

HOUSTON'S



ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

Findings from the Thirteenth Year of the Houston Area Survey

by

Stephen L. Klineberg, Ph.D.
Department of Sociology, Rice University



Southwestern Bell
Telephone

FOCUS'94

**T48
KTMD**

Fiesta 

To support the "*Houston Area Survey*":

Rice University invites tax-deductible contributions to support the annual Houston research. Please specify that your gift is in support of the "*Houston Area Survey*," and make your check payable to:

Rice University
Office of Development
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, Texas 77251
Attn: "*Houston Area Survey*"

For more information:

Copies of this publication are available as a public service exclusively from Southwestern Bell Telephone.

Copies may be requested by calling or writing:

de la Garza Public Relations, Inc.
24 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1303
Houston, Texas 77046
Telephone (713) 622-8818
Facsimile (713) 622-4431

From our Sponsors

Southwestern Bell is proud once again to provide Houstonians with access to Dr. Klineberg's research. We believe that this information is vital to our city's business and economic development and are pleased to see other corporations such as Fiesta Mart and KTMD Channel 48 support this project. Southwestern Bell is pleased to join them in sponsoring this new and expanded research on "*Houston's Ethnic Communities*."

Wayne Alexander
Vice President
Southwestern Bell Telephone

We must understand the differences among us in order to be able to live and work well together. As Houston continues to grow and change so do its major ethnic communities. KTMD Channel 48's participation in "*Houston's Ethnic Communities*" is our way of keeping the public informed and helping Houston realize its full economic and social potential.

Luis Fernando Rocha
General Manager
KTMD Channel 48

Houston is fast becoming a truly multicultural society. Fiesta Mart realizes the need to achieve a greater understanding of the increasing diversity within our great city. We are delighted to work with Dr. Stephen Klineberg to make this essential information available to the community.

Donald L. Bonham
Chairman of the Board
Fiesta Mart, Inc.

HOUSTON'S

ETHNIC COMMUNITIES



Contents

Introduction: Two Converging Revolutions	<i>Page</i>
The Ethnic Transformation	6
The Shift from Resources to Knowledge	7
Methodology	7
Residence Patterns, Socioeconomic Status and Basic Orientations	9
Table 1 Age Differences and Residence Patterns	9
Table 2 Measures of Socioeconomic Status	10
Table 3 Family Structures and Gender Roles	11
Table 4 Political and Religious Orientations	12
Economic Outlooks and Perspectives on Intergroup Relations	13
Table 5 Economic Assessments	13
Table 6 Beliefs About Inequality	14
Table 7 Perspectives on Discrimination and Immigration	15
Differences Within the Three Ethnic Communities	16
Table 8 Household Income and Residence Patterns in the Three Ethnic Communities	16
Table 9 Household Income and Perspectives on Inequality in the Three Ethnic Communities	17
Table 10 Differences by Gender in the Three Communities	18
Table 11 Differences by Party Affiliation in the Three Communities	19
Table 12 Indicators of Assimilation in Three Generations of Hispanics	20
Table 13 Socioeconomic Status in Three Generations of Hispanics	21
Summary and Conclusions	22

Introduction

Two Converging Revolutions

For the past thirteen years, the Department of Sociology at Rice University, working in collaboration with Telesurveys of Texas, has conducted systematic telephone interviews with representative samples of Houston-area adults. Beginning in March 1982, when Houston's oil-based economy was still in full boom, through the recession of the mid-1980s and modest recovery into a new kind of economy, the scientific surveys have tracked the way the perceptions of area residents are evolving with regard to the city and its future.

This ongoing research has helped to illustrate and clarify the revolutionary trends that have been changing everyday lives and challenging traditional assumptions. In particular, the systematic surveys have focused attention on the remarkable transformations that have occurred during the past decade in the ethnic composition of Houston's population and in the basic foundations of its economy. Similarities and differences among Houston's ethnic communities must be viewed within the context of these revolutionary changes in order to appreciate fully the nature of the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

The ethnic transformation

One of the great demographic revolutions of our time is occurring in the ethnic composition of the U.S. population as a whole. Between 1492 and 1965, more than 80 percent of all persons who came to American shores came from Europe. The United States was deliberately to be an amalgam almost exclusively of European nationalities.

For more than forty years, immigration was governed by the notorious National Origins Quota Act of 1921. One of the most viciously racist laws in American history, the act established a preference system designed to freeze the ethnic mix of the American population. Per-

mission to immigrate into the country would henceforth be determined by an applicant's ethnicity and national origin. In addition, the act explicitly identified Slavs, Jews and Italians as racially and culturally inferior, to be limited to tiny quotas. "Mongols" were believed to be especially dangerous, and Asians were banned entirely.

After 1965, when Congress finally revised the immigration laws, the numbers of newcomers into America began to grow rapidly, and the proportions among them who were Europeans fell precipitously. In the decade of the 1960s, 3.2 million immigrants arrived, of whom only 34 percent were Europeans. There were 5 million immigrants in the 1970s, with only 18 percent from Europe.

In the most recent decade, almost 10 million immigrated to America, and only 11 percent of them were Europeans. Immigrants from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for more than 83 percent of all the new entrants during the 1980s.

Once an amalgam primarily of European nationalities, the U.S. is rapidly becoming the first nation ever in human history to be a microcosm of all the peoples of the world, the first truly "universal" nation. Once a basically biracial society dominated by white males, the new America will be one in which no single ethnic group or gender will ever again automatically predominate.

Five American cities are at the forefront of these revolutionary changes — New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and Houston. Between 1980 and 1990, the population of Houston's Harris County grew by a total of 17 percent. The number of Anglos in the county increased during the decade by just 1 percent; and the Black population, by only 12 percent. The number of Hispanics, in contrast, expanded by 75 percent; and the Asian population, by a whopping 129 percent!

By the time of the 1990 census, 54 percent of Harris County's population was Anglo; 19 percent was comprised of African Americans; 23 percent were Hispanic; and 4 percent, Asian. The comparable figures for the City of Houston were 41, 28, 28 and 4 percent. A 1990 cover story in *Time Magazine* used this city to illustrate the new America:

"At the Sesame Hut restaurant in Houston," the article said, "a Korean immigrant owner trains Hispanic immigrant workers to prepare Chinese-style food for a largely black clientele."

"At the Sesame Hut

restaurant in

Houston, a Korean

immigrant owner

trains Hispanic

immigrant workers to

prepare Chinese-style

food for a largely

black clientele."

Time Magazine
April 9, 1990

The shift from resources to knowledge

In a second truly historical transformation, the Industrial Age, in place for the past 250 years, is suddenly and definitively over. In the "resource economy" of that period, the dominant occupation was the semiskilled production worker, and wealth came primarily from control over natural resources.

Today, the good blue-collar jobs (as in Houston's construction and oil-field manufacturing industries) have largely disappeared. Increasingly, a city's and nation's most crucial economic resources no longer derive from the raw materials of nature, but are to be found instead in the creativity and skills of its people. As a member of the Texas Railroad Commission recently observed, "Education will be the cotton and the oil of the Texas economy in the 21st Century."

In the global "knowledge economy" of the 1990s and beyond, almost all the world's workers now find themselves swimming in a single labor pool. The worldwide labor force is adding 45 million new workers every year, many well educated and highly motivated, prepared to start work immediately for a fraction of the U.S. wage.

