明冀来日).

This poem may explain a great deal about why Chen never joined the Revolutionary Alliance, nor participated actively in the 1911 Revolution. His antipathy

⁹¹ The Fairy is the maidservant who ascended the heavens by herself without help from anyone.

toward anti-Manchu racism was just part of the problem. Perhaps at a more fundamental level Chen did not believe that the motley group of revolutionaries, from secret society members to overseas students and disaffected gentry, was capable of bringing down the Qing.⁹² At the same time he was basically an intellectual, who was most comfortable when engaged in battles with words rather than guns. In a light-hearted moment, Chen and his good friend, Su Manshu, engaged in a series of chanting exchanges called *changhe*, in which one person begins with a poem, setting the rhyme and the tonal variations and challenging the other to respond in a like manner. The first person would then answer the other's four lines, and so on.

In this exchange Su Manshu took the lead. He began, "Infinite spring sorrow and infinite regret,/ All singing forth from my fingers./ In my difficult days of illness,/ I cannot bear listening to the 'eight-cloud' zither" (无量春愁无量恨，一时都向指尖鸣，我亦艰难多病日，那堪更听八云箏). Chen responded, "I extend my jade fingers to pluck the instrument,/ Like birds pecking chimes and pearls tinkling./ My hands caress each stem and string;/ How I wish to be reborn as the zither" (双舒玉笋轻挑拨，鸟啄风铃珠碎鸣，一柱一弦亲手抚，化身愿作乐中箏). In the fifth set, Su talked about the beauties he had admired, "Lightly painting my eyebrows, I sit for the painter;/ [My] jet black hair coiffed into a "one-heart" chignon./ Using a cup of color mixed with teardrops,/ I paint pear blossoms, but for whom?" (澹扫娥眉朝画师，同心华髻结青丝，一杯颜色双泪，写就梨花付与谁?)

Chen answered in a more masculine tone: "Danton and Byron are my teachers;/

⁹² ZL, 71-2.

Their talents are ocean-deep; their lives fragile as silken floss./ Do not break the strings for a beautiful maiden,/ For who will sing of their lonely struggles and unrequited passion?" (丹顿裴伦是我师，才入江海命如丝，朱弦休为佳人绝，孤愤酸情欲语谁?)

In the tenth concluding set of verses, Su remarks that "Nine years of meditation [have] led to my enlightenment;/ Carrying the Buddhist scepter I regretfully return to meet my friend./ I have betrayed but it is done;/ Let others become the zither of music" (九年面壁成空相，持锡归来悔悟卿，我本负人今已矣，任他人作乐中箏). Chen ended the poetic conversation by saying "King Zhao is dead and the Yan terrace is abandoned,/ Pearls and jade now all belong to you without reason./ The yellow crane flies alone for a thousand *li*;/ It is unnecessary to convey its anguish onto the zither" (昭王已死燕台废，珠玉无端尽属卿，黄鹤孤飞千里志，不须悲愤托琴箏).

In short, Chen spent a happy three years in Hangzhou, teaching, writing, and enjoying his family and friends. He did not travel to France during this period, as earlier biographers have suggested,⁹³ and although he sat on the sidelines during the 1911 revolution, he kept informed through friends. In hindsight it seems as if he had been re-charging his batteries for the next stage of his life, thinking and amassing ideas for his writing in the *Tiger* and *New Youth* magazines in the second decade of the twentieth century.

Self-Rule Movement and Constitutionalism

⁹³ This is a misconception that because little is known about Chen's activity during this period, and the fact that he spoke French, led earlier biographers to suggest that he had traveled to France. Chow Tse-tsung and Julie Howe claim that they have seen records of such travels, but do not substantiate such claims. Zhi Yuru inquired with Mr. Li Shizhen, who had studied in France from 1902-1910, and who had taught at Beijing University at the same time as Chen. Li said that Chen had not been France. See Zheng Xuejia, vol. 1, 41.

Less sensational than the activities of the radical intellectuals, but equally if not more revolutionary, was the late Qing movement to create a constitution and the corresponding activities at the local and provincial level toward self-rule (*zizhi*). Foreign observers have marveled that within the short span of a decade Chinese assemblymen were comfortably engaged in participatory democracy as if they had been born into the tradition. What is most remarkable, perhaps, is that this steep learning curve was achieved by a relatively large group of gentry-intellectuals at the provincial level, reaching into counties and cities and other smaller administrative units. To be sure, self-rule was not a totally alien concept in the Chinese political tradition, but the debates about instituting a constitution in the Western parliamentary tradition were entirely new. These discussions, conducted at all levels of society, resulted in an explosion of political and intellectual activity more powerful than bullets and bombs could ever have achieved.

The term “self-rule” meant different things to different people. On the one hand, monarchists used the term to stall revolutionaries, and on the other hand, revolutionaries used it to argue against foreign encroachment and *for* revolution. In institutional terms “self-rule” meant popularly-elected village councils as well as Western-style constitutional assemblies. The term was also used by students to argue that they should run their own schools and decide on the curricula. Almost everyone implicitly understood the concept, and at the same time, they had different definitions of the term.

The years from 1906 to 1908 witnessed an unprecedented burst of political activism at the local level in China. The New Policy reforms at various administrative

levels and the growing strength of the Chinese business and industrial sectors, created a constant tension between central government authority and local power.

The idea of this sort of tension was nothing new, for the concept of local rule had been a subject of debate among statesmen in China since the emergence of a centralized bureaucracy. The question centered on the relative merits of a “feudal” (*fengjian*) versus a “bureaucratic” (*junxian*; i.e. or centralized) form of governance. The “feudal” system was deemed a public (*gong*) form of political participation, with rule by many, while the “bureaucratic” system was considered a private (*si*) form, ruled by one. For centuries Chinese statesmen debated which form of governance would be more just, provide more benefits for the people, and result in a longer lifespan for the dynasty.⁹⁴ Now the debate was joined again. By the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) the idea of local self-government had become increasingly popular, and the emphasis in China shifted ever more toward reforms designed to advance the people’s rights and create a constitution.⁹⁵

In early 1906 the Qing ministers returned from their visit abroad with recommendations for promulgating a constitution. They urged the government to take three preliminary steps: (1) state clearly the government’s principal intention; (2) put the institution of local self-government into practice; and (3) introduce legislation regarding public gatherings and the press.⁹⁶ Consequently, an Office for Revising Government Institutions was set up, and the government began restructuring administrative institutions in preparation for a constitution. In the process several major conceptual shifts took place, which fundamentally changed the nature of Qing governance: (1) For

⁹⁴ Min Tu-ki, *National Polity and Local Power*, 89-91.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁹⁶ *Min*, 144.

the first time in the Chinese dynastic tradition, the power of the ruler was divided into executive, legislative and judicial branches; (2) The system of diarchy was abolished and inequalities between Manchus and Chinese were removed; (3) The rule of avoidance was abolished official duties were clarified; and (4) the removal of superfluous officials changed the nature of bureaucratic postings.⁹⁷

The 1906 re-organization did not, however, reduce significantly the number of people in direct communication with the Emperor. The heads of the various new ministries, as well as the heads of the Grand Council, the Secretariat and all the governors-general and provincial governors, still reported directly to the throne, bypassing the checks and balances of the parliamentary system.⁹⁸ Thus the argument for local self-government became conjoined with the need to create a constitution. The gentry pressed for the immediate establishment of local and provincial assemblies, as well as for a rapid convocation of the national assembly.

From 1906 to 1909, a great number of unofficial societies formed across China to discuss the preparation of a constitution. By one estimate, sixty-five such associations appeared during those years, with names such as the Jiangsu Local Self-government Investigation Study Society (Susheng difang zizhi diaocha yanjiu hui), the Jilin General Local Self-government Study Society (Jilin difang zizhi yanjiu zonghui), the Public Constitutional Preparatory Society (Yubei lixian gong hui) in Shanghai,⁹⁹ the Zhejiang Public Preparatory Association for the Promulgation of the Constitution (Zhejiang yubei

⁹⁷ COC, vol.11, 392-394; Min, 150.

⁹⁸ K. Asakawa, "The New Regime in China," 129.

⁹⁹ Roger R. Thompson, *China's Local Councils in the Age of Constitutional Reform*, 61, 63; Zhang Pengyuan, *Lixianpai yu Xinhai geming* (The Constitutionlists and the Xinhai revolution), 10.

lixian gong hui), and the Association for the Politics of Constitutionalism (Xianzheng gong hui).¹⁰⁰

Most constitutional societies advocated local self-government but they did not necessarily champion popular rights. They were dominated by returned students and local gentry expecting to make an official career out of local governance.¹⁰¹ Many societies published their own papers advocating the constitution; the best known were affiliated with Liang Qichao's network of Constitutionalists in the cities of Shanghai and Beijing. In Shanghai, the *Shenbao*, the *Times Daily*, the *China Foreign Daily* and the *Eastern Miscellany* were great advocates of a constitution, and the *Guomin gongbao* (Citizen's Public Paper) and the *Jinghua Ribao* (Golden Efflorescence Paper) were the pro-Constitution papers in Beijing. In addition to these two great metropolitan areas, the provinces had their own reformist papers.¹⁰² Virtually everyone agreed on the three most important reforms: the establishment of an assembly system; the creation of a responsible cabinet; and the division of power into executive, legislative and judicial branches.¹⁰³

A system of governing bodies--beginning with the national consultative body, or *zhizheng yuan*, in the capital, a provincial assembly, or *ziyi ju*, in the provinces, and a deliberative council, or *yishi hui*, below the provincial level--was suggested to the throne and approved in 1907.¹⁰⁴ The emperor called for the immediate convocation of provincial assemblies.¹⁰⁵ Eligibility to vote and sit in the assemblies was not, however, easy to come by. Members of the provincial assembly had to be males over the age of

¹⁰⁰ Bian Xiuquan, *Lixian Sichao yu Qingmo Fazhi Gaige* (The thought movement and legal reform in late Qing), 34.

¹⁰¹ Min, 136.

¹⁰² Bian, 24; Zhang Pengyuan, 53-59.

¹⁰³ Bian, 45.

¹⁰⁴ Min, 150.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 153.

twenty-five who could meet one or more of the following criteria: (1) be in possession of five thousand silver dollars; (2) have held an office or performed public service for three years in an exemplary capacity; (3) hold a degree from a Chinese or foreign higher institution of learning; (4) hold a degree above the first level in the old civil service exam system; (5) have served at level seven or higher in the civilian bureaucracy or level five or higher in the military bureaucracy; or (6) have lived in the voting province for ten years and have ten thousand dollars in assets.¹⁰⁶

In the national consultative body, half of the two hundred assemblymen were appointed by the court, and these were mainly Manchu aristocrats and court officials. The other half were elected among the provincial assemblymen across the country. The Qing gave limited voting rights to the progressive gentry, but excluded merchants and rural elites at the local level.¹⁰⁷ In defining eligibility to vote, a monumental shift had occurred: the performance of a public duty was more important than class status, thus privileging the “citizen” or *gongmin* over gentry, or *shenshi*.

Once the Emperor approved the concept of provincial assemblies, the gentry in Jiangsu, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangdong and Guangxi immediately began to organize, without waiting for government guidelines. In the city of Tianjin, Yuan Shikai established a self-government council in August of 1906, and the Tianjin Prefecture Self-Government Bureau became a showcase for returned students, many of whom had graduated from Hosei University in Japan. Upon their return they taught in provincial level laws schools (*fazheng xuetang*), and their students in turn became instructors in

¹⁰⁶ Zhang Pengyuan, 14.

¹⁰⁷ Thompson, 156.

local self-government schools at the county level.¹⁰⁸ Yuan heavily promoted his model of self-governance in newspapers and in memorials to the throne. His efforts paid off when, in the following year, the Qing government finally issued guidelines for the creation of provincial assemblies and the election of assemblymen. In so doing, the court sanctioned the Tianjin model and rejected the provincial initiatives, claiming that they had been improperly undertaken.¹⁰⁹ This angered the provincial gentry, who pushed the court to advance the date for council elections from 1912 to 1909.

With the publication of the nineteen "Principles of the Constitution" in 1908, the government set 1916 as the target date for promulgation of the constitution itself. The principles were modeled on the Meiji constitution, but they accorded more power to the emperor. For the first time in Chinese history the emperor was officially declared sacred and inviolable, and assured an unbroken line of succession for eternity. He also held power over the parliament, possessed the right to appoint ministers, commanded the military, wielded judicial power, and could conclude treaties with foreign countries. He could also declare war, abrogate peace, and restrict the rights of the people.¹¹⁰ The deaths of the Guangxu Emperor and Empress Dowager Cixi in the same year left the infant Puyi on the throne (as the Xuantoing emperor) and made possible the rise of his regent, Zai Fen, who concentrated virtually all Chinese military power in the hands of Manchu aristocrats.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Thompson, 42-44. The term for local self-government, *difang zizhi*, came from the Japanese term, *chiho jichi*, and the self-government school was modeled after the Japanese institution. See Min, 160.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 58.

¹¹⁰ COC, vol. 11, 397.

¹¹¹ Jiang Yong, "Shixi Qingmo de 'Yubei lixian'" (An attempt to analyze the late Qing's preparation for the constitution," 79.

The provincial assemblies (*ziyi ju*) convened for the first time in 1909. This event was hailed in the *Eastern Miscellany* as the “dawning of a new age, when the [Chinese] people are allowed to deliberate questions of government.” But the actual voter turnout was low, and corruption was rampant.¹¹² The cool reaction to these provincial assembly elections reflected not only unfamiliarity with the electoral process on the part of the common people, but also resistance on the part of the governors of the provinces. The governors of Guangxi and Henan provinces, for instance, upon receiving the edict to start the election process, stalled and sought returned students for help only after prodding from the central government.¹¹³ The conservative gentry looked on the process with suspicion; one censor wrote in 1910 that “prominent people in the rural area” were reluctant to join “untrustworthy figures from a journalistic or modern school background.”¹¹⁴ Thus the provincial assemblies became dominated by returned students and progressive gentry, while the conservative rural gentry took a backseat. Some of the old guard’s concerns were borne out when some assemblymen bribed their way to a seat in order to sway decisions for personal gain.¹¹⁵ In Huaining county, Anhui province, where Chen Duxiu was born, each vote was reportedly sold for somewhere between forty to 200 taels of silver.¹¹⁶

Impatient for the court to ratify the formation of the national assembly, representatives of sixteen provincial assemblies convened in Shanghai in 1909 at the behest of Zhang Jian (1853-1926), a leader in the constitutional movement. They petitioned the government three times to advance the date for the opening of the national

¹¹² Min, 179; Zhang Pengyuan, 17.

¹¹³ Zhang Pengyuan, 17.

¹¹⁴ Min, 164.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Zhang Pengyuan, 18.

assembly, gathering 200,000 signatures in the first petition in January and gaining 300,000 signatures in the second petition in July; they predicted 25 million signatures in the third petition in October.¹¹⁷ In response, the court reluctantly announced that the Constitution would be issued in 1912, and the national assembly would be convened in 1913. Still dissatisfied, a group of the petitioners protested once more, but this demonstration was forcefully quelled by the government.¹¹⁸

The national consultative body met in October, 1910. In the same month, seventeen provincial generals petitioned the court to form a cabinet and to convene the national assembly in the following year.¹¹⁹ The court named a "responsible cabinet" in April, 1911, which was dominated by nine Manchus and four Chinese. At this point, if not well before, it was clear to even the most loyal Chinese officials that the Manchus were unwilling to cede any substantial power. Under pressure, the court amended the nineteen principles of the constitution, yielding more power to the Chinese, but it was too late. By July 1911, Liang Qichao, who was regarded as the leader of the Constitutionalists, finally resolved to call for the overthrow of the Qing government.

While the Constitutionalists were often branded elitist and their actions seemed relatively ineffectual in the final days of the Qing dynasty, it is undeniable that they trained, in some respects inadvertently, and often imperfectly, a national class of progressive gentry and provincial officials in the ways of parliamentary politics. One historian has estimated that by 1911 the total number of county, department, sub-prefecture, market town and township councils came to about five thousand.¹²⁰ The

¹¹⁷ Zhang Pengyuan, 71.

¹¹⁸ COC, vol. 11, 513.

¹¹⁹ Jiang Yong, 79.

¹²⁰ Thompson, 125.

franchise was extended, albeit stringently, to qualified commoners, and the emperor's power had been divided and partially transferred to the cabinet. In the last six years of the Qing dynasty the Constitutionalists, in the name of the emperor, inspired dramatic changes that ultimately assisted the revolutionaries in bringing down the dynasty.

Rights Recovery

A further indication of the growing political clout of the gentry is the series of events that unfolded in the struggle between the government and the local provinces over the construction of railways in the first decade of twentieth century China. Although conservatives at the Qing court had long objected to railroad construction projects on the grounds that they were detrimental to Chinese customs (specifically, the widespread popular belief in *fengshui*; see Chapter 3) and also likely to encourage foreign interference, progressive officials in the late Qing period prevailed with the argument that railroads were conducive to economic development and important for national defense. In the 1880s, Li Hongzhang was able to build two railways financed with foreign loans, the Tianjin-Shanhaiguan line and the Jilong-Xinzhu line, but these came with no political strings attached, and management was in the hands of the Chinese.¹²¹ In 1889, the Qing government tried to raise capital from private sources in order to build a railroad designed to counter Russia's new Trans-Siberian railway, but it failed because the dynasty could not interest wealthy Chinese gentry in the project.¹²²

¹²¹ Lee En-han, *China's Quest for Railway Autonomy*, 12.

¹²² Ibid.

The “scramble for concessions” changed everything. After the Sino-Japanese War, China was no longer in a position to refuse foreign demands. Ultimately, as discussed briefly in Chapters 1 and 3, the scramble for railway concessions became part of an intense competition for financial, industrial and mining concessions, as well as for leased seaports and territorial “spheres of influence” in China. In 1896, Russia obtained the first such concession when it routed the Trans-Siberian railway through northern Manchuria to Harbin, Port Arthur and Dairen. From 1896 to 1898 the French gained railway and mining rights in Vietnam, Guangxi and Yunnan, after which they took over Guangzhou Bay. In 1897 Germany occupied Jiaozhou Bay and began building railways in Shandong province. The British owned a network of railways that extended to ten provinces from northern China, to the lower Yangzi River valley, and down to Guangdong and Yunnan.

China’s weak diplomatic position and lack of experience in international negotiations led them to make concessions that were economically disadvantageous. The Russians not only exploited coal and other mineral resources along its railways, it also received land concessions and exclusive rights to administer the land, including the right to import its own police force. Most foreign creditors forbade Chinese construction of other railroads in the same region or even extensions of lines in adjacent regions, which effectively curtailed Chinese efforts to establish a competitive presence. The terms of these Sino-foreign negotiations often demanded that China turn over management of the railway to the foreign power in question, borrow more funds from the same creditors, and pledge the railway as mortgage. These conditions virtually ensured that foreign powers had complete control of the railways. The interest on these loans averaged a profitable

11.05%; additionally the exchange rate was often controlled by foreign corporations, leading to more opportunities for the foreign creditors to manipulate the arrangements in their favor.¹²³

The Qing was so alarmed by the prospect of the break-up of China that in order to offset rivalries among the rest of the foreign nations, Chinese officials sought American involvement in construction of the Canton-Hankou railway.¹²⁴ In 1897, the China Railroad General Company (*Tielu zonggongsi*) was established by the Qing court to supervise and control railway construction and to negotiate with foreign powers, but the inefficiency and corruption rampant in the official-run railway companies was such that the government soon began to push for privatization.

In 1903 a Bureau of Commerce was established by the court, and guidelines were issued to the provincial authorities to allow privately run railroads.¹²⁵ The move to privatize railroad and mining companies coincided with the New Policy directives, which encouraged commercial development--especially with respect to the building of railroads. The prevalent thinking was, "the more railroads, the more commerce and the greater the tax revenue."¹²⁶ Encouraged by official sanction, merchants in fifteen provinces formed sixteen railroad companies in the period from 1903 to 1907.¹²⁷ Railway enterprises were set up in Sichuan, Yunnan, Anhui, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Guangxi, Henan, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shanxi and Guangdong. Some were government-supervised and merchant-run (*guandu shangban*; an old formula from the

¹²³ Lee En-han, 23. Ji Pixia, Zhao Yonghou and Jiang Xingmei, "Jianping Qingmo shangban tielu," (A concise critique of the late Qing's merchant owned railroads), 42-6.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 13-16.

¹²⁵ Sun Zijian, "Wanqing tielu zhengce de guanban yu shangban zhizheng" (The dispute between the late Qing officially-run and privately-run railroad policies), 52-5.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Wang Xianming and Shi Chunfeng, "Shenshi zai shouhui liquan yundong zhong de zuoyong," (The effect of the gentry in the Rights Recovery Movement), 20-27.

Self-Strengthening era), while others were undertaken solely by merchant-gentry, without government oversight.¹²⁸

Even though such companies might have been registered as "private" commercial enterprises, most received substantial funding from the government.¹²⁹ Ironically, while the merchant-gentry clamored to reclaim railroad rights from the government-sanctioned foreign investors, their inability to raise funds meant that the Qing government quietly had to subsidize their "private" operations with funds borrowed from foreign banks. Nonetheless, the difference between foreign-owned and Qing-subsidized "private" Chinese corporations was significant: In the latter situation the Chinese retained full control of the railways and the territory surrounding them, which remained subject to Chinese rule. This did not necessarily mean, however, that the Chinese people in these areas suffered any less.

Between 1904 and 1908, the people's vehement opposition to foreign-operated railroad and mining contracts attained new heights, fanned by newspaper articles, plays, and public speeches by progressive intellectuals like Chen Duxiu. Railroad companies offered public stocks at affordable costs; women sometimes sold their dowries to invest; and even coolies put their meager earnings into Chinese railway enterprises. Thousands of students became involved in the movement--ten times the number that had been actively engaged with the Resist-Russia movement.¹³⁰

Overseas students from Sichuan province raised \$300,000 to send home.¹³¹ Meanwhile, high school students in Sichuan, along with those in railway schools and

¹²⁸ Lee En-han, 43.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 93.

¹³⁰ Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 259.

¹³¹ Ibid., *Qingmo xin zhishijie*, 348.

schools of physical education, formed separate railway recovery associations that joined with the Sichuan All-School Railway Recovery Comrade Association. A student leader, Wang Zhiyi, called for “four strikes” (*siba*), urging the four classes of farmers, laborers, businessmen and intellectuals to go on strike in unison. The governor of Sichuan responded with violent and bloody reprisals against the strikers, significantly escalating the level of violence in the province.¹³² Elsewhere students formed organizations with names such as the Beijing Zhejiang Railroad Preservation Society, the Tianjin Beiyang Boycott of Japanese Goods Association, the Guangdong Save Sovereignty Association, and the United Jiangzhe Schools Loan Refusal Society. These networks not only tied the overseas students to their comrades in China, but also linked academic networks to the gentry in the provincial Rights Recovery Movement.¹³³

As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, an important facet of the Rights Recovery Movement was the attempt on the part of the Chinese gentry to reclaim ownership of mines. Organizations with names such as the All-Anhui Provincial Mineral Institute, the Zhejiang Railroad Fund Refusal Society, and the Henan Provincial Protect the Mine Association came into existence in the years from 1906 to 1911.¹³⁴ This period was a boom time for native investors, as there were twenty-four mining corporations registered with a total capital of 10.1 million yuan (Chinese dollars). The return on investment from certain profitable railway lines was significant; the Tianjin-Niuchuang railway reported gross revenues of \$12.9 million Chinese yuan, while its total expenditure was \$3.9 million. Some lines, however, were politically attractive but commercially barren.¹³⁵

¹³² Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 273.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 261.

¹³⁴ Wang Xianming and Shi Chunfeng, 22.

¹³⁵ Lee En-han, 35.

The surge of Chinese investment in railroad and mining operations coincided with a number of historical contingencies: (1) Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war had reduced the intense competition among foreign powers for concessions in China; (2) Japan's pre-eminence in China was checked by a pact signed with Britain in 1905, which compelled the Japanese government to adopt a cautious policy of cooperation with Britain in China; (3) The U. S. continued to champion the Open Door policy before the onset of the more mercantile Taft administration in 1908, thus pursuing an idealistic and non-invasive diplomacy in China; and (4) Somewhat ironically, Britain had set the tone by showing support for a stable, moderately progressive and independent Chinese government.¹³⁶

The first successful effort at rights recovery, as discussed in Chapter 3, was the return of the American Canton-Hankou railway concession in 1904-5, which was achieved through a strict interpretation of the original Sino-American agreement. In the next few years, officials and gentry-merchants in Zhejiang, Anhui and other provinces agitated to recover all or part of the railway mining rights that had been signed over to foreigners. They adopted a stance of "civilized anti-foreignism" (*wenming paiwai*), which meant using peaceful means to achieve their goals.¹³⁷ These peaceful and non-violent measures stood in sharp contrast to the destructive and xenophobic measures employed by the Boxers a few years before.