The only way to make a good salary in that new world is to have well-developed skills and to be able to do things that people in other countries cannot do. Failing that, the only alternative way to compete is to be willing to work for low wages. As a direct result of these new realities, the "rising tide" no longer lifts all boats, and the income gap between rich and poor in America and in Houston is widening rapidly.

According to the latest census, men in the full-time work force who had college degrees in 1990 were earning on average 9 percent more, controlling for inflation, than college-educated men earned in 1980. But men with just a high-school diploma were earning 7 percent less in comparison with high-school graduates ten years earlier, and those who had not graduated from high school in 1990 were making 14 percent less than did men of comparable education in 1980.

Houston's ongoing ethnic transformation is thus occurring in a new economic environment in which access to quality education has become the central determinant of an individual's life chances. The increasingly important divisions by education (and therefore by income) are closely related in American society to differences in ethnic background. This is clearly the case in Houston, as we will see, and it defines the

contours of one of the central challenges facing the city today.

In this period of remarkable transition, a systematic assessment of the ethnic experience in Houston is particularly needed. This report presents the results of the most recent and most comprehensive of the annual surveys that have been exploring attitudes and beliefs among Houston-area residents. Its focus is primarily on the differences in experiences and perceptions that were found both within and among Houston's three major ethnic communities through interviews conducted during February and March 1994.

Methodology

To select the respondents so that every adult in the Houston area has an equal chance of being interviewed, random four-digit numbers are generated each year by computer and associated equally with the 227 prefixes that designate Harris County telephones. In each of the households reached with these numbers, a second random process is used to select the specific respondent.

Bilingual supervisors and interviewers, trained in the use of both English and Spanish translations of the questionnaire, are assigned to the project at all times. Sample sizes over the thirteen years of the Houston Area Survey have ranged from 412 to 679, and response rates — indicating the number of completed interviews in relation to the total number of all possible respondents — have consistently exceeded 71 percent. This is a high figure for survey research, justifying continued confidence in the reliability of the data.

Thanks to a special grant provided by Southwestern Bell Telephone, the 1993 survey was expanded by additional interviews with 200 Blacks and 200 Hispanics. This made it possible to develop a more systematic and statistically reliable picture of the differences and similarities in perceptions and beliefs among Houston's three largest ethnic populations. The results of that research were published as "Houston's Ethnic Communities: A Report on Twelve Years of Survey Research" (Southwestern Bell Telephone, 1993).

The original sample of 651 respondents who participated in the 1994 Houston Area Survey included 103 Blacks, 110 Hispanics and 13 Asians, along with 410 Anglos and

*"Education
will be the
cotton and
the oil of the
Texas economy
in the
21st Century."*

*Statement attributed to
a member of the Texas
Railroad Commission*

15 "others." Additional grants from Southwestern Bell Telephone, KTMD-TV Channel 48 and Fiesta Mart Inc. made it possible this year to expand even further than in 1993 the samples drawn from Houston's African-American and Hispanic communities.

Comparable data are not yet available from Houston's rapidly growing Asian community. A reliable Asian survey will require initial contacts with close to 20,000 randomly-selected Harris County households so as to locate a truly representative sample of at least 700 Asians. In order to interview non-English-speaking members of the community, the surveys will need to be conducted in at least 8 different Asian languages. Funding is currently being developed for this purpose, and the first ever "Houston Area Asian Survey" is expected to be completed by the early spring of 1995.

Because of their much higher proportions in the Houston population, it is less difficult to locate representative samples of African Americans and Hispanics. Using the questionnaire from the 1994 Houston Area Survey, additional interviews were conducted in early March with 302 Blacks and 300 Hispanics, selected by contacting randomly designated households and asking if they contained Black or Hispanic residents.


With samples composed of more than 400 respondents from each of Houston's three largest ethnic communities, the 1994 surveys make it possible to explore differences within as well as among the three populations. It is now possible to ask about the effects, for example, of differences between rich and poor, or men and women, *within* Houston's Anglo, Black and Hispanic communities.

This report presents the most important results of that new research. The responses obtained from Houston's Anglo, Black and Hispanic residents are compared in the tables by statistical analysis to determine whether the discrepancies among them might have been generated by chance, or whether they reflect instead real differences among the wider populations from which the samples were drawn.

Differences that are statistically significant at better than the 95-percent level of confidence are shown in the tables by figures highlighted in boldface. Discrepancies of this magnitude could have been produced by chance fewer than five times out of a hundred, indicating that the data are indeed reflecting true differences either among or within Houston's ethnic communities.*

**Note that the percentages in the tables may not add up to 100 percent because they are rounded to the nearest whole number and the "don't knows" and "no answers" are usually not included. The tables present the questions themselves in abbreviated form, with their order rearranged to reflect the central themes.*

U.S. Census figures for the City of Houston – 1980, 1990, 2000



Growth Rates Compared (from 1980 to 1990)

	Houston	Harris County
Anglos	-21%	+1%
Blacks	+3%	+12%
Hispanics	+60%	+75%
Asians	+96%	+129%
Total Pop.	+2%	+17%

Source: Demographic & Land Use Profile for Houston, Texas. The Planning & Development Department, City of Houston, June 1992.

Residence Patterns, Socioeconomic Status and Basic Orientations

The "aging" and "colorizing" of Houston's population

Table 1 compares some basic background variables across the three communities. The right-hand column in this and subsequent tables presents the findings from the representative sample of 651 Harris County residents who were interviewed for the 1994 Houston Area Survey. The differences among the three ethnic groups, in the first three columns of

Table 1, clearly reflect the two great demographic revolutions of our time — the "graying" and the "browning" of the Houston (and American) population.

Despite mounting disparities in income and life circumstances, the American people generally are living longer, healthier, richer and more varied lives than human beings ever have in all of human history. In 1850, only 2 percent of Americans survived to age 65. Today, more than 75 percent do so, and the fastest growing age segment of all is comprised of Americans over the age of 85.

The survey findings make it clear that the "aging" of America is turning out to be a division along ethnic lines as well as generational ones. It is primarily the Anglo population in Houston that is aging rapidly,

Table 1 - #1
How old were you on your last birthday?




TABLE 1 - AGE DIFFERENCES AND RESIDENCE PATTERNS

		ANGLOS (N=410)	BLACKS (N=405)	HISPANICS (N=410)	HAS94 (N=651)
1. How old were you on your last birthday?	18 to 29	17%	31%	37%	22%
	30 to 44	38	36	45	38
	45 to 69	35	29	17	32
	70 to 92	10	4	2	8
2. How many years have you lived in the Houston area?	10 years or less	26%	18%	37%	27%
	11 to 24 years	30	31	42	31
	25 years or more	44	51	21	42
3. Where did you live just before coming to the Houston area?	Born in H. area	21%	38%	19%	22%
	Elsewhere in SW	42	37	26	38
	Elsewhere in US	32	23	16	30
	Outside the US	5	3	39	10
4. Where did you live when growing up (when you were 16 years old)?	Houston area	33%	47%	33%	35%
	Elsewhere in SW	33	33	16	31
	Elsewhere in US	31	16	6	24
	Outside the US	3	4	44	11
5. Were you born in the United States?	Yes	95%	95%	47%	86%
	No	5	5	53	14
6. Were your parents born in the U.S.?	Yes, both of them	92%	94%	31%	81%
	Only one of them	4	1	10	4
	No, neither of them	4	5	60	15

while younger generations are increasingly likely to be African Americans, Hispanics and Asians.

Table 1 indicates that fully 45 percent of all Anglo adults in Harris County were aged 45 or older. This was true of only 33 percent of Blacks and just 19 percent of Hispanics. At the other end of the spectrum, 37 percent of all Hispanic adults and 31 percent of Blacks in Harris County were under the age of 30, compared with only 17 percent of Anglos.

In this as in so many other respects, Houston is a faithful mirror of the American experience as a whole. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the year 1990 non-Hispanic white males comprised 43 percent of all full-time American workers. During the years from 1990 to 2005, the Bureau projects a net increase of 26 million American workers. Fewer than 4 million of them (less than 15 percent) will be native-born white males.

Women will comprise 57 percent of the expected growth in the labor force. Blacks, Hispanics and Asians will account for 54 percent. America's future now depends, in a way that has never been as true before, on the education and opportunities the nation provides to its "minority" citizens.

Table 1 also reflects the migration patterns that have transformed the city's ethnic makeup in recent years. Black Houstonians are by far the most likely of all groups to be long-term Houston residents. More than half have lived in the Houston area for 25 years or longer. Almost half (47

percent) report that they grew up in this region, compared to only a third of Anglos and Hispanics.

Not surprisingly, Hispanics are the most likely to be among the recent immigrants to the city. Table 1 indicates that 60 percent of all Hispanic adults in Harris County report that both of their parents were foreign-born. Over half (53 percent) indicate that they themselves are first-generation immigrants; 44 percent of the Hispanic respondents grew up outside the United States, and 39 percent moved to Houston directly from abroad—primarily from Mexico, with much smaller numbers from El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala and Colombia.

The inequalities in socioeconomic status

Table 2 delineates the striking and consequential differences between the three ethnic groups in the central indicators of social and economic well-being. In Houston's new economic climate, when education is increasingly the critical determinant of economic success, the academic deficits the data reveal in Houston's Black and Hispanic communities loom large indeed.

As indicated in Table 2, more than one-third of all Hispanic adults in Harris County are high-school dropouts and another one-fourth have no more than a high-school diploma. African Americans report slightly higher levels of

TABLE 2 – MEASURES OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

		<u>ANGLOS</u> (N=410)	<u>BLACKS</u> (N=405)	<u>HISPANICS</u> (N=410)	<u>HAS94</u> (N=651)
1. What is the highest grade of school or year of college that you've completed?	11th grade or less	4%	10%	34%	9%
	High-school diploma	20	27	27	23
	1 to 3 years of college	33	38	24	30
	B.A. degree or more	43	25	15	37
2. Total household income in 1993:	Less than \$25,000	14%	43%	48%	24%
	\$25,000 to \$50,000	35	37	36	38
	More than \$50,000	50	20	16	39
3. ZIP code of residence:	Inside 610 Loop	11%	18%	21%	14%
	Outside 610 Loop	37	57	42	41
	Outside city limits	52	25	37	45
4. Occupational status:	Working full time	61%	58%	57%	61%
	Working part time	9	16	12	10
	Keeping house	10	5	18	10
	Retired, disabled	16	16	8	12
5. Specific occupation:	Professionals	21%	13%	10%	18%
	Exec., managerial	16	21	9	14
	Tech., sales, service	46	49	52	46
	Production, laborers	18	17	29	22
6. [IF WORKING:] How much personally earned in 1993?	Less than \$25,000	26%	55%	68%	37%
	\$25,000 to \$50,000	44	37	28	42
	More than \$50,000	30	8	4	21

educational attainment than Hispanics, but they lag far behind the Anglo community.

Only 25 percent of Blacks and 15 percent of Hispanics have completed all four years of college. In sharp contrast, three-fourths of Anglo adults have had some college education, with 43 percent having achieved at least the B.A. degree.

The ethnic differences in household income are even greater than the contrasts in educational attainment. Fully one-half of Anglo respondents report family incomes above \$50,000, compared to one-fifth of African Americans and 16 percent of Hispanics. Only 14 percent of Anglo families report incomes as low as \$25,000; but this is the case for almost half of all Black and Hispanic households.

Table 2 also reflects the "white flight" into the suburbs, with Anglos disproportionately seeking single-family housing, usually in safely "gated" (and segregated) communities, beyond the city limits. As indicated earlier, the 1990 census revealed a net increase since 1980 of just one percent in the population of Anglos residing in Harris County, but the number of Anglos living in the city of Houston itself actually *declined* by 21 percent during the past decade. Today, more than half of all Anglos living in Harris County reside outside the city limits, compared with only a quarter of Blacks and a little more than a third of Hispanics.

The table also makes it clear that the striking inter-

group inequalities in economic well-being are in no way attributable to differences in work-force participation. Blacks and Hispanics are just as likely as Anglos to be working full time in the Houston labor market, but they differ importantly in the kinds of jobs they are able to find, and even more dramatically in the remuneration that they receive.

As Table 2 indicates, Anglos are significantly more likely to be employed as independent professionals. Hispanics are more likely than either Anglos or Blacks to have jobs as day laborers or production workers. Only one-fourth of Anglo job-holders reported personal incomes of less than \$25,000, but this was the case for 55 percent of all Blacks and 68 percent of all Hispanics who were working in the Houston labor market.

Differences in family and gender roles

The only difference in occupational status that the data reveal is the greater tendency on the part of Hispanic women to report that they are keeping house and not looking for work outside the home. Table 3 presents more direct evidence of intergroup differences in gender roles and family structures.

Hispanic adults, younger on average than Blacks or Anglos, are more likely to have children living at home and under the age of six. Blacks, who have more children at home than do Anglos, are significantly




TABLE 3 - FAMILY STRUCTURES AND GENDER ROLES

		ANGLOS (N=410)	BLACKS (N=405)	HISPANICS (N=410)	HAS94 (N=651)
1. Marital status:	Married	55%	38%	63%	55%
	Sep., Div., Wid.	27	27	15	25
	Never married	18	35	22	20
2. Any children at home?	None	63%	56%	37%	57%
	One or more	37	44	63	43
3. Any children under 6?	None	16%	22%	39%	20%
	One or more	84	79	62	80
4. More imp't for wife to help husband's career than have one herself.	Agree	21%	24%	31%	21%
	Disagree	73	71	67	74
5. Woman with yng childn should not work unless financially necessary ('93).	Agree	47%	50%	62%	49%
	Disagree	51	47	37	45

more likely to be never-married single parents.

Table 3 also indicates that Hispanics were consistently more likely than respondents from the other communities to concur with statements affirming the traditional roles of women. They were significantly more prepared to agree with the assertion that "it is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself," and (in the 1993 survey) that "a woman with young children should not work outside the home unless it is financially necessary." As will be seen below, the greater traditionalism in the Hispanic community is attributable almost entirely to the attitudes of Hispanic men.