The policy of "civilized anti-foreignism" was an effort to emulate Japanese and Western forms of protest in adopting peaceful and non-violent methods to counter an

¹³⁶ Lee En-han, 38.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 3.

unjust act.¹³⁸ It marked an emerging class of progressive intellectuals, returned students and gentry-merchants who strove to achieve certain economic goals as a means of asserting their growing political clout. In their eyes, national goals could best be attained by provincial means, and recovering the rights to built their own railroads and construct their own mines without foreign loans became the ultimate symbol of victory. Discounting the beneficial effects of foreign know-how in their efforts to jump-start the Chinese economy, provincial activists emphasized the politically aggressive aspect of foreign investments in China.

Significantly, the growth of the Rights Recovery Movement was in direct proportion to the size and location of the Constitutional movement. Thus the lower and middle Yangzi River regions and parts of South China were especially vocal about reclaiming railroad and mining rights, and the leaderships of rights recovery movements often belonged in the same network(s) as the Constitutionalists. The Western and Northern parts of the nation were less active on both fronts.¹³⁹

Aside from giving China's steel and other strategic industries a shot in the arm, the actual commercial benefits of privatization, i.e. provincial acquisition of the railway and mining companies, were few. And the gentry's refusal to accept foreign funding meant that in order to raise investment capital, taxes (on land, real estate and even everyday products such as rice, grain, salt, tea and medicine) had to be raised, rents had to be increased, and so forth--all of which would place a further burden on an already struggling population.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Lee En-han, 85.

¹³⁹ Lee En-han, 91.

¹⁴⁰ Ji Pixia et al, 44.

The audacity of provincial officials and gentry-merchants in rejecting the Qing government's contractual agreements with foreign powers represented the most radical outcome of the Rights Recovery movement. In this struggle for control of the railways, the local gentry forged a nationalistic coalition of disparate social groups against the central government, which was increasingly viewed as unpatriotic, pro-imperialist and anti-Chinese.

By the end of 1908, all of the provincially-run, gentry-financed railway programs in China, with the exception of the Beijing-Kalgan, Xinning and Zhejiang lines, were in serious financial trouble. Unable to raise enough capital privately, lacking engineering expertise and managerial talent, and beset by corruption and embezzlement,¹⁴¹ the private Chinese railway companies crumbled. By 1909, of the 3740 kilometers of railroads built in China, only 61 kilometers were owned by the Chinese (See Table 8). The situation with the mines was equally dire.¹⁴²

In the previous year, the Manchu regent, Zai Fen, had abruptly removed Yuan Shikai from his powerful posts as governor-general of Zhili and northern commissioner of military and foreign affairs, just when a group of Manchu princes and nobles decided to craft a new railway policy.¹⁴³ And as the deficit of the dynasty mounted, going from 33 million to 85 million taels of silver in the years from 1909 to 1911, the central government increasingly looked to the railways as a source of income, even though most of the private railroad ventures were falling apart.

In May of 1911 the government nationalized all privately owned Chinese railroads; it returned to borrowing from foreign powers, and suppressed all opposition.

¹⁴¹ Lee En-han, 133-139.

¹⁴² Wang Xianming and Shi Chunfeng, 22.

¹⁴³ Lee En-han, 232.

Considering the dismal record of most privately run railways, and the Qing government's growing sophistication in contract negotiations, a system of re-configured, officially-run, foreign-funded railroad companies might have been a rational economic solution to the state's problems.¹⁴⁴ But the Qing government managed things badly. Proceeding to buy back privately-run companies with a combination of foreign loans and bonds, the state provided adequate monetary compensation to the gentry in some provinces (Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong), and so there was little resistance. But the gentry in Sichuan received almost no compensation.

On June 17, 1911 the Society for the Preservation of Sichuan Railway rights was organized by the provincial gentry-merchants in order to coordinate the opposition movement.¹⁴⁵ Soon this movement developed into a massive political force calling for provincial autonomy. Anti-Manchu uprisings demonstrations followed, which were suppressed violently by Beijing. In September of 1911, opposition to the central government had erupted into open revolt. Soon thereafter, gentry-merchant organizations in Hunan, Hubei, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Yunnan, Guizhou, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Shandong rose up against the government. Provincial assemblies, often supported by local units of the New Army, declared their independence. By seriously misjudging both the intensity of Chinese nationalism and the power of the discontented Chinese public, the Qing dynasty had brought down its own house. The Manchu court tried to salvage the situation by re-appointing Yuan Shikai first as military commander and then as prime minister, and renouncing the railway nationalization plan, but it was too late.

¹⁴⁴ Sun Zijian, 54.

¹⁴⁵ Lee En-han, 260.

Table 8- Railways Built in China, 1880s-1911. (Miles)¹⁴⁶

Years	Chinese Government Financing	Chinese Private Financing	Foreign Capital	Total
1880s-1894	195			195*
1895-1903	814		1,699	2,513
1904-1911	2,009	401	678	3,088
Total	3,018	401	2,377	5,796
Percentage	52.07%	6.92%	41.01%	100%

*Excluding 59 miles built in Taiwan.

The 1911 Revolution

The 1911 revolution that toppled the Qing dynasty has been variously characterized as a revolution without real leadership, the initial stage of a larger historical process, or a political regime change without a significant alteration in the social structure.¹⁴⁷ If a "revolution" results in a radical transformation of some sort, then the designation 1911 Revolution seems apt, since the events of 1911-1912 ended an imperial system of dynastic rule that had endured for more than two thousand years. For all of its messy aftermath, including failed constitutionalism and rampant warlordism, the 1911 revolution achieved the peaceful abdication of an emperor and the transition of China into a republic; to that extent the "revolution" succeeded. The gains of the 1911

¹⁴⁶ Lee En-han, 13.

¹⁴⁷ Wright, 53-56.

revolution may have seemed minimal at the time, and the upheaval more of a “shudder” than a “revolt,” but in fact the changes were monumental.

On Oct. 9, 1911, members of the Progressive Association (Gongjin hui), a branch of the Revolutionary Alliance in Wuchang, Hubei province, accidentally exploded a bomb. The subsequent seizure by Qing police of rosters that included the names of revolutionaries forced the Alliance to preempt the starting date of their planned uprising. By October 11 they had taken over the city of Wuchang, and the well-liked Hubei New Army commander, Li Yuanhong, was persuaded to become the governor of the Hubei military government. News of the Wuchang uprising spread, and fifteen provinces declared their independence from the Qing in the following seven weeks. In many cases counties and cities preceded the provincial authorities in seceding from the Qing, but their declarations did not automatically become pledges of allegiance to new revolutionary authorities.¹⁴⁸ In fact, until the revolutionaries could provide a centralized authority, the chambers of commerce and the associated guilds became de facto governing units for several months.¹⁴⁹

In November of 1911 the provincial governments called for the convocation of a national assembly and the creation of a national government. Shortly afterward, the Hubei government invited delegates to attend an assembly in Wuhan, and a month later the military governors of Zhejiang and Jiangsu called for a national conference in Shanghai, using the “Continental Congress of America” as a model.¹⁵⁰ A tug of war ensued between Wuhan and Shanghai for provincial delegates. Shanghai was the headquarters of the Revolutionary Alliance, whose leader, Chen Qimei, was alienated

¹⁴⁸ COC, vol. 1, 527.

¹⁴⁹ Wright, 268.

¹⁵⁰ COC, vol. 1, 528.

from Sun Yat-sen after Sun's failed uprising in Guangzhou earlier that year. Shanghai fell on November 4 with little fighting, and Chen Qimei was elected its military governor.¹⁵¹ Revolutionaries worked closely with the Shanghai business community and the foreign consular corps, and the businessmen threw their support behind Sun Yat-sen. Eventually Shanghai won the power struggle.¹⁵²

On January 1, 1912, the Chinese Republic was proclaimed in Nanjing, with Sun Yat-sen as the provisional president. But the Wuhan government under Li Yuanhong remained in existence, and the men who carried out the Wuchang uprising never recognized Sun's authority. This situation highlights the diverse goals and regional allegiances of the revolutionaries. In effect, the 1911 revolution represented an almost accidental convergence of disparate revolutionary bodies who were able to defeat weak Qing forces in various localities, but who had no clear plan for their next move. The revolution was not a concerted effort by one united group with clear leadership, and had the Qing resistance been stronger, the revolutionaries might not have succeeded.

In any case, the Qing emperor abdicated on February 12, 1912, in a remarkably peaceful transition that was largely credited to the efforts of Yuan Shikai, who skillfully negotiated his way into the premiership of the Qing government. Yuan not only managed to bring about the bloodless abdication of the Manchu ruler, but he also managed to encourage the foreign powers to recognize the new Republic.¹⁵³

Wielding command of the Beiyang Army, Yuan had been sought after by both the revolutionaries and the dynasty because of his stature, experience, political savvy and military strength. The Qing central authorities naturally wanted Yuan to side with them

¹⁵¹ Rankin, 204.

¹⁵² Lu Desheng, X Chenglun, and Zhang Wei eds., *Zhengzhi Fengyun* (Political currents), 191.

¹⁵³ Wright, 436.

and defeat the revolutionaries, but he took a more attractive offer. Facing a bankrupt provisional government and a fractious Revolutionary Alliance, Sun and his comrades needed Yuan's military and financial resources, and by winning him over they removed the single most formidable obstacle to the success of the revolution.¹⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the foreign powers, for their part, counted on Yuan's authority to keep their investments safe. Sun thus had no choice but to hand in his resignation on February 14, and the next day Yuan Shikai was elected president of the Republic by representatives of seventeen provinces in the Nanjing National Assembly. Sun did not retire from office, however, until April 1, and was elected director-general of the Guomindang (lit. National People's Party), a party composed largely of members of the Revolutionary Alliance.¹⁵⁵

Anhui and Chen Duxiu in the 1911 Revolution

A brief look at conditions in Anhui during the years 1911 to 1913 yields an “on-the-ground” appreciation of the chaotic conditions associated with the revolution. The outcome must have seemed quite uncertain to the people who lived through the times with all of the changing allegiances and rampant opportunism. Anhui gazettes recounted plundering by invading forces (see below) and the suffering of the people--suffering that was not always at the hands of the Qing authorities. While the revolutionaries failed to take the city of Anqing in the aftermath of the Wuchang uprising, they succeeded in capturing Shouzhou in northern Anhui. They freed prisoners from jail, burned the tax

¹⁵⁴ Xia Siyun, “Xinhai geming shiqi gemingdang ren yongyuan fanqing celue xinlun” (New discussion on the pro-Yuan anti-Qing policy of the Revolutionary Party during the Xinhai Revolution), 37:5 (Sep., 2008), 113-114.

¹⁵⁵ Wright, 286.

registry, and prevailed on men to cut off their queues and join the army.¹⁵⁶ The provincial assembly of Anhui declared its independence from the Qing dynasty on November 8, 1911 and selected Zhu Jiabao as governor. Initially, Zhu refused to join the revolutionaries declaring, “[I] live by the munificence of the Qing and will die by the Qing; if the city stands, I stand. If the city dies, I die.”¹⁵⁷ Eventually, however, Zhu went over to the side of the revolutionaries.¹⁵⁸

On November 11 the military commander, Li Zongyue, from the neighboring province of Jiangxi, invaded Anhui. The Anhui governor, powerless when his troops were reassigned elsewhere, fled the province. Li set up a military government in Shouzhou, northern Anhui, and effectively divided the province into two. He plundered the Anhui treasury by confiscating the salt revenue, the customs revenue, and the indemnity payments earmarked for the British and Germans. In all, he embezzled a total of four hundred thousand taels of silver.¹⁵⁹ A commander under Li swooped down on Anqing and imposed a reign of terror on the city, only to be dislodged when another commander, Li Liejun, rode into town. However, when the grateful gentry-merchants of Anqing asked Li Liejun to become their governor, the revolutionaries in Anqing opposed his election.

On day twenty of Anhui’s independence, the revolutionaries and the gentry-merchants formed a Bureau for the Preservation of a United Anhui Province (Weichi Wan sheng tongyi jiguan) as an operational government; gentry member, Han Yan,

¹⁵⁶ Lu Desheng et al, 163.

¹⁵⁷ Lu Desheng et al, 164.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 187.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 193.

was chosen secretary-general.¹⁶⁰ By December Sun Yujun was appointed governor in a unanimous decision by the Shanghai branch of the Revolutionary Alliance and the Anhui provincial assembly. Sun, a friend of Chen Duxiu's, had studied in Japan and was a member of the Revolutionary Alliance. For his attempt to assassinate Duanfang in 1906, he had been jailed for five years, and upon his release became the vice secretary-general of the Zhejiang revolutionary army.¹⁶¹

Sun immediately summoned Chen Duxiu from Hangzhou to be the secretary general of the Anhui provisional government.¹⁶² The composition of the government reflected an inclination in the provinces to choose among a mixed bag of constitutionalists, members of the provincial assembly, military men, and bureaucrats from the Qing provincial administration.¹⁶³ Because Sun Yujun was an opium addict, the day to day operation of the provincial government fell to Chen.¹⁶⁴

Chen's first task was to participate in the Anhui Disaster Relief by traveling to Shanghai and setting up the All-Anhui Relief Coordination Bureau.¹⁶⁵ Heavy rains flooded nine counties of Anhui in June of 1911, contributing to 800,000 deaths and three million homeless in the province that year.¹⁶⁶ A notice was posted in papers soliciting help from the government, overseas Chinese, "assemblymen, soldiers, students, gentry

¹⁶⁰ Anhui Shengzhi (Anhui provincial gazette), vol. 1, 70.

¹⁶¹ Li Peng and Zhang Xi eds., *Anhui Lidai Mingren* (Famous People in Anhui History), 267.

¹⁶² Shen Ji and Zhang Xiangbing discuss at lengths whether Chen was secretary or secretary-general (*mishu* or *mishuzhang*). Various newspaper accounts and memoirs of friends call Chen secretary-general, but in the Anhui government roster Chen was not listed as such. Both conclude that in either case, Chen performed the duty of a secretary-general due to his proficiency and the lack of such of Sun Yujun. See Zhang Bingxiang, 290-294; Shen Ji, 150-153.

¹⁶³ Li Peng and Zhang Xi, 71.

¹⁶⁴ Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu," PLXB, vol. 1, 101. This post is equivalent to that of a provost.

¹⁶⁵ Zhang Bingxiang, 240-244.

¹⁶⁶ Weng Fei, 361.

and merchants.”¹⁶⁷ The response to the notice was positive, and this early effort got the Anhui revolutionary government off to a positive start.¹⁶⁸

As the secretary-general of the government, Chen took the opportunity to reopen the Anhui Upper Level School (precursor to today’s Anhui University) and appointed educator Ma Tongbo as president. In order to ensure that the school survived, he turned over his government position to a friend, Li Guangjiong, and became a dean at the Anhui Upper Level School.¹⁶⁹ Chen was a forceful speaker, and one of his colleagues recalled that during meetings Chen’s voice could always be heard over all the others. He was especially mindful about the problems of re-hiring bureaucrats from the former administration, wary that the corruptive practices of the past would carry over to the new government.¹⁷⁰

Due to an altercation with some students, Chen quit his position and returned to the position of secretary-general. The circumstances under which Chen left the school provide insight into the difficulty of being an educator in this transitional time. Prior to Chen’s tenure, Yan Fu had been dean of the school and did not stay long; the reputation of the school was such that Anhui natives did not care to apply for the position of the dean. The following conversation between Chen and the students over an undetermined issue was reconstructed by one of his successors:

“Students: ‘We insist on doing this, do you agree? It is fine if you do, and fine if you don’t.’

¹⁶⁷ Zhang Bingxiang, 242.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 243.

¹⁶⁹ ZL, 7.

¹⁷⁰ Shen Ji, “Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu,” PLXB, vol. 1, 101.

Chen: 'I will never agree.'

Student: 'You actually disagree? What is your reason?'

Chen: 'I don't have to explain my reason to you.'

Student: 'Well then, you are too barbaric.'

Chen: 'I am barbaric, and have been for many years. Don't you understand this yet?'

At this time, calls to beat him rose from all sides, and lights went out all over the school . . . Mr. Chen, limber revolutionary that he was, managed to escape in the nick of time . . ."¹⁷¹ No new materials have been unearthed to shed light on the exact nature of the student demands, but Chen was clearly not a champion of this group of youths.

The divided state of Anhui finally ended when it became subsumed under the national government in Nanjing in May 1912. Sun Yujun left his post to join Yuan Shikai in Beijing, and Yuan appointed Bo Wenwei, a staunch supporter of Chen's Yuewang hui, to be governor to Anhui. Chen returned to his post as secretary-general, watching warily as the revolutionary camp began to split into pro-Yuan and the pro-Sun factions.¹⁷² In the chaotic first seven months of Anhui's independence, seven different governors assumed control of the provincial government.¹⁷³ While Bo Wenwei was governor, he brought order and a measure of democracy to the province. He endowed the provisional assembly with the power to conduct provincial affairs, to decide military and civil legal issues, to calculate the budget, and to set the tax rate and float bonds. He held

¹⁷¹ Zhang Bingxiang, 295-296.

¹⁷² ZL, 7.

¹⁷³ They are: Zhu Jiabao, Wang Tianpei, Huang Huanzhang, Ma Yubao, Li Liejun, Li Zongyue, and Sun Yujun, Lu Desheng et al, 196.

province-wide elections, and by 1913 one hundred and forty-three assemblymen were chosen to sit in the houses.¹⁷⁴

Despite strapped finances, the assembly allocated a relatively generous budget for education, a decision that seems to have been the result of Chen Duxiu's efforts. Bo also hired revolutionaries to staff the government, reformed the finances, expanded the army, and set about eradicating opium smoking and foot binding. According to one of Chen's friends, this was a happy time in Chen's life, as he was able to realize his political ambitions and enjoy the company of family and friends. Zhou Yueran, later a Dean of the Anhui Upper Level School, recalled that Chen was a forceful personality, but outgoing and friendly. He played mahjong with the governor and often consorted with call-girls.¹⁷⁵

In the aftermath of the revolution, the Revolutionary Alliance splintered along ideological lines. Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing favored a push toward industrialization and economic development, leaving the political issues to Yuan Shikai, while Song Jiaoren wanted to create a cabinet with members of various political parties in order to counter Yuan's power. Song was the mastermind in the creation of the Guomindang uniting four smaller political parties on Aug. 25, 1912.¹⁷⁶ Although Sun Yat-sen was elected chairman of the Guomindang, Song Jiaoren held the real power.

Yuan Shikai, sensing a challenge, ordered Song's assassination in March, 1913. By April 26 a public verdict was reached on the Song assassination, and Yuan's complicity was revealed. The Anhui provincial assembly voted to investigate the

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 395.

¹⁷⁵ Zhang Bingxiang, 299-300.

¹⁷⁶ The four parties are: United Republican Party (Tongyi gonghedang), Citizens' Public Party (Guomin gongdang), Citizen's Progress Society (Guomin gongjinhui), and Republican Real Progress Society (Gonghe shijinhui), Lu Desheng et al, 166.

assassination and to impeach Yuan. Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing could not agree on their next move, however; Sun favored military force to fight Yuan, but Huang argued for using legal channels. In the meantime, Yuan showed his contempt for the constitutional system by failing to consult the national assembly before concluding a “Reconstruction Loan” of 2.5 million pounds with the five powers: England, France, Germany, Japan and Russia. This arrogance, as much as Song's assassination, led to an uproar among the provincial gentry. In May, Yuan appointed his protégé, Duan Qirui, as prime minister, and the latter began preparing for war. In June, Yuan fired provincial governors who opposed him, including Bo Wenwei of Anhui.¹⁷⁷

Despite Huang Xing's warning of the possibility of creating chaos on a national scale,¹⁷⁸ Li Liejun declared war on Yuan on July 12, and seven provinces, including Anhui, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian, Sichuan and Hunan, proclaimed independence from Beijing. This became known in Chinese historiography as the “Second Revolution.” By this time, Huang and Sun had had a falling out, and, overwhelmed by Yuan's superior military power, the anti-Yuan forces were defeated in just two months.

Chen Duxiu, who helped Bo Wenwei fight Yuan's forces in Anhui, was captured by Yuan's men after Bo was betrayed. Chen put himself in harm's way by scolding a revolutionary officer with a reputation for ruthlessness and brutality. The officer became enraged and ordered Chen tied up in preparation for his execution. When the officer's superior attempted to intervene, he was tied up in turn.¹⁷⁹ Chen's sang-froid became

¹⁷⁷ Lu Desheng et al, 207.

¹⁷⁸ Xue Jundu, *Huang Xing yu Zhongguo geming* (Huang Xing and the Chinese revolution), 159.

¹⁷⁹ AWZX, 23. This story has been disputed by Shen Ji and Zhang Binxiang, the former accepting the story that the officer in question was ruthless and Chen scolded him out of a sense of justice, while Zhang argues

legendary as he slept soundly after his arrest, and then calmly instructed his captors to make it quick if they decided to shoot him. He was rescued and released by a former student who had become an officer in the military.¹⁸⁰ Later, Chen's nephew was captured and condemned to death by the Yuan forces, but the nephew was finally released after much negotiation. Chen's stepfather had passed away by then, but his stepmother's illness worsened after this incident.¹⁸¹

The failure of the Second Revolution devastated intellectuals and revolutionaries alike. Their high hopes for building a new republic were dashed by the cynical manipulation of Yuan, and by the crushing realization that the lives of their comrades were lost in vain. Furthermore, the near bankruptcy of the provincial government prohibited a third campaign to fight Yuan. Anhui was recaptured by Yuan's lieutenant, Ni Sichong, who controlled the province for the next fourteen years. Ni's reign was noted for the expansion of his army, for his abolition of the provincial government's education and trade bureaus, and for placing family members and friends in charge of collecting taxes and all other financial matters.¹⁸²

As the political, social and economic situation deteriorated in Anhui,¹⁸³ a dispirited and penniless Chen Duxiu left the province for Shanghai, where he pursued the study of philology. He completed a manual called "Ziyi leibie" (A categorization of words by meaning), and also edited manuscripts, including an English dictionary, for Wang Mengzou's publishing house, the Yadong shudian. But none of his books sold

that the officer was framed by others and therefore grew enraged when Chen scolded him. See Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu," PLXB, vol. 1, 103; Zhang Bingxiang, 312.

¹⁸⁰ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 102.

¹⁸¹ Shen Ji, "Xinhai geming shiqi de Chen Duxiu," PLXB, vol. 1, 103.

¹⁸² *Anhui Shengzhi*, 73.

¹⁸³ Weng Fei, 359-363.

well. The manual, which explained the original meanings of many Chinese characters, was not published until 1925. Chen wrote in 1914 that he was “putting down my pen and quietly waiting to die.”¹⁸⁴ Chen’s adoptive father’s family was well-to-do, but he refused to ask for money. Instead, he would visit Wang Mengzhou in his publishing office, lingering for a bit, and Wang, knowing how proud Chen was, would quietly ask if he needed some money. “[Chen] would nod, take a dollar or two, sit for a bit longer and then leave.”¹⁸⁵ Upon hearing of Chen’s strained circumstances, Zhang Shizhao promptly invited him to Japan to edit the *Tiger*, or *Jiayin*, magazine. Leaving his wife behind in the care of Wang Mengzhou, Chen left for Tokyo.

With their defeat in the Second Revolution, Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing fled to Japan. Sun lost credibility among overseas supporters, and had a falling out with Huang over the creation of the new China Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua Gemingdang). To some extent Sun blamed Huang for the failure of the revolution, while Huang objected to the fingerprinting and swearing of allegiance to Sun as violations of democratic principles.¹⁸⁶ The new party was founded on July 8, 1914, but following Huang Xing’s example not many leaders of the revolution joined.¹⁸⁷ In 1914 Yuan abolished the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, dismissed the National Assembly, and declared that presidents would serve for life.

¹⁸⁴ ZZX, vol.1, 103.

¹⁸⁵ Shen Ji ed., *Chen Duxiu Yanjiu* (The study of Chen Duxiu), vol. 1, 378.

¹⁸⁶ Xue Jundu, 142-3.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 145.

Chapter 5. Chen Duxiu's Post-Revolution Revolution

If overthrowing the Qing dynasty was one of Chen Duxiu's main goals in the 1900s, overthrowing Yuan Shikai's dictatorship became his focus in the first half of the 1910s. Once again favoring the pen over the sword, Chen joined his friend Zhang Shizhao in attacking Yuan and other unscrupulous politicians of the early Republican era, turning the Japan-based *Tiger* magazine, established in 1914, into a celebrated instrument of overseas opposition to the Yuan regime. It was a particularly dark time for Chen, but after the *Tiger* was shut down by the Japanese government under Yuan's pressure in 1915, Chen returned to China and immediately made plans to launch his own progressive magazine.

Chen's grand design for this new magazine--titled *Youth* and later renamed *New Youth*--was to have a "great impact" on Chinese society within a decade of its inception. But not even he, with all of his rekindled energy and idealism, could have foreseen how rapid, widespread and profound the influence of this publication would be.

Chen had high hopes for his readers, a select group of young intellectuals on whose shoulders he placed the heavy burden of rehabilitating China. What did he expect of them? One of his major goals was their complete ethical transformation. In place of an old but still surprisingly persistent Confucian model of belief and behavior, which emphasized reverence for the past, stability and submission to hierarchical authority, Chen offered these "new youths" a Darwinian alternative, one that celebrated change, creativity and individualism. With the support of another former collaborator and friend from the early 1900s, Cai Yuanpei, who had become the chancellor of prestigious Beijing

University (aka Beida) after a period of study abroad, Chen developed a large network of talented and diverse individuals--many of whom were already friends and acquaintance--who assisted him in his ambitious project of transforming Chinese society by means of the written word. Together, they launched what became known as the New Culture Movement (1915-1923), an iconoclastic assault on inherited values, time-honored literary forms, conventional ways of looking at the world, and old-fashioned paradigms for understanding and evaluating experience. This assault produced an energetic response from a number of equally intelligent and highly educated individuals who happened to hold decidedly different views.

The result was that the *New Youth* magazine, and other publications like it, became the principle means by which Chinese intellectuals argued about everything that really mattered to them, from philosophy and science to art and literature. And almost everything mattered, especially politics. As had been the case in the first decade of the twentieth century, imperialism continued to loom large on China's horizon, encouraged now by the chaos caused by warlordism. Indeed, the two phenomena were closely connected, because warlords often sought military assistance from foreigners, who naturally expected political and economic advantages to be given to them in return. Thus, discussions and debates about what was best for China acquired a special urgency; Chinese intellectuals of the New Culture era simply did not have the luxury of abstract discussions.

Tokyo and the *Tiger* Magazine

After fleeing China and seeking refuge in Tokyo, Sun Yat-sen formed the China Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua Gemingdang). In 1914, Huang Xing and Li Genyuan (1879-1965) established the European Affairs Study Group (*Oushi yanjiu hui*), which attracted exiled assemblymen, political moderates and overseas students who shunned Sun's China Revolutionary Party.¹ Ostensibly the purpose of the study society was to discuss the ramifications of World War I for China,² but in reality its purpose was to advocate a united front against Japanese and Western imperialism, and to urge that all Chinese political factions drop their resistance to Yuan in pursuit of this goal.³ Chen Duxiu, Zhang Shizhao, Bo Wenwei, Cai Yuanpei, Chen Jiongming (1878-1933), Zhang Dongsun (1887-1973), Zhang Ji (1882-1947), and Wang Jingwei (1833-1944) were among the hundred-plus members of the Group.⁴

Zhang Shizhao, who had served as Sun's secretary-general during the anti-Yuan campaign in 1913, and had drafted Sun's declaration of war against Yuan, became chief editor of the *Jiayin zazhi* (Tiger magazine) in 1914.⁵ This periodical was funded by Huang Xing's European Affairs Study Group. First published when Yuan suspended the republican parliament and cancelled the Provisional Constitution, Zhang used the magazine to censure Yuan with theoretical discussions about political tolerance and the intricacies of Anglo-American democracy. While he was something of a political maverick, Zhang attempted to present a voice of moderation and compromise. He claimed that "In order to expose current abuse, [one must] offer solid knowledge and truthful reasoning" In his view, it was necessary to "examine all evidence before

¹ Weston, "The Formation and Positioning of the New Culture Community," 258-9; Xue Jundu, 142-3.

² Weston, "The Formation and Positioning of the New Culture Community," 86.

³ Bai Ji'an, *Zhang Shizhao Zhuan*, 86.

⁴ Weston, 259.

⁵ Zhang Bingxiang, 321.

reaching a conclusion,” and to “refrain from favoring any political party.” Speaking in particular about the *Tiger* magazine, he said that the aim of the publication was simply to “depict social reality and speak for society.”⁶

Zhang launched his magazine with an essay titled, “The Foundations of Government,”⁷ in which he suggested that the “root” of government rested in the people and their talents. Toleration of differences was the foundation of a good government, and the success of a government depended on the strengths and weaknesses of people. This sentiment also appears in the Confucian classic, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, to which Zhang made reference in supporting his statement that social transformations depend on the “prime movers” of society, on their leadership by example, and not on the institutions currently in existence.⁸ His erudite discussions of Western liberal political theories offered readers an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms necessary for founding regimes, the consequences of individual actions, and the nature of contractual agreements between the people and the state.⁹

In refuting Yan Fu’s critique of Rousseau’s concepts of natural rights and the social contract, Zhang re-interpreted natural rights in terms of Wang Yangming’s concept of *liangzhi*, or “innate moral knowledge.” While Yan argued that a social contract was premature for China because the people were too unsophisticated to understand politics, Zhang believed that the innately good qualities of all men, not just the elite, could transform society.¹⁰

⁶ Bai Ji’an, 89.

⁷ Jenco, 18.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 18-23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-33.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 11-18.

During the years of the *Tiger's* publication, Zhang developed a theory about the negotiation and harmonization of binary opposites. Postulating that in politics, as in nature, vitality could only be achieved when polarities are reconciled, he favored neither Yuan's autocracy nor the militancy of revolutionaries, pointing instead to the Western parliamentary system as a mediated central position.¹¹

In addition to providing a forum for esoteric discussions of political theory, the *Tiger* magazine offered timely information on the activities of the foreign powers, such as a report from an *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* article that listed the details of thirty loan agreements the Chinese central and provincial governments had signed with foreign powers after 1911. The journalist reported that not only the central government in Beijing, but also Qing authorities in provinces such as Sichuan, Yunnan, Hubei, and Shandong, had all borrowed extensively for diverse and often self-interested projects, including the building of roads, bridges, cotton factories, mines, cement plants and fur factories.

The *Asahi Shimbun* news item also indicated that Russia had an exclusive agreement to exploit the vast gold mines of Outer Mongolia, that Germany had gained access to the coal mines in Shandong, and that the American company Mobil was negotiating to explore the oil fields of Jehol.¹² The *Tiger* editor warned that foreign aggression had now moved from territorial conquests to economic imperialism and that the Republican government had gone on a reckless borrowing binge, unfettered by the sort of popular protests that had occurred in the late Qing.

¹¹ Guo Huaqing, *Tolerance and Compromise*, 68.

¹² *Jiayin*, 1:1 (May, 1914), 119-154.

Adopting a format that was much in vogue in early twentieth century publications, the *Tiger* featured separate sections on editorials, current affairs and literature, as well as an especially lively section featuring correspondence between Zhang Shizhao and his readers.¹³ Chen Duxiu emulated much of the magazine's format and tone when he published the *Youth* magazine in 1915, and he also employed many writers from the *Tiger*, as we shall see.

By inviting Chen to join his editorial board, Zhang gained many contributors who were either Chen's fellow Anhui co-provincials or his former students. Among the contributors who hailed from Anhui were Gao Yihan (1884-1968), Liu Wendian (1889-1958), Xie Wuliang (1884-1964), Yi Baisha (1889-1958), and Hu Shi. Other distinguished contributors, representing an extraordinarily wide range of political, social and cultural views, included Chen Yansheng (b. 1887), Li Dazhao (1889-1927), Li Jiannong (1880-1963), Su Manshu, Yang Changji (1870-1920), Yang Duanliu (1885-1966), Wu Yu (1872-1949), Wu Zhihui, and Zhang Dongsun (1886-1973). More occasional but no less distinguished contributors of poetry included Liang Shuming (1893-1988), Wang Guowei (1877-1927), Huang Kan (1886-1935), Zhang Taiyan, Kang Youwei, Huang Jie (1874-1935), and Liu Shipai. The four core members of this luminous group of writers--Zhang Shizhao, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Gao Yihan--were dubbed the Jiayin Clique (Jiayin pai).¹⁴

Only three articles in the *Tiger* magazine carried Chen's name in the byline, but all three conveyed a profound sense of despair and hopelessness. To judge by the tone of these essays, this period was one of the most depressing of his life. The first piece, titled

¹³ Hu Zhengqiang, *Zhongguo Xiandai Baokan*, 7. Zhuang Sen, "'Qingnian zazhi' xiangcheng 'Jiayin' Guanxi lun."

¹⁴ Weston, "The Formation and Positioning of the New Culture Community," 263-264.

“Survival” (*shengji*), was written in June of 1914 while Chen was still in Shanghai, and it was a letter addressed to the editor, Zhang Shizhao. Chen wrote, “The nation has changed drastically; compared to this day last year, it seemed like five or six centuries ago . . . Ever since the parliament was disbanded, a hundred political actions were aborted, and the unemployed filled the world. In addition heavy fines and exorbitant taxes have gouged the farmers and merchants. At this time among our citizens, except for bureaucrats, soldiers, bandits and spies, all carry heavy burdens . . . Our only hope is for foreigners to carve us up.”¹⁵ This short letter reflected Chen’s own predicament; with the end of the Republican revolution he had lost his job and he could barely make ends meet. The only safe haven in China at the time was the foreign concessions in treaty port cities, and he satirically suggested that carving up China might actually be better for its citizens than the present political state.

Three months later, in a preface to Zhang’s novel, *Shuang ping ji* (A tale of two scales), Chen reminisced, “Ten years ago the isolation and hardship of the Chinese political parties were worse than today’s . . . [but] looking back, they possessed moral principles, sincerity, willingness to self-sacrifice, and they supported the revolution out of a pure sense of patriotism.”¹⁶ He mourned for his friends who died in the revolution, and was anguished that their sacrifices were made in vain. As Zhang had structured his novel around the life of a deceased comrade, He Meishi, and had called it an unlucky book, Chen continued: “today an unlucky person prefaced this unlucky book, and offered it to an unlucky society.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Chen Duxiu, “Survival: addressed to the reporter of Jiayin,” in ZZX, vol.1, 103.

¹⁶ ZZX, vol. 1, 110.

¹⁷ Ibid., 111.

Chen also revealed his negative feelings in an essay titled "Patriotism and Self-Consciousness" (*Aiguo xin yu zijue xin*), written three days after Japan took over the port city of Qingdao. The article drew heated criticism from readers for its pessimism, but reading between the lines we can see the seeds of his resolve to raise the political consciousness of his fellow countrymen. He explained that there are two components in the minds and hearts of people all over the world: sentiment (*qing*) and wisdom (*zhi*). Chen asserted that both qualities were necessary to create the kind of government that provided prosperity and safety for its people. He did not think that China provided such a place, and that even if people were filled with a sense of patriotism, it was a blind sentiment that was obstructive, narrow-minded, and ultimately destructive.¹⁸ In order to love a country properly, Chen argued, one must develop an ability to discern right from wrong--a quality that was in short supply.

Chen further asserted that the most pressing practical problem in the China of his time was the total amount of debt owed to the foreign powers; according to his calculations it took half of the country's annual revenue just to service debts to the foreigners. In addition, he pointed out that the government used railroads and mines as collateral, thus effectively allowing the foreign powers to carve up China.

Chen advised, therefore, that from this point forward, the government ought to stop borrowing from abroad, and eliminate corruption from inside. He argued, moreover, that the Chinese people needed to be educated for ten years and the military had to be developed for twenty years before the country could be free from trouble. But since the people did not have the wisdom to build a republic, and the country was cruel to its

¹⁸ Chen Duxiu, "Patriotism and Self-Consciousness," in ZZX, vol. 1, 114.

citizens, the country deserved to die.¹⁹ Letters poured in attacking Chen for his treasonous thoughts, but one letter from Li Dazhao voiced support for Chen's views, and this correspondence was the beginning of a friendship that helped to shape the course of China's twentieth century history.

Li Dazhao was a student of political economy at Waseda University, and had been involved with Sun Yat-sen's China Revolutionary party. With Sun's funding Li had organized the China Study Society (Shenzhou xue hui) in order to mobilize overseas students against Yuan's dictatorship.²⁰ Prior to arriving in Tokyo, Li had been affiliated with Liang Qichao's Progressive Party.²¹ He would later become head librarian at Beijing University.

Li's response to Chen Duxiu's essay in the *Tiger* magazine took the form of an article titled "Alienation and Self-Consciousness," in which he interpreted Chen's pessimism as reverse psychology, designed to challenge his readers to act. Chen's words came from the heart of a man who deeply loved his country, Li explained, and Chen's clear purpose was to arouse the innate moral knowledge (*liangzhi*)--or, in Western terms, the Bergsonian self-consciousness--of every citizen in China.

Li condemned the many suicides committed in the name of patriotism, calling such demonstrations self-defeating, and he suggested that as long as China still had a breath left, it was possible to achieve the republican dream.²² In response, a grateful Chen praised Li for his compassion and patriotism--although he pointedly asserted that the problem with China is that it did not have enough people willing to kill themselves

¹⁹ Chen Duxiu, "Patriotism and Self-Consciousness," in ZZX, vol. 1, 113-119.

²⁰ Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, 15.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

²² Li Dazhao, "Alienation and Self-Consciousness," in *Jiayin*, 1:8, "Correspondence," 7-14.

for their country. Chen said: "If there were truly people who felt alienated, then they could go to the other extreme and resolve to sacrifice themselves to save others, demonstrating their Confucian integrity by refusing to live in such a turgid world . . . I blame the intellectuals [instead] for promoting the complacency of the people today."²³

Domestic and International Politics

During the heyday of the *Tiger* magazine, there was much to be pessimistic about. When World War I broke out in Europe in August of 1914, Japan seized the opportunity to take over all Chinese territories leased to the Germans, and in November, with the backing of Great Britain, the Japanese also moved into Qingdao. The infamous Twenty-One Demands, issued to Yuan Shikai's government on January 18, 1915, gave Japan extended control of Shandong, South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Organized into five parts, the document demanded Japanese economic and political dominance in the occupied areas, control of the Hanyanping Mine Company, and exclusive rights to various coastal facilities. The fifth and most notorious demand would make Japan the most powerful foreign presence in China by giving the Japanese first priority in capital investment, and by allowing Japanese advisers to occupy key posts in the Chinese government.²⁴

The Yuan government stalled for time, and leaked the document to the press in an effort to encourage public outrage and international sanctions against Japan. For a brief moment, Yuan's popularity surged as concerned politicians called for dropping all

²³ Chen Duxiu, in response to "Alienation and Self-Consciousness," in *Jiayin*, 1:8, "Correspondence," 14-15.

²⁴ Scalapino and Yu, 411-413.

factional differences and uniting behind Yuan to defend China. Anti-Japanese literature and patriotic demonstrations proliferated. Japan sent more troops to Mukden, Dairen and Jinanfu to increase the political and military pressure on Yuan. Chinese nationalism reached new heights as thousands gathered in the Zhang Garden in Shanghai to discuss the situation and to launch boycotts of Japanese goods.²⁵ Japan issued an ultimatum in early May, and Yuan's government had no alternative but to accept all but the last set of conditions. Thereafter the Chinese marked May 7th as National Humiliation Day.

Despite mounting disapproval of his policies, Yuan brazenly continued the campaign to make himself emperor. In August he convened the Peace Preservation Society (Chouan hui) and charged it with preparing for the transition. Among the diverse members of this group were Yan Fu, the eminent scholar who introduced Aldous Huxley and Charles Darwin to the Chinese; Liu Shiwei, the former anarchist who had taught in the Anhui Public School; Sun Yujun, the former governor of Anhui and friend of Chen Duxiu; and Yang Du, a Japanese educated law student and chief of the National Historical Bureau.²⁶ A Columbia University professor, Frank Goodnow, was hired by Yuan as consultant and advised that under certain conditions a constitutional monarchy would be the best form of government for China. The pro-monarchists argued that the Chinese were not ready for a system of government in which loyalty was pledged to institutions and not to an individual.

On December 10, 1915, the provincial representatives in the reconstituted National Assembly voted in favor of monarchy, and five days later Yuan assumed the throne. Public reaction was immediate and overwhelmingly negative. On December 25

²⁵ Scalapino and Yu, 413.

²⁶ Ibid., 414.

Cai E, the military governor of Yunnan province, declared independence from Beijing. In rapid succession Guizhou, Hunan and Sichuan followed suit. Long-time advocates of Yuan's monarchy backed off, and two of his staunchest military supporters, Duan Qirui and Feng Guozhang, turned against him. By March, Yuan rescinded his title as emperor and began negotiating for peace. In April, Guangdong and Zhejiang declared independence, and soon most of the South seceded from Beijing. Finally acknowledging his losses in prestige and political power, Yuan named Duan Qirui premier, but Yuan still hoped to remain as president.

Political power now devolved into four major factions: (1) the severely weakened monarchists, made up mainly of Cantonese civil bureaucrats; (2) the pro-Yuan northern military leaders who controlled most of the fighting forces in China; (3) the southern "moderates," led by military men and civilians such as Cai E and Liang Qichao, men who had once supported Yuan but now championed republicanism; and (4) the "radical republicans" such as Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing, who had returned to China months earlier.²⁷ Three rogue provinces, Hunan, Guangdong and Sichuan, completely ignored the dictates of the central government and acted autonomously. Key to the stability of the country would be a truce between the northern warlords and the southern "moderates," but, as with many other issues, the two sides could not agree on whether Yuan should remain as president. In July, with China in chaos, Yuan died of nephritis. His last act was to appoint Vice President Li Yuanhong, the reluctant leader of the Wuchang uprising, as president.

With Yuan's passing from the scene in 1916, the Beijing government was dominated by various forces behind the premier, Duan Qirui, who hailed from Anhui and

²⁷ Scalapino and Yu, 415.

had been the leader of the Anhui clique within a larger military configuration called the Beiyang party. The Beiyang party also contained a rival faction, known as the Zhili clique; it was dominated by the warlord Cao Kun, who for the time being was maintaining an uneasy truce with Duan's Anhui clique. The Beiyang party had a total of 200,000 troops, presenting a formidable obstacle to anyone who would try to challenge them, but there was no unified vision within its leadership, much among its rival factions. At the same time, growing animosity between Sun Yat-sen's Guomindang and Liang Qichao's Progressive Party complicated the political situation, particularly after Liang and his party threw their weight behind the premier and the president.²⁸ The only advantage to the situation, at least from Chen Duxiu's point of view, was that the chaotic political situation mitigated the state's ability to mount a systematic and sustained assault on journalistic critics.

Chen Duxiu and the New Culture Movement: A Productive Partnership

As indicated briefly above, the publication of Chen Duxiu's *New Youth* magazine, (before its transformation into an organ of the Chinese Communist Party in 1923), coincided with the New Culture Movement.²⁹ Although a great many of the ideas that circulated during the New Culture era had late Qing precedents, the period from 1915 to 1923 was unique because it inspired an in-depth exploration of these ideas, and this exploration, together with the introduction new ideas gleaned from an ever greater

²⁸ Sun Yat-sen disbanded his China Revolution Party in July 1916 because he felt that the fight against Yuan was over, and thus the republican revolution was finished, and it was time to rebuild the country.

²⁹ I follow the chronological demarcation that Chow Tse-tsung used in his seminal *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*.

number of Western and Japanese works in translation, ultimately led to highly iconoclastic political, social, and intellectual outcomes.

A convergence of serendipitous factors made the New Culture Movement possible: (1) a network of supremely talented and cosmopolitan intellectuals, many of whom taught at Beijing University (Beida) and all of whom engaged in intense debates in the pages of the *New Youth* magazine; (2) the leadership and protection of a highly respected and broad-minded scholar, Cai Yuanpei, chancellor of Beida; (3) the relative lack of political censorship; and (4) increasing greater numbers of Chinese intellectuals who had recently returned from study in the West. The New Culture movement also drew considerable strength from a vibrant Chinese nationalism that motivated intellectuals and others to find solutions to China's pressing domestic and international problems. Finally, the movement benefited from an increase in literacy that resulted from a reformed educational system and a proliferation of vernacular papers that served to foster a wider readership and an incipient political voice.

Chen returned to China in June of 1915. His family situation was in flux, as his second wife was dying, his older sons from his first marriage were in the process of moving to Shanghai to join him, and he had younger children who were still learning to walk. He proposed to his old publishing friend, Wang Mengzhou, to start a magazine of about 300,000 words per issue, which he believed would make "a great impact in eight to ten years."³⁰ As Wang's budget was stretched thin with other publications, Chen was not able to sign a contract with him. Instead, Wang recommended the Chen brothers, who were also friends of Zhang Shizhao, to fund Chen's magazine titled *Qingnian* (Youth),

³⁰ Wang Guanquan, 112. Also see Hao Bin and Ouyang Zhesheng eds. Vol. 1, 783.

renamed *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth--henceforth XQN) in September, 1916.³¹ For his editorial services he would be paid \$200 per month.³²

Advertisements for the magazine appeared in August, 1915 and the next month the first issue had come out. The speed with which the magazine appeared attests to Chen's easy access to a large network of writers and publishers, as well as to his expertise and single-minded focus. By the time he began to publish *Youth*, Chen had gained a great deal of editorial and journalistic experience, having edited the *Citizen's Daily* in 1903, the ASB from 1904 to 1905, and the *Tiger* from 1915 to 1916.

The magazine underwent several metamorphoses, which were reflected in the composition of the editorial board. At each stage, however, the intellectual prowess of the writers had a tremendous influence on public discourse, and the magazine thus played a critical role in the formation of the New Culture Movement. Hailed by twentieth century intellectuals as one of the three most influential journals of the century,³³ if not the most influential, the XQN featured progressive journalism of the sort pioneered so brilliantly by Liang Qichao. Chen's publication not only provided a forum for intense academic debate but also supplied a convenient outlet for iconoclastic personal ruminations from a network of sophisticated intellectuals with cultural and ideological perspectives similar to his. In reaching out to young intellectuals at a particularly fruitful moment in China's twentieth century history, Chen tapped a hitherto largely neglected

³¹ It was renamed *New Youth* because a Christian magazine in Shanghai had been named *Youth* before Chen published this magazine.

³² The \$200 a month was the top salary paid out to returnee students with Ph.D.'s, whereas a local university preparatory program graduate would only command twenty-four dollars a month, Chen Mingyuan, 43.

³³ Hu Shi enumerated three journals: Liang Qichao's *The China Progress*, *New People's Miscellany*, and *New Youth*. Chen Pingyuan called it the most influential journal of the century. See Chen Pingyuan, *Chumo lishi yu jinru wusi*, 39, 61.

source of power, thus helping to transform the political and intellectual landscape of Republican China.

As the XQN took off in popularity, by the first issue of the second volume in September, 1916, Chen expanded his circle of contributors to some of the more notable intellectuals from his past circle of acquaintances. When he was appointed Dean of the School of Letters at Beijing University, a post he held from 1917 to 1919, he moved the magazine to Beijing and invited fellow professors to share in the editorial duties. Toward the end of 1919 the magazine moved back to Shanghai, and in 1920 Chen resumed his role as the sole editor and he continued in that capacity until July of 1922. Altogether nine volumes were produced before 1923. For the six issues of the first volume (while the magazine was still named *Youth*), the writers were almost all staff from the *Tiger*, and with the exception of Xie Wuliang and Yi Baisha, all were Anhui co-provincials and Chen's friends.³⁴

Chen's Anhui network included the second most prolific contributor to the magazine, Gao Yihan, who attended Anhui Upper Level School, and claimed to have a student-teacher relationship with Chen. Also part of the network was Yi Baisha, a Hunanese who grew up in Anhui and joined the Anhui campaign against Yuan in 1913. Xie Wuliang was the other non-Anhui editor, but he had taught at the Anhui Public School, which Chen had helped to establish. Pan Zanhua was another old friend and fellow student of Chen in Japan, and Gao Yuhan was a member of the Weixin hui (Renewal Society), a satellite organization of the revolutionary Anhui anti-Qing group, Yuewang hui, which Chen had founded. Chen Xianian, Chen's nephew, also wrote

³⁴ Zhuang Sen, 4-5.

pieces for the magazine.³⁵ The contributors to the first volume of *Youth* were Chen Duxiu, Chen Xianian, Fang Shu, Gao Yihan, Gao Yuhan, Li Mu, Li Yimin, Liu Shuya, Meng Ming, Pan Zanhua, Peng Dezun, Ru Fei, Wang Shuqian, Xiao Rulin, Xie Ming, Xie Wuliang, Xue Qiying, and Yi Baisha.³⁶

By September 1916, with the start of the second volume (now renamed *New Youth*) and before the move to Beijing, the magazine had expanded its circle of contributors to include eighteen more friends and acquaintances of Chen, many of whom later became leaders in their respective fields. Joining the magazine at this time were Chen Qilu, Cheng Yansheng, Cheng Zongsi, Guang Sheng, Hu Shi, Li Dazhao, Liu Bannong, Ma Junwu, Su Manshu, Tao Lugong, Wang Zongming, Wen Zongyao, Wu Yu, Wu Zhihui, Yang Changji, and Zeng Mengming. Chen also added two women writers to his stable of contributors, Chen Qian Aichen and Li Zhang Jinan,³⁷ thus continuing the pioneering tradition of hiring women writers that he began with the ASB. (See Appendix L for the careers and activities of these early contributors prior to their employment by the XQN).