Political and religious perspectives

Table 4 explores the political and religious differences among the three communities. As indicated in the right-hand column, the 1994 Houston Area Survey found Harris County residents as a whole to be exactly evenly split in their allegiance to the Republican or Democratic Parties, but that parity masks striking ethnic divisions.

Anglos, somewhat more "conservative" in their self-image, are far more likely (by 53 to 34 percent) to be Republicans. African Americans, with only a slightly greater tendency to think of themselves as "liberals," are even more disproportionately likely (by 73 to 11 percent) to be Democrats. And while Hispanics generally report that they feel closer to the Democratic Party (by 40 to 32 percent), they are less likely than either of the other groups to be prepared to state a political preference.

Anglos and Blacks are overwhelmingly Protestants, Hispanics overwhelmingly Catholics. As in all previous surveys in this series, Table 4 also reflects the "religious exceptionalism" that is perhaps the single most distinctive attribute of African-American culture in the U.S. Fully 84 percent of Black Houstonians, but only 63 percent of Hispanics and 54 percent of Anglos, indicate that religion is "very important" in their lives.

**Table 4 - #1
Political Party
Preference:**




TABLE 4 - POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATIONS

		ANGLOS (N=410)	BLACKS (N=405)	HISPANICS (N=410)	HAS94 (N=651)
Politics					
1. Do you think of yourself as closer to:	Republican Party	53%	11%	32%	42%
	Democratic Party	34	73	40	42
	Neither/Don't know	13	16	28	17
2. Do you think of yourself as . . . in your politics	Conservative	43%	38%	36%	40%
	Moderate	39	29	27	35
	Liberal	15	23	22	18
Religion					
3. What is your religious preference, if any?	Protestant	60%	68%	18%	57%
	Catholic	21	11	68	26
	Other	6	17	7	7
	No religion	13	4	8	11
4. How important is religion in your life?	Very important	54%	84%	63%	62%
	Somewhat important	29	13	29	26
	Not very important	17	2	7	12

Economic Outlooks and Perspectives on Intergroup Relations

Assessments of the local economy

Table 5 - #1
Ratings of Job Opportunities in the Houston Area:



Not surprisingly, the intergroup differences in levels of education and income (in Table 2) are also evident in the economic evaluations presented in Table 5. African Americans are generally more pessimistic about the local economy than Hispanics, since the latter tend to bring more of the immigrant's faith in new possibilities. Anglos, whose educational levels have generally prepared them well for the kinds of employment opportunities that the post-oil economy now provides, are significantly more optimistic about the local economy.

Table 5 indicates that 39 percent of Blacks believed that job opportunities in the Houston area are "poor" at best. That degree of pessimism was expressed by only 23 percent of Hispanics, and only ten percent of Anglos. Blacks were also significantly less likely to report that their personal financial situations were improving.

Over the years, the surveys have documented a grow-

ing anxiety among Houstonians in general with regard to their personal financial situations. A smaller proportion of respondents than ever before in the thirteen years of survey research (only 49 percent in the 1994 Houston Area Survey) thought that things would be better for them financially 3 or 4 years down the road (in contrast to more than 61 percent on average who remained optimistic about their personal prospects through the recession years from 1983 to 1990). And there were no significant differences this year among the three communities in their outlooks on the future.

On inequality and intergroup relations

Ethnic-group differences in perspectives on inequality in America and in beliefs about the extent of continuing discrimination illustrate the different "worlds" that people experience. Every individual necessarily sees reality only through the lenses of his or her own experiences and assumptions. Each person therefore sees the world only partially, and always misperceives in important ways.

The only way to see more clearly is to enter into meaningful interaction with those who see the same world differently. But this occurs too rarely in the segregated worlds of modern America. Continuing patterns of residential separation and the tendency to prefer the company of similar others make it difficult for members of different ethnic communities to come to know each other better and to appreciate the bases for their different understandings of the world.

Table 6 presents some striking contrasts among the three groups in their perspectives on inequality and on the role of government in securing economic and social justice. As in all of the past thirteen years of surveys, Black Houstonians are far more likely to believe that the country is spending too little on improving the conditions of the poor. Hispanics, perhaps surprisingly, are more likely than Anglos to believe that too much is being spent on poverty programs.

Blacks and Hispanics agree, and differ strikingly from Anglos, in their belief that richer public schools in Texas should be required to give money to poorer schools. Clear

TABLE 5 - ECONOMIC ASSESSMENTS

		ANGLOS (N=410)	BLACKS (N=405)	HISPANICS (N=410)	HAS94 (N=651)
1. Ratings of job opportunities in the Houston area:	Excellent/Good	47%	20%	36%	40%
	Fair	35	38	39	36
	Poor	10	39	23	18
2. During last few yrs, has your financial situation been:	Getting better	35%	23%	36%	31%
	About the same	42	53	44	46
	Getting worse	22	24	20	23
3. How will things be for you financially 3-4 yrs down road?	Will be better off	45%	55%	51%	49%
	About the same	35	25	32	33
	Will be worse off	17	14	13	16

TABLE 6 - BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY

		ANGLOS (N=410)	BLACKS (N=405)	HISPANICS (N=410)	HAS94 (N=651)
1. Spending on improving the conditions of the poor:	Too little	56%	88%	69%	64%
	About right	25	3	9	21
	Too much	13	7	20	10
2. Making richer schls give to poorer schls:	For it	47%	83%	82%	60%
	Against it	47	12	15	35
3. Which most effective in reducing crime?	Longer prison terms	42%	33%	33%	38%
	Reduce poverty	52	61	65	56
4. Welfare benefits generally give the poor:	Second chance	14%	30%	32%	20%
	Make dependent	81	62	58	73
5. Most poor in US today are poor because:	Not trying enough	36%	22%	40%	33%
	Beyond control	56	72	56	60
6. People working hard not getting fair break.	Agree	71%	80%	72%	73%
	Disagree	26	18	24	24

majorities in all three communities believe that the most effective way to reduce crime is to spend large sums of money "to reduce poverty and to keep young people in school," rather than spending the same amount of money "to send criminals to prison and to keep them there a long time."

But Blacks and Hispanics are more convinced than Anglos of the need for crime prevention through poverty and education programs.

All three groups of respondents believe that welfare payments are more likely to "encourage poor people to stay poor and dependent," rather than to "give poor people a chance to get started again," but 81 percent of Anglos believe that to be the case, compared with 62 percent of Blacks and 58 percent of Hispanics. Strong majorities in all three groups are also convinced that most poor people in the U.S. today are poor "because of circumstances they can't control," rather than "because they don't work hard enough," but Blacks are much more likely to take that position than are Anglos or Hispanics.

Houston-area residents across the board seem increasingly to believe that in the new economy of the 1990s, people can lose their jobs and fall into poverty through no fault of their own. Table 6 indicates that 60 percent of respondents in the 1994 Houston Area Survey were convinced that most poor people in America today are poor because of forces beyond their control.

During eleven of the past thirteen years of the Houston surveys, area residents have also been asked whether they agreed or disagreed with this statement: "People who

work hard and live by the rules are not getting a fair break these days." Never before this year — even during the depths of the Houston recession — did more than 60 percent of survey respondents agree with that pessimistic assessment.