Starting with the third volume of the XQN in March 1917, Chen invited professors from Beijing University to form an editorial board. Among the new contributors to the journal at this time were faculty (Cai Yuanpei, Chen Daqi, Lin Sun, Lu Xun, Qian Xuantong, Shen Jianshi, Shen Yinmo, Wang Xinggong, Zhang Shizhao, and Zhou Zuoren) as well as students (Chang Naide, Fu Sinian, Ling Shuang, Lin Yutang, Luo Jialun, Mao Zedong, Yu Pingbo, and Yun Daiying).³⁸

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 17.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

The magazine benefited from the collective professionalism of many seasoned writers among its contributors, increasing numbers of whom had first-hand experience in the West. Cai Yuanpei had earlier edited *Warnings on Russian Affairs* and the *Alarm Daily*; Gao Yihan edited *People's Law* (Minyi); Hu Shi edited *The Struggle* (Jingye Xunbao); Li Dazhao published *Discussion on Politics* (Yanzhi); Liu Bannong edited *The World of Novels* (Xiaoshuo jie); Liu Shuya wrote for *People's Independence* (Minli bao); Ma Junwu was an editor of *New People's Miscellany*; Qian Xuantong co-edited *Today's Talk on Education* (Jiaoyu jinyu zazhi); Su Manshu co-edited *Pacific Paper* (Taiping yang bao); Wu Yu contributed to the *Sichuan Paper* (Shu bao); Wu Zhihui founded *New World* (Xin shijie); Xie Wuliang was chief editor of *Capital News* (Jing bao), and Zhang Shizhao created the *Tiger* magazine. The talented brothers, Zhou Zuoren and Zhou Shuren (aka Lu Xun), brought with them a track record of having contributed substantially to *Henan*, *Tides of Zhejiang*, *Women's World*, and to the creation of *Newborn Journal* (Xinsheng zazhi).³⁹

From July 1918 to May 1920, a period encompassing volumes five to seven, most of the new authors came from outside Beijing University. They included Chen Hengzhe, Chen Qixiu, Dai Jitao, Du Guoxiang, Gao Junyu, Li Cijiu, Li Jiannong, Ma Yinchu, Ouyang Yuqian, Pan Lishan, Ren Hongjuan, Sun Fuyuan, Wang Guangqi, Zhang Haonian, Zhang Weici, Zhou Jianren, and Zhu Xizu. Of this new crop of talent, only six individuals (Chen Qixiu, Gao Junyu, Ma Yinchu, Sun Fuyuan, Zhang Haonian, and Zhu Xizu) were faculty or students at Beida.⁴⁰ In 1919 Chen divided the editorial responsibility six ways, and assigned Gao Yihan, Hu Shi, Li Dazhao, Qian Xuantong and

³⁹ Chen Pingyuan, *Chumo lishi yu jinru wusi*, 53.

⁴⁰ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 18.

Shen Yinmo to be in charge respectively of the second through the sixth issues of volume 6, while he edited the first issue.⁴¹

The layout and format of the XQN followed closely that of the *Tiger*; each issue consisted of several essays by Chen and his friends, as well as sections on readers' correspondence, literature, and current domestic and international news. Occasionally translations of foreign literature, political or philosophical treatises, and biographies would be included, and by the second volume (each volume was comprised of six issues) a special column of readers' essays was added. For this section, Chen did not care whether the "view" or "style" of the author agreed with "view" or "style" of the magazine; if the contribution seemed "worthy of study," he would publish it to encourage "the free expression of the readers."⁴² The *Tiger* had used readers' correspondence to develop themes advanced by the editors, and Zhang Shizhao had made his individual responses into an art form. Chen expanded on the idea not only by answering letters, but also by inviting readers to publish their own articles.

Unlike the *Tiger*, which focused mainly on politics and political theory, the content of the XQN ranged broadly. In addition to politics and political theory, Chen published material on topics such as science, education, language, literature, history, philosophy, social customs, women's issues, national and world news. Chen wrote roughly four hundred essays, editorials, and letters to readers,⁴³ touching on subjects as varied as evolution, individualism, national character, Confucianism, the difference between Eastern and Western culture, imperialism, nationalism, democracy, socialism, scientific methodology, critical scholarship, new literature, vernacular language and

⁴¹ *Xin Qingnian*, 6:1 (Jan. 1919), "Editorial table of vol. 6 of this magazine," 3.

⁴² *Xin Qingnian*, 2:1 (Sep. 1, 1919), "Notice 2."

⁴³ Wang Guanquan, 119.

morality. These writings, like those of many other contributors to the *New Youth* magazine, were heavily influenced by a flood of new sources of information translated from Western books, articles and press stories.

Ethics and Religion

Chen's desire to create a new ethical system for China played a primary role in shaping the direction of his writing and the choice of his topics. He was convinced that all intellectual undertakings must begin with a new understanding of man's relationship to self and to society, a relationship free from the Three Bonds and Five Relationships of Confucian ideology. In "My Last Awakening," published in February, 1916, Chen began by stating that every life must be lived with meaning, and that fathoming the purpose of life is the ultimate awakening, the culmination of all philosophical and religious inquiry. For the Chinese people, he argued, the search must begin with a political awakening, comprised of two stages: (1) the understanding that all people are political beings; and (2) the knowledge that the laws of evolution will ultimately lead everyone to enjoy freedom and the right to political participation.

But because such a system was not compatible with the hierarchical relationships of Confucian society, a new ethical standard based on equality before the law and on the autonomy of economic production had to be found. Looking back through history, Chen observed that China's first awakening (exemplified by the late Ming Christian and astronomer, Xu Guangqi) was marked by an insufficient appreciation of Western knowledge, and its second awakening (in early Qing, characterized by an awareness of

Western firepower) involved a failure to look deeper to adopt Western political systems. Altogether Chen counted seven such “awakenings” down to his time, but without a thorough transformation of the ethical values of the Chinese people, he concluded, all previous insights were useless.⁴⁴

One of the most interesting features about the early career of Chen Duxiu and so many of his friends and associates is the battle that unfolded between the Confucian values that shaped their early lives and the institutionalized Confucianism that increasingly seemed to stand in the way of China’s revolutionary transformation. For all of their anti-Confucian activism, old habits of mind died hard. Even Chen’s fervent desire to replace the outmoded hierarchies and oppressive features of Confucianism with a worldview that was “progressive, proactive, and evolutionary” may reflect, at least in part, a deep-seated “Confucian” orientation to inspire moral rectitude in the “new” generation.⁴⁵ This “Confucian” orientation may also explain Chen’s enjoyment in composing classical poetry with friends, his persistent interest in ancient philology, and even his efforts to behave as a filial son in his personal life.

Chen considered sympathy (*tongqing xin*) to be the highest principle of human nature,⁴⁶ and he also believed in the virtues of hard-work (*qin*), frugality (*jian*), honesty (*lian*), cleanliness (*jie*), sincerity (*cheng*) and faithfulness (*xin*). But he was at pains to emphasize that these values were the “common practical morality of the world, and not

⁴⁴ Chen Duxiu, “My Last Awakening,” XQN, 1:6 (Feb. 15, 1916), 1-4.

⁴⁵ Zhang Baoming, 52. Chen’s exhortations for revolutionary youth echoed the ancient Confucian notion of “internal sagehood and external kingship” (*neisheng waiwang*)—that is, the idea that self-cultivation is only the beginning of moral responsibility; the next and most crucial step is to manifest one’s personal cultivation in service to society, not least as a model of correct behavior.

⁴⁶ Chen Duxiu, “In answer to Li Pingjing, (Learning French),” XQN, 1:2 (Oct. 15, 1915), “Correspondence,” 2.

exclusive to Confucianism.”⁴⁷ From a personal standpoint, Chen vowed to transform himself completely, by acquiring “a new body, a new personality, a new country, a new society, a new family, and a new race, [all in order] to face a brave new world”⁴⁸

In the early issues of the XQN, Chen displayed a particular interest in the development of the individual. “We must,” he wrote, “respect independence and self-directed character, and not become the property of others.”⁴⁹ Not surprisingly, then, he came to be fascinated with Nietzsche’s concept of the superman, urging his young readers to strive for the “morality of the Noble,” and not that of the slave.⁵⁰ By 1917, however, Chen had moved away from Nietzsche’s radicalism, and begun to contemplate the relationship of the individual to society. Individualism, Chen reasoned, originated within the Greek and Roman humanistic traditions, and it was then adopted by Darwin in his theory of the survival of the fittest. Nietzsche incorporated it into his concept of the superman, and finally it became manifest in German imperialism.⁵¹

Having turned against extreme individualism, Chen investigated various concepts of socialism. He praised Christianity for introducing a kind of socialist thinking, and singled out Tolstoy for being a great proponent of socialism. “The more civilization advances, the more we need to depend on each other,” Chen asserted.⁵² There were, however, limits to Chen’s perception of how to build a sense of community in China. For

⁴⁷ Chen Duxiu, “In answer to a fan of *New Youth*,” XQN, 3:5 (July 1, 1917), “Correspondence,” 3. The semantic weight that Chinese philosophical terms may have carried was not a matter that seems to have given Chen much concern.

⁴⁸ Chen Duxiu, “1916,” XQN, 1:5 (Jan. 1, 1916), 2-3.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Chen Duxiu, “The concept of morality and its different schools of thoughts,” XQN, 3:3 (May 1, 1917), “Record of Mr. Chen Duxiu’s Speech,” 1-3.

⁵² Ibid.

instance, he vigorously opposed the idea championed by Kang Youwei and others that Confucianism should be made China's state religion.

Chen's opposition was not simply the product of his hostility to the autocratic features of Confucianism; it was also because Yuan Shikai had begun to promote Confucianism for his own crass and narrow political purposes. Pointing to religious wars in the West as "eloquent refutation" of the idea that a marriage between Church and State was workable,⁵³ and observing that the Chinese people had little use for religion (a distinctly Confucian perception!), he maintained that for sufficient inspiration "we need to look no further than to people who behave ethically and who conduct themselves with honesty and cleanliness."⁵⁴

Was there, then, a place for religion in Chen's world? Chen equivocated, and his answers varied--as they had in the case of many other issues--according to the state of his knowledge and the nature of his politics. In 1914, Chen felt that because Christianity encouraged involvement in the present world, and its message of brotherly love and love for God were progressive, Christianity would be a better choice for the Chinese.⁵⁵ By 1916, however, Chen considered Buddhist theory and discipline to be superior to Christianity--even though the other-worldliness of Mahayana Buddhism encouraged a renunciation of life, which was counter-productive for society.⁵⁶

In 1917, responding to a reader named Yu Songhua, Chen argued that religion could provide an outlet for the restless human spirit, and that it could channel the mind to

⁵³ Chen Duxiu, "Rebutting the Memo of Kang Youwei to the President and the Premier," XQN, 2:2, Oct., 1916, 1-4.

⁵⁴ Chen Duxiu, "Constitution and Confucianism," XQN, 2:3, Nov, 1916, 1-5.

⁵⁵ ZL, 319. He later argued that the lack of a fighting spirit among his countrymen stemmed from Buddhist teachings about emptiness, the Daoist ideal of retreating from the world, and the Confucian preoccupation with ritual. See Chen Duxiu, "Resistance," XQN, 1:3 (Nov. 15, 1915), 1-5.

⁵⁶ ZL, 319.

the “outer” realm. Chen reasoned that the advanced material condition of Europe had created a backlash, which drove people to seek a sophisticated cultural explanation that would account for their advanced state. In such a context, “there are those who believed that a deep religiosity could transform the human heart, such as Tolstoy and Eucken, and I deeply respect their faith and their integrity.” Nevertheless, Chen continued, religion belonged to the realm of the supernatural, and given the backwardness of Chinese society, it would be best for the people to focus on the here and now, or the “inner realm,” and to rely on ethical consciousness as the ultimate authority in ordering their behavior.⁵⁷

In “Re-discussing the Problem of Confucianism as a Religion,” written in early 1917, Chen predicted that the future of mankind lay in science, which would replace religion. He concluded that there were two laws in the universe: laws of nature and man-made laws. Natural law is scientific, permanent, and universal, whereas man-made law is partial, transitory, and found in religion. As a result, Chen suggested, the absolution offered by religion is a false one; only science can lead to truth and permanence.⁵⁸ Chen partially agreed with Cai Yuanpei’s statement that religion, philosophy and the state were three separate entities that should not be conflated. At the same time, he argued that Confucianism should not be given any more primacy than Buddhism, Daoism, Islam or Christianity.⁵⁹ Aesthetics and philosophy, he believed, could also take the place of religion in this world.⁶⁰

In October 1916, Chen and his colleague Ma Junwu introduced Ernst Haeckel’s (1834-1919) *The Riddle of the Universe*, in which the German scientist attempted to unify

⁵⁷ Chen Duxiu, “Answering Yu Songhua,” XQN, 3:1 (Mar. 1, 1917), 22-24.

⁵⁸ Chen Duxiu, “Re-discussing the Problem of Confucianism as a Religion,” XQN, 2:5 (Jan. 1, 1917), 1-4.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁰ Chen Duxiu, “Answering Yu Songhua Again,” XQN, 3:3 (May 1, 1917), 12.

the material and the spiritual worlds with the evolutionary theory of Darwinism. At this stage in his theory of Monism, Haeckel emphasized a materialistic and mechanistic view of evolution, which, toward the end of his life, turned into a more idealistic and vitalistic pseudo-religious perspective.⁶¹ Chen and Ma introduced this earlier aspect of Haeckel's work to show that Western thinkers were also in favor of a naturalistic and non-religious view of the universe. Chen further believed that Monism could recover true Christianity from the distortions of the Vatican, and preach the correct values of humanity, including the Golden Rule, tolerance, and compassion, which were "virtues originating from antiquity, and not particular to Christianity."⁶²

Later, when Chen was incarcerated for eighty days for distributing pamphlets after the May Fourth demonstration of 1919 (see below), Chen read the only material available, a copy of the Bible. Upon his release he praised Christianity for its spirit of sacrifice, forgiveness, and its advocacy of universal love. He publicly recanted the harsh judgments he had sometimes made of Christianity in the past, and argued that the Bible could help encourage a love of music and art among his countrymen, who needed it.⁶³ Prior to becoming a Communist, Chen even hoped that the Christian spirit could prevent class struggle.⁶⁴

East Versus West

⁶¹ Niles R. Holt, "Ernst Haeckel's Monistic Religion," 267.

⁶² Chen Duxiu, "Science and Christianity," XQN, 3:6 (Aug. 1, 1917), 1-5; 4:1 (Jan. 1, 1918), 56-61.

⁶³ ZL, 324.

⁶⁴ Chen Duxiu, "The fundamentals of practicing people's rule," XQN, 7:1 (Dec. 1, 1919), 13-21.

Comparisons between Eastern and Western culture became a prominent feature of intellectual discourse during the New Culture era for several reasons. One is that a huge amount of information about the West was available in translation during the second decade of the twentieth century. Another is that ever greater numbers of influential Chinese intellectuals had received at least some of their education in the West and could thus speak with special authority about Western culture. A third is that increasing numbers of Western philosophers and educators came to lecture in China during the post Qing era. And a fourth is that the Great War of 1914-1918 raised serious questions about the value of Western ideas.

An early example of the East vs. West debate can be found in an exchange between Chen Duxiu and Du Yaquan, editor of the *Dongfang zazhi* (Eastern Miscellany). Du, a long time advocate of teaching the natural sciences in Chinese schools, and a respected editor of science textbooks and the *Eastern Miscellany* from 1911 to 1920, had a familiarity with chemistry, geology, physics and biology that surpassed that of most *New Youth* writers. His tenure at the *Eastern Miscellany* had transformed the journal into a well-respected source of foreign knowledge, which included current news, editorial comments and academic discussions, as well as translations from foreign sources on topics such as the arts, politics, chemistry, commerce, poetry and travel.⁶⁵ He had translated more than sixty articles, and thus had impeccable credentials as a Chinese scholar well acquainted with the West.

What set Du off was the first issue of the XQN, in which Chen lauded the contributions France had made to modern civilization in the forms of “human rights,

⁶⁵ Online access to *Dongfang zazhi*: http://res4.nlc.gov.cn/index_mg_qk.jsp?channelid=75011 (accessed 1/26/2009).

biological evolution, and socialism.”⁶⁶ The French Revolution broke the shackles of feudal society and allowed everyone to enjoy equality before the law, Chen declared, while evolutionary theory dismantled the hegemony of religious creationism, and made man responsible for his deeds. Most importantly, socialism introduced the idea of communal property and advocated the concept that each citizen should work according to his or her abilities, and should be given compensation according to his or her own needs. Later, Chen pointed out, the German thinkers Ferdinand Lassalle and Karl Marx, focused on the growing struggle between capitalists and laborers, leading to social legislation designed to regulate the two classes and protect the laborers.⁶⁷

Provoked by Chen's seemingly uncritical celebration of Western culture, Du responded by maintaining that the Eastern and Western civilizations were different in nature: the former was “tranquil” while the latter was “active.” Although he suggested that each civilization would do well to borrow from the other to make up for its respective deficiencies, he clearly saw a greater need to repair what he considered to be the bankrupt state of Western culture. Du maintained that “active” civilizations were egocentric and operated on the principle of survival of the fittest, thus competing for material gains at the expense of morality.⁶⁸ Being a peace-loving society, the Chinese would only engage in warfare during times of overpopulation and natural disasters, preferring to let other people live in tranquility.⁶⁹

The differences between Du and Chen could hardly have been more stark, Du hailed the hierarchical relationships defining “family, clan, society, nation, and all things

⁶⁶ Chen Duxiu, “The French and Modern Civilization,” XQN, 1:1 (Sep. 1 1915), 1.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁸ Du Yaquan, “Tranquil civilization and active civilization,” in *Du Yaquan wencun*, 338-348.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 340.

in the universe”⁷⁰ as the key to the serenity of Chinese society, whereas Chen saw Confucian hierarchy as leading to enslavement, loss of dignity, inequality, and lack of personal initiative.⁷¹ Du considered individualism to be the source of selfishness, bellicosity, and greed, while Chen championed the Western ideal of individualism for achieving personal happiness, freedom of thought and development of the individual. At one point Du ominously warned that importing Western principles of materialism, imperialism and utilitarianism to amend the weaknesses of Chinese civilization would be akin to importing “scarlet fever and syphilis” to cure an ailing patient.⁷²

Du operated under several disadvantages in this debate. In the first place, his defense of Confucianism, written during the years of Yuan’s monarchical ambitions and the government’s endorsement of Confucianism as state religion, made him look like a political reactionary. Second, his emphasis on the need to incorporate certain Western ideas (but not, presumably materialism, imperialism and utilitarianism!) in order to strengthen the inner core of Eastern “tranquility” suggested a peculiar twist on the largely discredited formula of the Self-Strengthening Movement: “Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning for the practical application.” Furthermore, Du lacked Chen’s institutional and personal prestige as well as Chen’s wit and sharp pen. Du’s views were thus marginalized. However, as the East-West debate continued past the end of World War I, Du’s opinions became increasingly influential, as a number of Chinese intellectuals became more critical of the “materialistic” West.

⁷⁰ Du Yaquan, “Tranquil civilization and active civilization,” 340.

⁷¹ Chen Duxiu, “The difference between the fundamental thoughts of the Eastern and Western races,” XQN, 1:4 (Dec. 1, 1915), 1-4.

⁷² Ibid.; Du Yaquan in Xu Jilin and Tian Jianye, 341-342.

Liang Qichao's pessimistic assessment of Western civilization upon his return from a trip to Europe, where he met Henri Bergson and Rudolph Eucken, had a sobering effect on a number of New Culture intellectuals. Reflections on his travels between December 1918 and March 1920 were published in the *Eastern Miscellany* and in two popular papers affiliated with the Study clique, *Chenbao* (Morning News) and *Shishi xinbao* (Current News Newspaper). In these articles, Liang discussed the dark side of individualism, materialism, and militarism. He saw the danger of pursuing material wealth and predicted a future of struggle between classes as well as between nations.

Liang went on to declare the bankruptcy of science as a philosophy of life. Although science allowed the West to revolutionize material production, it also led to intense competition for resources, harried workdays, and spiritual exhaustion. He felt a spiritual emptiness in the West, and called for the reassessment of Chinese culture and the resurrection of China's "national character", epitomized by the "Confucian" qualities of "reciprocity" (*shu*), "respect for rank" (*mingfeng*), and concern for posterity (*luhou*).⁷³ This return to "traditional" values, Liang believed, would allow China to avail of the West's material advantages without succumbing to the West's spiritual malaise.⁷⁴

In response to Liang's negative attitude, Chen wrote an article titled "What is the New Culture Movement?" In it, he refuted the idea that science was bankrupt. To be sure, he admitted, politicians and capitalists might use science for evil and selfish purposes, but this did not mean that Chinese youth should abandon the scientific way of thinking. Instead, they should combine scientific thinking with civic engagement and cooperation. They should become more creative and strive for a new culture, and they

⁷³ Goldman and Lee, 55.

⁷⁴ Liu Lihong, 62-63.

should spread the New Culture spirit to other spheres, such as politics.⁷⁵ As if to underscore the point, the next issue of the XQN in May, 1920, was dedicated to the issue of labor organization, with Chen writing on the “awakening of the laborer” and Li Dazhao discussing the history of the world labor movement.

Science as Methodology

In January, 1918, Chen defended the XQN in an essay titled “Letter in Response to the Crime of Our Magazine,” in which he admitted that the XQN was guilty of the charge of sabotaging old beliefs and old customs. He explained that “in order to support Mr. Democracy, we have no choice but to oppose Confucian religion, rituals, chastity requirements, old ethics, [and] old politics. In order to support Mr. Science, we cannot but oppose national essence and old literature.”⁷⁶ While posterity has forever linked the two terms, “democracy” and “science”, with the New Culture Movement, (they were engraved on two boulders in the Anqing Chen Duxiu Memorial Garden in 2007), in actuality “science” had a special meaning to Chen Duxiu. Although he naturally appreciated the need for Chinese students to learn subjects such as physics, chemistry, biology and so forth, he valued science primarily for the methodology it provided, which could be used to disprove old ideas and advance new ones. Chen argued, for example, that “If we believe that science is the compass for discovering truth, then those things that go against science, such as ghosts, spirits, fortune telling, geomancy, divination, *fengshui* and [other] mantic arts, . . . [can] all be considered pernicious and wicked lies, not to be

⁷⁵ Chen Duxiu, “What is the New Culture Movement,” XQN, 7:5 (April 1, 1920), 1-6.

⁷⁶ Chen Duxiu, “Letter in Response to the Crime of Our Magazine,” XQN, 6:1 (Jan. 15, 1919), 10-11.

believed in a million years.”⁷⁷

In the nine volumes of the XQN that were published before its metamorphosis into a CCP publication, less than twenty articles by a handful of authors were devoted to the natural sciences, most of them focusing on biology. Chen himself introduced the work of Ilya Ilyich Metchnikoff, revealing a clear understanding of the rudiments of immunology. After an exposition on Metchnikoff’s work with white blood cells, Chen concluded that although the scientist did not believe that humans are altruistic by nature, Metchnikoff’s contribution to society contradicted his own tenet that human beings are by nature selfish.⁷⁸ Chen’s endorsement of Haeckel implied that Chen saw the world as naturalistic and non-religious in origin, and that consciousness was purely a function of physiology.⁷⁹

In an essay titled “What is Scientific Methodology,” Wang Xinggong explained that factual logic, based on observation, analysis, judgment, deduction and experiment, was the only means by which one can correctly create knowledge.⁸⁰ In another article he emphasized that the search for truth as the ultimate goal of science. Wang wrote that “Curiosity . . . a sense of aesthetics, a desire to master skills, a preference for goodness, and a need to simplify matters can allow us to get closer to the truth.”⁸¹ Ren Hongjuan explained that a scientist was someone who discovered new knowledge based on factual research.⁸²

Some scientific articles were quite specific. Gao Xian detailed the physiology of

⁷⁷ Chen Duxiu, “The Political Problem of China Today,” XQN, 5:1 (July 15, 1918), 5.

⁷⁸ Chen Duxiu, “The Thoughts of Two Great Contemporary Scientists,” XQN, 2:1 (Sep. 1 1916), 1-6.

⁷⁹ Goldman and Lee, 89.

⁸⁰ Wang Xinggong, “What is Scientific Methodology?” XQN, 7:5 (Apr. 15, 1920), 1-4.

⁸¹ Wang Xinggong, “Biological Evolution and Global Development,” XQN, 9:3 (July 1, 1921), 1-10; and “The Rise and Impact of Science,” XQN, 7:1 (Dec. 1, 1919), 22-29.

⁸² Ren Hongjuan, “What is a Scientist,” XQN, 6:3 (Mar. 15, 1919), 249-253.

reproduction, introducing English terms such as nucleus, chromosome, ovum, copulation, amoeba, embryology and fertilization.⁸³ Zhou Jianren explored the experiments of French scientist Pasteur and British physician Bastian, and tentatively agreed to the view that life emanated from inorganic origins.⁸⁴ A chapter of Huxley's *The Scientific Spirit in Modern Thought*, "On the Advisableness of Improving Natural Knowledge" was translated by Liu Shuya to urge his readers to pay more attention to science.⁸⁵

The aforementioned articles on the natural sciences seem to have been selected for publication because they emphasized the factual, experiment-based truth-seeking method that Chen defined as "science." Evolutionary theory, especially Darwinism, was discussed at great length to shed light on political and social phenomenon, but most New Culture intellectuals were careful to suggest that the struggle for survival of the fittest would not necessarily lead to a cruel competition, because it was in man's interest to join together and compete against other groups. Such individuals believed that Darwin's ideas evolutionary struggle and Kropotkin's idea of mutual aid were in fact two sides of the same coin.⁸⁶ In any case, Darwinism proved to be a serviceable concept for New Culture thinkers in nearly every realm of life. Hu Shi even borrowed the theory to explain the need for reform in Chinese language, literature and drama.⁸⁷

Experiments in Vernacular Prose, Poetry and Plays

⁸³ Gao Xian, "The Biology of Sex," XQN, 9:4 (Aug. 1, 1921), 1-13.

⁸⁴ Zhou Jianren, "The Origin of Organic Matters," XQN, 6:4 (Apr. 15, 1919), 392-395.

⁸⁵ Liu Shuya, "The Scientific Spirit in Modern Thought," XQN, 1:3 (Nov. 1, 1915), 1-15.

⁸⁶ Zhou Jianren, "Darwinism," XQN, 8:5 (Jan. 1, 1921), 1-8; and "Competition for Survival and Mutual Aid," XQN, 8:2 (Oct. 1, 1920), 1-7.

⁸⁷ Hu Shi, "The Concept of Literary Evolution and the Reform of Drama," XQN, 5:4 (Oct. 15, 1918), 308-321.

As we have seen in previous chapters, the use of vernacular, or colloquial, language in print began with the increasing number of popular papers published in the periods 1897-98 and 1903-04. The push to elevate the status of the vernacular language even further began with the talented contributors and editors of the XQN, and their persistence paid off. In 1919, the Ministry of Education convened a Committee on Preparations for Unifying the National Language (*Guoyu tongyi choubuihui*), and in 1920 it decreed that henceforth all primary school Chinese language instruction was to be in the vernacular.⁸⁸

Most current scholars acknowledge that the renewed push to use vernacular language began with a letter from Hu Shi, a graduate student of John Dewey at Columbia University at the time. Hu wrote to Chen suggesting eight modifications for writing Chinese literature, and Chen published then the list in the pages of the XQN in October, 1916. Less well known among modern scholars is that in the meantime Chen had been seeking a way to reinvigorate Chinese literature by exploring foreign writings.

In the early issues of the XQN Chen published his translation of Ivan Turgenev's *Spring Floods*, Oscar Wilde's *An Ideal Husband*, and Rabindranath Tagore's *The Gitanjali* (*Song Offering*), the latter emphasizing Chen's intellectual utopia: "where knowledge is free; where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls."⁸⁹ Chen also translated the lyrics of the American national anthem, declaring that "literature is the manifestation of the citizen's highest spirit, but in our country this spirit has been stunted for a while."⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Chen Pingyuan, *Chumo lishi yu jinru wusi*, 73.

⁸⁹ Rabindranath Tagore, tr. by Chen Duxiu, "The Gitanjali", in XQN, 1:2 (Oct. 1, 1915), 2.

⁹⁰ Chen Duxiu, "Response from the journalist," in XQN, 1:3 (Nov. 1, 1915), 2.

In his discussion of the literary history of modern Europe, Chen credited the transition from classicism to romanticism with transforming the political and social conditions of Europe. Furthermore, Chen asserted that the development of science at the end of the nineteenth century led to the rise of naturalism in literature. Chen called Zola the "Napoleon of naturalism," and cited Tolstoy, Turgenev, Ibsen, Wilde, Shaw and Maeterlinck as representative writers of naturalism. Plays, Chen observed, took precedence over poetry and novels during this time.⁹¹

These particular authors were notable to Chen because collectively they focused on the individual's concern with personal freedom and respect for human dignity. Moreover, they were critical of contemporary civilization, anti-despotic, and they espoused a deep sense of religious morality.⁹² He called on his readers to emulate the style of the naturalists, as they provided excellent examples of the scientific and experimental spirit necessary to revive the moribund spirit of Chinese literature.⁹³

In answer to Chen's request for inspiring and instructive examples of foreign literature, Hu Shi submitted in early 1916 a vernacular translation of "The Duel" by Russian author Nikolai Dmitrievitch Teleshov. In a letter inquiring about the story's eventual publication, Hu submitted the aforementioned eight suggestions for a "literary revolution," taking Chen to task for publishing poems written in the classical style while advocating vernacular writing.⁹⁴ Overjoyed at finding a kindred spirit, Chen encouraged Hu to elaborate further, and declared Hu's "Preliminary Discussion on Reforming

⁹¹ Chen Duxiu, "A Discussion of the Literary History of Modern Europe, Pt. 1" XQN, 1:3 (Nov. 1, 1915), 1-2,

⁹² Chen Duxiu, "A Discussion of the Literary History of Modern Europe, Pt. 2", XQN, 1:4 (Dec. 1 1915), 1-2.

⁹³ Chen Duxiu, "Reader's correspondence," XQN, 1:6 (Feb. 1, 1916), 2.

⁹⁴ Hu Shi, "Correspondence," XQN, 2:2 (Oct. 1, 1916), 1-3.

Literature" a thunderclap in the literary world. Chen predicted that the vernacular language would eventually dominate in Chinese literature.⁹⁵

Hu's eight suggestions to save Chinese literature from decadence and superfluity were (1) write with substance, (2) do not imitate the ancients, (3) observe proper grammar, (4) do not adopt a baseless plaintive tone, (5) remove hackneyed and trite expressions, (6) do not use allusions, (7) do not use parallelism, and finally (8) avoid slang.⁹⁶

Chen's enthusiastic endorsement of Hu's ideas appeared in the next issue of the XQN, where he unequivocally announced the beginning of a literary revolution. Finding fault with Chinese literature from the *Classic of Poetry* through all of the different stylistic schools of classical literature, Chen argued that ornate, empty and esoteric literature was responsible for China's sycophantic, hypocritical and impractical national character. Simple, honest and realistic writing would create free and brave citizens who could save China, just as this kind of writing had done in the West. Clearly thrilled about the difference literature could make in his country's future, Chen wrote, "I love the France represented by Rousseau and Pasteur, especially the France of Hugo and Zola. I love the Germany of Kant and Hegel, of Goethe . . . I love the England of Bacon, Darwin, Dickens and Wilde. Do we have anyone willing to declare war with the eighteen monsters?"⁹⁷ I volunteer to be a vanguard dragging the forty-two gun cannon."⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Chen Duxiu, "In response to Hu Shi," XQN, 2:2 (Oct. 1, 1916), 3; and "Upon reading Hu Shi's 'A Preliminary Discussion on Refoming Literature'," XQN, 2:5 (Jan. 1, 1917), 11.

⁹⁶ Hu Shi, "A Preliminary Discussion on Refoming Literature," XQN, 2:5 (Jan. 1, 1917), 11.

⁹⁷ The eighteen monsters refer to the seven literary masters from Eastern Han (196-220): Wang Can, Kong Rong, Chen Lin, Xu gan, Yuan Yu, Ying Yang, Liu Zhen, the eight renowned writers of Tang (618-907) and Song (907-1127) dynasties: Han Yu, Liu Zongyuan, Ouyang Xiu, Su Xun, Su Shi, Su Zhe, Wang Anshi, Zeng Gong, and three famous essayists of the Tongcheng School, Fang Bao, Liu Dakui, Yao Nai of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).

⁹⁸ Chen Duxiu, "The Discussion of Literary Revolution," XQN, 2:6 (Feb. 1, 1917), 1-4.

These initial articles and correspondence between Chen and Hu appeared toward the end of 1916 and early 1917, coinciding with Chen's decision to accept the position of Dean of the School of Letters at Beijing University.⁹⁹ Once Chen moved the magazine to Beijing, the addition of the university faculty to his editorial staff broadened the debate on literary reform for the next two and half years. While Chen provided the impetus and acted as the cheerleader, weighing in occasionally to add his opinions, the bulk of the conversation was conducted among professors such as Hu Shi, Liu Bannong, Lu Xun, Qian Xuantong, Shen Yinmo and Zhou Zuoren, in addition to a few students, including Fu Sinian and Luo Jialun. These discussions took place primarily in the "reader's correspondence" section of the XQN. Recognizing the momentousness of their undertaking, Hu and a few readers counseled moderation and caution in their discussions, but the firebrand style of others generally prevailed.

The content of the writings concerning the vernacular movement has been discussed voluminously in other publications, but observations about the nature of the movement have been less substantial.¹⁰⁰ The imbalance is largely the result of a praise and blame historiographical style, in which the vernacularization of the language has been hailed as a populist effort liberating the people from a feudalistic past, and where the Marxist protagonists assumed a heroic profile in the process. The evidence suggests, however, that the process of reform was neither simple nor straightforward.

For instance, from the very beginning of the movement there was no clear delineation between reforming the language and reforming the literature. Both Chen and Hu assumed that there would be a commonly agreed upon vernacular language with

⁹⁹ Chen Duxiu, "Letter to Hu Shi," ZZX, 259.

¹⁰⁰ Chen Pingyuan's *Chumo lishi yu jinru wusi* is an exception.

which to construct a new corpus of literature. Evidently, no one thought of defining vernacular language, and all contributors to the debate assumed that they were referring to the same thing. However, the creation of the Committee on Preparations for Unifying the National Language attested to the need for defining the basic parameters of the language.

Another anomaly was that Hu and Chen wrote to each other in classical Chinese, even as they designated the vernacular as the savior of Chinese citizenry, and condemned the classical language as the moribund expression of a hierarchical and oppressive past. Most of their colleagues and readers were guilty of the same inconsistency, until a major decision was made in May 1918 for the XQN to be entirely written in vernacular language.

The writing of vernacular fiction was comparatively easy because the vernacular had been used to create great literary works like the legendary Qing novel, *Honglou meng* (Dream of the Red Chamber). But writing non-fiction prose in the vernacular was something unfamiliar to intellectuals.

In the polemical debates among "conservatives" and "radicals" over language reform, Hu's voice was, on balance, the most thoughtful and reasoned, although he clearly sided with the advocates of fundamental change. He was instrumental in framing the debate with his eight suggestions for literary reform, which he followed with an article titled "Constructive Literary Revolution" eighteen months later. Coining the phrase "a literature of national language, and a national language for literature" (*guoyu de wenxue, wenxue de guoyu*), Hu urged authors to write only when they had something of substance to say, to render their points truthfully, to use their own words and not emulate

the ancients, to write in the language of today, and above all, to base their writing on personal experience and solid observation.¹⁰¹

The idea that literature should reflect present times was a corollary to the evolutionary argument in the social sciences. Fu Sinian, Hu's brilliant student, argued that literature was intimately connected to the political and social conditions of society, and as society changed, so should literature.¹⁰² Reader Zhang Hulan suggested that moral and literary revolutions should be conducted in tandem, an idea that elicited an earnest response from Chen Duxiu, who added that dishonesty was the biggest problem with both Chinese morality and classical literature.¹⁰³

Among the most radical of the debaters was Beida professor Qian Xuantong, an anarchist disciple of Zhang Binglin, who became a noted linguist and philologist later in life. Qian advocated simplifying the Chinese language, reducing the number of characters, and writing horizontally from left to right rather than vertically, from right to left, as had been done in China for more than two thousand years. He argued for other changes in the language as well, including the eventual abandonment of Chinese characters and the use of Esperanto instead.¹⁰⁴

Chen agreed with Qian that Chinese writing needed to change, not only to make it more accessible but also because the inherited language contained so many poisonous and decadent concepts. In his response to Qian's letter, Chen suggested that it might not be a bad idea to burn the entire Chinese classical corpus. "Concepts such as 'country',

¹⁰¹ Hu Shi, "Discussion on a Constructive Literary Revolution," XQN, 4:4 (Apr. 1, 1918), 289-306.

¹⁰² Fu Sinian, "A Proclamation of Literary Reform," in "Reader's Correspondence," XQN, 4:1 (Jan. 15, 1918), 62-70.

¹⁰³ Zhang Hulan, "Reader's Correspondence," XQN, 3:3 (May 1, 1917), 23-24.

¹⁰⁴ Qian Xuantong, "On Essential Reform of the Writing of Prose" in "Readers's Correspondence," XQN, 3:5 (July 1, 1917), 13; and "The Future of Chinese Words," XQN, 4:4 (Apr. 1, 1918), 350-356.

‘race’, ‘clan’, and ‘marriage’,” he wrote, “are remnants of a narrow-minded barbaric age, [and] even you [Qian Xuantong] and I are not immune from exposure to such thoughts”¹⁰⁵

Chen felt that the way to achieve a new linguistic consciousness was to discard calligraphy, begin to transliterate the sounds of the Chinese language rather than continue using characters, and finally to dispense with the Chinese language altogether, replacing it with Esperanto.¹⁰⁶ One reader argued that Esperanto was an artificially created language devoid of cultural specificities, and that its enforcement across the world would be a form of tyranny. Chen’s optimistic but somewhat simplistic response to this argument was that the trend of the future was toward a more global outlook and that adopting Esperanto did not preclude individual national languages but simply offered a conduit for China’s entry into the world community.¹⁰⁷

As indicated above, the push toward vernacular language achieved a milestone when the XQN editorial board agreed to write all articles henceforth in vernacular, starting with the May 1918 issue. In that same issue, Lu Xun’s *Diary of a Madman* appeared and it soon became an icon in the new genre of vernacular literature. The “bai” or “white” in *baihua* or vernacular language, explained Hu, signified cleanliness of expression, clarity of thought, and freedom from burdensome classical allusions. Predicting that the world trend was moving toward short stories, short poems and one-act plays, Hu judged a good story as one that rendered a snapshot of life in the most

¹⁰⁵ Chen Duxiu, in a series of answers to Qian’s letters in the “Reader’s Correspondence” sections, starting with XQN, 3:3 (May 1, 1917), 17-18; XQN, 3:4 (June 1, 1917), 7-10; XQN 3:5 (July 1, 1917), 13; XQN, 3:6 (Aug. 1, 1917), 12-13; and XQN, 4:4 (Apr. 1, 1918), 356.

¹⁰⁶ Chen Duxiu, in a series of answers to Qian’s letters in the “Reader’s Correspondence” sections, starting with XQN, 3:3 (May 1, 1917), 17-18; XQN, 3:4 (June 1, 1917), 7-10; XQN 3:5 (July 1, 1917), 13; XQN, 3:6 (Aug. 1, 1917), 12-13; and XQN, 4:4 (Apr. 1, 1918), 356.

¹⁰⁷ Chen Duxiu, “Reader’s Correspondence,” XQN, 3:6 (Aug. 1, 1917), 4-5.

economical manner.¹⁰⁸ Lu Xun's terse language, realistic depictions, keen eye for pathos and genius for story-telling dazzled the literary world, and boosted the ongoing movement to create vernacular fiction.

In an attempt to prove his detractors wrong, Hu vowed to write only vernacular poetry for three years.¹⁰⁹ The result was a flurry of short poems that appeared in many issues of the magazine from 1917 to 1922, in an experiment carried on mostly by Hu, Shen Yinmo, Liu Bannong, and Zhou Zuoren. Chen Duxiu only contributed two poems during this time, one titled "Song of the 1917 New Year's Eve—Him and Me" and the other, "Responding to Bannong's 'D---' Poem," neither of which measured up to the quality of his classical poems. In 1920, Hu published a volume titled *A Collection of Experimentation* (Changshi ji), which was guest-edited by the New Culture movement's leading literary scholars and caused quite a stir in the literary world at the time.¹¹⁰

Hu's collection sparked a lively debate on the definition, appropriate content, style and future of vernacular poetry. Critics faulted him for using too many interjections, such as "le" (了) to link verses, and objected to the new poetry's disregard for the intricate rhyming conventions of classical poetry. In the end even though some of Hu's colleagues considered the vernacular language more effective in prose than in poetry, he remained optimistic about the future of vernacular poetry.¹¹¹ The overall consensus

¹⁰⁸ Hu Shi, "On Novels and Vernacular Rhyming Prose," in "Reader's Correspondence," XQN, 4:1 (Jan. 15, 1918), 75-79; "On Short Stories," XQN, 4:5 (May, 15, 1918), 395-407.

¹⁰⁹ Hu Shi, "Reader's correspondence," XQN, 3:3 (May 1, 1917), 5.

¹¹⁰ They are Zhou Zuoren and his brother Lu Xun, Ren Hongjuan, Chen Hengzhe, Kang Baiqing and Yu Pingbo.

¹¹¹ Chen Pingyuan, 209-236.

among historians is that the XQN succeeded in revolutionizing the writing of novels and essays but not in poetry and drama.¹¹²

Chen Duxiu, like many in his generation, recognized the power of drama in reaching the illiterate population, and called the theater “the people’s university.”¹¹³ His colleagues concurred and advocated the creation of non-musical plays, in emulation of European and American drama.¹¹⁴ Toward that end, the XQN devoted one issue entirely to Ibsen and his work, and another to reforming drama. Hu defined “Ibsenism” as an effort to describe society in as realistic a manner as possible. The family in Ibsen’s view was a microcosm of the selfishness, hypocrisy and cowardice inherent in human existence. What appealed to the XQN editors especially was Ibsen’s encouragement of the individual to rebel against family, to fight for personal freedom, and to accept responsibility for one’s own fate.¹¹⁵

In a special edition discussing the reform of Chinese drama, Hu used the concept of evolution to demonstrate that plays had changed over the centuries as part of a natural process, and suggested it was time to rejuvenate Chinese drama by borrowing from the West. In an astonishingly sweeping pronouncement, Hu recommended using tragic endings in all Chinese plays for impact and pathos, citing the writing of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides as exemplary creations, and celebrating the economy of expression he perceived in “sixteenth and seventeenth century British and French plays!”¹¹⁶

¹¹² Chen Pingyuan, 83.

¹¹³ Chen Duxiu, ASB, no. 11, 1.

¹¹⁴ Shen Ji, *Chen Duxiu Yanjiu Ji*, vol.1, 237-242.

¹¹⁵ Hu Shi, “Ibsenism”, in XQN, 4:6, June, 1918, 489-507.

¹¹⁶ Hu Shi, “The Concept of Literary Evolution and the Reform of Drama,” XQN, 5:4, Oct., 1918, 308-321.

By early 1919, as Hu's colleagues turned their attention increasingly toward political issues, he continued to write about the process of creating a national language, the teaching of vernacular Chinese in high schools and universities, and methods of studying grammar. He also published a textbook of vernacular literature which was used by the government to coordinate vernacular instruction from the secondary schools to the universities.¹¹⁷

The XQN's push toward vernacularization was met with varying degrees of resistance. Liang Qichao thought that students ought to use the vernacular language for expository writing, but not for creating fiction. He had a prejudice against literature, saying that "all fabulous literature possessed some numbing effect, and all famous writers of fiction were somewhat neurotic."¹¹⁸ Yan Fu was dismissive of the efforts of Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi as well their archenemy, Lin Shu, (see below). Surprisingly, the famous classical scholar Zhang Binglin was not averse to the use of vernacular language, pronouncing that good literature was simply writing that followed the right rules, which could be found in both classical and colloquial Chinese. Zhang believed that as long as the subject matter and the writing style together rendered a clear and refreshing lyricism, than the plainer vernacular format is preferable to the artificiality of an overwrought classical writing style.¹¹⁹

The most vicious attack on the writers of the XQN came from Lin Shu (1852-1924), who had transformed 150 works of Western literature into classical Chinese by having assistants read them to him in colloquial Chinese.¹²⁰ Together with Liu Shipai,

¹¹⁷ Chen Pingyuan, *Chumo lishi yu jinru wusi*, 310.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 316.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 324. Zhang's words were: "俗而工者, 无宁雅而拙也."

¹²⁰ Paula Harrell, 90.

Ma Xulun, Huang Kan, Zhang Xiangwen and Tu Jingshan, he formed an opposition group within Beida and created the Confucian Study Society, and used the student journal *National Heritage* (*Guogu*) to attack Chen and his colleagues, accusing them of “overthrowing Confucius and Mencius, and eradicating ethics and morality.”¹²¹ They petitioned Cai Yuanpei to fire Chen, but Cai responded that he encouraged a diverse range of opinion and respected freedom of expression. Lin and his supporters had an ally in the politicians of the Anfu Club, who made a motion in the parliament to impeach both the Minister of Education and Cai Yuanpei, and to fire Chen and Hu as well. However, most of the assemblymen did not want to stir up popular resentment, and the motion never came to pass.¹²²

Lin Shu also wrote a novel titled *Jingsheng*, in which the protagonist, a general under the warlord government of Duan Qirui, flogged characters whose names were word plays on the names of Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Qian Xuantong.¹²³ Lin’s student, Zhang Houzai, spread rumors that Hu Shi and his friends had been fired by the university and that Chen had run off to Tianjin.¹²⁴ These rumors and an unsubstantiated charge that Chen had fought with a student over a prostitute were printed in the papers. Zhang was expelled from Beida for spreading rumors and damaging the school’s reputation. Nevertheless, Chen was forced to resign from the deanship, although he was nominally retained on the faculty.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Zheng Xuejia, 175.

¹²² Ibid., 175-6; Thomas Kuo, 55.

¹²³ Shen Ji, *Chen Duxiu Yanjiu*, vol.1, 245. Chen Duxiu’s character was named Tian Bimei (Definitely beautiful Tian—田必美), Qian Xuantong was Jin Xinyi (Different heart Mr. Qian—金心异), and Hu Shi was Di Mo (Contentious Mr. Di—狄莫).

¹²⁴ Wang Guanquan, 135.

¹²⁵ Shen Ji, *Chen Duxiu Yanjiu*, vol.1, 246.

Discussions about the literary revolution disappeared from the main pages of the XQN by the early months of 1919, and almost all of the articles in the May issue engaged the issue of Marxism. Perhaps in an effort to keep a low profile, Chen Duxiu's writing also disappeared from this issue of the XQN. At the inception of the XQN, Chen tried to accommodate Hu Shi's pledge to avoid engaging in political activities for twenty years, and kept the political writings in the magazine to a minimum. At the same time, he began to devote more attention to the more overtly political journal that he created with Li Dazhao in December, 1918 (see below).

War, Peace and Struggle

In November 1917 the United States signed the Lansing-Ishii agreement in which the U.S. acknowledged Japan's special interests in China, especially in Manchuria. The two powers agreed to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of China and to maintain the American Open Door Policy.¹²⁶ Reassured of non-interference from the U.S., in May 1918 Japan pressured China to sign the Sino-Japanese Military Mutual Assistance Conventions, in which China would permit Japan to bring troops into China and to use Chinese transport and supplies. In a preview of things to come almost a year later, the students from Beida held an emergency all-campus meeting on May 20th to protest their government's sell-out to Japan. They then joined with students of Beijing Normal Higher School and two other schools in a march toward the presidential palace, where two thousand students presented a memorial to President Feng demanding that the agreement be revoked. The demonstration spread to other major cities including Tianjin,

¹²⁶ Scalapino and Yu, 452.

Jinan, Nanjing and Shanghai. Ultimately, the student protests failed; the pact was signed on May 30th. But their effort had important ramifications, as many of the leaders went on to become the earliest student activists, including Fu Sinian, Luo Jialun, Zhang Guotao, Deng Zhongxia, Li Da, Li Hanjun and Xu Deheng.¹²⁷

By mid-1917 the polarization of the nation into the Beiyang warlord-controlled North and the loose coalition formed around Sun Yat-sen in the South became more pronounced. In Beijing the Zhili faction and the Progressive Party backed President Feng Guozhang, who favored mediation with the South. However, Premier Duan Qirui, backed by the Anfu Clique, conducted a military campaign against the South, failed and stepped down from his office.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, being the only man capable of amassing a sizable military force, Duan returned to his office in March 1918 after only a few months' hiatus. He restarted military campaigns against the South and succeeded for a while. The National Council promulgated a parliamentary charter and issued new election laws in February 1918, but the elections were rigged and corrupt. At the same time, since the laws excluded those parliamentarians who had attended Sun Yat-sen's parliament in the South, the results favored Duan's men and further split the government between his supporters and those who supported former President Feng Guozhang. A stalemate between Duan and Feng led to the election of Xu Shichang as President. In November of 1918 after the end of World War I in Europe, President Xu declared an armistice in the North-South fighting in hopes of presenting a unified front at the upcoming international peace negotiations in Paris. After much wrangling in China, the North-South peace talks finally began in March of 1919.