In 1994, the level of agreement on this measure of "alienation" jumped to 73 percent, reaching 80 percent among the African-American respondents. The data suggest that area residents are increasingly experiencing in their personal lives the fundamental transformations that have occurred in Houston's economy during the 1990s.

Assessments of ethnic relations

The data presented in Table 7 suggest that Anglo concerns about the growth of "undeserved" poverty in America generally do not include the belief that minority communities face any special disadvantages. Anglos in Houston generally appear to believe that discrimination against minorities no longer exists, that opportunities are now equally available to all, and that government action giving preference to some groups over others is therefore unacceptable. Not surprisingly, Blacks and Hispanics perceive a quite different reality.

By 60 and 67 percent, Blacks and Hispanics support affirmative action programs, but 85 percent of Anglos are opposed to hiring and promotion preferences. On questions asking specifically about discrimination against African Americans, Black respondents differ strikingly from both Anglos and Hispanics. By 74 percent, they overwhelmingly *disagree* that "Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as whites in the U.S. today." But 58 percent of Anglos and 47 percent of Hispanics agree with this affirmation of racial equality.

When asked why it is that "Black Americans generally

Table 6 - #3
Which is most effective in reducing crime?





Table 7 - #2
"Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as whites in the U.S. today."



have worse jobs, income and housing than other Americans," 59 percent of African Americans indicate that these disparities are due primarily to continuing discrimination. But 57 percent of Anglos and 56 percent of Hispanics believe that Black Americans themselves are to an important degree responsible for their lower standards of living.

Respondents were also asked how often they personally felt discriminated against in Houston because of their ethnicity or gender. Almost half of all Black Houstonians said that they had experienced discrimination "very often" or "fairly often," but 74 percent of Hispanics and 86 percent of Anglos said that they had "rarely" or "never" felt discriminated against.

On issues of immigration, not surprisingly, the communities divide differently. Anglos and Blacks are far more likely to agree with each other and to disagree with Hispanics about the nature and consequences of the new immigration.

By 55 and 57 percent, clear majorities of Anglos and Blacks agree that "undocumented im-

migrants are a major cause of unemployment in the Houston area today." By 72 percent, Hispanics overwhelmingly disagree with that assessment. Similarly, strong majorities of Anglos and Blacks believe that immigrants to the U.S. generally "take more from the American economy than they contribute." Hispanics are equally convinced, to the contrary, that the new immigrants "contribute more than they take."

In light of the concern among Houston-area residents in general about the economic consequences of the new immigration, the last item in Table 7 seems particularly revealing. Respondents were asked whether they thought that "the increasing ethnic diversity in Houston brought about by immigration is a good thing or a bad thing." Clear pluralities in all three communities declared that the new ethnic diversity was a good thing for the city.

Houston's evolution into becoming a fully multiethnic society will inevitably be marked by conflict and controversy. In the course of navigating that remarkable transition, the city will be strengthened by the widely held belief among its citizens that Houston's increasing ethnic diversity is a distinctly positive development for the community as a whole.

TABLE 7 - PERSPECTIVES ON DISCRIMINATION AND IMMIGRATION

			ANGLOS (N=410)	BLACKS (N=405)	HISPANICS (N=410)	HAS94 (N=651)
Discrimination						
1. Preference to minorities in hiring, promotion:	For it		12%	60%	67%	58%
	Against it		85	32	30	47
2. Blacks, other minorities have same chance.	Agree		58%	24%	47%	50%
	Disagree		41	74	52	48
3. Blacks have worse jobs, income, housing than others. <u>Mainly</u> due to:	Continuing discrim.		31%	59%	39%	38%
	Not trying enough		40	17	36	35
	Both (volunteered)		17	20	20	16
4. How often felt discriminated against in H. because of gender or ethnic background?	Very often		4%	22%	9%	7%
	Fairly often		10	25	17	14
	Rarely		37	36	44	39
	Never		49	17	30	40
Immigration						
5. Undoc. immigs are a major cause of unemployment in H. today	Agree		55%	57%	26%	50%
	Disagree		42	38	72	47
6. Effects of new immigs on American economy:	Take more		57%	67%	31%	54%
	Contribute more		33	24	60	36
7. The increasing ethnic diversity in Houston, due to immigration, is:	A good thing		51%	55%	61%	54%
	A bad thing		32	33	25	29
	Don't know		17	13	14	10

Differences Within the Three Ethnic Communities

Household incomes and migration patterns

The larger samples from each of the three communities interviewed in 1994 make it possible to explore the differences in perceptions and beliefs that are found *within* as well as among the three groups of respondents. Table 8 examines the relationship between residence patterns and household incomes in each of Houston's three major ethnic communities.

The table compares the experiences within each of the three communities of three groups of respondents: those who report household incomes of less than \$25,000, those reporting \$25,000 to \$50,000, and those with incomes of more than \$50,000. The figures in parentheses give the number of respondents falling into each of these income categories in each of the three communities.

Table 8 indicates, not surprisingly, that the most recently arrived Hispanic immigrants generally report lower household incomes than do those who were born in the U.S. or who have lived in the country for many years. Almost half of all Hispanics with incomes of less than \$25,000 have lived in the Houston area for ten years or less; 63 per-

cent of them grew up outside the U.S., and 71 percent are foreign-born.

There is an interesting reversal among African Americans in the relationship between household incomes and Houston residence. More than half of the Black respondents with incomes of less than \$25,000 grew up in the Houston area, but 61 percent of those in the wealthiest African-American households report that they spent their childhoods somewhere else and moved to Houston as adults.

Respondents were also asked whether they were living in the city or in the suburbs. In all three communities, those with greater household incomes were significantly more likely to say that they resided in the suburbs. But the data suggest that Anglos are quicker to move to the suburbs than are Blacks and Hispanics. For the latter, a significant shift to the suburbs does not occur until after household incomes exceed \$50,000. Anglos generally opt for suburban living as soon as their incomes reach \$25,000.

Table 8 - #2
Where did you live when you were growing up? (Hispanics only)




TABLE 8 - HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND RESIDENCE PATTERNS IN THREE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

			ANGLOS			BLACKS			HISPANICS		
			<25K	25-50	>50K	<25K	25-50	>50K	<25K	25-50	>50K
			(52)	(128)	(182)	(158)	(136)	(73)	(174)	(133)	(58)
1. How many years lived in H. area?	10 yrs or less		21%	28%	27%	14%	21%	21%	48%	28%	26%
	11 to 24 yrs		25	29	34	27	29	38	39	47	41
	25 yrs or more		54	43	39	59	50	41	14	25	33
2. Where lived when growing up?	Houston area		37%	36%	32%	54%	46%	40%	24%	43%	41%
	Elsewhere in US		64	62	64	42	49	58	14	29	40
	Outside US		—	2	4	3	5	3	63	29	19
3. Were you born in the US?	Yes		100%	95%	95%	97%	92%	99%	29%	59%	74%
	No		—	6	5	3	8	1	71	41	26
4. Live in city or suburbs?	In the city		54%	37%	31%	72%	71%	51%	66%	62%	35%
	In suburbs		46	63	69	28	29	49	34	38	66

Household income, poverty issues and political orientations

Table 9 explores the impact of income differences on perceptions of discrimination, beliefs about poverty, and political preferences. Anglo respondents consistently show the expected pattern: those who have succeeded in America generally believe that the rules of the game are fair and that every player has an equal chance to make it to the top.

Table 9 indicates that wealthier Anglos are significantly less likely to be in favor of requiring richer schools to give money to poorer schools. Compared to their less fortunate brethren, they are also less willing to increase spending on poverty programs, or to believe that most of the poor in America are victims of "circumstances they can't control," or that welfare benefits generally give poor people "a chance to get started again."

Perhaps because they are less likely to be in competition with Blacks, the wealthiest Anglos are also less likely than others to agree with the assertion that "Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as whites in the U.S. today." And very few Anglos, regardless of in-

come, are prepared to support programs that give preference to minorities in hiring and promotion.

The pattern among Hispanics is generally similar to that found among Anglos, but it is less pronounced. In comparison to Anglos, wealthier Hispanics appear to retain a stronger sense of connection with less favored Americans, but not nearly to the same extent as is apparent in the African-American community.

Table 9 indicates that more successful Hispanics are more likely than those with lower incomes to reject proposals that would require richer schools to give money to poorer ones, and to endorse the suggestion that welfare benefits only increase dependency. They are also significantly more likely to oppose programs giving preference to minorities in hiring or promotion. But they are equally convinced that poverty generally results from circumstances beyond people's control, and they are *more* likely than the least advantaged Hispanics to believe that the nation is spending too little on improving the conditions of the poor.

Among Blacks, in contrast, there is generally no relationship at all between income and poverty concerns. The wealthier respondents are just as prepared as are less favored African Americans to support equalizing school spending

TABLE 9 - HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND PERSPECTIVES ON INEQUALITY IN THREE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

		ANGLOS			BLACKS			HISPANICS		
		<25K (52)	25-50 (128)	>50K (182)	<25K (158)	25-50 (136)	>50K (73)	<25K (174)	25-50 (133)	>50K (58)
Poverty										
1.	Richer schools giving to poor:									
	For it	66%	58%	41%	89%	89%	80%	89%	83%	75%
	Against it	34	43	59	11	11	20	12	17	25
2.	Money for poverty programs:									
	Too little	72%	66%	54%	90%	93%	86%	65%	81%	77%
	OK/Too much	28	34	46	10	8	14	36	20	23
3.	Most poor are poor because:									
	Not trying	22%	40%	41%	27%	17%	28%	42%	38%	44%
	Beyond control	78	60	59	73	83	71	58	62	56
4.	Welfare benefits generally give:									
	2nd chance	25%	16%	11%	41%	29%	21%	47%	26%	19%
	Dependency	76	84	89	59	72	79	53	74	81
Equality										
5.	Blacks have same chances.									
	Agree	62%	61%	51%	30%	19%	17%	54%	44%	34%
	Disagree	39	39	49	71	81	83	46	56	66
6.	Preference to minorities:									
	For it	19%	13%	10%	72%	64%	56%	81%	67%	52%
	Against it	81	87	90	28	36	44	19	33	48
Politics										
7.	How often have you felt discriminated against?									
	Often	29%	16%	10%	42%	52%	52%	25%	25%	23%
	Rarely	27	41	39	37	34	37	44	47	53
	Never	44	43	51	20	14	11	31	28	25
8.	Think of self as closer to:									
	Republicans	35%	67%	64%	15%	10%	14%	36%	45%	59%
	Democrats	65	33	36	85	90	86	64	55	41

or investing more money in poverty programs, even though they are also more skeptical about the efficacy of welfare benefits. And wealthier Blacks are significantly more likely than those with low incomes to *disagree* with the assertion that "Blacks and other minorities have the same opportunities as whites in the U.S. today."

The data suggest that, as Hispanics become more successful in American society, they gradually come to resemble wealthier Anglos in their belief in the basic justice of the system and in their rejection of affirmative action programs. Blacks, in contrast, even as they succeed in their own lives, remain firmly committed to programs designed to secure greater economic and social justice.

One explanation for these ethnic differences may be seen in item #7 on Table 9. When respondents were asked how often they personally felt discriminated against in Houston, striking differences emerged among the three ethnic communities in the relationship between answers to this question and household income.

Less advantaged Anglos were significantly more likely than wealthier Anglos to report that they often experienced discrimination. Among Hispanics, there were no differences on this question by income. And among African Americans, the pattern was reversed.

One-fifth of the Black respondents with household incomes of less than \$25,000 said that they never felt discriminated against. Such freedom from discrimination was reported by only one-tenth of the wealthiest Blacks. Among African Americans with incomes of \$25,000 or more, 52 percent indicated that they "very often" or "fairly often" experienced discrimination in Houston.

Finally, and not surprisingly, these patterns are reflected as well in political party preferences. Anglos appear to become predominantly Republican as soon as their household incomes exceed \$25,000. Hispanics also become increasingly Republican with rising incomes, but they do so more gradually. Only among those reporting incomes above \$50,000 do the majority indicate that they think of themselves as closer to the Republican than to the Democratic Party.

African Americans, in contrast, remain faithful to the Democratic Party across the income levels. In all economic groups, 85 percent or more of Black respondents indicate a preference for the Democratic Party. These contrasting internal patterns offer important insights into the different realities experienced by Anglos, Blacks and Hispanics in their encounters with discrimination and acceptance in the Houston and America of the 1990s.

Gender differences in the three communities

Table 10 presents some of the ways in which being male or female has different consequences in each of the three ethnic communities. Among Anglos and Blacks, women tend to report lower household incomes, primarily because single-parent households are more likely to be poor. But the "feminization of poverty" is less apparent in the Hispanic community, where fewer household heads are unmarried.

Women tend to be more pessimistic than men about the direction in which the country is headed, but this is primarily the case among Anglos and Hispanics. There are no gender differences among Anglos and Blacks in the respondents' readiness to reject the assertion that "it is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself." But that traditional assumption

Table 10 - #3
"It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself."
(Hispanics only)




TABLE 10 - DIFFERENCES BY GENDER IN THE THREE COMMUNITIES

		ANGLOS		BLACKS		HISPANICS	
		Males (204)	Females (206)	Males (164)	Females (241)	Males (186)	Females (224)
1. Total household income:	\$25K or less	12%	17%	32%	51%	49%	46%
	\$50K or more	58	43	23	18	15	17
2. In next few years U.S. headed for:	Better times	43%	31%	33%	26%	39%	24%
	More difficult	57	69	67	74	61	76
3. Wife should help husband's career.	Agree	21%	24%	29%	22%	39%	25%
	Disagree	79	77	71	78	61	75
4. How often felt discriminated against in H?	Often	11%	17%	52%	43%	25%	27%
	Rarely	34	41	31	39	50	39
	Never	55	43	17	18	25	34

tion is significantly more likely to be endorsed by Hispanic men than by Hispanic women.

When asked if they have ever felt discriminated against in Houston, Anglo women are more likely to answer in the affirmative than are Anglo men. There are no gender differences in the experience of discrimination among Blacks. And the pattern is reversed among Hispanics. Here, women are more likely than men to report that they have never felt discriminated against in Houston, presumably because Hispanic women are less likely to be looking for work outside the home.

Once again, these patterns offer important insights into the contrasting realities of being Black or Hispanic in Houston in the 1990s. They suggest that gender differences in experiences and perspectives are greatest among Hispanics (who are generally more traditional in their family roles) and are least apparent among African Americans. And they underscore the "feminization of poverty," particularly among Blacks and Anglos.