¹²⁷ Wang Guanquan, 130.

¹²⁸ Scalapino and Yu, 441.

China's decision to join World War I as a supplier of non-combatant labor, was made by the Beiyang government in the hope that an Allied victory would facilitate the return of the German occupied Jiaozhou Peninsula, which had already fallen into Japanese hands. American President Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of national self-determination raised China's hopes of regaining sovereignty over its territory. In the early months of 1919 newspapers across China devoted their front pages to discussing the possible return of the Shandong peninsula. It was therefore a devastating blow for the diplomats and the Chinese people alike to learn that Britain, France and Italy had signed secret treaties with Japan in 1917 backing its claims to Germany's rights in China. Disappointment turned to outrage when Japanese diplomats in Paris further disclosed that in 1918 Duan Qirui's government had negotiated a secret loan for the construction of two railroads in Shandong, and that Duan had not only pledged to Japan the property and the income of the two railroads, but he also agreed to a seven-point Japanese proposal for the management and policing of the railroads.

When news of this stunning development reached the Chinese public on May 3, 1919, the students of Beijing University, with the support of Chancellor Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), decided to move up the date of a demonstration originally planned for May 7th to mark "National Humiliation Day." On May 4th, over three thousand students from thirteen colleges and universities in Beijing gathered at Tiananmen Square to protest the treachery of their own government and the deception and aggression of the foreign powers, calling for the Chinese delegates in Paris not to sign the treaty.

The demonstration began peacefully, but turned violent as marchers arrived at the residence of the pro-Japanese Minister of Communications, Cao Rulin, and were turned

back by police. A few students managed to set fire to Cao's residence, and were arrested. Others returned to their schools and immediately began planning their next step. On May 6th the Student Union of the Middle Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning in Beijing was created, with the aim of "facilitating the performance of students' duties and promoting the welfare of the nation."¹²⁹ This city-wide organization inspired the creation of the Student Union of the Republic of China a month later, and within a month sympathy strikes by students had spread to more than twenty cities. The students received strong support from the press and gentry organizations such as the Lawyers Association of Shanghai, the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai County and the Federation of the Commercial Organizations of Shanghai (Shanghai shangye gongtuan lianhe hui). Southern politicians, led by Tang Shaoyi, used their endorsement of the strike as leverage to attack the Northern representatives in the North-South peace conference held in Shanghai.¹³⁰

After an initial period of confusion about how to deal with protesters, the Beijing government adopted a hard line approach and bore down on the educators, whom they blamed for inciting the students.¹³¹ Before the government could fire him, Cai Yuanpei resigned his post as Chancellor of Beijing University and left the city. The Minister of Education, under fire, resigned as well. In protest, professors from thirteen universities and a number of high school teachers created the Alliance of Teachers' Unions of the Middle Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning in Beijing, and declared their support for the student movement.¹³² As the protests continued, the pro-Japanese Beijing

¹²⁹ Chow, 122.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 117- 129.

¹³¹ Ibid., 137.

¹³² Ibid., 138.

government arrested thousands of students on June 3 and 4. These wholesale arrests only increased the indignation of the public.

Expanding the circle of alliances, a Federation of All Organizations of China was formed in Shanghai on June 5, linking merchant and labor groups, the press and the Shanghai student union. For seventy days, the city's shopkeepers, clerks, factory workers and students began a series of strikes against Japanese goods, involving approximately 13,000 students and up to 90,000 workers.¹³³ The strikes and boycotts spread to other cities, primarily along the Yangzi River. Ultimately, the imminent threat of merchant strikes in Tianjin, close to the capital of Beijing, forced the government to capitulate. President Xu Sichang reluctantly accepted the resignation of the three officials who were targets of the May Fourth demonstration: Minister of Communications Cao Rulin, the Chinese Minister to Japan Zhang Zongxiang, and Chinese director of the Chinese-Japanese Exchange Bank, Lu Zongyu.¹³⁴

Although the students won this initial concession from President Xu, when they learned that the government had secretly instructed the Paris representatives to sign the Treaty, they rallied merchants, industrialists and workers to continue their protests. Finally, the President sent a telegram to Paris reversing his earlier instructions. Although the telegram did not arrive in time for the signing, in fact the Chinese delegates had already decided not to sign the Treaty because they were under heavy pressure from the Chinese students and workers protesting in Paris. By July, Cai Yuanpei returned to Beida as Chancellor, effectively bringing the May Fourth incident to a close. This iconic historical event, which continues to be celebrated in China up to the present day, marked

¹³³ Chow, 153-157.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 162.

an unprecedented outpouring of nationalistic sentiment from all sectors of Chinese society--an outpouring guided by intellectuals and students, facilitated by the popular press and sustained by a growing political consciousness on the part of the masses. Nationalism, once an essentially elite phenomenon in China, had acquired a new character and with it, a new political importance.

Chen watched the increasingly oppressive political situation with great sadness. When a friend warned that after Cai's departure, it would be safer for Chen to leave the city, the latter responded, "My head is hurting so; I would rather have the government arrest and execute me right away, so that I won't have to live in such a filthy world!"¹³⁵ Distraught over the massive arrests of so many of his students, Chen wrote a short article titled "Laboratory and Prison" in an effort to rally the spirit of the students. He said, "There are two sources of world civilization: one is the science laboratory and the other is the prison. Our young people ought to pledge that they will leave the lab for the prison, and leave the prison for the lab. That would be the highest and most beautiful form of living. Only civilization that emanates from these two sources can be considered true civilization, and the only civilization worthy of life."¹³⁶

Chen also drafted a "Manifesto of the Citizens of Beijing," which he distributed throughout the city. In it, Chen delivered five demands to the Beiyang government: (1) reclaim the economic rights of the Shandong peninsula, including abrogation of the agreements made with Japan in 1915 and 1918; (2) remove the Premier, the three pro-Japanese officials targeted by the students, and two Beiyang army generals; (3) disband the offices of infantry police and army police; (4) reorganize the Beijing security forces

¹³⁵ Ren Jianshu, *Chen Duxiu Dazhuan* (The big biography of Chen Duxiu), 173.

¹³⁶ *Weekly Critic*, no. 25 (June 8, 1919).

with civilians; and (5) guarantee absolute freedom of speech and assembly for the citizens of Beijing.¹³⁷ Two nights later, as he was scattering the flyers from the second floor balcony of an open-air theater, he was arrested by the Beiyang police.

News of Chen's arrest was spread swiftly by his friends in newspaper offices across the country. It is a measure of the power of his networks that a coalition of members of the academic community, the Anhui co-provincial associations, the Anhui government, the Shanghai business and educational circles, and social luminaries immediately formed to loudly protest this injustice. Telegrams poured into the Beiyang government; Sun Yat-sen scolded the Beijing representative at the Paris peace conference, and Mao Zedong, then editor of the *Xiang River Commentary*, wrote about Chen's arrest and rescue effort in his inaugural issue in July, 1919. Hailing Chen as an intellectual star, Mao commended him for introducing scientific thinking and democracy, and wished him "ten thousand years of life."¹³⁸ Despite this outpouring of public sympathy and support, the government incarcerated Chen for ninety-eight days, and only released him on the condition that he would either leave the city or promise not to engage in "illegal activities." Police visited him once a month to check on his "reformed" behavior, and each month he was required to fill out a form for "security violators."

Chen's thinking began to change after this experience, and he was no longer content to devote the XQN to largely non-political discussions. Nor was he content to try to effect change with words alone. In the months immediately following his release from jail in 1919, Chen left Beida to organize work study groups and help poor students

¹³⁷ Ren Jianshu, *Chen Duxiu Dazhuan*, 175.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 181.

establish cafeterias and laundromats as a way to supplement their income.¹³⁹ At the same time, his long-standing interest in socialism took a new turn.

Socialist Currents and Consequences

By 1919, a wide variety of "socialist" ideas had entered the philosophical discourse of Chinese intellectuals, including Christian socialism, guild socialism, anarchism, nihilism, Marxism and Bolshevism. Often, however, these ideas were only incompletely understood. The reasons for this are clear. In the first place, references to socialist ideas initially appeared in excerpted passages and in second-hand translations, so many terms and concepts were rendered inaccurately or discussed out of context. Also, these ideas appeared as part of a torrent of philosophical options, in which the ideas of Aristotle and Marx were equally "new." Finally, Chinese intellectuals were looking desperately for immediate solutions to China's pressing problems; they literally did not have time to sift carefully through all of the philosophical options that had become available in translation and were now being disseminated by the rapidly growing Chinese periodical press. In short, Chinese revolutionaries lacked the theoretical sophistication to differentiate clearly between anarchism, socialism, communism and republicanism.¹⁴⁰

As a result, Chen and his cohorts were not strict followers of any particular doctrine; rather, they selectively adopted ideas that seemed useful for their cause at any given moment. This eclectic incorporation of concepts was a distinctive feature of most New Culture intellectuals--at least until the new-style political parties of the 1920s

¹³⁹ Shen Ji, *Chen Duxiu yanjiu ji*, vol. 2, 222.

¹⁴⁰ Gasster, 187.

established rigid orthodoxies and began to purge themselves of "heterodox" ideas as well as the people who espoused them.

The debacle of World War I brought disillusionment about democracy's effectiveness to thoughtful individuals throughout the world, and their search for an alternative political system was affected by the large number of massive labor protests worldwide. Social Darwinism, liberalism and utilitarianism began to lose their luster, and a wide range of socialist doctrines, from those Bakunin and Kropotkin to those of Marx and Lenin, began to gain popularity.¹⁴¹

As we have seen in previous chapters, anarchist thought had a relatively long and well-developed history in twentieth century China. Chen Duxiu himself had been attracted to anarchism in the early 1900s and his admiration for this particular form of socialism continued into the New Culture era. We can see it, for example, in his XQN article on "The French and World Civilization," where he praises the bravery of female anarchists Sophie Perovkasa and Louise Michel in "Europe's Seven Heroines."¹⁴² Throughout his tenure at the XQN, Chen championed concepts that seem to have reflected anarchist thinking, such as the destruction of the Confucian family system, the adoption of the universal language of Esperanto, the elimination of national boundaries, and the formation of a universal community. However, these concepts were mixed with his endorsement of Western democracy and Social Darwinism. In all, he did not place faith in anarchism's ability to solve China's problems.¹⁴³

Still, anarchism had substantial appeal to intellectuals of the May Fourth generation. At Beida, the Society for the Advancement of Morality, founded by Cai

¹⁴¹ Meisner, 100.

¹⁴² Chen Duxiu, "Europe's Seven Heroines, XQN, 1:3 (Nov. 1, 1915), 1-2.

¹⁴³ Meng Qingshu, 129.

Yuanpei in 1917, had borrowed its name and its guidelines from two anarchist organizations of earlier years.¹⁴⁴ In 1919 and 1920, anarchist societies and Esperanto schools appeared in Beijing, Shanghai and several other major cities in China, while Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid* and Bakunin's *God and the State* were translated into Chinese.¹⁴⁵ Small in numbers,¹⁴⁶ but led by two prominent intellectuals, Wu Zhihui and Li Shizeng, the anarchist movement in China seems to have exerted a profound influence on the New Culture movement. In the pages of the XQN, anarchist editors and contributors such as Wu, Cai Yuanpei, Qian Xuanton, Yi Baisha, and Zhou Zuoren aroused a great deal of interest among intellectuals in calling for the use of education as a means of achieving a social revolution, for the ethical transformation of the individual, and for the advancement of the idea of mutual aid.¹⁴⁷

Marxism and Leninism appeared more slowly in China. In 1899, Marx's name was first mentioned in the pages of *The Review of the Times*, and by 1903 small segments of *The Communist Manifesto* had appeared in Chinese via the translated writings of a Japanese author, Fukuda Shinzo, in his book, *Modern Socialism*. Meanwhile, the overseas Chinese student publication, the *Tides of Zhejiang*, had translated *The Socialist Heritage* (by the Japanese Socialist Kotoku Shusui), in which Marx and Engels were mentioned.¹⁴⁸ We have also seen that Chen Duxiu referred to Marx in his debate with Du Yaquan, discussed above. Lenin's name was first mentioned in Shanghai's *Minguo*

¹⁴⁴ Meng Qingshu, 172.

¹⁴⁵ Arif Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*, 155-156.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 152.

¹⁴⁷ There were only a few hundred activists in China in 1919-1920. Ibid., 161, 181.

¹⁴⁸ Pantsov, 26.

Ribao (Nation's Daily) in 1917, at about the same time that Trotsky's name first appeared in China.¹⁴⁹

Li Dazhao was by all accounts the first major Chinese intellectual to recognize the significance of the Bolshevik victory in 1917, proclaiming it a triumph for the people of the twentieth century the world over. He wrote, "[It is] the victory of socialism . . . the victory of world proletariat . . . Rather than saying [this triumph] is a tribute to the hard work of Wilson, instead [let us] say that it is a tribute to Lenin's, Trotsky's, [and] Kollontay's hard work"¹⁵⁰

In May 1919, Li Dazhao edited a special issue of the XQN devoted almost exclusively to Marxism. In this issue Li introduced a biography of Karl Marx, and offered discussions on *Das Kapital*, the theory of surplus value, the materialist conception of history, and the Communist Manifesto. The reception of Marxist ideas was not all positive, however. For instance, Li considered the Marxist analysis of history to be devoid of ethical and spiritual factors. And another contributor to the XQN, Ling Shuan, found inherent contradictions in Marx's theory of surplus value, concluding that Marxism's strength was in its general critique of contemporary capitalist society rather than in its specific economic analysis.¹⁵¹

Chen Duxiu, for his part, did not discuss Marxism in any depth until after the first cell of the Chinese Communist Party was organized in 1920 (see below). Prior to that time, he rarely used terms such as "class struggle," "exploitation of labor," "capitalist bourgeoisie" or "dictatorship of the proletariat." He did not distinguish concepts usually

¹⁴⁹ Pantsov, 28.

¹⁵⁰ Li Dazhao, "The Bolshevik Victory," XQN, 5:5 (Oct. 15, 1918), 442-448. Aleksandra Mikhaylovna Kollontay (1872-1952) was a Russian revolutionary, Marxist feminist and Soviet official who was the first female ambassador in the world.

¹⁵¹ Ling Shuang, "The Discussion of Marxism," XQN, 6:5 (May, 1919), 464.

identified with anarchism, such as “mutual aid,” and “sanctity of labor,” from those associated with Marxism--a general confusion shared by many intellectuals immediately after the October revolution. But he moved quickly, very quickly, to Marxism-Leninism after 1919.

The Weekly Critic and Chen's Conversion to Communism

Even before the May Fourth demonstration, Chen and Li Dazhao were frustrated by their colleagues' lack of interest in discussing politics. They therefore created the *Weekly Critic* (*Meizhou Pinglun*) in 1918 as a forum to air opinions on domestic and international politics. In the first issue of this publication Chen expressed optimism about the outcome of World War I. He considered Germany's loss to be an instance of justice triumphing over brute force, and he praised Woodrow Wilson's policy of self-determination. Indeed, he described the American president to be “the best person in the world.”¹⁵² In the second issue, Chen urged his readers to demand equality and freedom for all mankind, and he specifically addressed the issue of racism, saying that it was especially important “for the Europeans and Americans to abandon their discrimination and prejudice against people of color.”¹⁵³

The disappointing outcome of the Treaty of Versailles, however, demonstrated to Chen the duplicity and hypocrisy of the Western democratic nations. Embittered, he wrote in the May 18, 1919 issue of the *Weekly Critic*, “We still live in a world of banditry! After this world war . . . brute force still triumphs, making it inevitable for [another]

¹⁵² *Weekly Critic*, no. 1 (Dec. 22, 1918).

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, no. 2 (Dec. 29, 1918).

world war. To avoid [another] war, we must reform the thoughts of humanity in order to erase their arrogant disregard of justice.”¹⁵⁴ A week later he pointed out that “The Shandong question should bring about two awakenings in our people: (1) We cannot simply rely on justice, and (2) We cannot allow a minority to cut short our awakening to political power . . . We will use force to support justice, and we will let the people conquer the government.”¹⁵⁵ Economic conditions increasingly became a barometer in Chen’s configuration of political justice. In an article titled “The Cries of the Poor,” Chen compared the causes for disparities in wealth among China and the West, and concluded that in the West the capitalists exploited laborers, while in China it was the government officials who pocketed the nation’s riches. Increasingly, Marxist concepts such as the exploitation of labor and relations of production began to appear in Chen’s writing, along with periodic calls for the use of force to achieve justice for the masses.¹⁵⁶

On the domestic front, Chen was fearless in attacking Chinese politicians, bureaucrats, militarists, and assemblymen alike for neglecting their public duties. His suggestions for the participants at the North-South Peace Conference give us a glimpse of the sad state of Chinese politics at this time: (1) The military governors, or warlords, must honor the value of the central government’s currency, and not discount it at will; (2) The military governors “who have gained enough money through graft” should be removed, by foreign intervention if necessary; (3) The regional armies should be streamlined and transformed into one centralized army under the national government; (5) The Chinese National Defense army, which was nothing but “a branch of the Japanese defense force,” should be disbanded; and (6) The Northern and the Southern governments

¹⁵⁴ *Weekly Critic*, no. 22 (May, 18, 1919).

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 23 (May 26, 1919).

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 19 (Apr. 27, 1919).

must adhere strictly to the law, because “we can only use the law to change the law, as a means of resolving the dispute between the North and the South.”¹⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Chen invited his XQN colleagues to contribute to the *Weekly Critic*. Hu Shi, among others, answered the call. His article, titled “More Study of Problems, Talk Less of ‘Isms’!” provoked a lively debate with Li Dazhao over the merit of ideology versus pragmatism. Hu rejected the discussion of “empty or imported ideologies on paper,” and favored finding solutions in a pragmatic and concrete manner. He counseled patience and moderation, noting that civilization was built up “inch by inch, drop by drop.”¹⁵⁸ Li, expressing a decidedly Marxist point of view, countered that without a theoretical formulation by which to analyze the economic relations of society, problems could never be solved.¹⁵⁹ Chen joined the debate briefly by stating that ideology was the rudder of a ship, without which a nation would be at a loss as to how to move forward.¹⁶⁰

Chen's newfound interest in ideology as a guiding mechanism for the state, together with his impatience over China's domestic and international politics, provoked a new phase in his intellectual development. The incessant civil wars conducted by the northern and southern warlords demonstrated to Chen the futility of republicanism, and at the same time his disappointment with the behavior of the Western nations at the Paris peace conference alienated him from the ideals of Western democracy. In the midst of his continuing search for ways to save China, the Bolshevik revolution suggested a possible path.

¹⁵⁷ *Weekly Critic*, no. 18 (May 20, 1919).

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 31 (July 20, 1919).

¹⁵⁹ Chow, 219.

¹⁶⁰ Chen Duxiu, “Ideology and Labor,” *ZZX*, vol. 2, 219.

Like many Chinese, Chen was moved not only by the success of the Bolsheviks in 1917 but also by their policies toward China in the immediate aftermath. In July 1918, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgi Chicherin, declared that Bolshevik Russia had unilaterally renounced all Czarist "unequal" treaties with China, as well as Russia's agreements with Japan and other countries relating to China. A manifesto to this effect was issued on July 25, 1919.¹⁶¹ Fearing Japanese reprisals, the Beiyang government did not endorse this magnanimous gesture, but when the news of the offer began to spread in China, a number of people sent telegrams of gratitude to the Bolshevik government.¹⁶²

The time was now ripe for Chen's political conversion to Marxism-Leninism. In the April 1920 issue of XQN, analyzing the Malthusian theory of overpopulation, Chen called explicitly for the abolition of private property and the equalization of wealth. Believing that each society required a special solution to its own problems, he was not ready to accept the idea that there might be some sort of "eternal sage," or that there could ever be a panacea for all social problems.¹⁶³ But Marx and Lenin seemed to be the best sages for Chen's time and place.

Enter the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1920, Comintern agent Grigori Voitinsky came to China in an effort to establish a Communist party. Rebuffed by the Beiyang government, he met Li Dazhao in Beijing and inspired him to form a Marxism Study Society. At Li's recommendation, Voitinsky then met Chen Duxiu in Shanghai. After many discussions with prominent socialists, including Dai Jitao and Zhang Dongsun,

¹⁶¹ Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, 61.

¹⁶² Kuo, 81.

¹⁶³ Chen Duxiu, "Malthusian Population Theory and the Problem of Chinese Population," XQN, 7:4, Mar., 1920, pp. 1-10.

Chen also created Marxism Study Society, thus inspiring the expression, “South Chen, North Li” (*Nan Chen bei Li*). Shortly thereafter, Chen called his Shanghai contacts Shi Cuntong, Li Hanjun, Yu Xiusong, and Chen Gongpei to a meeting and resolved to establish the a Communist Party in China.¹⁶⁴

Because Chen did not keep a record of the event, historians disagree on the founding date and the composition of its members.¹⁶⁵ But its orientation was clear: The party was to adhere to the revolutionary principle of relying on “a dictatorship of labor and peasantry and their collaboration in economic production.”¹⁶⁶ At the next meeting of the Committee to Establish the Chinese Communist Party, the original five members were joined by Chen Wangdao, Shen Xuanlu, Yu Xiusong, Yang Mingru, Li Da and Voitinsky.¹⁶⁷ Chen was elected secretary-general of the party sometime in 1920.

Chen used his extensive network of contacts in the south to start cells in Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang provinces, and he urged Li Dazhao to do the same in the north, where cells were established in the provinces of Zhili, Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan.¹⁶⁸ In Hunan province, Mao Zedong, who had been Li Dazhao's assistant at Beida, began a Communist cell in Changsha. Similar Chinese Communist organizations developed in France and in Japan. In November 1920, the Chinese Communist Party drafted a proclamation stating its goal of eradicating private property and social classes by means of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. Chen's group became the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, and they began to push for the establishment of a Socialist

¹⁶⁴ Ren Jianshu, *Chen Duxiu Dazhuan*, 218, and Zheng Xuejia, 357.

¹⁶⁵ Some believed it was in May; Shi Cuntong said June, Li Da, Shen Yanbin, Chen Gongpei, Zhou Fohai thought it was summer, and Yang Zhihua remembered fall or winter. Zheng Xuejia believed it was in the summer of 1920. Zheng Xuejia, 356.

¹⁶⁶ Ren Jianshu, *Chen Duxiu Dazhuan*, 218.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 219.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 219.

Youth Group (a translation society for introducing Marxist ideas), the publication of *Communist Party* (Gongchandang), and the gradual transformation of *New Youth* into a party newspaper.¹⁶⁹

In several articles written around the time of the founding of the first Communist cell, Chen shared a number of views that reflect a blend of his previously held opinions and his new Marxist orientation. Among these views were the following: that a country is nothing but an idol; that it is important for everyone to nurture creativity and to think in a scientific manner; that mutual aid should be the defining principle in social organizations and relationships; that literature should be "realistic;" and that people should apply "direct action" and harbor a "spirit of sacrifice" in their daily lives.¹⁷⁰

Not surprisingly, the May 1920 issue of XQN was dedicated exclusively to the topic of labor, with Li Dazhao writing on labor history and Chen discussing the need to raise workers' consciousness. Chen suggested that laborers demand a wage increase and the right to self-rule from their employers.¹⁷¹ In the same issue, he demonstrated his mastery of Marxist terminology by analyzing the exploitation of Hunanese women laborers in a Shanghai cotton mill, using the theory of surplus value and exploitation of labor to demonstrate wage inequality. He urged the owner of the mill to adopt a cooperative system in which workers could share in the profit.¹⁷²

In the second half of 1920 Chen moved the publication of the XQN back to Shanghai, and devoted its eighth volume, published in September, to the promotion of

¹⁶⁹ Ren Jianshu, 221-224.

¹⁷⁰ Chen Duxiu, "Destroy Idols," XQN, 5:2 (Aug. 15, 1918), 89-91; "A Note to All Comrades of the New Culture," ZZX, vol. 2, 83. "What is the Spirit of the May Fourth?" ZZX, vol.2, 131.

¹⁷¹ Chen Duxiu, "The Consciousness of the Laborer," XQN, 7:6 (May 1, 1920), 1-2.