Republicans and Democrats in the three communities

Table 11 explores differences by political party within the three ethnic populations. The data are particularly interesting in suggesting that the meaning of party affiliation in the Black community appears to be somewhat different from its meaning in the other two groups.

Black Republicans are more likely than Democrats to be young and male, but there are no such differences by age or gender in the other two communities. The best predictor of political party preference among Houstonians in general is household income, and that relationship is clear among both Anglos and Hispanics. But there is no relation at all between income and party preference among African Americans. And in none of the groups does education, despite its high correlation with income, predict the choice of political party.

Among Anglos and Blacks, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to agree that "Blacks and other minorities have the same chance as whites in the U.S. today." And only among Anglos is there a tendency for those who report

TABLE 11 - DIFFERENCES BY PARTY AFFILIATION IN THREE COMMUNITIES

		ANGLOS		BLACKS		HISPANICS	
		<u>Reps</u> (218)	<u>Dems</u> (138)	<u>Reps</u> (44)	<u>Dems</u> (297)	<u>Reps</u> (132)	<u>Dems</u> (163)
Demographic differences							
1. Age at last birthday:	18 to 29	19%	18%	48%	29%	45%	34%
	45 to 90	44	42	16	36	16	20
2. Gender:	Males	52%	49%	55%	38%	49%	45%
	Females	48	51	45	62	51	55
3. Total household income:	\$25K or less	8%	24%	50%	43%	33%	46%
	\$50K or more	54	47	23	20	24	13
4. Highest level of education:	H.S. or less	18%	28%	43%	37%	53%	57%
	B.A. or more	46	42	34	24	23	14
Perspectives on inequality							
5. Minorities have same chance.	Agree	67%	46%	49%	20%	50%	40%
	Disagree	33	54	51	80	50	61
6. How often felt discrimination?	Often	10%	21%	48%	48%	27%	27%
	Never	47	51	21	16	31	25
The "social agenda"							
7. Pay for abortions for poor women:	For it	35%	63%	44%	35%	34%	40%
	Against it	65	37	56	65	66	60
8. Equal civil rights for homosexuals:	For it	46%	72%	67%	70%	43%	65%
	Against it	54	28	33	30	57	35
9. Youth should be taught to...	Do what's right	63%	52%	75%	69%	80%	67%
	Think for self	37	49	25	32	20	33

that they have often felt discriminated against in Houston to prefer the Democratic Party.

Finally, it is interesting to note that among both Anglos and Hispanics, there is a clear and consistent tendency for "social-agenda" conservatives to affiliate with the Republican Party. But no such relationship exists within the Black community. The Blacks who become Republicans do so for reasons having more to do with their distrust of government than with their religious conservatism. Among Anglos and Hispanics, both motivations appear to be equally important.

Differences among first-, second-, and third-generation Hispanics

The large sample of Hispanic respondents makes it possible to explore differences in experiences and perceptions among three immigrant generations. Tables 12 and 13 compare three generations of Hispanic respondents in the degree of their "assimilation" into the American mainstream and in the levels of educational and professional success that they have attained.

The three groups consist of those who are themselves

foreign-born (first-generation immigrants), those who were born in the U.S. but both of whose parents were born abroad (the second generation), and those who were not only born in the U.S. themselves, but have both parents who were also born in this country (the third generation). Five Hispanic respondents, who indicated that their parents were born in the U.S. but that they themselves were foreign-born, were removed from this analysis.

Table 12 makes use of a variety of indicators of assimilation to examine differences among the generations in the degree to which they have moved toward the American mainstream. With each successive generation and across a wide variety of questions, the data point to progressively increasing "Americanization."

As indicated in the table, third-generation Hispanics are more likely than the second generation, who in turn are more likely than first-generation immigrants, to have conducted the interviews in English rather than Spanish, to think of themselves as primarily American rather than Hispanic, and to reject the traditional beliefs about women's roles. Each generation is also progressively more convinced that too much is being spent on foreign aid, that immigrants to the U.S. generally take more from the American economy than they contribute, and that undocumented immigrants are a major cause of unemployment in the Houston area.

TABLE 12 - INDICATORS OF ASSIMILATION IN THREE GENERATIONS OF HISPANICS

		1ST GEN. (N=214)	2ND GEN. (N=71)	3RD GEN. (N=120)	ALL HISPS (N=405)
1. Language in which interview conducted:	English	32%	87%	97%	61%
	Spanish	68	13	3	39
2. Do you think of yourself as:	Primarily Hispanic	82%	29%	14%	53%
	Hispanic and American	15	60	41	30
	Primarily American	4	11	45	17
3. More imp't for wife to help husband's career.	Agree	36%	30%	20%	31%
	Disagree	61	66	79	67
4. Spending on econ. aid to the poor countries of the world:	Too little	18%	23%	17%	19%
	About right	43	35	20	34
	Too much	31	39	58	41
5. Effects of immigrants on American economy:	They take more	19%	32%	50%	31%
	Contribute more	71	55	44	60
6. Undoc. immigs major cause of unemployt.	Agree	17%	27%	43%	22%
	Disagree	79	73	56	72
7. Which most effective in reducing crime?	Longer prison terms	25%	38%	44%	33%
	Reduce poverty	72	59	54	65
8. Preference to minorities in hiring, etc.:	For it	78%	58%	55%	67%
	Against it	19	39	43	30
9. Welfare benefits generally give the poor:	Second chance	41%	27%	22%	40%
	Make dependent	46	65	73	58

All Hispanics generally believe that prevention is more effective than incarceration in reducing crime, but Table 12 indicates that third-generation Hispanics are less likely than others to accept that view. In addition, they are more firmly opposed to affirmative action in hiring and promotion, and they are more likely to believe that welfare benefits succeed

only in encouraging poor people to stay poor and dependent.

All of these are suggestive indicators of increasing assimilation into the American mainstream. There are no signs at all in these data of resistance on the part of Hispanic immigrants to encroaching "Americanization." The findings presented in Table 12 indicate that third-generation Hispanics are more fully assimilated into American life than are members of the second generation, who in turn are more "Americanized" than first-generation immigrants.

Table 13 explores the degree to which the generations also differ in the levels of educational and professional success that they have achieved. The data suggest that the improvements in socioeconomic status that usually accompany increasing assimilation have stalled during the transi-

tion from the second to the third generation.

Table 13 makes it clear that second- and third-generation Hispanics have successfully moved up in the socioeconomic hierarchy beyond the positions that the first generation now occupies. Both groups report significantly higher levels of educational attainment, household income and occupational prestige, in comparison to foreign-born Hispanics.

The table also indicates that native-born Hispanic Americans whose parents were also born in the U.S. (the third generation) have made little progress in educational achievement or occupational status over those whose parents were foreign-born (the second generation). Third-generation Hispanics are even less likely to have college degrees than are those whose parents were foreign-born immigrants, and they are more likely to have lower-status jobs as day-laborers or production workers.

Respondents were also asked to compare their own (expected) standard of living with that of their parents. Third-generation Hispanics were markedly less optimistic than those in the second generation about their prospects for upward mobility.