¹⁷² Chen Duxiu, "The Problem of Hunanese Women Laborers in the Shanghai Housheng Cotton Mill," XQN, 7:6 (May 1, 1920), 1-47.

dialectical materialism and socialism. The authors, all espousing varying schools of socialist thinking, were a new group of intellectuals that included Chen Gonbo, Cheng Shewo, Chen Wangdao, Li Da, Li Hanjun, Li Ji, Shen Xuanlu, Shen Yanbing, Shen Zemin, Shi Cuntong, Yang Mingzhai, and Zhou Fohai. The XQN became the official publication of the Chinese Communist Central Committee in 1923 until its demise in 1926.¹⁷³

By the end of 1920, Chen had identified himself as a Marxist socialist. In retrospect, it appears that he embraced Marxism-Leninism before he fully understood it, but he knew enough to believe, however erroneously, that it was China's best hope for a bright future. From that time onward he disparaged all other non-economic based socialist theories as mere "pipe dreams." He declared that Marxist socialism was the only scientific and objective doctrine, and that only the socialist mode of production could remove surplus value and eliminate the exploitation of the proletariat. The goal of social revolution in China, Chen stated, was for the proletariat to become victorious and to link up with laborers in other countries and bring about an international revolution.¹⁷⁴

The rest of Chen's story lies beyond the scope of this study. The organizational efforts of Comintern agents in China from 1920 onward gave structure to ideology, and Chen became a central figure in the political drama that unfolded in China during the next several years. From 1921 to 1927 he served as the head of the Chinese Communist Party, only to be blamed for its near liquidation in 1927. He was expelled from the CCP in 1929, and died in 1942 in poverty and shunned by both the CCP and the GMD.

¹⁷³ Chen Wanxiong, *Xin wenhua*, 19.

¹⁷⁴ Chen Duxiu, "Critique of Socialism," XQN, 9:3 (July 1, 1921), 1-13.

In an article written in the *New Youth* magazine in 1916, Chen recalled Kang Youwei's importance as a reformer in the late Qing period, when Kang bravely memorialized the emperor to ask for an overhaul of the central governmental structure, and when Chen proudly considered himself a member of the "Kang party." But, as Chen pointed out, historical evolution had made Kang an anachronism. Chen outlined the general pattern: He (Chen) and his generation were dissatisfied with Kang, the way Kang was dissatisfied with Zhang Zhidong and Li Hongzhang, the way Zhang and Li were dissatisfied with those who opposed the building of railroads and the navy."¹⁷⁵ By 1929, Chen's time, too, had passed, although he retained a great many friends and supporters to the end.

¹⁷⁵ Chen Duxiu, "The Way of Confucius and Modern Living," XQN, 2:4, Dec. 1916, 1-2.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

There are any number of ways to measure the significance of historical actors. One is, of course, to gauge the influence of their ideas and/or their actions over time. By either measure, Chen Duxiu deserves attention, much more than he has received so far from Western scholars. But there is another way to determine significance--one that takes us away from "great man" theories and one-dimensional narratives, and that is, of course, to see the objects of our study not as the architects or engineers of historical events but rather as reflections of their time and place. This is the general approach that I have chosen to take in this study.

This dissertation is not so much about Chen Duxiu, then, as it is about the nature of his networks--how and why they were formed, how they operated, how they were related to one another, and what they achieved (or failed to achieve)--in the tumultuous period from 1895 to 1920, a time framed neatly by the end of the Sino-Japanese War and the beginning of the Chinese Communist Party. What I have tried to show, using Chen and his associates as a focus, is how people and ideas traveled in late nineteenth and early twentieth century China, and what effect these circulations had on China's historical evolution. By taking this particular approach, my goal has been to understand more clearly and completely the complexities and the contradictions of a time when China moved rapidly from a dynasty in decline to a troubled republic.

As indicated in my Introduction, during the last several years, a wealth of material has appeared in Chinese on Chen Duxiu's early life and the lives of his friends, colleagues and associates. Unfortunately, much of this information is raw, appearing

either in the form of primary sources, or in rather straightforward descriptive accounts. And where Chinese scholars have ventured interpretations, many of them (though to be fair, not all) have been politically motivated. Western scholars, for their part, have so far given very little systematic attention to this vast repository of information.

But I see this study as doing more than simply bringing to light new materials, as interesting as these materials may be. It is also designed to place this “data” in a framework that challenges conventional understandings of the late Qing and early Republican periods of Chinese history. Moreover, it seeks to open up other research topics and possibilities.

The standard narrative in both Chinese and Western scholarship for the period from 1895 to 1920 emphasizes a series of events or “movements” driven by major personalities and defined by their successes and failures. Thus, Li Hongzhang’s Self-Strengthening Movement succeeded in suppressing internal rebellion and maintaining a measure of domestic tranquility, but it failed to protect China from foreign aggression. After China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the infamous “Scramble for Concessions,” nationalistic reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao tried to save the dynasty, while equally nationalistic revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing tried to destroy it. Ultimately the revolutionaries prevailed, establishing the Republic of China, but failing to secure a democratic government after the self-interested military strong man, Yuan Shikai, reestablished autocratic rule. After Yuan’s death in 1916, China dissolved into warlordism, during which time Chinese intellectuals such as Cai Yuanpei, Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Li Dazhao led a New Culture Movement that ultimately produced the two major Chinese political parties of the twentieth century--the

Guomindang (Nationalist Party) under Sun Yat-sen and eventually Chiang Kai-shek, and the Gongchandang (Chinese Communist Party) under Chen Duxiu and eventually Mao Zedong.

The problem with this linear narrative is that it obscures nearly everything important about the period. Nothing about the Chinese revolution was foreordained. Any and all of the historical actors, including Chen, might easily have faded from view had it not been for the elaborate political, social and intellectuals networks that held them together.

These networks, I maintain, were particularly strong in late nineteenth and early twentieth century China. One reason for their strength is that they drew upon two different but complementary types of bonding. One was a long-standing and extremely powerful kind of Chinese affiliation known as *guanxi*, based on ties such as family, friendship, local affinity and common educational background. The other was the product of a new type of organization that arose largely in response to the rapid growth of Chinese nationalism after the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. Networks of this sort were based on politically oriented study societies, schools, professional associations and eventually political parties. They were especially effective in the waning years of the Qing dynasty and the nascent years of the Republic precisely because of the weakness of central governmental control.

The various tables and appendices that I have provided in this study indicate, both individually and collectively, the extraordinary range of networks in which Chen was enmeshed or at least tangentially involved. There are several points worth noting about these networks. One is certainly their great number and wide variety. Another is the

way that they intersected or overlapped in terms of their goals and/or their membership. A third and especially important point to keep in mind is the way that old-style *guanxi* networks, such as ties based on local affinity (*tongxiang guanxi*), could serve radically new political purposes, and operate effectively in new organizational contexts. Indeed, one of the things that I have tried to emphasize in this study is the enormous importance of provincial affiliations and identifications in the political history of China from 1895 to 1920.

Significantly, Chen Duxiu's life intersected in meaningful ways with the lives of virtually all of the major figures of late nineteenth and early twentieth century China, not to mention a great many more individuals who have for too long remained more obscure than they should be. Thus, Chen's life sheds light on the lives of these historical actors and vice versa.

What we see in this light is nothing but complexity. Even the most seemingly straightforward ideas of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries were constantly contested and challenged. Debates within Chen's overseas and domestic networks highlight the instability of these organizations, even when their constituent members seemed to share the same basic goals. An especially dramatic example is the defection of Chen's recently established Yuewang hui to the Revolutionary Alliance in 1906. At the same time, a focus on these networks reveals the extraordinarily important role of the new-style print media in spreading new knowledge about China's domestic and international situation. Study associations, schools, publishing houses and other organizations, both at home and abroad, produced newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and propaganda, and they also used

public spaces, such as the Zhang Garden in Shanghai, in unprecedented ways for the exchange and dissemination of information.

One important point that an examination of political, social and especially intellectual networks reveals is that the descriptive categories to which prominent individuals in nineteenth and twentieth century China have been relegated do not suffice to indicate the richness and complexity of their ideas. To be sure, some individuals may have found continuity more comfortable than discontinuity, or vice versa. And naturally people's ideas might change in response to different political, social and economic conditions. Virtually all of the prominent individuals discussed in this study underwent transformations of this sort at one time or another. Sometimes these transformations were dramatic. Chen's life was full of such drama.

But there was seldom if ever a clear line demarking "conservatives" and "radicals," even among intellectuals who saw themselves as revolutionaries. Thus, for example, Chen Duxiu could spearhead the vernacular movement, attack Confucianism as the root of all of China's social ills, experiment with new poetry and novels, and even entertain the idea that Christianity might be the right religion for China, while his fellow revolutionaries, Zhang Binglin and Liu Shipei, championed the Old Text as the true repository of Confucian canon, opposed the use of the vernacular language, and proposed the study of National Learning. At the same time, Zhang and Liu advocated anarchism, which Chen ultimately found too impractical. Finally, while Zhang and Liu strongly supported Sun Yat-sen and his Three People's Principles, Chen rejected their brand of nationalism as narrow and racist, setting his sights on a Chinese democracy that erased all racial and class barriers. And even this series of contrasts and contradictions is only a

snapshot, since it doesn't take into full account the shifts in perspective of each individual over time.

Similarly, although large themes such as imperialism, nationalism, modernization and revolution were inescapable in the multiple discourses of early twentieth century Chinese intellectuals, these concepts were constantly challenged, contested and variously understood. Within different networks, and at different times, Japan could be an imperialist threat, the provocation for Chinese nationalism (including anti-Russian nationalism among overseas students in Tokyo), a "modernizing" model, and a safe haven for Chinese revolutionaries. Japan's activities could inspire hatred or admiration or both.

"Nationalism" was equally an problematic concept. For some "patriotic" Chinese, the emphasis in their minds was more on ethnic identity than on nationhood, as in the case of certain forms of anti-Manchu sentiment prior to 1912. Anti-foreignism, as a manifestation of nationalism, could be directed against both the Manchus and external threats. A number of nationalistically inclined individuals, of whom Chen Duxiu was certainly one, loved their country passionately, but also envisioned a world without competing nation-states.

In short, what I have tried to do in this study is to highlight the twists, turns and contradictions that have marked the course of China's late nineteenth and early twentieth century history by looking at events on the ground, through the networks that facilitated them or inhibited them. By comparing and contrasting Chen Duxiu with the people he worked with, debated, supported and opposed, both they and he become more interesting. At the same time, an examination of the ideas and actions of these

individuals, operating in multiple networks and not always in concert, reveals the extraordinary richness and complexity of life in late Qing and early Republican China.

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- AQZ - *Anqing wenshi ziliao* (Materials on the literary history of Anqing). Ed. by Zhengxie Anqingshi wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui Anqing wenshi ziliao bianjibu (internal circulation). Anqing: Anqing archival repository, 1985.
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Appendix A

A Preliminary Note:

The Zhang Garden (Zhang Yuan) was located in the Shanghai International Settlement, at the corner of what is now Nanjing Road West and Taixing Road. The owner of the garden from 1882 onward was Zhang Shuhe (aka Zhang Honglu), a merchant from Wuxi, Jiangsu province, who purchased the property from a Frenchman in that year. Zhang rebuilt the original garden, enlarging it from about 4 acres to about 12, reconstructing it along the lines of a typical European-style estate, with a large lawn and a wide, straight road that led from the entrance of the garden to the main building. According to *The Shanghai Gazetteer*, Zhang built the European-style structures in the garden after he had purchased it. Photographs and lithographs from the first decade of the twentieth century indicate that the Zhang Garden had mixed “Chinese” and “Western” architectural features, and that men and women freely mingled in this hybrid space. The two main European-style buildings, Haitian shengchu (Where the Sky Meets the Sea) and the Ankaidi (a transliteration of Arcadia), were constructed after the Zhang Garden opened to the public in 1885.

As a public space, the Zhang Garden was designed initially for entertainment: It boasted a stage for opera performances, a theater, a photographer’s studio, a billiard room, tennis courts, a dance hall, and a movie theater. After the Sino-Japanese War, however, the garden increasingly became a site for the expression of political criticism directed against both the Qing government and the imperialist powers.

As indicated in Chapter 1, the Qing rulers had long been fearful of urban places where crowds could gather, and Shanghai was a city where large gatherings of people were expressly forbidden. But, as Xiong Yuezhi suggests, the administrative “gap” that existed between the authority of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Qing government regarding the affairs of the International Settlement provided an opportunity for the emergence of a political “public sphere” in places such as the Zhang Garden. As the tables below indicate, although the Zhang Garden remained an amusement park of sorts for a number of years, by 1900 or so it also began to host a variety of public meetings and conferences, ranging in size from less than 100 people to more than 1,000, a venue where Chinese citizens could express their political views with relative freedom.

Meetings at the Zhang Garden attracted a wide variety of individuals and groups, from literati and student associations (including groups of overseas Chinese students) to women’s organizations, schools, and merchant associations. Well-known writers and intellectuals delivered lectures at the Zhang Garden, including many individuals who have figured prominently in this dissertation. Among these were Yan Fu, Wang Kangnian, Zhang Binglin, Tang Caichang, Cai Yuanpei, Zou Rong, Wu Zhihui, and Sun Yat-sen, to name a few. The Qing authorities were well aware of the subversive potential of this site. At one point, for example, Zhang Zhidong specifically identified the Zhang Garden as a hotbed of rebellious activities. In a telegram to Governor-General Liu Kunyi, Zhang pointed out that the meetings in the Zhang Garden were organized by *xindang* (new parties) and that the lectures and speeches delivered there were full of threatening terminology, such as *zizhu* (self-government), *ju E* (resistance to Russia), and *ziyou*

(freedom). Unfortunately for Liu and other Qing officials at the time, they could do little except protest to the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Meanwhile, the kinds of activities that had been occurring in the Zhang Garden spread to other Shanghai gardens as well. Dissatisfaction with Qing policy toward Russia (see Chapter 2), for instance, turned the well-known Yu Garden (Yu Yuan), a Jiangnan-style private space, into a site for public meetings and open criticism of the regime. It was there that a Resist Russia Club (Dui E tongzhi hui) was founded in 1903. During the 1905 movement to protest United States discrimination against Chinese (see Chapter 3), the Yu Garden became a major rallying point, where a merchant leader from Fujian province named Zeng Zhu gave speeches and organized native-place and professional associations, students, literati, women's organizations, schools, and shopkeepers.

Public meetings and lectures associated with the anti-American boycott of 1905 also took place in other sites in the Shanghai area, connecting previously unconnected urban spaces. The Association of Public Lectures (Gongzhong yanshuo hui) featured a series of scholars and writers as speakers, including Cai Yuanpei, Wo Woyao, and Wang Kangnian. The forty or so public lectures and conferences organized during this time took place at a variety of sites, ranging from the headquarters of native-place and professional associations, to public and private gardens, to schools and learned societies. According to statistics provided by Meng Yue, eleven of the events in 1905 were held in public and private gardens and residences; fourteen took place in native-place and professional associations; eight occurred in schools and study societies; and an additional seven were held in unspecified venues.

Meng is at pains to point out that the connection in the work of Habermas between an *emerging* public sphere and a *rising* bourgeois class does not apply in the late Qing Chinese context. In contrast to the European example that Habermas adduces, the public sphere in China was democratic and revolutionary in spirit; thus, those who participated in it were not counterparts to the European bourgeois class; rather, they were its critics. In their effort to detach themselves in some significant way from the Qing state, they also, in a sense, detached themselves from their "class" status and became instead somewhat closer to the "crowds" that gathered in public spaces like the Zhang Garden. Increasingly, as indicated above, the historical actors who appeared in these spaces were not representatives of a specific social class; rather, they represented a broad "united front" that included all kinds of people, from political activists such as Cai Yuanpei and Tang Caichang, to writers such as Wu Woyao and Li Boyuan, to merchant leaders such as Zeng Zhu, to students (male and female), leaders of the women's movement, public educators, shopkeepers, and others.

Sources: Meng Yue, *Shanghai and the Edges of Empires*, 141-169; Xiong Yuezhi, "Zhang Yuan: Wanqing Shanghai yige gonggong kongjian yanjiu" (Zhang Garden: a study of a public sphere in late Qing Shanghai), in Zhong Zhongli, ed., *Zhongguo jindai chengshi qi ye shehui kongjian* (Modern Chinese Urban Institutions, Society and Space). Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1998; Mei Yinsheng, "You Zhang Yuan shikuai shuo" (Ten pleasures of visiting the Zhang Garden), in Chen Wuwo, ed., *Lao Shanghai sanshinian jianwen lu* (1928) (A record of thirty years' experience in Old Shanghai). Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1997.

Appendix A (Cont'd)

Zhang Garden Events

(From Table 6.1 of Meng Yue, *Shanghai and the Edges of Empires*, 249-250 and from Table 3.)

Year	Events	Activists	Attendance
1900	Anti-Qing speeches	Bi Yongnian Di Baoxian Ji Yihui Long Zehou Ma Xiangbo Rong Hong Shen Jin Song Shu Tang Caichang Weng Tingshi Wu Baochu Yan Fu Ye Han Yung Wing Zhang Binglin Zhang Tongdian	80
1901	Anti-Russian speeches and meetings urging the rejection of signing a treaty with Russia.	Wang Dehan Wang Kangnian Wen Qinfu	200
1901 (March)	Same as above	Wu Woyao Wen Xinyao Huang Zongyang	10000
1901 (April)	Speeches to oppose Russian invasion of the Northeast.	Wang Kangnian and others	1000
1901 (April)	Meeting to organize the Citizens' General Assembly for discussions on China's international relations.	Feng Jingru Yi Jifu	1200
1902	China Education Society meeting welcoming the	China Education Society	

	return of Wu Zhihui and Sun Bojun from Japan.		
1902	China Education Society meeting to fund studies in Japan.		
1903	Meeting of Shaoxing native-place association to establish the Shaoxing Education Society.	Du Yaquan Cai Yuanpei	
1903	Lectures given by Ma Junwu, Cai Yuanpei others on the topic of the discrimination against Chinese in the Osaka Exposition	China Education Society (weekly meeting)	
1903	Speeches by students and other patriots attacking Wang Zhichun, the governor of Guangxi, who sold land to France and called in French troops to quell local rebellions.		
1903 (April)	Speeches by Cai Yuanpei, Zou Rong and others on urging the gentry and merchants to resist the French army.		300-400
1903 (April)	Meeting of gentry and merchants from eighteen provinces to discuss opposing Russia's occupation of Northeastern China.		1000+
1903 (April)	Meeting of the	The Simin Native-	1000+

	Simin Native-Place Association ¹ on opposing Russia's occupation of Northeastern China.	Place Association	
1903 (April)	Resist-Russia Meeting in Concert with the Formation of the Resist-Russia Volunteer Corps in Tokyo.	China Education Society meeting.	
1905	Students from the Zhendan Public School gathered for a photo to commemorate their withdrawal from the school over a dispute on the curriculum.		1400

¹ I am not sure if this is the same as the China Four-People General Assembly (*Zhongguo simin zonghui*).

Appendix B

Names of board members of the Qing Overseas Student Club (Qingguo liuxuesheng huiguan)

(Dong Shouyi, 232)

- | | |
|---------------------|-----|
| 1. Wu Zhenlin | 吴振麟 |
| 2. Qian Chengzhi | 钱承志 |
| 3. Fan Yuanlian | 范源濂 |
| 4. Cai E | 蔡锷 |
| 5. Lu Shifen | 陆世芬 |
| 6. Wang Jingfang | 王璟芳 |
| 7. Cao Rulin | 曹汝霖 |
| 8. Zhang Shaozeng | 张绍曾 |
| 9. Wu Luzhen | 吴禄贞 |
| 10. Gao Yi | 高逸 |
| 11. Jing Bangping | 金邦平 |
| 12. Zhang Zongxiang | 章宗祥 |

Appendix C

Members of Youth Society

(Chen Wanxiong, 26; Zheng Xuejia, 45, and Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol. 1, 151-2.)

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Chen Duxiu | 陈独秀 |
| 2. Cheng Jiasheng | 程家桢 |
| 3. Dong Hongwei | 董鸿祎 |
| 4. Dong Jitang | 董缉堂 |
| 5. Hu Jingyi | 胡景伊 |
| 6. Hua Hong (Shanji) | 华鸿 (裳吉) |
| 7. Huang Honghui, | 黄鸿祎 |
| 8. Ji Jing | 嵇镜 |
| 9. Jiang Fangzhen (Baili) | 蒋方震 (百里) |
| 10. Jin Bangping | 金邦平 |
| 11. Niu Xiangqing | 钮翔青 |
| 12. Niu Yongjian | 钮永建 |
| 13. Pan Zanhua | 潘赞华 |
| 14. Qin Lishan (Yuliu) | 秦毓璠 |
| 15. Sa Rui | 萨瑞 |
| 16. Shen Xiangyun | 沈翔云 |
| 17. Su Zigu (Manshu) | 苏子穀 (曼殊) |
| 18. Wang Jiaju | 王嘉驹 |
| 19. Wang Rongbao | 汪荣宝 |
| 20. Wu Guanzhang | 吴绛章 |
| 21. Xie Xiaoshi | 谢晓石 |
| 22. Xiong Gai | 熊垓 |
| 23. Ye Lan | 叶澜 |
| 24. Zhang Ji | 张继 |
| 25. Zhang Zhaotong (Shizhao) | 张肇桐 (士钊) |
| 26. Zhou Hongye | 周宏业 |

Appendix D

Members of the Military Citizen's Education Society who Spoke at the Resist Russia meeting in Kanda, Tokyo, on April 29, 1903

(Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol.1, 155)

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Cheng Jiasheng | 程家桄 |
| 2. Dong Honghui, | 董鸿祎 |
| 3. Kuai Shoushu | 蒯寿枢 |
| 4. Li Shucheng | 李书城 |
| 5. Lin Changmin | 林长民 |
| 6. Niu Yongjian | 钮永建 |
| 7. Tang Erhe | 汤尔和 |
| 8. Wang Jingfang | 王璟芳 |
| 9. Wang Rongbao | 汪荣宝 |
| 10. Weng Hao | 翁浩 |
| 11. Ye Lan | 叶澜 |
| 12. Zhang Zhaotong (Shizhao) | 章肇桐 |
| 13. Zhou Hongye | 周宏业 |

List of Members of the Military Citizen's Education Society

(Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol.1, 165, 181)

- | | |
|--------------------|-----|
| 1. Bei Yongli | 贝镛礼 |
| 2. Chen Bingzhong | 陈秉忠 |
| 3. Chen Diingbao | 陈定保 |
| 4. Chen Tianhua | 陈天华 |
| 5. Cheng Jiasheng | 程家桄 |
| 6. Dong Honghui | 董鸿祎 |
| 7. Gui Shaowei | 桂少伟 |
| 8. Hu Jingyi | 胡景伊 |
| 9. Hua Hong | 华鸿 |
| 10. Huang Xing | 黄兴 |
| 11. Lan Tianwei | 蓝天蔚 |
| 12. Liu Kuyi | 刘揆一 |
| 13. Lu Shaoqi | 卢少岐 |
| 14. Niu Yongjian | 钮永建 |
| 15. Qin Yuliu | 秦毓鎏 |
| 16. Sa Rui | 萨端 |
| 17. Tao Chengzhang | 陶成章 |
| 18. Wang Jiaju | 王家驹 |

- | | |
|---------------------|-----|
| 19. Weng Hao | 翁浩 |
| 20. Weng Yougong | 翁友巩 |
| 21. Ye Lan | 业澜 |
| 22. Zhang Ji | 张继 |
| 23. Zhang Zhaotong | 张肇桐 |
| 24. Zheng Xiancheng | 郑宪成 |
| 25. Zhou Hongye | 周宏业 |

In Shanghai, the April 1903 Resist-Russia meeting led to the formation of the China Four People's General Assembly, later renamed Citizens' General Assembly, disbanded in May.