The lack of economic and educational progress in the lives of the adult children of native-born Hispanic Americans has occurred despite the evidence (in Table 12) of their fuller acceptance across the board of middle-class American values. The data raise important questions about the barriers to achievement that continue to be experienced by Hispanic Americans in Houston and the nation.

Table 12 - #2

Do you think of yourself as:

- Primarily Hispanic
- Equally Hispanic and American
- Primarily American




TABLE 13 - SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS IN THREE GENERATIONS OF HISPANICS

		1ST GEN. (N=214)	2ND GEN. (N=71)	3RD GEN. (N=120)	ALL HISP (N=405)
1. Highest grade of school or year of college completed:	11th grade or less	48%	20%	17%	34%
	H.S. diploma	22	30	36	27
	Some college	16	31	31	24
	B.A. or more	13	18	14	15
2. Total household income in 1993:	Less than \$15,000	30%	17%	8%	21%
	\$15-\$25,000	34	20	17	27
	\$25-\$35,000	16	26	28	22
	More than \$35,000	20	38	47	31
3. Specific occupation:	Profes., managerial	10%	22%	26%	19%
	Technical	23	34	23	25
	Sales, service	25	29	28	27
	Production, laborers	42	15	23	29
4. Expected standard of living, compared to that of parents:	Higher	48%	68%	57%	54%
	About the same	40	18	25	32
	Lower	12	14	18	14

Summary and Conclusions

The findings of the 1994 Houston Area Survey, with its additional "oversamples" of African-American and Hispanic respondents, paint a compelling picture of Houston's three largest ethnic communities during a period of extraordinary social and economic change. They underline and help to clarify some of this generation's most important challenges and opportunities.

The Houston community as a whole is in the process of being fundamentally changed by economic and demographic revolutions. As one of the main destinations of the new immigrants from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Houston is in rapid transition toward its destiny as a conspicuously multiethnic and multicultural metropolis. All of the city's "minority" communities are becoming larger, more powerful, and more involved as full partners in making the decisions that will shape its collective future.

As its Anglo population ages rapidly, the younger people who will be responsible for the vitality and competitiveness of the Houston economy in the 21st century will increasingly be Black, Hispanic, Asian and female. Meanwhile, a second revolutionary change has fundamentally transformed the local economy. Almost all of the jobs in the 1990s and beyond that will pay enough to support a family will require high levels of literacy, language fluency and technological training.

The good blue-collar jobs (in such areas as construction and oil-field manufacturing) that Houston's oil-based economic expansion created for almost a century are disappearing rapidly. To a greater extent than ever before in human history, *education* will now determine the kind of life a person will lead. And it is precisely in the levels of their educational attainment and consequent economic well-being that the greatest disparities exist between Anglos, on the one hand, and Blacks and Hispanics, on the other.

Without determined public and private intervention, the gap will continue to widen. Even third-generation Hispanics suffer stalled progress and striking deficits in educational achievement. Only if the Houston community as a

whole can find a way to ensure that its Black, Hispanic and Asian citizens are given the same opportunities and support as those of European descent to learn in school and throughout their lives, will there be a chance to build a strong and unified multiethnic society.

How likely is it that Houston will be able soon to develop the breadth of understanding and the depth of commitment that will sustain the needed investments in the skills of its citizens? The survey findings we have reviewed surely offer reasons for doubt. But they also point to bases for optimism.

Houstonians are more worried about their personal financial situations today than they have been at any time in the thirteen years of the Houston surveys. The proportion believing that things will be better for them financially three or four years down the road is at an all-time low. The pessimistic belief that "people who work hard and live by the rules are not getting a fair break these days" is at an all-time high. Periods of economic stress and financial insecurity rarely occasion public eagerness for new and costly initiatives designed to help those who are less fortunate.

In addition, the citizens who are most likely to vote or to contribute to political campaigns are disproportionately affluent, Anglo and elderly. They are generally less inclined than minority and younger voters to support new social programs designed to help other people's children. Parents surviving on minimum-wage jobs are most in need of family support from the wider community, but they and their children are generally among those who are least likely to be heard in the public policy-making process.

Moreover, Anglos are more likely than other Harris County residents to be living in largely segregated and protected communities outside the city of Houston. Most are able to provide their children with private schools, private recreation, private child-support systems and private security. They are unlikely to believe that they stand to benefit personally and directly from


major increases in public investments.

The surveys indicate that Anglo Houstonians are generally convinced that discrimination is a thing of the past and that programs designed to benefit minorities are therefore unjustified. As they become more affluent, they are more likely than wealthy Blacks or Hispanics to believe that opportunities to get ahead in America are equally available to all, and they are less likely to sympathize with those who have not succeeded.

"What would be most effective in encouraging economic development in the Houston area?"

■ Keeping taxes low and public spending to a minimum

■ Improving education and public services, even if it means higher taxes



Source: Houston Area Survey

At the same time, there are reasons for optimism. The surveys document a growing understanding throughout the population that, in the new economy of the 1990s, people from all walks of life may need help despite their best efforts to help themselves. And even though the fear of crime is increasing everywhere, strong majorities in all three communities are convinced that spending large sums of money on education and poverty programs is a more effective way to reduce crime than spending the same amount of money on more prisons and longer sentences.

Throughout its history, Houston has been the dominating model of the "free-enterprise city," whose "good business climate" built on a low-tax/low-spend philosophy of minimal government was thought to be largely responsible for the virtually uninterrupted economic growth it experienced for more than a century. It is now clear to all that the economic realities of the 1990s and beyond will require a different combination of growth strategies. One survey question in particular suggests a striking new readiness on the part of the Houston community to rethink traditional economic assumptions.

In 1990 and again in 1994, representative samples of Houston-area residents were asked this question: "What would be most effective in encouraging economic development in the Houston area?" And they were offered two choices: "Making major improvements in education and public services, even if it means higher taxes," or "Keeping taxes low and public spending to a minimum."

In February 1990, Houstonians reaffirmed their time-honored commitment to "keeping taxes low" by 51 to 43 percent. Four years later, they appear to have changed their

minds. By the even more decisive margin of 58 to 38 percent, respondents in the 1994 survey called instead for "making major improvements in education and public services." The Houston electorate may be more receptive today than it has been at any time in the recent past to new public initiatives and foresightful leadership.

In this period of remarkable transition, two insights from ancient China come to mind. First, that famous curse: In the old days of ancient China, when you were really angry with somebody, you might scream at him or her, "May you live in *interesting* times!"

The Chinese, of course, knew that interesting times are unusually difficult ones in which to live. They are the times when people experience the greatest discrepancy between the traditional assumptions with which they have long approached the world and the new realities that are suddenly upon them.

A second insight derives from the way in which the Chinese render the word for "crisis." It consists of two characters, one signifying *danger*, and the other, *opportunity*.

It will require an unprecedented degree of sustained commitment and shared responsibility for Houston to be able to seize the opportunities and derail the dangers that are inherent in the economic and demographic revolutions of our time. Only a determined and deliberate community-wide effort can build a multicultural metropolis whose diversity is indeed its greatest asset. Only through an effort of that sort can Houston ensure that its citizens will be prepared for lives of common purpose, personal fulfillment and effective leadership in the new millennium that lies ahead.

"crisis"

危機