(Feng Ziyou, Geming Yishi, vol.2, 79)

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----|
| 1. Wu Jinghen (Wu Zhihui) | 吴敬恒 |
| 2. Feng Jingru | 冯镜如 |
| 3. Chen Fan | 陈范 |
| 4. Long Zehou | 龙泽厚 |
| 5. Zou Rong | 邹容 |
| 6. Huang Zongyang | 黄宗仰 |

Appendix E- List of Members of the Translation Society- Yishu Huibian 1900¹

Cao Rulin	曹汝霖	Student, Meiji Law School
Fu Shiying	富世英	Student, Tokyo Special School
Ji Yihui	戢翼翬	Graduate, Tokyo Special School (early Waseda University)
Jin Bangping	金邦平	Student, Tokyo Special School
Lei Fen	雷奋	Student, Tokyo Special School
Lu Shifen	陆世芬	Student, Tokyo Higher Commercial School
Qian Chenzhi	钱承志	Student, Imperial Law University
Wang Rongbao	汪荣宝	Student, Keio Gijuku
Wang Zhishan	王植善	Principle, Shanghai Yucai School
Wu Zhenlin	吴振麟	Student, Imperial Law University
Yang Tingdong	杨廷栋	Student, Tokyo Special School
Yang Yinhang	杨荫杭	Student, Tokyo Special School
Zhang Zongxiang	章宗祥	Student, Imperial Law University
Zhou Zupei	周祖培	Former Student, Tokyo Special School

Members of the Kaizhi lu *Record of Enlightened Wisdom*:

Feng Ziyou	冯自由
Zheng Guanyi	郑贯一
Feng Siluan	冯斯栾

Members of the Guomin bao *The Citizen Paper*

Feng Ziyou	冯自由
Ji Yihui	戢翼翬
Lei Fen	雷奋
Qin Lishan	秦力山
Shen Xiangyun	沈翔云
Yang Tinglian	杨廷棟
Yang Yinhang	杨荫杭
Wang Chonghui	王宠惠

¹ Saneto Keishu, p. 146.

Appendix F
Members of the 242nd Year Commemorative Service, April 27, 1902.
(From KGQ, vol. 1, p. 103)

Zhang Binglin	章炳麟
Qin Lisan,	秦力山(鼎彝)
Feng Ziyou,	冯自由
Ma Junwu,	马君武
Li Qun,	李群
Zhou Hongye,	周宏业
Zhu Lingxi,	朱菱溪
Wang Xiong,	王雄
Wang Jiaju	王家驹
Wang Sicheng	王思诚
Chen Youlong,	陈犹龙
Chen Taochi	陈桃痴 (犹龙)
Feng Siluan,	冯思栾
Tang Mang,	唐蟒 son of Tang Caichang (唐才常) .

Appendix G
Names of *Subao* contributors
(Dong Rui, 24-36)

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Chen Fan | 陈范 |
| 2. Wang Wenpu | 汪文溥 |
| 3. Zhang Shizhao | 章士钊 |
| 4. Zhang Taiyan | 章太炎 |
| 5. Zou Rong | 邹容 |
| 6. Cai Yuanpei | 蔡元培 |
| 7. Long Zehou | 龙泽厚 |
| 8. Wu Zhihui | 吴稚晖 |
| 9. Huang Zongyang | 黄宗仰 |
| 10. Zhang Ji | 张继 |
| 11. Liu Yazhi | 柳亚子 |
| 12. Cai Zhimin | 蔡治民 |
| 13. Zhang Xiangwen | 张相文 |
| 14. Liu Shiwei | 刘师培 |
| 15. Hongyi Dashi (Li Shutong) | 弘一大师 李叔同 |
| 16. Xie Wuliang | 谢无量 |
| 17. Hu Zhang | 胡璋 |
| 18. Sheng Juyue | 生驹悦 |
| 19. Zou Tao | 邹韬 |
| 20. Qiu Tingliang | 裘廷梁 |

Names of *Citizen's Daily* contributors
(Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishu*, 195; Zheng Xuejia, 63)

- | | |
|------------------|----------|
| 1. Zhang Shizhao | 章士钊 |
| 2. Zhang Ji | 张继 |
| 3. He Mishi | 何靡施 |
| 4. Lu Hesheng | 卢和生 |
| 5. Chen Qubing | 陈去病 |
| 6. Su Manshu | 苏曼殊 |
| 7. Chen Duxiu | 陈独秀 |
| 8. Jin Tianhe | 金天翮 |
| 9. Liu Qiji | 柳弃疾 |
| 10. Pu Xie | 朴懈 |
| 11. Xie Wuliang | 谢无量 |
| 12. Chen Tianfu | 陈天复 (士辛) |
| 13. Lian Heng | 连横 |

**Names of contributors to *Warnings on Russian Affairs*--renamed *The Alarm Bell*
banned in 1905.**

- | | |
|--------------------------|----------|
| 1. Liu Guanghan (Shipei) | 刘光汉 (师培) |
| 2. Chen Qubing | 陈去病 |
| 3. Lin Xie | 林懈 |
| 4. Lin Zongsu | 林宗素 |

Appendix H
Liang's Following in Japan (Sworn brothers)
Philip Huang, 90-91.

Chen Guoyong	陈国镛
Han Wenju	韩文举
Huang Weizhi	黄为之
Li Jingtong	李敬通
Liang Bingguang	梁炳光
Liang Qitian	梁启田
Liang Zigang	梁子刚
Luo Runnan	罗润楠
Mai Zhonghua	麦仲华
Ou Qujia	欧渠甲
Tan Xiyong	谭锡镛
Tang Caichang	唐才常
Zhang Xuejing	张学璟
Zhang Zhiruo	张智若

Liang and his friends who favored joining forces with SYS
(Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol. 1, 93; vol. 2, 31-35)

Chen Lusheng	陈侣笙
Han Wenju	韩文举
Huang Weizhi	黄为之
Li Jingtong	李敬通
Liang Zigang	梁子刚
Lin Shutang	林述唐
Luo Pu	罗普
Luo Boya	罗伯雅
Ou Qujia	欧渠甲
Tan Bosheng	谭柏生
Tang Caichang	唐才常
Zhang Zhiruo	张智若

Students in Liang's Datong School in Tokyo
Feng Ziyou, *Geming Yishi*, vol.1, 107; vol. 2, 101.

Cai E (Genyin, Songpo)	蔡锷(艮寅,松坡)
Cai Zhonghao	蔡钟浩

Chen Weihuang	陈为璜
Fan Yuanlian	范源濂
Feng Siluan	冯斯栾
Feng Ziyou	冯自由
Li Binghuan	李炳寰
Li Qun	李群
Li Weihuang	李渭璜
Lin Shutang	林述唐
Li Xigui	林锡圭
Qin Lishan	秦力山
Tang Caizhi	唐才质
Tian Bangxuan	田邦璇
Zheng Guanyi	郑贯一
Zhou Hongye	周宏业

Students of the Datong School in Yokohama

Zhang Ruzhi	张汝智
Zeng Guangrang	曾广襄
Zheng Yunhan	郑云汉

Friends who visited the school to talk about revolution

Cai Chengyu	蔡丞煜
Fu Liangbi	傅良弼
Ji Yihui	戢翼翬
Jin Bangping	金邦平
Li Ke	黎科
Shen Xiangyun	沈翔云
Zhang Yuquan	张煜全
Zheng Baochen	郑葆丞

Appendix I Names of Publications

(I will use the Chinese name of the publication when it is well known, but the English name when it is not a widely recognized title.)

<i>Anhui baihua bao</i>	(Anhui Colloquial Paper)
<i>Anhui chuan</i>	(Anhui Boat)
<i>Anhui guan bao</i>	(Anhui Official Gazetteer)
<i>Anhui suhua bao</i>	(Anhui Vernacular Paper)
<i>Anhui xuewu zazhi</i>	(Anhui Scholarly Paper)
<i>Chenbao</i>	(Morning News)
<i>Dalu</i>	(The Continent)
<i>Dongfang zazhi</i>	(Eastern Miscellany).
<i>Eshi jingwen</i>	(Warnings on Russian Affairs--renamed "The Alarm Bell" in 1904)
<i>Gezhi huibian</i>	(Collection of Scientific Articles, 1876-1878, 1880-1882, 1890-1892) published by British missionary John Fryer.
<i>Geming jun</i>	(Revolutionary Army)
<i>Guomin bao</i>	(Citizen Paper)
<i>Guomin gong bao</i>	(Citizen's Public Paper)
<i>Guomin riribao</i>	(Citizen's Daily)
<i>Hangzhou baihua bao</i>	(Hangzhou Vernacular Paper)
<i>Jiaoyu jinyu zazhi</i>	(Today's Talk on Education)
<i>Jiayin zazhi</i>	(Tiger Magazine)
<i>Jing bao</i>	(Capital News)
<i>Jingshi zhong</i>	(A Bell to Warn the World)
<i>Jingzhong ribao</i>	(Alarm Daily)
<i>Jingye Xunbao</i>	(The Struggle)
<i>Juemin</i>	(Awakened People)
<i>Juyue bao</i>	(Resist-Treaty Paper)
<i>Kaizhi lu</i>	(Record of Enlightened Wisdom)
<i>Lixue Yibian</i>	(Compendium of Great Learning Translations)
<i>Meizhou Pinglun</i>	(Weekly Critic/ Weekly Review)
<i>Meng huitou</i>	(About Face)
<i>Min bao</i>	(People's Journal—Organ of the Revolutionary Alliance—not to be confused with the Shanghai vernacular paper of 1870 bearing the same name).
<i>Min bao</i>	(People's Paper—First recorded vernacular paper published in 1870 in Shanghai, not to be confused with the organ of the Tokyo Revolutionary Alliance of the same name).
<i>Min yi</i>	(People's Law)
<i>Minguo ri bao</i>	(Nation's Daily)
<i>Minli bao</i>	(People's Independence)
<i>Nü bao</i>	(Women's Journal)
<i>Nüxue bao</i>	(Initially named "Women's Journal," a year later changed to "Journal of Women's Learning")

<i>Nüzi shijie</i>	(Women's World)
<i>Osaka Asahi Shimbun</i>	(Osaka Morning News),
<i>Qingnian zazhi</i>	(Youth Magazine, renamed New Youth in 1916.)
<i>Qingyi bao</i>	(The Pure Discussion Paper)
<i>Qiangxue bao</i>	(China Strengthening Paper)
<i>Qiushi bao</i>	(The International Review)
<i>Rangshu</i>	(Book of expulsion)
<i>Shaonian Zhongguo bao</i>	(Youth China Paper)
<i>Shenbao</i>	(full name: <i>Shenjiang xinbao</i> , "[Shanghai] Morning Post")
<i>Shi bao</i>	(Times Daily)
<i>Shishi xinbao</i>	(Current News Newspaper)
<i>Shiwo bao</i>	(The Paper for Current Affairs--later called The China Progress)
<i>Shu bao</i>	(Sichuan Paper)
<i>Subao</i>	(The Jiangsu News)
<i>Taiping yang bao</i>	(Pacific Paper)
<i>Waijiao bao</i>	(Foreign Affairs Paper)
<i>Wanguo Gongbao</i>	(Review of the Times 1889-1907; named "Church News" in 1868-1874, "Chinese Globe Magazine" 1874-1883).
<i>Xiaoshuo jie</i>	(The World of Novels)
<i>Xie bao</i>	(Blood Paper)
<i>Xin Hunan</i>	(New Hunan)
<i>Xin Shijie</i>	(New World)
<i>Xin Xiaoshuo</i>	(The New Novel)
<i>Xinsheng zazhi</i>	(Newborn Journal)
<i>Xiang bao</i>	(Hunan News)
<i>Xiangxue xinbao</i>	(New Hunan Learning News)
<i>Xin Qingnian</i>	(New Youth)
<i>Xinmin cong bao</i>	(New People's Miscellany)
<i>Xin Qingnian</i>	(New Youth)
<i>Xuan bao</i>	(Selection Paper)
<i>Xunhuai Ri bao</i>	(Universal Circulating Herald)
<i>Yadong shi bao</i>	(East Asia News)
<i>Yanzhi</i>	(Discussion on Politics)
<i>Yangzi jiang baihua bao</i>	(Yangzi River Vernacular Paper)
<i>Yilin</i>	(Forest of Translation)
<i>Yishu huibian</i>	(Translation Journal)
<i>Youxue yibian</i>	(Collection of Translations of Studies Abroad)
<i>Zhejiang Chao</i>	(The Tides of Zhejiang)
<i>Zhixin bao</i>	(Know the News Paper)
<i>Zhongfa huibao</i>	(Sino-French General Paper)
<i>Zhongguo baihua bao</i>	(China Vernacular Paper)
<i>Zongwai ribao</i>	(China-Foreign Daily)

Appendix J

Names of Societies

(I will use the English name throughout the text unless the Chinese name is widely recognized.)

Anhui Patriotic Society	(Anhui aiguo hui)
Anqing Determination Study Society	(Anqing lizhi hui)
Anti-Footbinding Society	(Bu chanzu hui)
Association of Mathematicians	(Suanxue she)
Association of Translating and Printing Western Maps	(Yiyin xiwen ditu gong hui)
Chemistry Study Society	(Huaxue yanjiu hui)
Chengji Import Store Assassination Squad	(Chengji yanghuodian ansha tuan)
China Assembly	(Zhongguo gong hui)
China Education Society	(Zhongguo jiaoyu hui)
China Industrial Study Society	(Zhongguo gongye yanjiu hui)
China Revival Society	(Huaxing hui)
China Strengthening Society	(Qiangxue hui)
China Study Society	(Shenzhou xue hui)
Citizens' Assembly	(Guomin hui)
Citizens' General Assembly (formerly China Four People's General Assembly)	(Guomin zonghui-formerly the Zhongguo Simin zonghui)
Cleansing Shame Learning Society	(Xuechi xue hui)
Clear Principle Society	(Mingli hui)
Correct Spirit Society	(Zhengqi hui)
Determination Society	(Lizhi hui),
Do Not Bind Feet Society	(Bu guozu hui)
East Asia Common Culture Society	(To-A Dobunkai)
East Asia Discussion Group	(Tongya tanhua hui)
East Asia Volunteer Brave Battalion	(Dongya yiyong dui)
East Mainland Press	(Dong Dalu tushuju)
Efflorescence Race Society	(Huazu hui)
Elder Brothers	(Gelao hui)
Enlightening Society	(Kaizhi hui)
Fujian Student Association	(Fujian xuesheng hui)
Guangdong Independence Association	(Guangdong duli xie hui)
Huang School	(Huang shi xuexiao)
Iron and Blood Association	(Tiexie hui)
The Mirror of Today Press	(Jingjin shuju)
Lecture Society of the Normal School	(Shifan jiangxi hui)
Martial Strength Society	(Wuyi hui)
Military Citizen's Education Society	(Jun guomin jiaoyu hui)
Musical Society	(yinyue hui)
Mutual Love Society	(Gong'ai hui)
National Learning Society	(Guoxue she)
Natural Foot Society	(Tianzu hui)

New People's Miscellany Branch Office	(Xinmin Congbao zhidian)
Newspaper and Books Society	(shubao hui)
Non-Smoking Society	(Bushì yangyan hui)
Overseas Study Translation Society	(Youxue Yibian she)
Physical Exercise Society	(Tichao hui)
Progressive Society	(Gongjin hui)
Protect the Emperor Society	(Baohuang hui)
Struggle Learning Society	(Jingye xue she)
Strengthen Nation Society	(Qiangguo hui)
Qing Overseas Student Club	(Qingguo liuxuesheng huiguan)
Recognize Shame Society	(Zhichi Xueshe)
Renewal Society	(Weixin hui)
Resist-Russia Comrade Society/ Survial Society	(Dui E tongzhi hui)
Resist-Russia Iron and Blood Army	(Kang E tiexie jun)
Resist-Russia Volunteer Corps	(Ju E yiyongdui)
Resist-Russia Women Comrades Society	(Dui E tongzhi nǚ hui)
Restoration Society	(Guangfu hui)
Revive China Society	(Xing Zhong hui)
Revolutionary Alliance	(Tongmeng hui)
Same Heart Society	(Tongxin hui)
Self-standing Army	(Zili jun)
Self-standing Society	(Zili hui)
Self-strengthening Society	(Ziqiang hui)
Shanghai Assassination Squad	(Shanghai ansha tuan)
Shanghai Four People's Assembly	(Shanghai simin zonghui)
Shanghai Make-new Society	(Shanghai zuoxin society)
Society for Small Children	(Youtong hui)
Society for Reading Newspapers	(Yuebao hui)
Society of Comrades Against Russia	(Dui E tongzhi hui)
Sports Society	(Tiyu hui)
Textbook Translation Society	(Jiaokeshu Yijishe)
The Broadening Wisdom Press	(Guangzhi shuju)
The Civilization Translation and Editing Press	(Wenming bianyi yinshuju)
The Commercial Press	(Shangwu yinshuju)
Tokyo Military Citizen's Education Society	(Dongjing jun guomin jiaoyu hui)
Tokyo Speech Society	(Tongjing yanshuo hui)
Tongli Self-Rule Study Society	(Tongli zizhi xue hui)
Translation Society	(Yishu hui) or (Yishu huibian she)
Trust and Loyalty Society	(Xinyi hui)
Wentai Chu Native Association	(Wentai chu huiguan)
West Anhui Newspaper Reading Society	(Huaixi yuebao she)
Wide Learning Society	(Tongxue hui)
Women's Study Society	(Nǚxue hui)
Wuchang Garden Mountain Bureau	(Wuchang Huayuan shan jiguan)

Youth Determination Study Society
Youth Society
Yue Fei Loyalist Society

(Qingnian lizhi xue hui)
(Qingnian hui)
(Yuewang hui)

Appendix K
Names of XQN Contributors

First Volume:

Chen Xianian
Fang Shu
Gao Yihan
Gao Yuhan
Li Mu
Li Yimin
Liu Shuya
Meng Ming
Pan Zanhua
Peng Dezun
Ru Fei
Wang Shuqian
Xiao Rulin
Xie Ming
Xie Wuliang
Xue Qiyang
Yi Baisha

Second volume:

Chen Qian Aichen
Chen Qilu
Cheng Yansheng
Cheng Zongsi
Guang Sheng
Hu Shi
Li Dazhao
Li Zhang Jinan
Liu Bannong
Ma Junwu
Su Manshu
Tao Lugong
Yang Changji
Wang Zongming
Wen Zongyao
Wu Yu
Wu Zhihui
Zeng Mengming

Third Volume:

Cai Yuanpei,
Chang Naide
Chen Daqi

Fu Sinian
Lin Sun
Lin Yutang
Ling Shuang
Lu Xun
Luo Jialun
Mao Zedong
Qian Xuantong
Shen Jianshi
Shen Yinmo
Wang Xinggong
Yu Pingbo
Yun Daiying
Zhang Shizhao
Zhou Zuoren

Volumes 5 to 7

(Names in bold are Beida faculty or students)

Chen Hengzhe
Chen Qixiu
Dai Jitao
Du Guoxiang
Gao Junyu
Li Cijiu
Li Jiannong
Ma Yinchu
Ouyang Yuqian
Pan Lishan
Ren Hongjuan
Sun Fuyuan
Wang Guangqi
Zhang Haonian
Zhang Weici
Zhou Jianren
Zhu Xizu

Appendix L
Activities of the Editors of the Second Volume of *New Youth* prior to Chen's
Appointment to Beijing University.

Name	Dates	Provincial Origin	Education in China	Education Abroad	Teacher at	Member or editor of
Chen Duxiu	1879-1942	Anhui	<i>Xiucui</i>	Yakuroku Shoin, Seijo School or the Tokyo Police Officer Academy.	Teacher, Anhui Public School (1905), Wanjiang Middle School (1906), Hangzhou Military Primary School (1909), and Anhui Higher School (1912).	Anhui Determination Society (1902), Youth Society, Resist-Russia Volunteer Army, Anhui Patriotic Society (1903), <i>Citizen's Daily</i> , ASB, Shanghai Assassination Squad (1904), Yuewang hui (1905), Asia Friendship Society, Society for the Study of Socialism, Secretary of the Anhui Provisional Government (1911), <i>Tiger Magazine</i> , European Affairs Study Group. (1914).
Gao Yihan	1885-1968	Anhui	Graduate, Anhui Higher School.	Meiji University		Editor of <i>Tiger Magazine</i> , officer in the Tokyo Chinese Overseas

						Student Association, joined Li Dazhao in China Study Society (<i>Shenzhou xue hui</i>), anti-Yuan activities (1916), and co-edited two papers with Li Dazhao (1916).
Liu Shuya	1889-1968	Anhui	Anhui Public School	Studied in Japan (1909).		Member, Revolutionary Alliance (1907), editor of <i>People's Independence Paper</i> (Minli bao), and member of China Revolutionary Party.
Gao Yuhua	1888-1948	Anhui	Privately tutored.	Waseda University	Faculty, Zhesan Fifth Middle School (1916).	Member of <i>Weixin hui</i> , satellite group to Yuewang hui, Revolutionary Alliance, founder of Anhui Youth Society, and contributor to <i>China Daily</i> (<i>Shenzhou ribao</i>).
Pan Zanhua	1885-1959	Anhui		Japan Zhenwu School (1902) and Waseda	Founded Tongcheng Academy (1906), and official in	Joined Youth Society with Chen Duxiu (1902), member of

				University Veterinarian School.	the Wuhu Customs Bureau in the Wuhu Military Government	Revolutionary Alliance, and joined anti- Yuan campaign in Yunnan.
Yi Baisha	1886- 1921	Hunan		Studied in Japan.	Head of Yongshui Normal School (1902), head of Huaining Middle School and Hunan-in- Anhui Middle School (1903).	Organized "Youth Army" uprising (1911), assisted in the anti-Yuan activity of Chen Duxiu and Bo Wenwei, and co-edited Zhang Shizhao's <i>Tiger</i> magazine.
Xie Wuliang	1884- 1964	Sichuan	Nanyang Public School (1901)	Studied in Japan.	Teacher, Anhui Public School; Sichuan Cungu School, Sichuan Higher School, and Tongsheng Normal School (1909).	Member of Patriotic Learning Society, editor of <i>Subao</i> , co- editor of <i>Citizen's</i> <i>Daily</i> with Chen Duxiu and Zhang Shichao (1903), founded Sichuan Learning Society, and Sichuan Railroad Recovery Movement.
Hu Shi	1891- 1962	Anhui	Shanghai Meixi Academy,	Cornell University B.A.,		Contributor to <i>The Struggle</i> , member of

			Chengzhong Academy, and China Public School.	Columbia University Ph.D.		<i>Struggle Learning Society.</i> Contributor to <i>Tiger</i> magazine.
Guang Sheng	1876-1963	Anhui	<i>Xiucui</i> , and Jiangnan Higher School (1904).	Waseda University Special Division of Law and Political Science.	Teacher, Anhui-in-Ningpo School (1910), and Principal of Jianghuai University (1913).	Member of Revolutionary Alliance, and Secretary in Anhui Provisional Government under Bo Wenwei
Liu Bannong	1891-1934	Jiangsu	Changzhou Prefecture Middle School		Teacher, Shanghai Shiye School, and Zhonghua Railroad School.	Joined Youth Corps in the 1911 revolution, playwright in Shanghai Enlightened Drama Society, and editor in Zhonghua Publishing Company.
Li Dazhao	1889-1927	Hebei	Yongping Prefecture Middle School (1905), and Beiyang Law and Political Special School	Waseda University, regular division, economics department (1914).		Official in the Tianjin branch of the Socialist Party; editor-in-chief of the Beiyang Law and Political Association, editor of <i>Discussion on Politics</i> and <i>People's Law</i> magazines.
Su Manshu	1884-1918	Guangdong		Japan Datong School, Waseda	Teacher, Shanghai Wuzhong Public	Member of Youth Society (1902), Resist-Russia

				Preparatory School, and Seijo Military School.	School, Nanjing Military School (1905), Wanjiang Middle School (1906), and Anhui Higher School (1913).	movement, member of China Strengthening Society (1904), published " <i>Pacific Paper</i> ", and contributor to <i>Tiger</i> magazine.
Ma Junwu	1881-1940	Guangxi	Guangxi Tiyyong School(1898), Shanghai Zhendan Academy (1900), and China Public School.	Tokyo University (1903), and Berlin University (1907) Ph.D. (1916).		Member, Revolutionary Alliance, contributor to <i>People's Journal</i> , creator of <i>People's Independence Paper</i> (1912), and Minister of Commerce (1912).
Wu Yu	1872-1949	Sichuan	Chengdu Zunjing Academy (1892)	Japan Fazheng (Law and Politics) University, short course (1905)	Teacher, Chengdu County School, and Tongsheng Law and Politics Academy, and the Government Law and Politics Academy.	Editor, "Political Progress Paper" (1911), editor of <i>The Journal of Women's Learning</i> , <i>Public Discussion Paper</i> , and <i>Wake the People Paper</i> .
Tao Lugong	1889-1960	Tianjin	Tianjin Yan's School	Tokyo Higher Normal School, and graduate of the London		

				School of Economics.		
Yang Changji	1871-1920	Hunan	<i>Xiucan</i> , Changsha South City School, Yuelu Academy	Tokyo Higher Normal School (1906), and Edinburgh University.	Teacher, Hunan Fourth Normal, First Normal school, and professor at Beijing University (1917).	Co-edited " <i>Public Speech</i> " magazine with Li Jinxi (1914).
Wu Zhihui	1865-1961	Jiangsu	<i>Juren</i> , Nanjing Academy (1890)	Japan (1902)	Teacher, Beiyang Higher Academy (1898), and Shanghai Nanyang Public School.	Member, Revolutionary Alliance (1905)